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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the relationships between surveillance, acts of resistance to 
surveillance and their respective roles in the contemporary social order.  The context 
for this investigation is the contemporary ‘information society’.  This is characterised 
by globally networked information and communication technologies, and is 
represented most plainly by one medium in particular: the Internet.  The Internet 
has historically been a contested domain; it represents, for some, the cornerstone of 
civil liberties yet at the same time it is highly regulated and susceptible to control.  
The significant social, cultural, economic and political impacts of the Internet include 
the proliferation of techniques of digital surveillance.  However, while the Internet 
has facilitated the growth of these practices, it has also created new opportunities 
for resistance to surveillance.  By attending to the social dynamics and mechanics of 
resistance, we can generate more nuanced and subtle understandings of the ways in 
which social control is being performed. 
A framework of nodal governance steers this research.  Consequently, this study 
locates these dynamics within three specific sites: online civil society, the regulatory 
process and the media.  These cases demonstrate how a range of social actors, 
across a variety of settings, are implicated in the dynamics of digital surveillance and 
resistance.  An innovative, multi-strategy approach to the fieldwork, including 
computational social science methods, captures these emergent dynamics as they 
are played out.  The analysis of the data is guided by a theoretical preoccupation 
with control that serves to illustrate its plural and fluid character. Central to this are 
social and technological networks as forms of organisation and communication that 
facilitate surveillance and resistance.  The thesis concludes that contemporary social 
control is an inherently socio-technical process, shaped primarily by dynamics of 
digital surveillance and resistance. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 NO EXCUSE FOR INVISIBILITY  
At an event in 2015, Alan Rusbridger remarked there is now ‘no excuse for 
invisibility’.  The former Guardian editor was talking about the extent to which the 
evolution of digital communications and media has produced a fundamental 
restructuring of our ability to engage and interact with people and places virtually 
anywhere in the world.  That invisibility is ‘inexcusable’ was not a proclamation on 
any sort of right to remain hidden, more an observation that technological advances 
allow us – and indeed require – new means by which to understand and shape our 
world.  We have developed the capacity to render what was previously invisible, 
visible, and consequently we have the capacity to harness that potential to impact 
positively on globally dispersed situations.  Rusbridger cited the example of live 
crowdsourced crisis mapping in the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti in 20102.  
Satellite imagery was used to collaboratively construct and update vital maps of the 
transport infrastructure of Haiti.  Monitoring social media and emergency SMS 
platforms permitted individual calls for assistance to be plotted that could then be 
used as actionable intelligence by response teams on the ground.  Such an example 
shows it would be inexcusable to overlook our ability to make distant people and 
places visible in such a way that it changes the political profile of certain events. 
The discussion that followed these observations later shifted to consider the current 
landscape of digital surveillance.  At this point it struck me that the Guardian editor’s 
earlier comment actually spoke to a much deeper set of issues that were roundly 
captured by this notion of visibility/invisibility.  Here, concerns about the ability to 
maintain a degree of privacy were implicit.  In the context of pervasive, global, 
digital surveillance, for many people the antithesis to Alan Rusbridger’s observation 
rings equally true: there is no excuse for ubiquitous visibility.  No excuse for 
                                                          
2 http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2012/07/02/crisis-mapping-haiti/ 
2 
 
rendering entire populations – or at least their social lives and interactions in the 
virtual realm – subject to the surveillant gaze of either governments or private 
corporations. 
The Internet is a socio-technical system highly susceptible to regulation, in a variety 
of forms (Lessig 1999).  Such regulation means digital environments can be designed 
to automatically collect a huge variety of data about Internet users.  At the same 
time, visibility has traditionally been a one-way street.  The term ‘surveillance’ 
means ‘to watch over’; it implies a power dynamic wherein one party effectively 
remains invisible.  The construction of cyberspaces as sites where people can be 
monitored and managed is the product of a specific set of economic and security 
interests (Loader 1997).  Events over the last 24 months have shown the truth in 
this, but they have also evidenced a significant shift in the politics of surveillance.  
For as much as control, the Internet affords the opportunity for resistance.  The 
result is a constant dynamic of moves and counter-moves between surveillance on 
the one hand and resistance on the other. 
In June 2013, the landscape of government intelligence and mass surveillance was 
changed irrevocably.  Edward Snowden was an infrastructure analyst and expert in 
cyber-security and counter-intelligence for the United States’ National Security 
Agency (NSA).  Disillusioned both with the lack of reform of surveillance activities by 
US intelligence agencies and by the undermining of the transformative potential of 
the Internet by ubiquitous surveillance (Greenwald et al. 2013a), Snowden amassed 
thousands of confidential documents detailing the surveillance capacities and 
intentions of the NSA.  In late 2012 and early 2013 he made contact with journalist 
Glenn Greenwald and filmmaker Laura Poitras, signalling his desire to leak this trove 
of information.  In May 2013, he absconded from the NSA station in Hawaii and flew 
to Hong Kong.  On the 6th June, while he was in Hong Kong, The Guardian published 
the first story related to Snowden’s leaked information – an exposé of the collection 
of millions of phone call records of Verizon customers by the NSA (see Greenwald 
2013a). 
What followed over the course of many months was a persistent and detailed 
release of information concerning (primarily) the digital surveillance apparatus of 
the NSA as well as partner intelligence agencies in the UK, Canada, Australia, New 
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Zealand and Germany.  Within only the first two months of publication, several 
important systems operated by the NSA and other agencies had been publicly 
identified.  The PRISM program allowed for the collection of a vast array of online 
data including the contents of emails, VoIP3 chats and transferred documents direct 
from the servers of several major US Internet firms: Google, Microsoft, Yahoo!, 
Apple and Facebook (see Greenwald and MacAskill 2013; Greenwald et al. 2013b).  
The XKeyscore system was a database containing all this information and more – 
including social media web history and communications metadata – and was 
searchable by NSA analysts without prior consent or authorisation by the courts.  
Confidential information provided by Snowden in the form of training materials for 
XKeyscore claimed the system was the ‘widest-reaching’ means of gathering Digital 
Network Intelligence, able to capture ‘nearly everything a typical user does on the 
Internet’ (see Greenwald 2013b).  The Tempora program, meanwhile, was operated 
by the UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and involved the 
indiscriminate harvesting of Internet data (both content and other metadata) direct 
from the submarine fibre-optic cables that carry the majority of Internet traffic.  
‘Mastering the Internet’ and ‘Global Telecoms Exploitation’, the two components of 
Tempora, indicate the scale of the ambition of this program (see MacAskill et al. 
2013). 
Having been granted asylum in Moscow, Snowden continues to play an active role in 
contributing to on-going debates about the scale, intensity, necessity and 
proportionality of digital surveillance, the implication of multinational corporations 
in these practices and oversight and accountability (or lack thereof) of these 
powerful institutions of surveillance.  His efforts – along with all other 
whistleblowers – allow us to flesh out our thinking about the concept of visibility 
and invisibility. 
‘There is no excuse for invisibility’ says Alan Rusbridger.  The intelligence agencies 
would argue otherwise and they have done; it is necessary that their activities 
remain invisible to be effective in combating terrorism and organised crime.  
Snowden’s actions forced visibility onto these agencies and their partners.  At the 
same time they show how, by exploiting the potential of digital communication, all 
                                                          
3 Voice over Internet Protocol, e.g. Skype. 
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manner of social interactions and behaviours are made visible.  Of course, there are 
more influences at play here to account for.  We make ourselves increasingly visible 
by virtue of changes in social organisation and interaction (Lyon 2002); we 
volunteer, by varying degrees, large quantities of personal information on social 
media platforms and we collude in practices of consumer surveillance for the sake of 
convenience and reward (Andrejevic 2007).  However, the key issue is consent to 
visibility.  When the extent to which we are made visible is obfuscated, and when we 
have little say in how this is achieved, as Snowden showed, invisibility is certainly 
inexcusable.  The on-going dynamic between surveillance and resistance is further 
seen in the pushback from the intelligence agencies attempting to justify their 
actions and in governmental attempts to legislate for greater surveillance powers.  
They argue there is no excuse for invisibility of citizens if they have done nothing 
wrong; the classic argument that if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to 
fear (see Solove 2007a).  It is ironic that in the aftermath of Snowden’s revelations 
this flawed argument should backfire so spectacularly on the intelligence 
community. 
This thesis investigates the relationship between surveillance, acts of resistance to 
surveillance and their respective roles in the contemporary social order.  Framed by 
theories of nodal governance, the empirical data in this research are analysed to 
illuminate how and why innovations in surveillance capacity and capability, induce 
new modes of resistance.  By attending to the social dynamics and mechanics of 
resistance, we can generate more nuanced and subtle understandings of the ways in 
which social control is being performed and understood. 
1.2 SO WHAT’S THE (SOCIAL) PROBLEM? 
The Snowden revelations ignited a clamorous debate about mass (digital) 
surveillance and various attendant issues including privacy, necessity, 
proportionality and regulation of both the intelligence agencies and Internet 
communication in general4.  Surveillance, perhaps now more than ever, is framed as 
a social problem that demands a response.  The increasing digitalisation of 
surveillance raises questions about the potential for control inherent in such systems 
                                                          
4 The latter of which is a prominent theme in this thesis; see Chapters Two and Three. 
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as a result of the availability of increasingly granular details about our personal lives.  
Here it is not only surveillance conducted by institutions of the state that is 
problematic; increasingly it is the surveillance powers of private entities that are 
framed as a social problem.  Snowden has helped to catalyse public sentiment 
around these related issues.  However, such public conversation is not new.  The 
revelations, while significant, are but the latest in a long trajectory of claims-making 
about the necessity and dangers of surveillance.  Any sentiments concerning the 
dangers of surveillance are strongly counter-balanced by the fact that surveillance is 
inseparable from the ‘problem’ of crime and terrorism, the response to which is, 
inevitably, more surveillance.  The terror attacks in Paris in 2015 and the on-going 
concern with paedophile rings in the UK, send powerful messages to the public that 
monitoring of online activity is vital to ensuring the safety and security of children, 
communities, and the country.  Ever more sophisticated and wide-reaching control 
is therefore promoted by the state as vital for the security of citizens.  However, we 
also see that surveillance and social control are constantly negotiated and resisted; 
efforts that subsequently generate new or adapted forms of control (Marx 2009; 
Innes and Levi 2012). 
Public space surveillance exploded as a mechanism of crime prevention in the early 
1990s.  A catalyst of this was the murder of James Bulger in 1993.  The identification 
of his killers from CCTV footage helped to support the Conservative government’s 
crime prevention agenda (see Home Office 19945).  Estimates suggest that from 
1990 to 2002 the number of CCTV cameras in England and Wales designed for crime 
prevention purposes increased from 100 to approximately 40,000, while over the 
three-year period 1996-1998 three quarters of the Home Office crime prevention 
budget was spent on CCTV (Armitage 2002).  CCTV use – both public and private – 
continued to escalate and current approximations of the number of cameras in 
England and Wales range anywhere from two to four million.  Nevertheless, CCTV is 
expensive and its effectiveness in preventing crime has frequently been called into 
question (e.g. Gill and Spriggs 2005).  Some recent indications are that CCTV is falling 
out of favour with law enforcement (Instrom 20146), however, technological 
                                                          
5 ‘CCTV: Looking Out For You’. 
6 A recent study commissioned by the Police and Crime Commissioner for Dyfed-Powys Police 
recommended, amongst other things, the removal of redundant cameras, a shift away from actively 
6 
 
developments in the form of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs/’drones’) suggest that 
CCTV may in fact simply be evolving into a more mobile, tactical resource. 
Technological advances have gone hand-in-hand with the evolution of surveillance.  
This thesis is predicated on that fact.  CCTV, for instance, is now high definition and 
capable of facial recognition.  However, while there has been a global expansion of 
technologically enabled surveillance, the scale and pace of change between 
countries has been different.  Britain is often given the dubious honour of being 
called the world’s leading ‘surveillance society’, which again is tied to the ‘hallmark’ 
of modern surveillance, CCTV7.  Other countries, with a legacy of state intrusion into 
citizens’ private lives, are much less passive when it comes to mass surveillance.  
Resistance, then, is an important topic to study as it sheds light on these 
comparative differences.  Related to the question of technology is what it ‘adds’ to 
surveillance practices that predate such transformations (Dandeker 1994).  The 
answer is that technological developments such as the Internet have allowed for the 
manipulation of the very environment in which control is exercised.  Technological 
changes do not just make surveillance more accurate or more granular; they make 
surveillance the default position.  The digital world is designed to surveill. 
The trend of equating crime prevention with expansive surveillance has continued in 
the 21st century, albeit shifting towards digitalisation as a response to changes in 
social organisation and interaction online.  In the wake of the terror attacks in 2001 
in New York and in 2005 in London, the ‘necessity’ of extensive surveillance was 
given new life.  Surveillance at border gateways was particularly intensified, air 
travel became an enormously regulated affair, biometric technologies such as the 
UK ePassport in 2006 were introduced and communications data – i.e. logs of email 
and telephone calls – were prioritised as an invaluable resource for the ‘war on 
terror’.  These trends continue today; in the wake of the ‘Charlie Hebdo’ incident, 
David Cameron outlined his desire to overcome barriers to accessing encrypted 
communications within the UK (see Watt et al. 2015).  What people do online is 
increasingly captured within the discourse of crime prevention.  A key facet of this 
                                                                                                                                                        
monitored CCTV in favour of passive (unmonitored, recorded) systems and the constant evaluation of 
existing CCTV to ascertain its continued economic value. 
7 BBC News (2009) noted that the London borough of Wandsworth had more CCTV cameras than 
Dublin, Johannesburg, Boston and Sydney combined. 
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discourse, an area that this thesis explores, is that governments ‘cannot do it alone’; 
in recognition of their access to massive quantities of data, private sector companies 
are situated (through regulatory processes) as valuable auspices of security. 
However, rapid expansion of the national and international surveillance apparatus 
has been met with resistance.  The UK has an active community of civil liberties 
organisations that itself is part of a global network concerned with issues related to 
free speech, censorship and privacy.  These groups have played a pivotal role in 
shaping the public conversation about the control implications of new surveillance 
practices.  The No2ID campaign group, for instance, was instrumental in the repeal 
of the Identity Cards Act 2006.  Later, in response to government plans in 2012 to 
extend the surveillance powers of law enforcement, a large number of individuals 
and groups alike voiced their discontent and were again successful in forcing the 
plans to be abandoned8.  Independent oversight bodies and academic researchers 
have also been influential claims makers in respect of surveillance.  In 2004, the UK 
Information Commissioner Richard Thomas warned that Britain was in danger of 
‘sleepwalking into a surveillance society’ (see Booth 2004).  These comments led to 
an ICO-sponsored report by the Surveillance Studies Network (see Wood et al. 2006) 
that was updated four years later (see Wood et al. 2010).  These reports described 
current surveillance practices and, in 2006, projected developments until 2016.  
Many of these are already in evidence to an extent; the introduction and expansion 
of UAVs, body-worn cameras on police officers, RFID9 sensors embedded in 
mundane household items, personalised advertising in public spaces and extensive 
biometric border security.  Official concerns with the gradual expansion and 
pervasiveness of surveillance in the UK are still evident, with the Surveillance 
Commissioner Tony Porter recently reiterating Thomas’ concern, albeit in the 
context of re-igniting the debate about CCTV (see Riley-Smith 2015). 
It is not only state-sponsored surveillance that is resisted by the public and civil 
society; monitoring techniques have also proliferated in the private sector.  
Supermarket loyalty cards are a prime example of this.  Our shopping habits are 
recorded and analysed and we are persuaded to remain loyal customers as a result 
                                                          
8 See Chapter Six. 
9 Radio Frequency Identification. 
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of the individually tailored rewards we are offered.  Recently, Samsung ‘smart TVs’ 
have been shown to be capable of recording conversations in their vicinity (i.e. in 
the home) and sending the data to third party marketing companies (see Harris 
2015).  Online, such practices are amplified.  The dominance of multinational 
communications corporations and service providers such as Google, Facebook, 
Apple and Microsoft has produced myriad mechanisms by which Internet users are 
monitored, tracked, influenced, persuaded and regulated.  Browsing histories, 
purchasing habits, personal details and preferences and geographical location are 
only some of the data valuable to commercial enterprises.  The data stream 
generated by our online activities is big business – so much so that it has generated 
its own buzzword in recent years: ‘big data’.  Again, the very architecture of the 
Internet is shaped so as to facilitate processes of identification and surveillance 
(Lessig 199910). 
Once again, however, these patterns have elicited negative public reaction.  In the 
US, for instance, CASPIAN11 campaigns against loyalty card monitoring of consumers.  
But it is online forms of monitoring – and regulation of Internet life in general – that 
the public conversation has begun to problematise.  For activists who advocate its 
founding principles, the Internet is the cornerstone of free speech and democracy in 
contemporary society.  Consequently, attempts to subject the Internet to 
surveillance are often met with resistance12.  These concerns have been amplified as 
a result of the confluence of political and economic interests in monitoring online 
behaviour (Fuchs 2008).  Snowden’s revelations highlighted how political and 
economic forms of surveillance are entwined making it increasingly difficult, yet also 
vital, for the public to make their voice heard. 
The overarching impression is that the Internet is a site of struggle, where 
governments, corporations and individuals or groups of citizens, amongst others, 
grapple for the right to determine the shape of the playing field.  The Internet is an 
enormously empowering technology but also a site of ‘ambiguous danger’ (Molotch 
                                                          
10 Also, Chapter Two. 
11 Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering 
12 Prominent examples in recent years include the Stop Online Piracy Act, Protection of Intellectual 
Property Act and Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement in the United States – all of which were 
instances of legislation perceived as a threat to civil liberties and digital rights – and the on-going battle 
to preserve ‘net neutrality’ (Save the Internet 2015). 
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2012).  It allows for democratisation of communication, innovation and political 
engagement.  At the same time it is increasingly subjected to the will of political and 
economic interests that are eager to capitalise on the wealth of information 
available and the potential it offers for identifying, monitoring and managing 
populations.  Digital surveillance and resistance are networked, diffuse and diverse 
practices involving a plurality of actors with overlapping mentalities.  This thesis is 
immersed in this contested domain.  The set of questions guiding it develop out of 
this complex dynamic of relationships and motivations. 
1.3 RESEARCH CONTEXT, AIM AND QUESTIONS 
Broadly speaking, this thesis examines contemporary social control.  It achieves this 
by focusing on the relationship between digital surveillance and resistance, both 
constituent parts of social control, in an age of proliferating information networks.  
Social control is not something that simply ‘happens’.  It is the product of constant 
actions and reactions between groups in society.  Surveillance and resistance are 
one important way in which we can see this dynamic occurring. 
The preceding discussion highlights the relevance and continuous evolution of the 
relationship between surveillance and resistance.  It also captures the contemporary 
context in which studies of surveillance are situated.  Specifically, it signals a 
prominent undercurrent that has featured in many studies of surveillance, namely, 
the role of the state in the conduct of surveillance.  Surveillance scholars have 
traditionally embraced Foucault’s (1977) elaboration of ‘panoptic’ surveillance, a 
metaphor for the dispersal into wider society of a disciplinary mode of power.  The 
concept has shaped much of the literature on surveillance, and continues to do so 
owing to the conceptualisation of power and governmentality that underpins it. 
Despite its appeal, many in the field of surveillance studies question the utility of the 
panopticon as a model of contemporary surveillance (e.g. Haggerty 2006; Lyon 
2003a, 2006; Dupont 2008).  It makes several assumptions that are increasingly 
untenable in the contemporary information society.  It describes a centralised or 
top-down process of surveillance where ‘the few watch the many’ and consequently 
has its roots in a state-centric view of control.  While discipline is dispersed into 
society’s institutions, this process is part of a wider system of governance guided by 
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the state.  There is also little attention given to the role of individual agency and 
resistance in Foucault’s original exposition.  Above all, technological developments 
that have produced changes in social organisation force us to reconsider the 
relevance of the panopticon.  The democratisation of surveillance – the increasing 
availability of surveillance tools and technology – challenges panoptic notions.  
Closely linked to this is resistance, ‘where efforts are deployed by the subjects of 
surveillance to understand, reveal, mock, evade, and neutralize surveillance 
technologies through the collaborative power of socio-technical networks’ (Dupont 
2008: 258).  The characteristics of the information society13 also make it difficult to 
subscribe to the idea of centralised, top-down control.  Instead, networks and 
dispersed control mechanisms are more suitable organising concepts. 
Previous research has examined the relationship between surveillance and 
resistance at the micro level, where surveillance is creatively and deliberately 
evaded and challenged (Marx 2003; Dupont 2008).  This thesis, however, is 
concerned with social processes on a broader scale, examining the interplay 
between digital surveillance and resistance across a number of social settings – 
within civil society, in the context of regulation and in the media.  To capture a sense 
of these dynamics a nodal governance framework is employed in the research.  
Nodal governance is a theoretical construct for understanding the way in which ‘a 
variety of actors operating within a social system interact along networks to govern 
the systems they inhabit’ (Burris et al. 2005: 33).  This perspective has gained 
currency in the study of security and crime control for highlighting the multitude of 
actors – increasingly those beyond the state – who are involved in delivering these 
social goods.  Surveillance, as this opening gambit has illustrated, is a key 
mechanism in this apparatus of control.  Nodal governance also draws attention to 
the processes of cooperation and competition (Fuchs 2008; Wood and Shearing 
2007) that characterise the relationships between these actors.  It is helpful, 
therefore, for identifying the entities wherein surveillance and resistance take place.  
It is a framework that will aid in capturing the dynamics of action, reaction and 
counter-reaction at play. 
                                                          
13 See Chapter Two. 
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With this framework in place, the research is guided by the following overarching 
research questions: 
1. How are digital surveillance and resistance related? 
2. Why do individuals and groups who resist surveillance identify a need 
for doing so? 
3. What are the implications of these patterns for our understanding of 
control in the information society? 
These questions structure the analysis in the thesis, drawing out key elements of the 
relationship between digital surveillance and resistance and the implications of 
these for social control in the information society.  The thesis explores these 
questions empirically and theoretically.  Empirically, it examines three sites where 
the dynamics between digital surveillance and resistance are played out and can be 
observed: online civil society; regulation of surveillance, and; WikiLeaks and the 
news media.  The nodal governance framework provides the rationale for selecting a 
variety of social domains and actors (nodes) that contribute in different ways to the 
landscape of digital surveillance and resistance.  Each of these sites shows different 
ways in which surveillance and resistance intersect and are enacted by different 
nodes (research question one).  They show, through empirical examples, why and 
how digital surveillance is resisted (research question two).  Each case also 
contributes to a rolling narrative of the characteristics of social control in a digitally 
mediated world (research question three). 
Theoretically, the thesis offers insight into how established theories of control can 
be developed and applied to contemporary information society.  To do this, the 
cases that constitute the research are each analysed using theoretical frameworks 
relating to social control.  A theory of nodal governance, as well as informing the 
structure of the research, is used to examine the online organisation of resistance in 
Chapter Five.  In Chapter Six, regulation as a modality of control is analysed in the 
context of legislation that aimed to reform surveillance practice in the UK.  Finally, in 
Chapter Seven, literature on moral panics and the construction of social problems is 
used to analyse the impact of WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden on the landscape of 
digital surveillance.  These frameworks are combined in this thesis to capture the 
multi-layered phenomena of digital surveillance and resistance.  At each step of the 
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analysis, the reader’s focus is drawn in more detail to the intricacies of this 
relationship. 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Chapter Two  sets out the context in which this research is situated in the form of a 
brief social history of Internet communication.  The chapter explores the 
relationship between the information society and surveillance.  It argues that 
technological, economic and cultural developments have had a major impact on 
social order, the nature of surveillance and the character of resistance.  It begins by 
drawing out key characteristics of the conceptualisation of contemporary society as 
‘informational’ and ‘networked’.  Following this, the chapter describes the 
emergence of the Internet as a socio-technical medium of communication and 
outlines the technical systems that allow it to function.  Understanding these 
systems makes it clear how they relate to expanding capacities for both surveillance 
and resistance.  Attention is paid to the political and economic drivers of regulation 
of surveillance and Internet communication more broadly, and the chapter thereby 
begins to chart the nodal character of governance in the network society. 
Continuing these themes, Chapter Three engages with theoretical contributions to 
the study of social control and surveillance.  The chapter describes the evolution of 
theories of control, and assesses in greater detail the division between a 
Foucauldian, panoptic approach to surveillance (and resistance) and the networked, 
nodal conception on which this research is predicated.  This leads into an 
explanation of the literature on surveillance, outlining the characteristics of ‘digital’, 
‘political’, ‘economic’ and ‘resistive’ surveillance.  The connections between theories 
of control and surveillance and their impact on the direction of the research are 
made clear.   
Chapter Four presents the methodology.  It describes the fieldwork and analysis, 
outlining the three research sites that act as gateways into developing an 
appreciation of the intricacies of social control in a digital, networked society.  
Whilst not an explicitly stated aim of the thesis, the chapter also raises questions 
about how to effectively research surveillance and resistance online.  To that end, 
Internet-based research methods are advocated, including emerging and innovative 
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strategies of computational social science.  Alongside these, the chapter justifies the 
use of more ‘traditional’ methods of inquiry and recounts some of the obstacles that 
arose in trying to access and recruit some high profile respondents.  The chapter also 
reflects on the conduct of research into surveillance, including the subjectivity of the 
researcher in this field and being bound up in the processes and practices that the 
research outlines. 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven deal in turn with each of the research sites.  The first 
empirical contribution to the thesis, Chapter Five, is an examination of the 
networked nature of the social organisation of resistance.  It suggests that to 
understand the dynamics of digital surveillance and resistance, we need to look at 
how the Internet allows for organisation and politicised communication (i.e. 
‘information politics’) to take place.  The chapter develops the nodal governance 
framework on the grounds that resistance is multi-polar; just as governance is nodal, 
so too are the counter-responses to surveillance and control.  The chapter achieves 
this by examining the online structure and communication patterns of civil society 
groups – specifically those oriented around issues of privacy, surveillance and digital 
rights.  Civil society is a governing node, however, within civil society are individual 
nodes jostling for position and acting out their own connections and interactions.  
Network analysis and other data show how these groups align with each other and 
interact with other nodes beyond civil society.  These relationships are visualised, 
providing a level of empirical insight frequently missing from theoretical 
elaborations of nodal governance. 
Chapter Six examines the legal frameworks that regulate surveillance and generate 
effects of resistance.  It illustrates why digital surveillance is seen as problematic and 
thus relates to the second research question ‘why do individuals and groups who 
resist surveillance identify a need for doing so?’ as well as generating more insight 
into the relationship between surveillance and resistance (research question one).  
Drawing on documentary analysis of the consultation process that was part of the 
Draft Communications Data Bill (CDB) in 2012, this chapter widens the scope from 
civil society to a whole host of other stakeholders (i.e. nodes) who were engaged in 
debates about digital surveillance.  At the same time, it narrows the concern with 
surveillance and resistance to a specific instance where the regulation of 
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surveillance was being reshaped.  The findings here relay some of the main points of 
contention in the Bill.  While these concerns are important in their own right, the 
CDB also signalled a broader opportunity for codification of resistance in law.  In 
addition, the relationship between the government and private commercial 
organisations in shaping social control is subjected to analysis.  Broadly, the chapter 
contributes to the continuing narrative by illustrating the role of regulation as a 
modality of control but also how and why it generates resistance. 
The final substantive empirical component of the thesis, Chapter Seven, turns to 
examine the symbolic and communicative aspects of surveillance and resistance.  
The chapter is informed by a study of the news media and ‘new media’ platform 
WikiLeaks.  This case is the most granular presented, bringing to light the actions of 
one specific node concerned with online resistance or ‘resistive surveillance’.  The 
example of WikiLeaks is used to demonstrate how resistance to surveillance 
capitalises on the opportunities of a new technological medium.   At the same time, 
the saga of this organisation (seen through the lens of media reports) is one that 
displays clearly the counter-attempts by government to maintain social order by 
framing WikiLeaks as deviant and problematic. Consequently, as a basis for the 
chapter, the concept of moral panic is used to explore the construction of both 
surveillance and resistance as problematic.  By following this recent history to its 
current point, appropriately, this chapter returns us to where the thesis begins – 
with Edward Snowden and the contemporary state of surveillance. 
Chapters Eight and Nine conclude the thesis.  The preceding chapters show 
conflicting tendencies towards centralisation and decentralisation in both digital 
surveillance and resistance, patterns of competition and cooperation and 
implications for the idea of visibility, where this chapter began.  Chapter Eight 
explores these themes.  Chapter Nine draws together the key findings from the 
three research sites and summarises what has been learned about the dynamic 
between digital surveillance and resistance, the reasons for resistance and the 
lessons for thinking about contemporary social control.  It offers reflection on the 
limitations and future directions of the research before concluding with the broader 
theoretical, methodological and policy contributions of this thesis. 
--. --- ...- . .-. -. -- . -. - ...  --- ..-.  - .... .  .. -. -.. ..- ... - .-. .. .- .-..  .-- --- .-. .-.. -.. --..--
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CHAPTER TWO 
A (BRIEF) SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE INTERNET: THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY AND SURVEILLANCE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is the first of two that set the context for the research.  Where settings 
for social research are often physically bounded, this study is situated in the digital 
environment of the Internet.  The Internet is the cornerstone of the ‘information 
society’ – a concept explored in this chapter – and in laying out the digital context of 
the thesis, it is important that we understand the social and technological 
foundations of this system.  The contribution of this chapter, therefore, is to expand 
upon some of the key messages outlined in the introduction and to achieve one 
primary aim: to illuminate the connection between the ‘information society’ and 
contemporary forms of digital surveillance and resistance. 
The discussion that follows is set out in the following terms.  First is a theory of the 
information society, drawing on commentaries that have outlined its chief 
characteristics.  These incorporate the various and related social, technological, 
cultural and economic features of contemporary society, as they are constituted 
within and by digital networks.  It is suggested that these features, particularly 
‘informationalism’ (Castells 1996), are tied to contemporary forms of surveillance.  
Continuing with this fundamental point, the chapter also explores the concept of 
regulation as it applies to the Internet.  The Internet is a highly regulated socio-
technical system and the discussion here highlights how surveillance is both 
designed into and a natural product of interactions in cyberspace.  However, what 
also becomes apparent is how such regulation permits new and effective forms of 
resistance to surveillance to emerge.  This chapter consequently lays the 
foundations for a more detailed theoretical exposition of social control, surveillance 
and resistance in Chapter Three. 
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The history that this chapter presents is complex.  However, it is necessary to 
understand the many influences upon the shape and character of the Internet and 
the information society.  These are grouped into two broad themes – technological 
and social forms of ordering.  Any such separation is somewhat artificial; however, 
as the thesis goes on to show, surveillance and resistance can be characterised as 
both technological and social processes. 
2.2 THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 
There is a widespread consensus that we are living in an ‘information society’ 
(Beniger 1986; Castells 1996; Williams 2006; Webster 2014).  The continued scale 
and pace of information technology development has had profound implications 
across the whole of society.  Central to these is the proliferation of networks; of 
economic, political and technological systems, of individuals and of diverse and 
dispersed communities and populations.  The effect of these has been to produce 
what Manuel Castells (1996) calls the ‘Network Society’.  The social and 
technological changes both producing and produced by the rise of information 
networks amplify those social shifts typically associated with the transition from 
modernity to late/reflexive/liquid modernity (see Giddens 1990; Beck 1992; Beck et 
al. 1994, Bauman 2000).  So too has the rise of information as a global commodity 
altered the social organisation of relationships between institutions and their 
interests.  This introductory discussion draws out several features of the 
information/network society14 that have particular relevance to this thesis. 
It is insufficient to assert the existence of an information society or define its 
characteristics based solely on the prevalence of advanced computing and 
communication technologies (although these are of central importance).  Rather, 
there are several dimensions to understanding what is meant by an information 
society.  Webster (1995) outlines five ways in which we can understand the 
information society: economic, technological, spatial, cultural and occupational. 
                                                          
14 While Castells uses the term ‘network society’ I have opted to refer to the contemporary situation as 
the ‘information society’.  I do not imply any difference with this alternative nomenclature; the decision 
is based on a more ready association with practices of surveillance. 
17 
 
The characteristics of the ‘new economy’ constitute a significant portion of Castells’ 
(1996, 1997, 1998) analysis of the information age.  For Castells, with his Marxist 
roots, this ‘economic base’ of society is a key determinant of social order.  The new 
economy, emerging in the latter part of the twentieth century, he argues, is 
informational, global and networked.  The basis of this economy, its raw material, is 
information, transmitted across pervasive and flexible electronic networks.  
Information is the source of productivity and power in this new global economy; the 
networked economy is characterised by increased efficiency in production and 
management made possible by global networked communications.  
‘Informationalism’, the outcome of the interaction between a new information-
technology paradigm and the economy, is described by Castells as the ‘action of 
knowledge upon knowledge itself as the main source of productivity’ (1996: 17). 
The informational, global and networked economy (and indeed the information 
society as a whole) has at its heart the Internet.  The changes Castells (1996) 
describes did not begin with the emergence of the Internet – the shift to an 
information-driven economy was identified in earlier work by the likes of Machlup 
(1962) and Porat (1977) – but they have been accelerated and compounded, as this 
chapter goes on to describe.  Online commerce now constitutes a significant part of 
national economies.  In 2014, Internet sales accounted for 11.2% of all retail 
spending and the average weekly spend for that year was £718.7 million (ONS 2015).  
One example of how the Internet has caused global shifts in the nature of commerce 
(related to digital surveillance) is online advertising.  Revenue is generated on most 
websites through banner and click-through advertising.  Our web browsers store 
information on websites we visit (‘cookies’) and this information is used to deliver 
targeted adverts based on our preferences and predicted spending habits15.  
As well as representing the pervasive technology by which flexible, global 
communication and trade is made possible, the Internet also emerges as an active 
domain in itself.  The Internet is thus both a tool and manifestation of the 
information society.  Already this signals why the Internet is such a vital and 
contested resource and space.  The interests of the capitalist system are played out 
                                                          
15 As of May 2011, all EU websites are required to display a notice of informed consent for the 
collection of cookies.  In the UK this is enacted under the Privacy and Electronic Communications 
Regulations. 
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on and via the Internet, sometimes with those of nation states and sometimes 
against them.  According to Fuchs (2013) ‘what has emerged in the online sphere is 
corporate and state control.’  The impact of these two forces in online regulation 
and policy is discussed later.  Likewise, as discussed in Chapter Three, Marxist-
influenced theoretical perspectives emphasise the economic imperatives and 
relationships that shape online social control.  The Internet is subject to regulation, 
then, largely as a product of economic interests.  The Internet can be regulated in 
various ways but one of the driving forces is to make identifying users commonplace 
(Lessig 1999) – again for the purposes of monetising Internet activity.  As will 
become clear, attempts to regulate the Internet in these ways have significant 
impacts for the daily experiences of Web users; indeed this has contributed to the 
issues at the centre of this research. 
There is a clear overlap and mutual influence therefore between economic and 
technological characteristics of the information age.  The technological definition is 
the one primarily espoused by proponents of the information age and 
understandably so; without technological advances the networking and 
informationalisation of the economy, occupations and cultures would not have 
occurred.  While the Internet is at the core of the technological definition, we should 
acknowledge the convergence of technologies that has led to the Internet becoming 
a ubiquitous feature of everyday life for large sections of the population.  These are 
described in more detail below (section 2.3) but what are referred to here are 
increases in sophistication and processing capacity, coupled with decreasing size and 
cost, of computers, laptops, mobile telephones (smartphones) and tablets. 
Whilst acknowledging the central importance of technology to the changes 
described so far, this thesis seeks to avoid technological determinism by illustrating 
the inter-relationship between social and technical factors in the context of 
surveillance, resistance and control.  To this end, the technological underpinnings of 
the information society are particularly relevant to this thesis where they overlap 
with its spatial and cultural characteristics (Webster 1995).  While there is much to 
be taken from Castells’ (1996, 1997, 1998) expansive analysis of the information age, 
considerations of the spatial and cultural changes being brought by technological 
development are evident in much earlier work.  Preceding, but in parallel with 
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Castells’ global and networked effects of the information society, Marshall McLuhan 
(1964) popularised the term ‘global village’ to describe the effects of new 
communication media; previously distanced or isolated places became increasingly 
connected, decreasing the time it took for information to travel between people.  
Earlier still, in 1926, Nikola Tesla foresaw the emergence of worldwide (and indeed 
mobile) wireless connectivity: 
‘We shall be able to communicate with one another instantly, irrespective of 
distance.  Not only this, but through television and telephony we shall see and 
hear one another as perfectly as though we were face to face, despite 
intervening distances of thousands of miles; and the instruments through which 
we shall be able to do his will be amazingly simple compared with our present 
telephone.  A man will be able to carry one in his vest pocket’ (Kennedy 1926). 
McLuhan and Tesla’s prescient insights suggest a ‘shrinking’ of the globe.  This 
coincides with notions of a ‘borderless’ world, where nation state boundaries are 
transcended by virtual networks.  This is an enduring issue for this thesis as it raises 
questions about the ability of governments to exert control in a virtual realm (i.e. 
the Internet) that exists largely independently of physical and geographical 
limitations16. 
In respect of culture, the information society exposes us to a vast array of cultural 
symbols and messages.  The proliferation and convergence of media channels on the 
Internet naturally alters how we perceive and engage with the wider world.  The 
advent of social media has intensified this process, bringing people together in social 
relationships – some now fleeting, others more permanent – and allowing for the 
sharing and construction of cultural norms.  Related to this is the concept of online 
community.  Of relevance for this thesis is the extent to which Internet users around 
the world possess shared ideals about the nature and opportunities of cyberspace.  
Perhaps the most prosaic formulation of these important ideas is John Perry 
Barlow’s Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace17, the following extract 
from which illustrates the connection between spatial and cultural characteristics of 
the information age.   
‘You [governments] do not know us, nor do you know our world. Cyberspace 
does not lie within your borders. Do not think that you can build it, as though it 
                                                          
16 Although, as we see later (Chapter Six), national jurisdictions do play a role in shaping the ability of 
government to surveill online communication. 
17 See Appendix I. 
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were a public construction project. You cannot. It is an act of nature and it 
grows itself through our collective actions…You do not know our culture, our 
ethics, or the unwritten codes that already provide our society more order than 
could be obtained by any of your impositions’ (Barlow 1996). 
The growth and colonisation of the Internet thereby ushered in vociferous debates 
concerning the value of information, access to it and the cultural importance of free 
speech that the Internet was, and still is, seen to represent.  For the likes of Barlow 
(1996), cyberspace was distinct from ‘real space’ and the community that inhabited 
it responsible for forging a social domain free from restrictive government 
intervention and control.  Activists and campaigners advocate for the Internet as 
capable of establishing and protecting a liberating social order.  However, as this 
chapter later demonstrates, the Internet is highly susceptible to technological forms 
of regulation and control (see Lessig 1999; Galloway 2004).  Related to this, some 
authors have observed that ‘experiences online are not considered as ‘virtual’ or 
apart from ‘real’ life, and that this presumed dichotomy is a false one’ (e.g. 
Markham 1998, Miller and Slater 2000 [cited in Williams 2006: 16]).  This contention 
is followed throughout the thesis.  Despite some unique characteristics of 
cyberspace, digital surveillance controls are intrinsically bound to their offline 
manifestations. 
It is also important to note that the trends identified above are far from universal.  A 
substantial ‘digital divide’ exists between those who can access networked 
communication technologies – and benefit from them – and those who cannot.  This 
divide is played out globally between different countries and continents and also 
locally; most Internet users are young, middle-class males (Compaine 2001).  The 
idea of an inclusive, global, online community is skewed.  However, by paying 
attention to the ‘flawed dichotomy’ between online and offline social life we gain a 
sense that the struggles for regulation and control online have as much of an effect 
on the ‘real world’ as the virtual and, by extension, on both those who are 
empowered and disempowered by networked communication technology. 
2.3 THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE INTERNET 
The technological foundations of the Internet are important not only for an 
historical appreciation of this mode of communication but also in the context of 
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studying new modes of social control.  The intention here is to outline a short socio-
technical history of the Internet (not purely technical; as already noted, social and 
technical factors are inseparable in this context).  The intentions that led to the 
creation of the Internet and the architecture that governs its operation are 
intrinsically linked with accompanying developments in digital surveillance. 
2.3.1 DISTRIBUTED AND SECURE 
The Internet, in its earliest incarnation, emerged nearly simultaneously on both sides 
of the Atlantic during the Cold War era.  In the United States, a perceived scientific 
knowledge gap between the USA and USSR and fears over the threat of nuclear war 
with the Soviet Union lead Paul Baran of the Rand Corporation to conceive of a 
‘survivable’ computer network.  In 1964, acknowledging that an attack on a 
centralised communications hub could cripple the United States, Baran proposed a 
decentralised computer network that would be capable of withstanding nuclear 
attack.  Under such a system, communications could be hindered but would still be 
able to route around the network effectively. 
At roughly the same time, but unaware of Baran’s work, Welsh computer scientist 
Donald Watts Davies invented a system of sending data via a distributed network 
(such as telephone lines) by breaking it up into smaller pieces and reassembling it as 
it arrived with the recipient.  Coining the terms ‘packet’ and ‘packet-switching’ to 
describe this system, Davies was motivated by an academic interest in collaborative 
and simultaneous working on remote computers.  Packet-switching remains the 
system by which the inter-networking of computers operates today18. 
The coincidence of the work of these two pioneers occurred when Davies’ packet-
switching technology was put into place by the U.S. Department of Defense in the 
form of ARPANet (Advanced Research Projects Agency Network) in 1969.  This small 
group of networked computers allowed academics based at different universities 
across the United States to share resources.  This first incarnation of the Internet as 
                                                          
18 The alternative system, ‘circuit-switching’, operated via a physical connection made by wire between 
one caller and one recipient such as in traditional telephone exchanges.  The disadvantage compared to 
packet-switching is that only one connection can use the wire at once; in other words, packet-switching 
allows multiple users to send data at once – a vital requirement for high speed Internet 
communication.  
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a secure, distributed communications network was born of both academic and 
military interests.  It is important to note that both of these influences remain today 
– albeit combined with powerful economic motives. 
In 1989 Tim Berners-Lee contributed perhaps the single most important 
development since Baran and Davies 20 years previously.  Berners-Lee, working at 
the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN), was motivated in a similar 
fashion to Davies; he conceived of a means by which scientists around the world 
could share resources and findings without having to be in the same location and be 
able to create links between these documents.  His invention, the World Wide Web, 
is what most of us would recognise, and refer to, as the Internet today.  It is 
important, however, to understand the distinction between these two.  The World 
Wide Web is only one functional layer of the Internet; specifically, a computer 
protocol dictating a particular form of content known as Hypertext Mark-up 
Language (HTML)19.  Webpages are written in this language and allow for the 
standardised presentation of text and image files over the Internet.  The documents 
that constitute webpages can also be hyperlinked to one another, which is the basis 
of the Web.  The Web, as a distinct form of media, was more user-friendly and 
accessible than the forums and Usenet discussion groups that had previously 
dominated communication and interaction via the ARPANet/Internet.  
Consequently, the birth of the Web signified the start of mass-uptake in public use 
of the Internet that both drove, and was driven by, commercial interests. 
2.3.2 PROTOCOL AND CONTROL 
These technical developments are in actuality the design and implementation of 
standards of computer protocols.  Protocols are guides for behaviour.  As the term 
gained currency in the computer sciences, it came to mean a set of agreed upon 
standards for computer communication.  In respect of networked communications, 
for computers to be able transmit data, rules have to exist about the format of the 
content, how it will be parsed and sent, what to do if data get lost in transit, how the 
data will be sent between different networks and how the data travel over physical 
                                                          
19 For example, a second constituent part of modern Internet communications is email, which operates 
using a different protocol known as Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). 
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infrastructure (copper and fibre-optic cables for example).  The Web and its 
languages are all protocols of differing hierarchical stature20.  The reason it is helpful 
to understand this is because the architecture of the Internet (both its codes and 
cables) is a highly constraining form of regulation.  Regulation is about affecting 
process (Innes 2014) – how something must be done – and thus the functionality of 
the entire Internet depends on it being regulated.  The suite of protocols known as 
TCP/IP are responsible for governing access to the Internet and the Web21.  These 
technological artefacts, that ‘radically distribute control into autonomous locales’ 
(Galloway 2004: 142) underpin the libertarian ethos of Internet activism.  The 
Domain Name System (DNS), on the other hand, allows for hierarchical control of 
access to webpages.  It is through this mechanism that websites can be removed 
from the Internet.  Internet communication is therefore characterised by duality 
between highly liberating and restrictive forms of regulation (Lessig 1999).  This is 
not only a metaphor for how the Internet allows both surveillance and resistance; 
this is the technological basis of everything that can occur online.  
Galloway’s (2004) exploration of protocol develops this principle that control and 
attempts to subvert it are the product of the same system.  Protocol is a form of 
distributed management, within which everything is possible within a predefined set 
of standards.  In the context of this research it means that digital surveillance and 
resistance are part of one socio-technical system that allows both to occur.  Protocol 
is the way in which what seems like a chaotic, uncontrollable directionless system 
(the Internet) is managed and subjected to order and logic.  Protocols should not be 
equated with ‘rules’, per se, more with the ‘best course of action’.  For the majority 
of Web users, there is little option but to follow this guidance; it is the least difficult 
route to engagement with the Web and with others there present.  However, the 
commercialism that drives Internet activity would be better served with proprietary 
standards for communication.  Access to the Web would be predicated on rules and 
ownership of the means of communicating with the network.  As Lessig (1999: 7) 
says ‘if the code of cyberspace is owned…it can be controlled; if it is not owned, 
control is much more difficult.’  This speaks to a bigger debate for the thesis 
                                                          
20 See Hall (2000) and Kozierok (2005) 
21 See Appendix A for a more detailed discussion of the architecture of the Internet. 
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concerning who has the power to shape regulation (and consequently surveillance22) 
of the Internet. 
Galloway’s (2004) analysis supports Deleuze’s (1992) assertion that contemporary 
society has transitioned beyond Foucault’s disciplinary model to a control model23.  
Where the former can be characterised in decentralised terms – the dispersal of 
discipline into multiple locales in society – the latter can be understood by the 
distributed network form.  As Deleuze (1992: 6) argues: 
‘types of machines are easily matched with each type of society – not that 
machines are determining, but because they express those social forms capable 
of generating them and using them…the recent disciplinary societies equipped 
themselves with machines involving energy, with the passive danger of entropy 
and the active danger of sabotage; the societies of control operate with 
machines of a third type, computers, whose passive danger is jamming and 
whose active one is piracy and the introduction of viruses.’ 
That contemporary society is reliant upon the power of computing, communication 
technology and information processing is a foregone conclusion.  However, we 
should properly acknowledge Deleuze’s foresight, writing prior to the popular 
uptake of the Web.  The parallels with Castells (1996) are also evident; ours is a 
society that has developed and adapted to the capabilities of computer 
technologies.  ‘Active’ dangers include hacking24 – a politicised form of resistance 
and a particularly creative appropriation of the potential of Internet technology25.    
The passive danger of ‘jamming’ (i.e. that systems can fail) can be understood in 
terms of efficiency.  For a society dependent upon pervasive computing and an 
informational economy, efficiency and reliability are vital and it is here where 
protocols come into their own. 
Protocol alerts us to the forms of control embedded in technologies that are used 
for – and are proscriptive of – social organisation.  This research is not a study of 
protocol but the message to take from this is important.  Rules and forms of control 
are embedded within operating systems, much as the physical laws of the world 
shape our daily lives.  However, in both cases these laws shape how we 
communicate, how we organise, how surveillance occurs and how it can be resisted. 
                                                          
22 See Chapter Three. 
23 See Chapter Three. 
24 See section 2.5. 
25 This theme informs the analysis of WikiLeaks in Chapter Seven. 
25 
 
The pervasiveness of protocol as a form of management has led, according to 
Galloway (2004: 243), to the Internet being ‘the most highly controlled mass media 
hitherto known.’  This is provocative.  It does not fit with the common social and 
political perception of the Internet as ‘free’ or ‘unregulable’.  Lessig (1999: 25) 
argues that ‘there is no single way the Net has to be’.  There are multiple forms it 
could take and each would allow for different degrees and types of control.  Lessig’s 
(1999) contributions to these debates are revisited below.  Galloway’s (2004) 
‘protocol’ and Lessig’s (1999) ‘code’ both signal the technical means by which online 
environments can be shaped and controlled.  Increasingly, the influences upon this 
come from political and economic spheres – whose relationship is at times tenuous 
– which forces us to question where the ‘centre’ of a possible centralised model of 
control would lie26.  However, control online is not dictated solely by the technical 
architecture.  The concern of this thesis is with the socio-technical character of 
control.  How control operates online is thus undecided.  It is constantly being 
reconfigured as attempts are made to allow for greater control by governments and 
by corporations and as people and groups push back and strive for less control of 
this kind – or alternatively, control that protects values such as privacy and free 
speech. 
2.3.3 EXPANSION 
Beyond the technological and computational developments concerned with inter-
networking, several related advancements have increased the worldwide 
availability, usage and capability of the Internet and the World Wide Web.  
Consequently, the opportunities for digital surveillance are enhanced.  A few 
important and on-going developments can be identified: the improved physical 
infrastructure of the Net27, the spread of Internet-enabled mobile devices (such as 
smartphones and tablets), and the expansion of wireless connectivity (Wi-Fi) (ONS 
2013: 11).  In the simplest terms, these developments mean that there is a greater 
variety of social activity that can be done online and can consequently be surveilled.  
                                                          
26 Typically, conceptions of control have advocated a centralised model.  This thesis later identifies 
some of the ways in which centralising and decentralising tendencies are evident in online control (see 
Chapters Five to Seven). 
27 There are over 260 submarine fibre-optic cables that constitute the primary physical architecture of 
the Internet. An interactive map of these cables is available at http://www.submarinecablemap.com/ 
26 
 
Video-calls, online gaming and streaming of audio-visual content are three 
prominent examples. 
Figures from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) bear out these points.  In 2013, 
21 million (83%) UK households had Internet access – an increase of 3% from the 
previous year (2013: 14).  In 2006, 31% of households connected to the Internet 
used a dial-up connection on a standard telephone line; in 2013, this figure dropped 
to less than 1%.  The majority of households are now connected via a broadband 
connection and of these, an increasing proportion year on year utilises fibre-optic or 
cable connections (ONS 2013: 16).  Smartphones and, more recently, tablet devices 
have meant that people can increasingly access the Internet ‘on the go’; 53% of 
adults accessed the Internet via a mobile phone in 2013, compared to 24% in 2010 
(ONS 2013: 12). 
This expansion of the communications infrastructure is relevant for this thesis in a 
few ways.  The economics of the expansion of the physical infrastructure are 
regulatory forces in the same way as the infrastructure itself.  They are both 
permissive and restraining in that they allow for a vast variety of online activity but 
also dictate who can do and access what online.  They reinforce the fact that some 
of the chief influences on online control are economic but also that government 
regulation of these companies’ activities will have a significant impact on this.  We 
also see in these developments the increasing invasion of physical space by virtual.  
In respect of surveillance, as indicated above, ubiquitous mobile computing leads to 
the generation of more granular data about individuals, including their physical and 
digital behaviour. 
2.4 REGULATION AND THE INTERNET 
So far the concept of regulation has featured in technological terms.  The discussion 
now turns to the social and economic aspects of regulation, to illuminate the 
influences on the growth of digital surveillance and subsequently why resistance 
may occur.  Regulation is the control and management of risk through the use of law 
(Innes 2003) and attends to process rather than outcome (Innes 2014).  In other 
words, like code and protocol, legislative (i.e. ‘social’ and ‘economic’) regulation 
dictates the way things must be done.  This begins to develop the theme of nodal 
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governance underpinning the fieldwork of the thesis by introducing key nodes 
involved in practices of both digital surveillance and resistance – specifically 
governments and private entities.   
It is difficult to argue against the advent of the World Wide Web as representing the 
most significant shift in respect of regulation concerned with the Internet; the 
Internet as a commodity grew from this point and has continued to do so since.  The 
discussion points towards some of the technological developments associated with 
these economic motives.  What follows here is an outline of some of the chief 
influences over the regulation of Internet communication.  These are divided 
broadly into two main categories driving Internet regulation: commercial interests 
that position the Internet as central to the global information economy and 
public/state interests that respond to the challenges posed by the global Internet, 
particularly in relation to crime and national security. 
2.4.1 CONTROLLING THE SWITCH  
Commercial interests online fall into two broad categories.  Primarily, this concerns 
those involved in the online business sector.  However, we cannot forget the 
telecommunications industry itself that has ownership of the physical infrastructure 
of the Internet.  As demand for Internet access and greater bandwidth increases, 
these companies have had an increasingly significant role to play.  Owning the 
physical infrastructure obviously has ramifications for control over the Internet; the 
major telecoms companies have the power to prevent or at least slow down 
Internet traffic as it passes through their networks.  Equally they can be instructed 
by court order to remove access to websites that have caused some transgression28.  
Their privileged position also means they have been a target for ‘back door’ access 
by intelligence agencies, as the Snowden revelations showed. 
One example illustrates the power held by such companies.  A current issue related 
to these companies, considered by many activists, campaigners and technologists as 
undermining the founding principles of the Internet is ‘net neutrality’29.  This 
                                                          
28 This may or may not be effective, as the case of WikiLeaks (Chapter Seven) illustrates. 
29 For detailed background on this issue see ‘Save the Internet’ (http://www.savetheinternet.com/net-
neutrality). 
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describes the free end-to-end movement of information across the Internet without 
restriction or privilege.  Major US telecoms companies have lobbied for greater 
control over how they deliver services to customers. However, permitting telecoms 
companies to create a ‘fast lane’ system for Internet traffic, allowing them to charge 
additional fees for access to online services and giving them the capability to block 
access to competitors’ networks and websites goes against the core ideals of the 
Internet.  Vint Cerf, speaking on behalf of Google (2005) has noted: 
‘…do great damage to the Internet as we know it. Enshrining a rule that broadly 
permits network operators to discriminate in favor of certain kinds of services 
and to potentially interfere with others would place broadband operators in 
control of online activity.’ 
The question this raises concerns the concept of control we are dealing with.  Most 
references to ‘centralised control’ in the literature point to state control but in this 
context, commercial entities are equally as significant.  It may be more appropriate 
to think of multiple, decentred points of control that seek to regulate different 
activities, according to different motivations of the public and private sectors – 
hence the framework of nodal governance employed here.  Centralisation in this 
context is also, perhaps, inappropriate as it implies a single locus of control.  This 
runs counter to what we have already established about the distributed structure of 
the Internet and, more broadly, about the role of flexible, global networks in the 
information economy.  Related issues of censorship and intellectual property 
legislation highlight the potentially choking effect the major telecoms companies can 
have over the Internet.  Economic advantage and provision of security are two 
primary motivations for regulation and surveillance online.  Consequently, the drive 
for Internet regulation also comes from other commercial online service providers. 
2.4.2 THE GROWTH OF WEB COMMERCE 
It was not until the mid to late-1990s that commerce online began to grow.  The 
emergence of the first popular graphical web browser Mosaic in 1994 was a 
necessary precursor to this, as were subsequent improvements in user interfaces 
with the Web such as Netscape Navigator and Internet Explorer.  From the initial 
capability for individuals and businesses to communicate via the Internet to the 
World Wide Web as a global marketplace, the Internet has come to be the 
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manifestation of Castells’ (1996) information-technology paradigm; it is a 
convergence of flexible, pervasive technologies operating via network logic to 
exchange and trade information. 
The shift to online service delivery did not happen overnight.  Even major 
multinationals such as Amazon and eBay (established in 1994 and 1995 respectively) 
were slow to take off.  However slow this may have been, by the turn of the 
millennium the ‘dot-com bubble’ was at its peak; businesses had latched onto the 
idea of e-commerce, while Internet entrepreneurs were reaping the benefits of new 
technology and media markets.  By 2001 the bubble had burst; the information 
economy could not keep up the pace.  During the growth period of Internet 
commerce, however, the seeds were also sown for the future form of online 
entertainment and interaction.  Pseudo.com – the brainchild of entrepreneur Josh 
Harris – was an interactive media/chat platform delivering audio and, later, video 
streaming entertainment services and was the first of its kind.  The company was 
bankrupt in 2001 but the projects that Harris went on to develop were similarly 
‘visionary’ – to a large extent predicting the growth of future Internet entertainment 
services.  We Live in Public, a real-time Big Brother-style interactive broadcast of 
Harris’ daily life, resonates particularly with this research.  The public fascination 
with voyeurism helps to perpetuate the ‘normality’ of surveillance. 
Today, Web commerce is dominant.  Many high street retailers have an online 
presence, while purely Web-based corporations such as Amazon and eBay global 
commercial giants.  Information and communication technologies are therefore 
disruptive in the sense that new business models continually replace more 
established ones.  ‘Big data’, for example, is the big business of the moment.  
Growing from long-established practices in marketing and advertising, 
supplementing these with new data storage and processing power, businesses are 
now able to harvest and analyse astronomical amounts of consumer data.  Cross-
pollination of these datasets can yield accurate predictions about consumer 
behaviour and deliver targeted services to boost revenue.  In an Observer article, 
Naughton (2013) describes how US retailer Target used data analytics to predict the 
due date of pregnant women based on purchasing histories.  It is not far-fetched to 
see these systems drawing on the capabilities of biometric identification technology 
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to build a truly individual and real-time picture of consumers.  In addition, retailers 
are not the only businesses to draw on the predictive potential of big data.  Internet 
and social media giants such as Google and Facebook possess significant data 
repositories that are sold to advertisers, generating their primary source of income – 
particularly in the growing mobile Internet market.  These practices exemplify some 
of the defining traits of the contemporary ‘surveillance society’. 
The relevance of this for the thesis lies in the predominantly commercially driven 
environment of the World Wide Web.  The corporate interests at the heart of the 
Web shape the user experience and have dictated forms of interaction between 
users and corporations and between users themselves.  One of the main drivers of 
Internet regulation, therefore, is protection for both commerce and for consumers.  
Safety of financial transactions is necessarily vital, but balanced against this is a 
desire to avoid stringent policies that could restrict online commerce (see Lessig 
1999: 41 and Lyon 2003a).  Resistance (to regulation and surveillance) does not 
come solely from citizens but just as emphatically from the private sector30. 
Other surveillance themes are evident here.  ‘Dataveillance’ (Clarke 1988) grew out 
of pre-WWW informationalism and has evolved into the big data practices of the 
private sector.  Lessig (1999) also takes up the theme of monitoring people online.  
One possible future for the Internet that he outlines is an ‘architecture of 
identification’.  Knowing and being able to verify who an Internet user is opens the 
door to much greater control; ‘an ID-enabled world facilitates regulation’ Lessig says 
(1999: 54), bringing to mind earlier work by Simon Cole (2001).  In Suspect Identities, 
Cole charts the history of fingerprinting as a reliable and acceptable method of 
verifying identity.  Regulating the Net to make users more ‘visible’ is, in this way, the 
latest step in the history Cole describes.   Control across national and trans-national 
jurisdictions is also made easier in this way and both corporate entities and states 
have an interest in this.  Identifying users and tracking them using cookies leads to 
more accurate and targeted advertising and subsequent economic gain.  Verification 
is tied to security of online transactions and thus is favoured by commercial 
enterprises; encryption and certification of this kind already exists to an extent and 
is what has allowed Internet commerce to flourish.  Yet what Lessig proposes goes 
                                                          
30 See Chapter Six. 
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further.  He envisions a cyberspace where ID authentication constitutes the basis of 
cyberspace.  The link between digital surveillance and regulation is how Lessig sees 
this occurring: persuasion and incentives.  By making online life easier for people 
who possess a digital ID, coercive regulation by the state that enforces the use of 
digital IDs is not required.  Convenience is the key.  Equally, as a society we accept 
much of the everyday, mundane surveillance we encounter because it is more 
convenient to do so (Lyon 2001; Andrejevic 2007). 
The social and technical factors that make regulation and surveillance of online 
behaviour possible are inseparable.  Writing in an American context, Lessig (1999: 
53) calls this relationship ‘East coast versus West coast code’.  Law and regulation is 
an East coast (i.e. state) activity; code writing (increasingly a commercial domain) is 
a West coast one.  The former progressively exerts power over the latter (through 
regulation), enabling the Internet architecture to be changed in favour of 
government interests.  As Lessig describes, 
‘we must distinguish between two claims. One is that given the architecture of 
the Net as it is, it is difficult for government to regulate behaviour on the Net. 
The other is that, given the architecture of the Net, it is difficult for the 
government to regulate the architecture of the Net.  The first claim, I believe, is 
true. The second is not’ (1999: 43, emphasis in original). 
Thus the relationship between political and the economic actors is a vital part of 
understanding regulation and control online.  In Chapter Six, amidst a web of 
negotiation and bargaining they emerge as prominent actors – part adversaries, part 
allies.  The broader tone of the thesis illustrates the difficulty in regulating and 
surveilling the Internet; there is (increasingly) resistance. 
2.4.3 A GAME OF CAT AND MOUSE (PART 1: KEEPING PACE) 
The discussion now expands on different ways in which regulation and surveillance 
overlap online.  In the UK, the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 
are the primary instance of the protection afforded to consumers online and the 
obligations of service providers.  The rapid development of technology and social 
interaction on the Web, however, has led some to question the applicability of these 
regulations.  In dealing with a global network of communications, there are 
problems raised when it comes to the transmission of personal data across national 
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boundaries and the processing and storing of this data overseas.  Here we see one of 
the primary challenges for regulation in the information society that is a direct result 
of the growth of a global, networked society.  
Naughton (2013) identifies the current regulatory dilemma as that which surrounds 
the big data revolution, describing the usual legislative efforts to keep pace with 
technological change as akin to ‘watching somebody try to drive a car by looking 
only in the rear-view mirror.  The results are amusing and predictable but not really 
interesting.’  At the time of writing, the European Commission is debating draft 
regulations concerning the processing of personal data of EU citizens.  The General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), proposed in 2012 outlines the need for more 
robust regulation in this area: 
‘Rapid technological developments have brought new challenges for the 
protection of personal data.  The scale of data sharing and collecting has 
increased dramatically.  Technology allows both private companies and public 
authorities to make use of personal data on an unprecedented scale in order to 
pursue their activities.  Individuals increasingly make personal information 
available publicly and globally.  Technology has transformed both the economy 
and social life.’ (European Commission 2012: 1). 
The proposed regulation makes provisions for an overarching set of data protection 
rules for all EU member states.  Unlike the current situation, where the EC Directive 
is incorporated into national legislation in varying ways (such as the UK Electronic 
Commerce Regulations), the GDPR is a unifying regulation with which all member 
states would have to comply.  This raises a number of issues.  First, EU member 
states are likely to differ in their approaches to data protection, in part as a result of 
prevailing attitudes towards privacy31 and differing appetites between nation states 
for risk and regulation (Vogel 2012)32.  This is already playing out in practice with the 
Information Commissioner for the UK stating recently the proposed regulation was 
‘too dirigiste’ and that Britain ‘was not interested in regulation that is a to-do list’ 
(Oltermann 2013)33. 
Second, the GDPR places obligations on companies outside of the EU if they process 
the data of EU citizens.  This is crucial; in the information society, such regulation is 
                                                          
31 See Chapter Five. 
32 See Chapter Six.  This observation also resonates with the observation in the previous chapter the 
global spread of surveillance has not been uniform. 
33 Following the UK European Referendum in June 2016 this may, of course, no longer be problematic. 
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bound to impact on the global economy.  Data transmission between the EU and the 
US is currently governed by the ‘Safe Harbor’ regulation from 2000, which allows 
data to be transferred between the two states irrespective of different security 
standards.  This, too, has been the subject of debate at the European Commission, 
particularly in the wake of Snowden’s revelations regarding US and UK intelligence 
agency practices (see below).  The GDPR proposes a fine of 2% of global turnover for 
breaching the regulations.  For major corporations like Google and Facebook, this is 
more than a trifling figure.  Tensions in this regard between national and supra-
national governments and corporations are never far from the surface.  Each of the 
actors here are in some way dependent upon the others in economic terms but will 
also have their own motives in regard to data protection and online commerce. 
These themes are visible in the findings of this thesis.  Differences between 
countries in their approaches to privacy and resisting surveillance are seen in 
Chapter Five.  The issue of ‘jurisdictionality’ in respect of surveillance and regulation, 
is reintroduced in Chapter Six.  And in Chapter Seven it is shown how WikiLeaks took 
advantage of different legal protections in different jurisdictions. 
2.4.4 A GAME OF CAT AND MOUSE (PART 2: KEEPING TABS) 
The focus shifts a little at this point to examine those forms of regulation that apply 
to digital/communications surveillance powers (specifically in the UK).  Counter-
terrorism is foremost among the justifications given by governments for the need 
for increased controls in cyberspace.  The issue of cybercrime in general, however, 
has been the source of much academic and policy debate.  With new technologies 
come new avenues for crime, whether these are ‘traditional’ crimes re-engineered 
for the virtual domain or entirely new crimes that are produced as a result of the 
new opportunities available (Wall 1998). 
The debate around the GDPR has been complicated recently following the leaking of 
confidential information from the US National Security Agency (NSA) and the UK 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) by whistleblower Edward 
Snowden34.  Besides providing unparalleled insight into the digital surveillance 
capabilities of the intelligence agencies, these revelations have also shed light on the 
                                                          
34 See Chapter Seven. 
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uneasy relationship between the nation state and corporations.  Big 
(communications) data is not only of commercial value; there is a legacy of 
intelligence agency interest, particularly in the US context, in the wealth of 
information available as Internet communication has developed. 
Prominent among this history is ECHELON, a joint signals intelligence (SigInt) 
initiative between the UK, US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand – a partnership 
referred to as ‘Five Eyes’ in the latest leaked documents.  ECHELON grew out of Cold 
War-era foreign intelligence and denotes the capabilities for the interception of 
communications data.  Concerns grew during the late 1990s that ECHELON was 
being used beyond its original remit – including having been used for industrial 
espionage in the US – resulting in a European Parliament report (2001).  Similar fears 
over public surveillance emerged in 2003 when the media reported on the US ‘Total 
Information Awareness’ program, which was subsequently (and astutely) renamed 
Terrorism Information Awareness.  This initiative was naturally part of the significant 
counter-terrorism efforts post-9/11, which continue to be a primary motivation for 
government agencies to advocate the benefits of communications surveillance. 
The recent revelations continue in this vein.  Communications data have been 
described as both invaluable to law enforcement in order to combat terrorism and 
organised crime and correspondingly inaccessible (particularly in the UK context) 
owing to insufficient powers granted to police and intelligence agencies to obtain 
and retain such data.  The current legislation in the UK governing surveillance 
powers of law enforcement and other public authorities and their access to personal 
data is the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA).  Wide-ranging, RIPA 
covers a breadth of surveillance powers: the intercept of communications (e.g. wire-
tapping) via a warrant, the collection of communications data35 and (covert) human 
surveillance and intelligence.  RIPA also outlines processes for dealing with 
encrypted electronic data and the oversight mechanisms provided by various 
commissioners and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT).  RIPA repealed the 
                                                          
35 Typically described as the ‘who, when and where’ of communications; for more detailed discussion 
see Chapter Six (6.4). 
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previous (and outdated) legislation in this area, the Interception of Communications 
Act 198536. 
The primary purpose of RIPA and other legislation in the UK regarding collection and 
retention of communication data is for crime prevention.  In practice, law 
enforcement can only access communication and content data on a case-by-case 
basis and after they have justified the necessity and proportionality37 of the request 
as it pertains to a specific investigation.  Communications data are typically used to 
ascertain ‘the activities, contacts and whereabouts of a person who is under 
investigation’ (for more detail see Home Office 2012).  Accessing the content of 
communications is more strictly governed and, specifically, local authorities are not 
permitted under RIPA to use covert techniques to obtain these or any other data.  
To this end, several public authorities are allowed access to data including the 
security and intelligence services, police and HM Customs and Excise.  Subsequent 
legislation has been motivated by this crime prevention agenda and while regulation 
is directed at Communications Service Providers (CSPs) with regards to data 
retention obligations, the underlying aim remains the same.  The Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001 was a key instance of this, allowing for a code of 
practice38 to be issued to CSPs delineating retention of communications data. 
There is a significant degree of shared ground between RIPA and other Acts of 
Parliament and European Directives that are concerned with personal data.  These 
have been the subject of increased scrutiny in recent years as digital 
communications have proliferated and both industry and government have sought 
to respond to opportunities this presents.  The Data Protection Act 1998 – the 
implementation in UK law of the European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC – is 
the primary legislation that covers individuals’ rights regarding data held on them by 
organisations.  It outlines eight principles that data handlers must abide by, 
including length of retention.  Despite this, digital rights campaigners the Open 
Rights Group note that it ‘is widely felt to be both weak and defective compared to 
the original Directive’ (ORG 2014).  As above, the GDPR has faltered, with opposition 
                                                          
36 This Act, created as a response to the case of Malone (1984), prevented the unlawful interception of 
postal or telephonic communications, i.e. without knowledge/consent of the subject. 
37 Two key terms in the discourse of resistance – see Chapter Six. 
38 The Retention of Communications Data (Code of Practice) Order 2003 
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coming from the UK among others.  Home Secretary Theresa May noted that ‘[t]he 
UK’s priority is to ensure the right of access to, and to erase, personal data does not 
prejudice or hinder criminal investigations or proceedings’ (Hansard 2014: WS112).  
Concerns have also been voiced over the detriment to the UK economy of proposed 
restrictions on transfer of personal data outside of the EU. 
More recent is the EU Data Retention Directive, which came into force in 200639.  It 
compelled CSPs to capture various communication data relating to their customers 
and retain it for between six and 24 months.  This was declared invalid on the 8th 
April 2014 by the European Court of Justice.  In their ruling the Court stated that 
‘by requiring the retention of those data and by allowing the competent 
national authorities to access those data, the directive interferes in a 
particularly serious manner with the fundamental rights to respect for private 
life and to the protection of personal data.’ (Court of Justice of the European 
Union 2014) 
While this ruling will provide a major hurdle for future legislative attempts at data 
retention in the UK, the appetite for such regulation has been shown clearly over the 
past decade.  At the time of writing the most recent example of this was the Draft 
Communications Data Bill (CDB) 201240, the latest in a long history of attempted 
reforms of surveillance regulation.  In 2006, the Labour government proposed the 
Intercept Modernisation Programme (IMP).  While the IMP was never formalised, 
being dropped after an unpublished (and unfavourable) public consultation in 2009, 
its basis was allegedly the retention of greater amounts of communication data and 
the storage of these in a centralised government database41 (see for example Prince 
2008).  Despite their opposition at the time to these plans the Coalition government 
revived the IMP in 2010 as the Communications Capabilities Development 
Programme (CCDP).  While departing from the idea of a centralised database, these 
plans remained committed to the goal of managing the risk posed by technological 
developments; maintaining the focus on crime prevention and terrorism, the CCDP 
appeared in the 2011 revision to the government’s counter-terrorism strategy 
(CONTEST): 
                                                          
39 Implemented into UK law by Statutory Instrument (Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009). 
40 Since 2012, two further changes have been implemented/planned in the form of the Data Retention 
and Investigatory Powers Act (2014) and the Investigatory Powers Bill (2015). 
41 See Chapter Six (section 6.3) for a discussion of the relevance of centralisation of information. 
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‘…the Government will therefore introduce a programme to preserve the ability 
of the security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies to obtain 
communications data and also to intercept communications within the 
appropriate legal framework.’ (HM Government 2011: 52) 
Data collection, processing and retention thus have a prominent place in the crime 
prevention agenda of the UK government and (reformed) regulation here is 
constantly pursued.  At the same time this is clearly a contentious area and one that 
is proving to be a volatile environment for governments to legislate in, not least 
because of competing interests in personal data.  The public consultation on the CDB 
is the case study that is the basis of Chapter Six.  These documents provide a unique 
insight into the development of digital surveillance capabilities as well as how such 
surveillance is resisted. 
Snowden’s revelations have also shed light on the role of the private sector in the 
activities of the intelligence community.  As should be clear by now, the data held by 
corporations is a gold mine not only in economic terms but also, allegedly, for crime 
prevention purposes.  Internet corporations do not acquiesce easily with 
government requests to hand over the personal data of customers.  However, 
Greenwald et al. (2013b) described the complicity of a number of corporations, 
specifically Microsoft, with the data collection efforts of the NSA.  Data that were 
encrypted, such as video chats using Skype, were made accessible to the NSA 
without the knowledge of users.  It later emerged (Ball et al. 2013b) that the NSA 
was also actively pursuing means to gain access to encrypted information held by 
the likes of Google through sophisticated attempts to break encryption protocols42 
and by covertly influencing software design to make future access easier (creating 
‘back doors’ into software, as mentioned above). 
The reasons why regulation of Internet communication is pursued reveal a complex, 
dynamic interplay of corporate and state interests.  These simultaneously 
competitive and cooperative interests have considerable impact for end-users and, 
clearly, raise important questions about personal data in the context of digital 
surveillance.  Security of personal data emerges as a pressing question, as do the 
purposes for which personal data are collected either in the private sector or by 
intelligence agencies.  The role and necessity of regulation of surveillance powers is 
                                                          
42 One specific form of encryption targeted was ‘Secure Sockets Layer’ which is commonly used to 
protect online purchases. 
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brought into question by these revelations.  The powers requested under the CDB 
were, in hindsight, remarkably similar to those already being practiced.  Existing 
legislation such as the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) is also 
questionable for its ability to curtail the use of such powers.  The discourse around 
digital surveillance in the UK has not yet reached a critical mass but it is in the 
ascendance, helped along by such ‘condensing symbols’43 as the NSA Files.  This is a 
significant point of departure for this research. 
2.4.5 POLICY FUTURES? 
In summing up this overview of the regulatory environment on the Internet, it is 
worth considering the future and what it may hold for Internet users, corporations 
and governments.  Brown et al. (2010) conducted a series of expert focus groups 
designed to reveal opinions as to potential futures for the Internet.  The outcome, 
resembling Webster’s (1995) typology, was four possible scenarios that combine 
technological, economic and social trends. Each scenario depicts a future where the 
influence of a particular political agenda, corporate motive or social trend is 
prioritised.  The four scenarios were shaped in accordance with four contemporary 
trends observed as part of the research process: the continued rise of the Internet 
economy in general; the increased significance of environmental concerns for 
people’s social life; the amalgamation of consumer environments into social media 
platforms and; the role of the Internet as a democratising tool and an arena for 
dissent (Brown et al. 2010: 49-50).  There is insufficient space here to deal with 
every aspect of these scenarios but some relevant features can be drawn out. 
1. Smooth Trip: emphasises the development of the information economy. 
Saturated mobile and Internet markets drive innovation.  Ubiquitous mobile 
Internet access. The Internet community becomes more united against 
commercial and governmental control of cyberspace; however, there is a 
global identity scheme akin to passports that ensure the convenience of an 
Internet-based social and professional life (bearing some resemblance to 
Lessig’s (1999) architecture of identification). 
                                                          
43 See Chapter Seven. 
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2. Going Green: major climatic shifts result in global environmental action.  The 
Internet is the cornerstone of a new green global economy and 
simultaneously acts as a unifying arena for an increasingly network-aware 
citizenry.   
3. Commercial Big Brother: the Internet is primarily a commercially-operated 
domain for advertising, consumption and entertainment; governmental 
engagement online is minimal.  Users are passive, privacy all but disappears 
and user-generated content, innovation and education fade away in a 
commercial environment dominated by big Internet players.   
4. Power to the People: greater user-interconnectedness leads to innovative 
and collaborative community and application building online.  Users have 
greater control over Internet environments and in turn, governments and 
corporations are reactive rather than proactive.  Inclusive technologies and 
politics produce locally-driven, informal social networks that effectively 
resist coercive regulation.   
These scenarios are enlightening for this research.  In each, there are elements that 
speak to a study of surveillance, resistance and control.  Any one of the four 
scenarios feels possible and equally, some aspects appeal more than others.  The 
continued growth of social networks is entirely plausible, as is their potential to 
foster community initiatives.  The commercial value of personal data has already 
been highlighted here and thus it is also reasonable to foresee an Internet future 
that expands upon this.  Brown et al. observe that the Internet will become vital for 
EU citizens in five to ten years’ time (2010: 21), partly as a result of increased online 
delivery of government services.  Such trends are already apparent in the UK, with 
the centralising of several services in one virtual gateway, GOV.uk44.  Corporate and 
government-driven regulation has the potential to produce wide-scale change in 
user experience of the Internet.  In this regard ‘Commercial Big Brother’ seems to be 
a ‘worst case scenario’, particularly from the point of view of a growing culture of 
surveillance, diminished personal privacy and restriction of free exchange of ideas 
online. 
                                                          
44 See Chapter Six. 
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2.5 CULTURE AND THE INTERNET  
The discussion so far has alighted briefly on some of the social and cultural aspects 
of the Internet and information society: the new diversity of Web interfaces, the 
increasing worldwide usage of the Internet and mobile Internet ubiquity.  The 
commentary now turns to two distinct areas of interest: the legacy of hacker culture 
and ‘Web 2.0’.  Here, as in the preceding commentary, we can see the seeds of 
trends that could easily contribute to any of the four ‘policy futures’. 
2.5.1 THE LEGACY OF HACKER CULTURE 
Hacking is a form of ‘cyber trespass’ (Wall 2001).  For Wall, hacking can involve the 
planting of viruses, the misrepresentation of data such as webpages, breaking 
encryption and security measures in order to obtain classified information (‘cyber 
spies’) and targeted cyber-attacks on institutions using methods such as Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) to render a system inoperable or cause economic damage 
(‘cyber terrorists’).  Yet hacking is also associated with the libertarian roots of the 
Internet.  The ‘true’ hackers (Levy 1984) of the 1960s and 1970s were responsible 
for opening up much of the early computer hardware and for contributing to the 
gaming culture of the 1980s.  Added to this, Taylor (2001) tell us about ‘Microserfs’ – 
former hackers who have since joined major computer firms45 – and ‘hacktivists’ 
who are motivated by political goals.  The significance of the history of hacking for 
this thesis is that it is tied to some of the core ideals that continue to motivate 
resistance to repressive forms of online control.  It is also a highly effective and 
creative form of resistance, and the legacy of this is seen in the actions of WikiLeaks. 
WikiLeaks’ Editor-in-Chief Julian Assange was convicted in 1995 of hacking into the 
computer system of telecoms company Nortel46.  Anonymous and their splinter 
group LulzSec are subversive groups of hackers/hacktivists who target institutions, 
businesses and government agencies – and now political movements as well – 
perceived to be undermining Web freedoms with restrictive regulation, privacy-
                                                          
45 Many IT companies, such as Microsoft and Google, also offer financial rewards to hackers and 
computer scientists if they can find vulnerabilities in new software, with the intention of improving the 
security of their products and services for consumers. 
46 His pseudonym ‘Mendax’ translates as ‘noble truth’.  Assange has been described as an ‘ethical 
hacker’ given his code of conduct of not causing any undue harm to computer systems that are hacked. 
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invading surveillance or censorship.  Very few convictions have been brought against 
members of Anonymous, largely as a result of the difficulty in identifying those 
responsible for their actions47.  The resilience of hacker groups such as Anonymous 
and LulzSec (and indeed WikiLeaks, although as a media platform they would not be 
classified as hackers/hacktivists) is due to the distributed nature of their networks 
afforded by the Internet.  This echoes the earlier discussion of protocol (Galloway 
2004); by its very nature, the Internet offers a unique and powerful site for both 
resistance as well as for control.  Hackers operate within the realms of possibility of 
the Internet.  In other words, they exemplify a form of resistance that is made 
possible by the very system that gives rise to the forms of surveillance, censorship 
and corporate control that are the targets of hackers’ actions. 
This provides a foundation on which to answer the research question of why people 
resist surveillance?  As some of the actions of Anonymous and LulzSec demonstrate, 
anti-commercialism is at the heart of hacker culture.  The ethos of hacker culture 
has always been, as Levy (1984: ix) identifies, based around the ideals that ‘all 
information should be free’ and ‘access to computers…should be unlimited and 
total.’  Similarly, British hacker Dr-K stated ‘corporations and governments cannot be 
trusted to use computer technology for the benefit of ordinary people’ (2000: 9). 
In the context of digital surveillance, hackers motivated to subvert the workings of 
proprietary technology are arguably not contributing to a wider discourse about the 
prevalence of online surveillance and collection of personal data.  However, this 
research views the issues as inter-related.  Hacking for whatever purposes 
demonstrate the potential of Internet technology to foster resistance and dissent.  
Moreover, restrictive regulation around the Internet can be understood as part of a 
broader surveillance and control culture that grows out of the possibilities of a 
pervasive, globally networked society.  This is predicated on the desire to know, to 
categorise and to single out for different treatment (see Gandy 1993; Lyon 2003b).  
For commerce, this is for profit.  For government, it is for risk management.  This 
discussion of hacking and hackers is therefore not an isolated one.  It intersects with 
                                                          
47 One ‘Anon’ was recently sentenced to 10 years custody in the US for his role in obtaining and making 
public millions of emails relating to intelligence contractor Stratfor, in the publication of which 
WikiLeaks also played a role (see Pilkington 2013b). The Stratfor case in itself has some relevance to 
this research, as the activities of Stratfor were bound up in the global surveillance-industrial complex. 
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a number of themes unified by the potential of the Internet to act as a site for 
resistance and dissent. 
Not everyone who campaigns against restrictive Internet regulation is a hacker.  
However, they share common ideals and each group exists to the benefit of the 
other.  The shared ethos stems from a desire for the free exchange of ideas and 
knowledge and for limiting the oversight of individuals online by commercial actors 
and governments.  Digital surveillance in its many forms is incorporated under this 
umbrella in that it represents unwanted, or at least dangerous, incursions into 
private and social lives.  To protect against this, a number of practical solutions have 
emerged that permit users to interact differently with the Internet (anonymously for 
the most part) and to protect themselves online from a demonstrably prevalent 
culture of political and economic surveillance.  These tools are open-source and 
community driven.  As such, they represent an important example of a mechanism 
of resistance and also, in the environment they produce, a safe arena for dissent. 
Two of the best examples of these tools which are experiencing greater uptake are 
The Onion Router (Tor) and GNU Pretty Good Privacy (GnuPG).  The Tor Project is run 
primarily by the Electronics Frontier Foundation and among other things, offers an 
Internet browser that allows users to remain anonymous online (i.e. no identifying 
IP address).  GnuPG on the other hand is a piece of software for encrypting and key-
signing communications.  This allows users to send encrypted emails so that any 
interceptor will be unable to read the content and also to electronically ‘sign’ emails 
so that the recipient can verify the sender. 
These mechanisms for ‘surveillance self-defense’48 are effective and becoming more 
widespread as the extent of digital surveillance becomes more widely known.  
However, there are two limitations to the technology.  First, a degree of technical 
competence is required to operate Tor and GnuPG (as only two exmaples) 
effectively.  Second, open-source encryption software (specifically Tor) has been 
targeted by the NSA in its attempts to break forms of online encryption.  
Nevertheless, these tools and others like them are a relevant example of the 
                                                          
48 https://ssd.eff.org/ 
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growing culture of privacy awareness amongst Internet users – and perhaps also an 
ingredient for the ‘Power to the People’ future Internet scenario. 
Here an interesting analytical question arises, which Galloway (2004: 160) helps to 
formulate.  Is resistance to digital surveillance to be understood in individual or 
collective terms?  There is much to be said, as this chapter has shown, about the 
power of networks in contemporary society and thus the potential of collective, 
collaborative resistance.  This is the primary contention of Chapter Five.  However, 
Galloway draws out an alternative perspective.  Hackers’ resistive behaviour is 
equated with the more general rise of Internet awareness among the general public.  
For Galloway hackers are decidedly individual.  Parodying traditional Marxist calls for 
unity, Brand (1987, in Galloway 2004: 160) writes: ‘Workers of the world, fan out.’  
Further to this, the Critical Art Ensemble (CAE, 2009: 22) assert that ‘[t]he use of 
power through number – from labour unions to activist organisations – is bankrupt, 
because such a strategy requires consensus within the resistive party and the 
existence of a centralized, present enemy.’  In the face of distributed/decentralised 
power, resistance needs to operate on the same basis.  This is what the CAE go on to 
refer to as a ‘nomadic’ form of resistance (see also Deleuze and Guattari 1987); if 
you like, a type of guerrilla warfare. 
The distinction between individual and collective resistance is blurred.  We should 
not assume that collective, networked action is the best or, indeed, only way to 
challenge the enactment of control.  Neither must resistance be approached as a 
contest between a powerful and powerless group.  Resistance to surveillance does 
not only come from campaigners for privacy, for instance, but from private sector 
entities with substantial capacities to surveill Internet users.  In other words, the 
configurations of resistance are many and will vary according to context.  In the 
context of the information society, the target of resistance is often where 
technologies are developed or regulated that are perceived to threaten the interests 
of one or more groups.  All of these ideas are evidenced throughout the thesis as 
various forms of networked and individual resistance are explored. 
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2.5.2 WEB 2.0 
The combination of technological and economic antecedents circa-2000 produced 
significant shifts in the way in which every day Internet users experienced the Web 
but also importantly, shaped the Web.  More and more social activity has moved 
online and found new ways to be expressed and engaged with.  Consumption, 
dating, counselling, gaming and finding news have all established an online 
presence.  From the early 2000s, however, the most successful Web enterprises 
were those that re-positioned the user as producer, or rather ‘prosumer’ (Toffler 
1980). 
The term ‘Web 2.0’ was coined in 2004.  Its definition is contested but broadly 
speaking it is intended to refer to a step-change in the way in which users engage 
with the Web.  In comparison to ‘Web 1.0’ – webpages created and edited by 
administrators – Web 2.0 emphasises the shift to user-generated content (UGC).  
Alongside UGC, Anderson (2007) notes five other key trends associated with Web 
2.0: harness the power of the crowd; data on an epic scale; architecture of 
participation; network effects and; openness.  When aggregated, these factors add 
up to increased online participation and collaboration between individuals and 
groups.  As Anderson (2007) phrases it, Web 2.0 ‘lowers the barrier to entry’.  There 
is overlap here with Castells’ (1996) notion of informationalism – knowledge being 
brought to bear upon knowledge.  Despite the emergence of ‘prosumption’, new 
markets have grown out of the value that user participation brings.  The ‘big data’ 
industry and associated consumer analytics are prime examples of this.  In 
topological terms, too, drawing on Webster’s (1995) schema of the information 
society, Web 2.0 draws our attention to the ‘coming together’ of people online to 
collaboratively work and create documents, projects and communities. 
Web 2.0 is not necessarily an accepted phenomenon.  The idea of connecting people 
rather than simply computers as unique to Web 2.0 is rejected by Tim Berners-Lee, 
who, when questioned whether Web 2.0 is about connecting people and facilitating 
collaboration responded: 
‘Totally not. Web 1.0 was all about connecting people. It was an interactive 
space, and I think Web 2.0 is, of course, a piece of jargon, nobody even knows 
what it means.  If Web 2.0 for you is blogs and wikis, then that is people to 
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people.  But that was what the Web was supposed to be all along…the idea of 
the Web as interaction between people is really what the Web is.  That was 
what it was designed to be – as a collaborative space where people can interact’ 
(Berners-Lee 2006). 
With that said, there has been an undeniable increase in Web services that foster 
participation, collaboration and interactivity.  The most prominent example of this is 
social media.  There is insufficient space here to elaborate the many linkages 
between social media, the changing face of the Web and surveillance discourses (for 
example Trottier 2012).  Social media cannot be ignored, however, and hence there 
are a few key points to note. 
The reach of social media is vast.  The largest social media website, measured by 
active users, is Facebook, who claimed to have over 1 billion users in October 2012 
(Facebook 2013).  In July 2013, 100 million people use Facebook on mobile per 
month.  By comparison, Twitter advertises over 230 million active monthly users, 
sending 500 million tweets per day and 76% of whom are active on mobile (Twitter 
2013).  Both of these sites are listed by Alexa Internet (2013) in the global top ten 
most visited websites49.  Also in the top ten are three other social networking sites 
(YouTube, LinkedIn and China’s QQ) and in addition Google, at number one, offers 
social networking services via Google+ launched in 2011.  If nothing else, these 
figures serve to enforce earlier observations regarding the expanding information 
economy. 
Social media demonstrate all of the characteristics of UGC proposed by Anderson 
(2007).  They are by their nature descriptive of UGC.  Problem-solving on social 
media points to its crowdsourcing potential.  Mammoth quantities of data are 
produced by such a volume of users, which are readily amenable to not only social 
science analysis but are collected, processed and sold in the information economy.  
The ‘architecture of participation’ describes the inviting usability and personal 
benefits of social media and the network effects – the suggestion that services get 
better the more users engage with them – are, in essence, the foundation of these 
companies’ business models.  Last, openness in social media can be understood by 
the development of myriad secondary applications and programs that ‘tag-on’ to 
social media or make use of publicly available application programming interfaces 
                                                          
49 Based on monthly traffic rank, calculate from the combined average daily visitors and page views. 
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(APIs) to harness the potential of social media data.  The very concept of ‘sharing’ 
information in these public forums is synonymous with openness.  However, Lessig 
(2006, in Anderson 2007: 25) offers a word of caution here: with social media such 
as YouTube (and the same largely applies to Facebook amongst others) ‘never does 
the system give users an easy way to actually get the content someone else has 
uploaded.’  This begs the question of to what extent ‘Web 2.0’ (at least in the 
corporate service provision sense) is truly collaborative and participatory.  Are these 
qualities reserved, instead, for non-corporate, community-based initiatives that hark 
back to the more liberal, utopian, open-source roots of Web 1.0 technologists? 
The coincidence of Web 2.0 with technological developments already mentioned – 
such as data storage capacity – and economic motivations to do so has meant that 
our personal digital data are increasingly more permanent.  This has led to debates 
about the ‘right to be forgotten’.  As is most often the case, once data are provided 
by us to, say, Facebook, those data are free to be collected, analysed and sold by the 
company.  Should we choose to close our account with Facebook, what happens to 
the data?  That history of social interaction is not forgotten, even if data are deleted 
from your account before leaving. 
Recent social networking applications for mobile phones play on this desire for 
‘ephemeral’ data.  Snapchat is an application that allows users to take a photograph 
and send it to a contact, where it displays on screen for between 1-10 seconds and 
then disappears.  There is no record left on the recipient’s phone50 but they can 
‘screenshot’ the photo.  This system is likely to appeal to a desire for impermanence 
in social media – even more so if the recent trend of teenagers spending less time 
on Facebook in favour of mobile messenger apps continues (Olson 2013).  This may 
not be problematic for most users but it does, at least theoretically, raise the 
possibility of embarrassing images being recovered at a later date.  On a more 
formal level, the ‘right to be forgotten’ appears in the proposed GDPR outlined 
above. 
                                                          
50 It has been demonstrated that with the right forensic data tools Snapchat photographs can be 
recovered from the recipient’s phone (InfoSecurity 2013). 
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Web 2.0 has also featured prominently in the surveillance studies literature, most 
notably for discussions of the surveillance/sousveillance/synoptic51 potential of 
social networking websites.  Trottier (2012) has argued that a characteristic of 
Facebook interactions is the tendency/ability for users to expose others without 
their knowledge – for instance by ‘checking in’52 to locations with friends or tagging 
them in photos and comments. 
These observations of Web 2.0 are important for this thesis in a number of ways.  
Social media represent an important addition to the landscape of digital surveillance 
and control.  For one, we again see the relevance of Lessig’s (1999) architectures of 
identification.  Certain information on Facebook cannot be accessed (e.g. the 
profiles of people you are not friends with) because of who you are verified to be.  
Simultaneously, one’s identity is monitored intensely on Facebook in order to gather 
information that can be sold to advertisers.  This chapter has already emphasised 
the role of commercial regulations online.  These are central to the operation of 
social media but there has also been increased regulatory attention from 
government.  Chapter Six illustrates the attempts made by the UK government in 
2012, in part, to capture social media data about individuals.  The picture is not 
entirely negative however; regulation also dictates social media companies’ 
responsibilities to service users. 
Berners-Lee (2010) was among the first to describe Facebook and its ilk as ‘walled 
gardens’; virtual environments within which corporate owners have control over all 
media, content and access.  His claim that ‘the Web could be broken into 
fragmented islands’ is reminiscent of the decentralised conception of control.  Social 
media are digital surveillance ‘hotspots’ and are consequently significant nodes in 
the nexus of control and governance.  Yet at the same time they offer the resources 
for public debate and online civic engagement, as Chapter Five illustrates.  Once 
again is dualism – of the surveillance and resistance dynamic playing out in the same 
digital spaces – a prominent theme.  The apparent shift in the nature of social 
                                                          
51 See Chapter Three. 
52 Checking-in via Facebook uses either GPS data or user-generated information to display where a user 
is currently situated, for example, a restaurant, the cinema or their home. This is displayed on the 
user’s Facebook Wall as ‘Wil Chivers was at Cardiff University School of Social Sciences with Friends X, 
Y, Z.’ 
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organisation online represented by Web 2.0 is the basis for this – fostering the 
collaborative, networked interaction of individuals. 
Projecting into the future of the Web is a difficult task, given a lack of agreement on 
where we are at present.  However, the vision of Berners-Lee is of a ‘Semantic Web’ 
that understands the context of data.  The effect would be to produce a Web that is 
more intuitive and relevant for users.  Again, this relies on processes that overlap 
significantly with surveillance.  In the context of this research, the Semantic Web 
contributes to the trend towards an ‘Internet of Things’.  This is the idea that more 
of our physical world is becoming connected via the Internet thanks to technology 
such as Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags, micro-sensors that store and 
transmit information about the item to which they are attached: clothing, 
foodstuffs, electronics.  It is a prime example of making more of the world 
surveillable, showing more people doing surveillance and extends Lyon’s (2001) 
classic definition of surveillance to the inanimate world.  As Murakami Wood (2008: 
93, citing Arraya 1995: 233) has also observed, ‘a society of pervasive computing is a 
pervasive surveillance society because it must “give instantaneous access to any 
‘thing’, including tools, books, and people, transforming them into surveillable 
things”’.  Such a note is an appropriate point to draw this discussion of the 
connection between the information society and surveillance to a close. 
2.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THESIS 
This chapter has illuminated the various connections between the contemporary 
information society, digital surveillance and resistance.  These inter-related issues 
are the foundation of the thesis.  The research, outlined in the previous chapter, is 
concerned with exploring the nature of control in the information society, using the 
relationship between digital surveillance and resistance as an analytical lens.  
Gaining even a small appreciation of the numerous and complex ways in which the 
information society has given rise to the potential for new forms of surveillance and 
resistance is a useful first step in this endeavour. 
In particular, the chapter has sought to present two related issues that help to 
ground the research.  The first is the combination of social and technical factors that 
constitute the information society and its relationship to forms of surveillance and 
49 
 
resistance.  The Internet is in one part a technological system that creates the 
possibility for certain kinds of behaviours and processes – including surveillance and 
resistance (Lessig 1999; Galloway 2004).  Equally, the Internet is a social system 
wherein new patterns of order and organisation have emerged.  A product of both 
political and economic motivations, these emphasise informationalism and digital 
surveillance.  Resistance occurs where other social and cultural values are 
promoted; some dating back to the roots of the Internet, others a product of 
continuously evolving forms of online social organisation.  The thesis demonstrates 
that the socio-technical workings of the information society (and the Internet 
specifically) allow us to think about a ‘socio-technical’ form of social control.   
The second issue is regulation.  This thesis is not a study of regulation.  However, the 
relationship between digital surveillance and resistance is influenced greatly by the 
forms of regulation that this chapter has delineated: of the Internet architecture 
that facilitates both surveillance and resistance; of the ways in which people can 
connect and communicate online; of how personal data can be transmitted around 
the world, and; of how communications providers conduct digital surveillance on 
behalf of governments and law enforcement.  These echo the combination of social 
and technological components of control. 
This scene setting of a global, networked and information-based society implicates 
and introduces a breadth of social actors, whose relationships to one another 
constitute the landscape of digital surveillance and resistance.  This foreshadows the 
concept of nodal governance developed in Chapter Three and that guided the choice 
of research sites in the fieldwork.  This implies multiple centres of control, each with 
their own motivations for pursuing surveillance or resisting surveillance.  Those 
involved both compete and cooperate with one another (Wood and Shearing 2007; 
Fuchs 2008), which connects to the earlier discussion of the simultaneously 
individualised and collective nature of resistance.  Resistance to digital surveillance, 
then, is more complex than opposing dominant power.  There are cultural, 
technological and political influences on how and why resistance (to surveillance) 
occurs.  The story of surveillance and resistance is an old one but it finds new energy 
in the contemporary information society. 
-.-- --- ..-  .-- . .- .-. -.--  --. .. .- -. - ...  --- ..-.  ..-. .-.. . ... ....  .- -. -..  ... - . . .-.. --..--
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS: SURVEILLANCE, 
CONTROL AND GOVERNANCE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the major theoretical constructs and debates that guide this 
research: social control and surveillance.  While in many ways theories of 
surveillance are a subset of the broader concept of social control, the relatively 
young discipline of surveillance studies has much to contribute.  Given that the aim 
of this thesis is to examine the relationship between surveillance and resistance and 
what it can tell us about contemporary forms of control, there are several themes 
from the surveillance literature that can be drawn out, particularly where they 
intersect with dominant theoretical approaches to social control.  The aim of this 
chapter, then, is to lay out current and historical thinking about social control 
(underpinned by notions of power) and to illustrate how studies of surveillance fit 
within these discussions and contribute to the framing of the research. 
These tasks also entail developing an appreciation of the theory of nodal 
governance.  This theory guides the analysis in Chapter Five but, as described in 
Chapter One, it also structured the fieldwork.  It is important, therefore, to 
understand how nodal governance fits with theories of control and with the 
approach that was adopted during the research.  Reflecting the previous chapter, 
this chapter argues for a conception of control alert to its networked, flexible 
character in the contemporary information society.  This is an approach that, in 
some ways, challenges the orthodoxy of a Foucauldian reading of contemporary 
surveillance and also necessitates examining a broad range of social actors and 
domains implicated in practices of digital surveillance and resistance. 
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3.2 IDEAS OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
Social control is a concept employed widely across the social sciences.  Although 
each disciplinary treatment brings with it intrinsic assumptions about the nature of 
the subject under scrutiny, there have been key influences from the major 
theoretical traditions of the social sciences that have shaped how social control has 
come to be understood.  The earliest engagements with ideas of social control – 
which pre-date the coining of the term as such – can be seen in the foundations of 
modern social science.  Marx, Weber and Durkheim all grappled with questions of 
social order, conformity, conflict and deviance, all of which are important 
constituents of the study of social control.  The influence of these early thinkers can 
still be seen in the formulations of control described here. 
This discussion traces the major contours in thinking about social control.  The 
various approaches that are outlined touch, in different ways, upon issues that 
relate to surveillance.  These connections are returned to later where the discussion 
focuses more explicitly on key issues in the surveillance literature. 
3.2.1 CAPITALISM, INFORMATION AND CONTROL 
Radical perspectives on social control emphasise the inherent conflict in society 
caused by the capitalist system (e.g. Bonger 1969) or other relations of domination 
and subordination (Dahrendorf 1959).  It is with the state that the power to exercise 
social control lies, in order to maintain the social order necessary for the functioning 
of the economy.  While state control today may not be as overt as described in the 
earlier works of Marx, there is still considerable attention given to the forms of 
control enacted by powerful capitalist institutions that are designed to maintain the 
status quo of the modern economy.  Turk (1982) describes how the form of control 
enacted by these institutions has become more subtle – a ‘soft’ form of control.  A 
contemporary parallel here is with Lessig (1999) whose ‘bovine metaphor’ suggests 
that control is best achieved online by means of small ‘nudging’ practices rather than 
coercive enforcement. 
The previous chapter described the informationalising of today’s economy and the 
shifting relationship between state and private sector that is crucial for this research.  
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Online, private sector corporations exert significant influence in shaping social 
engagement with technology.  Meanwhile, the government works on two fronts: 
ensuring a stable, competitive economy and protecting the public against deviance 
in a new virtual environment.  The lessons of the radical perspective on control, 
therefore, are still pertinent.  A prominent example is Fuchs (2008) who provides an 
in-depth analysis of the role played by governments and the private sector in 
shaping the socio-technical Internet environment.  He argues that the global, 
networked information economy is characterised chiefly by structural inequalities; 
‘segmented spaces in which central hubs (transnational corporations, certain 
political actors, regions, countries, Western lifestyles, and worldviews) centralize the 
production, control, and flows of economic, political and cultural capital’ (2008: 
119).  Competition, then, defines the contemporary information society. 
An important consideration therefore is the perceived legitimacy for the capitalist 
system and support for the dominant discourse on the need to control online 
deviance.  Media provide government with an avenue for achieving this.  The 
construction of deviance and deviants in the press and ultimately the generation of 
‘moral panics’ can legitimise the need for (increased) social control of certain 
populations (Cohen 1972; Hall et al. 1978)53.  Government frequently portrays 
greater surveillance powers in the press as necessary for combating terrorism.  
However, their ability to control this discourse has been challenged by the 
emergence of a new media ecosystem that capitalises on the subversive possibilities 
provided by Internet communication (see Associated Press 2013).  Fuchs (2008: 119-
20) again picks up on this tension; the information economy ‘is an antagonistic space 
that by producing new networks of domination also produces networks of liberation 
that undermine the centralisation of wealth and power that has thus far been 
achieved by networking.’  Competition is thereby challenged by logics of 
cooperation. 
Traditional conceptions place the locus of control with the state, although more 
recent analyses such as that of Fuchs (2008) do acknowledge the shift to other 
(commercial) institutions.  However, a limitation is the modernist, binary conception 
of power that is its basis: power is ‘something that is possessed by the dominant and 
                                                          
53 Chapter Seven is oriented around these themes. 
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wielded against the subordinate; the subordinate may, in turn, resist and attempt to 
seize power’ (Raby 2005: 152).  A number of assumptions follow from this.  Chiefly, 
power is a one-sided resource.  You have it, or you do not.  While there are strengths 
to the radical approach to social control, this formulation of power limits its 
explanatory capacity in the context of contemporary social control.  Work discussed 
below (Sharp et al. 2000) is a helpful remedy to this, as are post-structuralist 
conceptions of control. 
3.2.2 POST-STRUCTURALISM, DISCIPLINE AND CONTROL 
The post-structural approach, by contrast, sees power as distributed strategically 
across the various institutions of society.  The state retains an important position in 
the apparatus of control but this perspective recognises the dispersal of control 
functions beyond the sole remit of the state.  This clearly differs from the modernist 
basis of radical theories, which, as Hollander and Einwohner (2004: 550) note, 
‘ignores the fact that there are multiple systems of hierarchy, and that individuals 
can be simultaneously powerful and powerless within different systems.’  Raby 
(2005: 162) adds to this, asserting that ‘power is enacted by all, and people occupy 
multiple subjectivities, or locations in relations of power.’  Power, then, is not 
possessed or wielded solely by one group.  Instead, it is a relation that flows 
throughout the institutions and citizenry of a society.  The contention of this 
research is that this distribution of power is amplified as an effect of the global, 
networked information society. 
The main proponent of this conception of power and control is Michel Foucault.  
Foucault’s contention, primarily drawn from Discipline and Punish (1977) but found 
elsewhere in his works (Foucault 1991), was that modern society was characterised 
by the dispersal into wider society – beyond closed penal institutions – of a 
particular logic of control: discipline.  This broad social project was what Foucault 
called governmentality or ‘the art of government’, but it was not limited to the state 
and politics.  Rather, this described the organisation of rationalities and techniques 
for controlling human behaviour and producing a ‘self-controlling’ populace that met 
the needs and requirements of the (then) dominant factory system.  Such 
‘normalising’ strategies were influenced by the growth of natural and behavioural 
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sciences, which generated new understanding about the interaction, organisation 
and psychology of the human subject.  Knowledge, therefore, assisted in the 
categorisation and classification of behaviour – in particular deviancy – that was 
central to the operation of this governing mentality.  Discipline was thus a 
‘technology of the mind’, a form of control that Foucault (1977) described as ‘soul 
training’.  He argued this marked a significant departure from earlier societies 
characterised by sovereign monarchical authority and its accompanying strategy of 
practising control with spectacular, bodily and lethal acts of punishment.  Discipline 
was thus a subtler, more pervasive form of control. 
Nevertheless, Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power was in many ways a product 
of its age.  Deleuze (1992) updated the concept, arguing that as a disciplinary society 
was borne of the factory system of labour, the evolving information society 
characterised by the machinery of computers, networked organisation and data 
flows required a new model of understanding power.  A ‘control society’ by 
comparison, then, operated on a much more granular level.  Individuals were (or 
indeed, are) no longer the unit of knowledge.  Instead they are ‘dividuals’ 
constituted by numerous data streams that are a product of large amounts of 
information that is volunteered or collected about people and aggregated to provide 
a picture of broader social patterns.  The parallel with the trends of the information 
society outlined in the previous chapter is clear, as is the connection to ideas of 
digital surveillance discussed later. 
The lessons of discipline and control are important and both have their merits.  
Foucault’s (1977) dispersal metaphor and basis of power in knowledge of human 
subjects are just as instructive as Deleuze’s (1992) necessary update of this work to 
fit with global, networked and distributed patterns of social organisation.  Foucault’s 
work has of course had a major influence in the field of surveillance studies.  This 
legacy should be acknowledged, not because it provides a universal model for 
understanding contemporary control or surveillance practices, but because it allows 
us to question current logics of control.  There is also a degree of continuation into 
present forms of control.  However, there are also many limitations.  The accuracy of 
Foucault’s historical analysis, for example, is questioned by Garland (1985, 2001), 
whose later work is arguably more sophisticated and rigorous.  Equally, to return to 
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the primary critique outlined in Chapter One, the top-down model of surveillance 
that Foucault’s panoptic metaphor suggests is inappropriate in the contemporary 
networked information society.  This point is at the heart of this research. 
3.2.3 ‘POST-SOCIAL’ CONTROL AND NODAL GOVERNANCE 
The post-structural perspective typified by Foucault and the patterns he identified 
were developed in the work of Stan Cohen (1985).  Cohen noted a number of 
different trends that broke with those previously observed.  Specifically, the state 
was divested of their monopoly over deviants and deviancy.  However, the 
progressive intentions behind this ‘destructuring impulse’ were undermined; the 
result, ironically, was to extend the ‘nets’ of social control more widely, intensely 
and invisibly across society.  Consequently, delegating control of deviancy to the 
community was subsumed by the control of communities.  A broader spectrum of 
individuals and groups were caught up in a more pervasive and subtle control nexus.  
Rather than replacing the state-based control regime, the new formations 
augmented existing strategies with the result that the system became increasingly 
punitive.  As this trend continued, the boundary between public and private domains 
was blurred; security and control were commodified and an array of private 
interests infiltrated their delivery (Shearing and Stenning 1981, 1983, 1985).  
Cohen’s reformulation of the character of modern social control bears some 
resemblance to the patterns identified by Foucault – primarily the dispersed 
character of control – but in other respects it paved the way for novel thinking about 
social control that recognised the plurality of actors beyond the state with a stake in 
the system and the manifold aims that guided the questions of whom and how to 
regulate through control mechanisms. 
The same conception of power underpins this approach.  The central idea that 
control is pluralistic is extended by Johnston and Shearing (2003; see also Shearing 
and Wood 2003; Wood and Shearing 2007).  Based on the earlier intellectual 
foundations of Shearing and Stenning’s work (above), these authors sought to 
develop an alternative language of social control.  One that moved beyond concerns 
with the ‘social’ (hence ‘post-social’ control) as both a target and location for control 
and advocated in its place distinct and varied locales or sites of governance – nodes.  
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‘Nodal governance’ therefore implies the presence of networks of governing entities 
with different aims and ideas about the governance of security. Increasingly, these 
‘mentalities’ (Burris et al. 2005) are centred on managerialism, risk and prevention 
(Feeley and Simon 1994).  This is due partly to the presence of private auspices of 
control alongside state agencies, as intimated above.  This ‘blurring of governing 
mentalities’ (Wood and Shearing 2007: 29) – the recognition that other ways of 
thinking about the problem of security may be more effective – mirrors the patterns 
identified earlier by Cohen.  On the same note the nodal governance perspective 
‘is not one that assumes a decline in state authority and power. Indeed, one 
could argue that state power is now even more diffuse and pervasive through 
the ways in which it governs through the knowledge, capacity and resources of 
others. The conceptual shift we advocate is simply one that recognizes the 
diversity of entities…that function as auspices or providers of security…’ (Wood 
and Shearing 2007: 33-34). 
Burris et al. (2005: 37-38) suggest that alongside specific ways of thinking about the 
matters they seek to govern (mentalities) nodes have specific methods 
(‘technologies’) for exerting their influence, the ‘resources’ to support their 
operation and have an ‘institutional’ form that allows the ‘directed mobilization’ of 
these three characteristics54.  Importantly, nodes exist; they are not simply 
theoretical points in a network.  The implication for this thesis is that their character 
and the relations between them can be explored empirically. 
Wood and Shearing (2007: 27-28) observe that whether nodes come together to 
form networks is, likewise, an issue to be explored empirically.  In language that 
resonates with Fuchs (2008), it is not a given that networking or cooperation exists 
between the multiplicity of actors involved in the system.  Indeed, there can be 
competition between nodes – how, where and whom should be governed.  This 
framing of governance (or control, whichever language we choose to use) as 
something that is negotiated and constructed as well as both coordinated and 
uncoordinated is one that guides the analysis in this research.  The theme of 
competition and cooperation introduced in Chapter Two is an enduring one in this 
thesis and Chapters Five and Six pay particular attention to this antagonism.   
                                                          
54 There is some conceptual overlap here with the literature on social movements that suggests groups 
and organisations can have more or less influence depending on their ability to mobilise resources.  
While this thesis does not delve into these debates, the parallel should be noted in the context of the 
analysis in Chapter Five. 
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Nodes are both governing and governed entities.  They seek to enact their own 
forms of governance/control while at the same time being subject to forms of 
influence and mobilisation by other nodes.  For instance a key dynamic that is seen 
at play in this research is that because private sector CSPs have extensive digital 
surveillance capabilities, the state attempts to regulate their conduct to harness 
these resources for crime prevention purposes.  Resistance, the thesis argues, is 
therefore a part of the system of nodal governance insofar as nodes compete 
against one another for ownership of their various forms of social, cultural and 
economic capital (Bourdieu 1986; Dupont 2003, 2006) – their mentalities, 
technologies and resources55.  However, what seem to be missing from the literature 
on nodal governance are the broader forms of resistance to the technologies of 
governance.  In applied terms, this means resistance to the practices of surveillance 
that public or private nodes seek to implement.  There is a global network of 
organisations that seek to resist surveillance practices56.  These entities are as much 
governing nodes as the state and private auspices in that through their interactions 
with these entities they contribute to shaping the character of contemporary 
control.  What we see, then, and what the empirical aspects of this thesis illustrate is 
that some nodes are engaged predominantly in resistance activity (civil society 
actors and media platforms), some are engaged more with surveillance as a form of 
control (the state) and others occupy both positions, being agents of surveillance for 
their own or others’ purposes at the same time as resisting the efforts of the state to 
co-opt their resources and technologies (CSPs). 
The conceptual shift that connects the theory of nodal governance to the broader 
‘post-social’ approach to control is one that illuminates the plurality of actors 
involved in shaping control and how their varying mentalities and technologies 
influence the character of control.  Governance, then, is about management of social 
systems.  Nodal governance ‘is an elaboration of contemporary network theory that 
explains how a variety of actors operating within social systems interact…to govern 
the systems they inhabit’ (Burris et al. 2005: 33).  The potential inherent in such 
networks has been amplified in the information society: ‘information technology has 
allowed networks to retain adaptability and at the same time to achieve superior 
                                                          
55 See Chapter Five and, later, Chapter Eight. 
56 See Chapter Five. 
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levels of coordination and management’ (Burris et al. 2005: 37).  Equally, the need to 
govern via networks is amplified in the context of global communication and the 
new risks presented by the contemporary information society.  As with Deleuze’s 
reworking of Foucault’s disciplinary society, the theory of nodal governance is 
designed to fit alongside and explain contemporary patterns of global, networked 
social organisation.  The unit of analysis in accordance with this approach are the 
various nodes that constitute such networks.  The framework for this thesis is based 
on precisely this idea.  The fieldwork examines different nodes involved in the 
dynamic relationship between digital surveillance and resistance: civil society 
groups, the state, communications service providers and media platforms.  In turn 
this allows for a discussion of the character of contemporary social control. 
3.3 SURVEILLANCE AND SOCIETY 
The second half of this chapter provides a critical overview of the treatment of 
surveillance in the literature, including how it fits alongside accounts of social 
control and how resistance to surveillance has been explored to date.  Throughout 
this discussion, a typology (of sorts) is developed for understanding different forms 
and features of digital surveillance: panoptic, political, economic, lateral and 
resistive are all ways of thinking about surveillance that will be useful for the analysis 
later in this thesis. 
3.3.1 DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE DEFINED 
Surveillance is a mode of social control.  It features in this thesis as a vital part of this 
apparatus, particularly as a result of the proliferation of tools and techniques of 
surveillance made possible by the growth of the Internet.  The most frequently cited 
definition of surveillance is: 
‘any collection and processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for 
the purposes of managing and influencing those whose data have been 
garnered’ (Lyon 2001: 2). 
The parallels in this definition with concepts of control and power will be returned 
to.  Lyon’s definition for the time being allows us to grasp the breadth of activity that 
might be associated with contemporary digital surveillance.  Other authors have 
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sought to provide a degree of clarity as to precisely what sorts of practices ‘count’ as 
surveillance.  Marx (2002: 12) defines ‘new surveillance’ as ‘the use of technical 
means to extract or create personal data’ that can be drawn from individuals or 
contexts.  This draws attention to the continuing evolution of tools of surveillance 
beyond our own senses and self-reporting of information.  Moreover, extraction of 
data from contexts as well as individuals, signals the trend towards techniques for 
pattern recognition and analysis.  Marx also aims to distinguish ‘new’ surveillance by 
its move away from purely visual forms of surveillance, such as CCTV, which have 
long held the primary position in society as the most readily identifiable form (both 
physically and metaphorically) of surveillance.  As the synopsis in Chapter One 
described, surveillance as a crime prevention mechanism in the UK developed 
primarily around CCTV strategies.  Marx’s observations are helpful for this research 
insofar as they point towards the on-going technological advancement of 
surveillance in the information society and its capacity to render people and 
contexts visible in increasingly sophisticated ways. 
Fuchs (2008) also adds to this definitional debate, distinguishing between 
‘monitoring’ and surveillance (see also Giddens 1985) as well as the various motives 
that exist in the information society for conducting surveillance.  Andrejevic (2005) 
has questioned the impact for understanding surveillance in light of the increasing 
number of ways in which people can communicate and connect with one another 
online (Web 2.0 services such as social media are a prime example here).  The thrust 
of his observation is that such connectivity facilitates peer-to-peer or lateral forms of 
surveillance.  In this sense, information technologies empower people to become 
surveillance agents – able to (covertly) observe the actions of romantic interests, 
family and friends – at the same time as they subject themselves to surveillance by 
others.  Fuchs (2008) hesitates to identify this trend as surveillance, preferring 
instead to designate this as monitoring.  The difference between monitoring and 
surveillance comes down to motivation.  Monitoring is the ‘general notion of 
providing and gathering information with the help of electronic systems’, whereas 
surveillance is ‘the gathering of information on individuals or groups in order to 
control their behaviour’ (Fuchs 2008: 268).  Controlling behaviour is done for 
political or economic purposes; therefore surveillance is either a product of state 
efforts to control deviancy or private sector pursuit of profit through electronic 
   60 
 
commerce.  Surveillance, for Fuchs (see also Ogura 2006), is about influencing or 
managing human conduct57 and therefore we see a good deal of similarity with 
Lyon’s (2001) earlier definition. 
A number of observations follow from this.  It may not be necessary to distinguish 
between monitoring and surveillance.  The reason for this is that surveillance implies 
a power dynamic; it signifies the capability to watch, observe or gather information 
about someone or something else.  The etymology of ‘surveillance’ (to ‘watch over’) 
is a simple point that underpins many of the theoretical expositions of surveillance.  
While digital surveillance still incorporates these power dynamics, it does not follow 
that this must be a hierarchical relationship.  Andrejevic’s ‘lateral surveillance’ is 
preferred here to ‘monitoring’ because the former still points to the power dynamics 
at play58.  Lateral surveillance does not involve the violence of the law or the market 
(Fuchs 2008: 267).  However, there is an element of influencing other people 
through the carefully managed interpersonal interactions we engage in within online 
spaces, whether this is volunteering audience-specific information about ourselves 
(making ourselves ‘surveillable’) or monitoring the activities of others to guide our 
interactions with them. 
Nevertheless, Fuchs is correct that it is important to be aware of the different 
motivations for surveillance.  The primary drivers behind digital forms of surveillance 
are indeed political and economic.  This fits with the discussion of the formative 
influences on the information society in Chapter Two.  A chief characteristic or effect 
of surveillance – one that predates the contemporary information society but has 
been enhanced significantly by its continued expansion – is ‘social sorting’ (Lyon 
2003b).  This is the social and economic categorisation of people and groups that 
aids the goal of surveillance to influence and manage populations.  In the 
commercial realm, ‘the panoptic sort’ (Gandy 1993) refers to singling out certain 
consumers for differential treatment or targeted advertising based on analysis of 
personal data.  Gandy’s earlier elaboration of this concept has found new currency 
with digital surveillance technologies.  These practices are at the heart not only of 
                                                          
57 Referring to Haggerty’s (2006) observations regarding the potential for surveillance of non-human 
entities (bacteria, space, flora and fauna for example), Fuchs also classes these as monitoring. 
58 ‘Interpersonal’ or ‘participatory’ (Albrechtslund 2008) surveillance could also aptly describe the 
process and highlights the lack of political or economic motive.   
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online and electronic commerce (economic surveillance) but also increasingly in the 
efforts to identify risky or dangerous categories of people (political surveillance).  
We are often unaware of the existence of these various economic and political 
categories and of the fact that we may be allocated to them.  Regardless, we are 
funnelled into these categories through surveillance of personal data that we supply 
(often willingly) online.  As Lyon notes, 
‘in everyday life our life-chances are continually checked or enabled and our 
choices are channelled using various means of surveillance. The so-called digital 
divide is not merely a matter of access to information. Information itself can be 
the means of creating divisions’ (2003b: 2). 
The terms ‘categorical suspicion’ (Marx 1988) and ‘categorical seduction’ (Lyon 
2007) neatly capture the dynamics of political and economic surveillance in these 
cases.  While the ends are different, the same philosophy underpins both; that 
people can be ordered, classified, profiled and managed in various ways.  However, 
as a result of burgeoning data available about individuals and populations, the 
distinction between political and economic surveillance has become blurred.  This is 
the same message Cohen (1985) stated with regards to post-social control. 
A note on which to conclude this initial (and admittedly brief) foray into surveillance 
studies returns to an idea from Chapter One: the concept of ‘visibility’.  Visibility is a 
helpful tool for this research.  It is also one that translates well across the changing 
landscape of surveillance studies.  Foucault (1977) pointed towards the ‘state of 
permanent visibility’ imbued into prisoners in Bentham’s Panopticon.  The expansion 
of this disciplinary mode of power rendered wider sections of the population visible 
in other senses.  As Marx (2002) suggested, surveillance has evolved from purely 
visual/sensory observation to more granular and context-based forms, based on the 
extraction and creation of information.  This is a process amplified as ICTs have 
developed and infiltrated most aspects of our daily lives.  Our shopping habits make 
us visible to commercial entities.  The concurrent trend of volunteering large 
amounts of personal information in online spaces shows people making themselves 
visible, both to public and private bodies but also to friends, acquaintances and 
strangers.  There can be elements of empowerment or performativity (Koskela 2004) 
in divulging information creatively or for different audiences but the overall effect is 
to contribute to a greater state of personal, social, political and economic visibility.  
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Visibility is revisited below, for as well as digital forms of surveillance we can also 
understand resistance to surveillance in terms of visibility. 
3.3.2 A DIGITAL PANOPTICON? 
Having laid out some of the prominent conceptualisations of contemporary digital 
surveillance, the next task is to examine the fit between these and the approaches 
to social control discussed earlier.  To return to Lyon’s (2001) definition of 
surveillance, we can immediately see parallels with the disciplinary perspective of 
Foucault; surveillance is about managing and influencing individuals and groups.  
However, there is a distinctly contemporary feel to Lyon’s definition that perhaps 
extends beyond what Foucault suggested.  ‘Processing of personal data’ speaks 
more of information flows characteristic of the information society.  Moreover, if 
data do not need to be identifiable, there is a level of abstraction in surveillance; it 
suggests that a level of control can be achieved without having to connect 
knowledge to specific subjects.  Detailed knowledge about individuals’ habits and 
preferences garnered from surveillance of their online activity does not need to be 
attributed to a known individual.  Instead, our actions online create digital 
‘doppelgangers’ that are taken to be an accurate representation of us.  To reiterate, 
the designation of digital surveillance throughout this thesis is intended to refer to 
those surveillance practices that have evolved and expanded in tandem with those 
of the information society described in Chapter Two. 
Historically at least, surveillance has been understood as a top-down or one-way 
process.  Foucault’s (1977) study once again provides the classic example; a good 
deal of research and theorising about modern surveillance has been influenced by 
Foucault’s panoptic metaphor, adapted from Bentham’s (1791) classic design of a 
circular prison with a central watchtower59.   The enduring tenet of Foucault’s 
discussion is that the panopticon would induce in a subject ‘a state of conscious and 
permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power’ (Foucault 
1977: 201).  As above, this technique was central to Foucault’s conception of 
governmentality.  To what extent the panopticon remains a helpful model for 
understanding the breadth of modern surveillance is, however, contested (see 
                                                          
59 See McLaughlin and Muncie (2013: 16-22). 
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Deleuze 1992; Poster 1996; Bogard 2006; Latour 1998; Haggerty 2006).  As Lyon 
(2003a: 4) suggests ‘it is not clear that [models like the panopticon] are entirely 
helpful ways of understanding surveillance today.’  Yet at the same time, Lyon 
(2006) also acknowledges that ‘the panopticon refuses to go away.’  It is an enduring 
theoretical model for understanding surveillance.  At first glance, it is clear why this 
might be so in the information society.  Robins and Webster for instance claim that 
information technologies are a logical extension of the panopticon because they 
‘monitor the activities, tastes and preferences of those who are networked…Power 
expresses itself as surveillance and Panopticism, now on the scale of society as a 
whole’ (1999: 118, 122).  Other authors, including Lyon (1994) and Poster (1990, 
1996), have attempted to contemporise the lessons of the panopticon, proposing 
new frameworks such as the ‘electronic panopticon’ or ‘superpanopticon’ 
respectively.   However the evolution of the information society is such that 
totalising models of the type to which Lyon (2003a) refers are indeed undesirable for 
capturing the complex dynamics of contemporary surveillance and, by extension, 
social control.  To reiterate the position from Chapter One, the theoretical basis of 
this research is that Foucault’s model for understanding surveillance requires 
rethinking in the information society.  In its place a distributed, networked, nodal 
conception of surveillance (and resistance) is proposed. 
There are, then, patterns of contemporary digital surveillance that challenge the 
utility of the panopticon as an analytical frame.  Norris (2003) for example argues 
that while widespread CCTV use does bear many similarities to the panopticon, its 
increasing digitalisation serves to exclude individuals and groups, rather than include 
(normalise) them.  Likewise the ‘social sorting’ (Lyon 2003b) capacities of 
contemporary surveillance necessitate more attention; the gearing of surveillance 
towards prediction, prevention and risk management through the use of 
interconnected, searchable databases represents a very different manifestation of 
surveillance. 
Related to this is Haggerty and Ericson’s (2000) ‘surveillant assemblage’.  This 
concept is immensely useful for the thesis as it ties together the patterns identified 
above in respect of nodal governance with the contemporary organisation of 
surveillance.  It depicts contemporary surveillance as ‘rhizomatic’ – organised in an 
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expansive, horizontal, networked fashion, spread across the breadth of social 
institutions.  For example CCTV, as described by Norris and Armstrong (1999), can be 
seen as an assemblage comprised of computers, people, telecommunications and 
cameras (Haggerty and Ericson 2000: 614).  It goes further than the panopticon in 
one sense in that it extends the analysis of surveillance beyond a government 
‘project’, incorporating a plurality of actors such as private entities into relationships 
of surveillance.  It consequently extends it in another sense insofar as this 
necessitates a shift in thinking about surveillance in top-down terms, which 
coincides with patterns identified so far in the chapter.  In the same way that the 
theory of nodal governance points towards the simultaneous competition and 
cooperation that can exist between governing entities, Haggerty and Ericson (2000) 
show how the surveillant assemblage comprises relationships that can either be ad 
hoc or more permanent.  In addition, the rhizome60 metaphor indicates the ‘under 
the surface’ quality of surveillance and, to an extent, unpredictability about how 
surveillance practices will emerge. 
Other parallels with the theory of nodal governance emerge if we consider shifts in 
the governing mentalities of surveillance.  Governing nodes can be equated with 
actors in the surveillant assemblage; each has a specific way of thinking about 
surveillance and the technologies and resources for doing it.  The chapter has shown 
that contemporary surveillance is designed to meet many ends.  As a result, new 
subjects are constituted, new classifications and categories found.  Big data 
analytics, for instance, provide the means to extract new forms of data and 
knowledge at the level of whole populations (Housley et al. 2014).  There is, 
therefore, a stretching beyond the boundaries of control that is designed to 
normalise deviants; powerful economic motives dictate the character of much digital 
surveillance.  In these contexts, the applicability of Foucault’s governing rationality 
of discipline is questionable.  We could also think about the overt and covert nature 
of surveillance.  For Foucault, surveillance was somewhere in the middle.  
Observation had to be seen as a possibility by subjects – so not completely covert – 
yet not so blatant as to be coercive; this would negate the aim of changing the 
subject’s relation to him or herself.  Today, there is little doubt: we are constantly 
                                                          
60 A rhizome is an organic structure; a root system that links otherwise seemingly dispersed and 
disconnected plants. 
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being surveilled.  Although we may be unaware to precisely what extent, particularly 
online, we accept it.  As mentioned in Chapter Two, this is often for the sake of 
convenience, access to services or for reward and benefits. 
Panopticism signals directionality in surveillance.  For all it says about the dispersal 
into society of a particular logic of control, the panoptic metaphor is tied to a top-
down conceptualisation of power: the few watch the many.  Critiques – or perhaps 
more appropriately adaptations – of the Foucauldian reading of surveillance are not, 
however, limited only to highlighting the more fluid, nebulous character of 
surveillance and control in contemporary society.  Mathiesen’s (1997) exposition of 
the ‘synopticon’ was an attempt to rethink and invert panoptic principles in an age 
of new and expanding media.  Using entertainment and news media as primary 
examples, Mathiesen argues that where the panopticon enabled the few to watch 
the many, the synopticon enables the many to watch the few.  By this Mathiesen 
referred to the ways in which the public can observe the lives and actions of the 
powerful through a multiplying number of media channels.  However, the 
synopticon, despite inverting the panoptic gaze, was not liberating but instead 
intensified the repressive aspects of surveillance.  Mathiesen noted, pessimistically, 
that ‘taken as a whole things are much worse than Foucault imagined’ (1997: 231).  
Coleman (2013) reinforces this point.  A persistent stream of media messages about 
how we should admire the ways of the powerful few is, he suggests, a way to keep 
us in thrall to control. 
Although Mathiesen’s argument is a necessary addition to thinking about 
surveillance in contemporary society – particularly given the importance this 
research places on new forms of media and communication – the inversion of the 
surveillance relationship is overly simplistic.  While it is accurate that new media 
allow the public to observe the lives of the elite (politicians, celebrities and their ilk) 
the ability of the few to watch the many remains a potent counter-balance to this.  
Further critiques of Mathiesen’s (1997) work also suggest he underplays the role of 
the Internet.  Doyle (2011) for instance suggests that contemporary online media 
have expanded further and far more rapidly than Mathiesen’s analysis can account 
for.  An example of this is social media.  The forms of ‘lateral surveillance’ 
(Andrejevic 2005) identified above arguably usher in a state where the ‘many watch 
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the many’.  New media, then, continue to produce new dynamics of surveillance.  So 
too do they produce new dynamics of resistance: the synopticon is one concept 
used to inform the analysis presented in Chapter Seven of the potential of new 
media platforms to invert surveillance relationships. 
There are conflicting tendencies in digital surveillance.  There is hierarchy in 
surveillance (such as political and economic surveillance) but there is also 
horizontality; recall from Chapter Two the evidence of this in both technological and 
social terms.  This antagonism is at the centre of the issues explored in this research.  
Not only is power dispersed throughout society into multiple centres, it is also 
dispersed rhizomatically across a breadth of actors who both enact and resist or 
subvert control practices.  Herein lies another criticism often directed at Foucault’s 
analysis, namely that he leaves no room for considering resistance against 
disciplinary power.  Doyle (2011) makes the same criticism of Mathiesen’s 
synopticon; media channels can challenge the status quo, not only reinforce it.  
Nevertheless, the post-structuralist influence on social control endures by alerting us 
to the dispersal of power throughout society.  This decentred, multiple, fragmented 
character of control is what is taken forward in this research.  Acknowledging such 
networked and diffuse power and control also means recognising that resistance to 
one or other practice of social control or surveillance may not be sufficient to 
dismantle the whole apparatus.  With that in mind, the final theme of this discussion 
turns to accounts of surveillance and resistance. 
3.3.3 SURVEILLANCE AND RESISTANCE 
Resistance is a comparatively under-researched and under-theorised issue in the 
field of surveillance studies (Fernandez and Huey 2009).  There are several studies 
that are important milestones in our thinking about the relationship between 
surveillance and resistance (see for example Gilliom 2001; Bennett 2008; Marx 2003; 
Mann et al. 2003), and empirical research into resistance has gathered pace (see Bell 
2009; Introna and Gibbons 2009; Martin et al. 2009; Marx 2009; Sanchez 2009; 
Wells and Wills 2009) but overall there is still work to be done in developing a critical 
understanding of how, why, where and by whom surveillance is resisted.  Examining 
some of the trends in the existing literature on resistance helps to signify the 
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connections with the theoretical stance adopted in this research.  This thesis is, of 
course, also designed to continue developing an empirical and theoretical 
understanding of resistance and surveillance. 
Marx (2003) outlines eleven61 ‘behavioural techniques of neutralization’ by which 
surveillance technologies can be resisted.  Broadly, these ‘moves’ involve deliberate 
detection, identification and evasion of surveillance technologies or practices, 
confrontation and (physical) retaliation against surveillance systems, confounding of 
the information displayed or given to surveillance systems, and inverting the 
surveillance gaze.  The examples Marx provides are primarily of ‘real world’ 
surveillance practices, although there is some mention of electronic forms of 
economic surveillance – for instance refusing to comply with supermarket loyalty 
schemes.  For that reason, the work of Dupont (2008) is also enlightening.  
Acknowledging Marx’s earlier work, Dupont turns his attention to online examples 
of resistance to surveillance.  In particular, cryptography and anonymous Internet 
browsing are discussed as digital versions of ‘blocking’ and ‘masking’ (Marx 2003).  
His useful update also serves as a critique of the way in which surveillance scholars 
have approached the issues of the panopticon and resistance to surveillance, in that 
they fail to fully account for the democratisation of surveillance technologies and the 
creative ways in which people can appropriate both surveillance tools and online 
technologies more broadly to counteract digital surveillance practices.  However, the 
contributions of Marx (2003) and Dupont (2008) both tend toward individualised 
strategies of resistance.  This thesis seeks to incorporate these empirical and 
theoretical contributions with an approach that recognises the plural, networked 
and diffuse nature of surveillance and resistance. 
A problem already noted with the Foucauldian reading of contemporary surveillance 
is that it offers little space for resistance.  It is a totalising system of control that 
denies agency to those who are surveilled.  This limitation, Doyle (2011) argues, was 
replicated in Mathiesen’s account of the synopticon.  The ecosystem of new and 
online media platforms is much more complex than Mathiesen suggested (Doyle 
2011) and this raises questions about how these media can both propagate 
                                                          
61 Marx called these: discovery, avoidance, piggybacking, switching, distorting, blocking, masking, 
breaking, refusal, cooperative and counter-surveillance moves. 
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surveillance as well as amplify the potential for resistance online.  Relatedly, the 
plurality of contemporary surveillance opens it up to new forms of resistance.  It is 
logical that where there are multiple surveillance agents pursuing their own 
objectives, there will also be opportunities for surveillance to be resisted where 
these objectives clash.  This is the case in Chapter Six where political and economic 
forms of surveillance are seen to be at odds with one another. 
This situation also alerts us to the fact that in the context of digital surveillance, 
some of the most effective resistance can come from those who are simultaneously 
the most powerful surveillance agents.  Martin et al. (2009) argue that the landscape 
of surveillance and resistance goes beyond the typical ‘subject-agent’ relationship 
and is instead ‘multi-actor’, signifying the complex web of governing nodes and 
mentalities discussed previously.  This research employs a similar multi-actor 
framework for examining surveillance and resistance and this sits alongside the 
theory of nodal governance.  In tandem, these point to the necessity of exploring 
surveillance and resistance across a variety of social settings.  Reinforcing the point 
made earlier, both these perspectives challenge a binary conception of power where 
it is possessed by some and wielded against others.  Sharp et al. (2000), by contrast, 
discuss ‘dominant’ and ‘resisting’ forms of power.  In the information society, 
communication technologies empower both those who seek to control and those 
who resist. 
Moves against surveillance can also be met with counter-moves designed to nullify 
resistance.  Marx (2009) picked up on this dynamic in a later addition to his work on 
techniques of neutralisation.  The relationship between surveillance and resistance, 
he suggests, is cyclical. 
‘Neutralization is a dynamic adversarial social dance involving strategic moves 
and counter-moves…Those in the surveillance business respond to 
neutralization efforts with their own innovations which are then responded to 
in a re-occurring pattern. Whether for agents or subjects, innovations may offer 
only temporary solutions’ (Marx 2009: 299). 
The same patterns of action and reaction are evident in the development and 
deployment of counter-terrorism initiatives (Innes and Levi 2012).  This pattern is 
amplified given that digital and online forms of resistance can be seen as more 
flexible and mobile.  In Chapter Seven, online media platforms like WikiLeaks are 
   69 
 
discussed as an example of how the Internet has fostered a particularly resilient and 
adaptable form of resistance that counter-moves can only for a short time debilitate. 
Another prominent way in which resistance to surveillance has been conceptualised 
is as ‘sousveillance’ (Mann et al. 2003).  From the French ‘sous’ (meaning ‘under’) 
and opposed to ‘sur’ (‘over’) the term denotes offering panoptic technologies to 
individuals to allow them to invert the surveillance gaze of organisations.  Practical 
examples of sousveillance include people wearing body cameras to record the 
activities of those in authority (such as police officers).  Sousveillance signifies the 
relocation of the power to watch and observe with those typically subject to such 
practices.  There is a degree of conceptual overlap between sousveillance and 
Mathiesen’s (1997) synopticon insofar as both propose a situation in which ‘the 
many watch the few’.  However, there is a difference in focus.  The former is 
concerned with technologically augmented strategies for openly challenging the 
hegemony of information flow from people to private companies or state agencies.  
The latter implicates news and entertainment media in the control apparatus 
through the communication of information designed to promote the goals of 
political or economic surveillance.  While this would suggest the synopticon is not 
associated with resistance, Doyle’s (2011) critique demonstrates how contemporary 
online media do allow for resistance as well as surveillance.  Alternative news media 
outlets have proliferated online, carving out spaces for challenging dominant 
discourses (about crime control and surveillance for instance).  An effect of this has 
been to encourage cultural shifts in trust in major social institutions (Doyle 2011). 
Rather than trying to keep these two concepts separate we might usefully employ 
the broader term of ‘resistive surveillance’.  This captures the dynamics of resistance 
in the information society neatly and avoids any confusion in trying to delineate 
what is synoptic surveillance and what is sousveillance.  Resistive surveillance points 
to those contexts in which digital technologies are used to surveill the actions of 
those in authority – or ‘watch the watchers’ to paraphrase the old adage62.  In other 
words to render these entities more visible.  This is also in keeping with the idea 
discussed earlier that ‘surveillance’ implies a power dimension.  In this case, 
‘resistive surveillance’ would counteract ‘political’ or ‘economic’ surveillance.  Each 
                                                          
62 ‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodies?’ is a Latin phrase meaning ‘who will guard the guards?’ 
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side of this coin would be described as exercising resisting or dominating power 
respectively (Sharp et al. 2000).  Less overt strategies of resistive surveillance are 
seen in the actions of advocacy groups – the ‘privacy advocates’ (Bennett 2008) who 
aim to protect civil liberties and minimise intrusive surveillance.  These groups also 
try to shine a light on those practices (including regulations, as seen in Chapter Six) 
that extend surveillance capacities or threaten privacy but they tend to do so 
through lobbying, campaigning and raising awareness rather than creative and 
adaptive appropriation of digital technologies.  This global network of organisations 
is subject to analysis in Chapter Five. 
Resistance to surveillance is multi-faceted.  As well as more pervasive and diffuse 
surveillance, ICTs have allowed for new and resilient forms of resistance.  The 
relationship between digital surveillance and resistance is dynamic, a process of 
moves and counter-moves.  Resistance enlists a broad range of actors, some of 
whom may also engage in forms of surveillance that are resisted elsewhere.  This is 
significant for the second research question of the thesis concerning motivations to 
resist.  As we will see, resistance to surveillance is not only about the traditional 
counter-balance of privacy.  Last, resistance can incorporate, perhaps through 
adaptation or innovation, the same tools and technologies that are used to surveill.  
A pertinent feature of resistance to digital surveillance, therefore, is that it re-
appropriates the idea of visibility.  Which brings us back to the first point (and one 
that underpins the thesis as a whole); the information society amplifies and 
intensifies both those practices that seek to enact and subvert control. 
3.4 LESSONS FOR THE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this chapter was to outline the contours in the literature on social 
control and surveillance.  The themes that have been drawn out are those that are 
relevant for the research and that illustrate the parallels between the various 
strands of theories of control, surveillance and resistance.  The one-directional 
modernist conception of power that is the basis of radical theories, while helpful for 
considering the powerful economic motives underlying many of the recent trends in 
social control, is inappropriate for the current context.  More convincing (and 
certainly more relevant to the information society) is a pluralistic conception that 
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sees power as distributed across society.  Moreover, power is not a negative 
phenomenon – a possession of a dominant group in society – it is a resource that 
flows between different groups and can thus take the form of ‘dominating’ or 
‘resisting’ power (Sharp et al. 2000).  Following Cohen’s (1985) reimagining of 
Foucault’s analysis, we see that control has drifted away from the state (albeit 
dispersed into various institutions) and into numerous other locales or governing 
nodes.  Private organisations are prominent among these but added to this are other 
actors such as NGOs or media groups who increasingly play an active role in the 
negotiation of control.  Deleuze’s (1992) brief exposition of the ‘control society’ 
similarly argues for moving beyond Foucault’s disciplinary society and is much more 
helpful for framing the dynamics and logics of contemporary control.  Specifically, it 
places the computer at the centre of these shifts and acknowledges the impact 
technological advances of this kind have on individual members of society.  This is 
likewise in keeping with Haggerty and Ericson’s (2000) elaboration of the ‘surveillant 
assemblage’63, which prioritises networks, flows and flexibility in the constitution of 
the social control apparatus.  Other contributions from the field of surveillance 
studies reflect this tension between the legacy of Foucault’s panoptic metaphor and 
more diffuse forms of contemporary surveillance. 
..  -.-. --- -- .  ..-. .-. --- --  -.-. -.-- -... . .-. ... .--. .- -.-. . --..--
                                                          
63 This is, perhaps, to be expected as the concept of assemblages was borrowed from earlier work by 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
STUDYING DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE AND 
RESISTANCE: A MIXED-METHOD/MULTI-STRATEGY 
APPROACH 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Researching surveillance raises many questions for social research.  Surveillance is 
concerned with the gathering and processing of information about people.  It is a 
practice of observing, extracting, categorising, influencing and managing.  Let us 
forget the ends; above all, surveillance is ultimately about knowing.  There is a 
unique relationship, and similarity, therefore, between surveillance and social 
research.  Coupled with an investigation of resistance to surveillance, this raises 
some poignant issues for social researchers that are explored towards the end of 
this chapter.  Aspects of the methods used here allow us to question the position of 
the researcher as a surveillance agent and alerts us to the ethical and political 
dimensions of the research tools that are used. 
This chapter describes the research process, outlining the multi-strategy and multi-
method design and implementation of each stage of the fieldwork.  While some 
degree of description is necessary, the broader aim is to situate this within the 
context of studying (digital) surveillance, resistance and social control.  The focus on 
these phenomena in an online context at times necessitated, and was accompanied 
by an enthusiasm for Internet-based research methods.  Consequently, contained 
within this chapter are commentaries on the exploratory and online aspects of the 
methodology that was employed as well as reflections on the usefulness of these 
and the obstacles that they presented.  The research is also placed in the context of 
the current growth of digital and computational social science research methods.  
The design of this research was not fixed from the outset.  Quite the opposite; it was 
at times opportunistic and responsive and was constructed above all in order to 
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support the theoretical motivations of the thesis and to be reflective of the dynamic 
and myriad configurations of surveillance and resistance.  Consequently, there was 
diverse methodology that this chapter aims to clarify and justify. 
4.2 THE APPROACH TO THE FIELDWORK 
Fieldwork for this thesis was constructed in three parts, designed to explore each of 
the three settings identified in Chapter Two as constituting the landscape of digital 
surveillance and resistance: civil society, regulation and media.  The research design 
for the fieldwork, therefore, took the form of three distinct yet related case studies.  
Each of the cases utilised different methods and different data.  As outlined in 
Chapter One, the first case examined the online social organisation of resistance, 
using network analysis techniques (section 4.3).  The second was concerned with the 
legal frameworks that seek to regulate surveillance and that generate effects of 
resistance, using content analysis of these documents (section 4.4).  The final case 
explored media presentation of surveillance and resistance focusing on coverage of 
WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden, using a combination of quantitative content 
analysis and qualitative interviewing (section 4.5). 
The choice of method was guided by the question of what data could shed light on 
the contribution of each sphere to the current landscape of surveillance and 
resistance and, more broadly, the nature of contemporary social control.  Each of 
the three sites contributed to a rolling narrative that informed a response to each of 
the research questions.  At the same time, Chapters Six and Seven (regulation and 
the media respectively) are based on data that engages more with research question 
two.  To reiterate these research questions: how are digital surveillance and 
resistance related?; why do individuals and groups who resist surveillance identify a 
need for doing so?, and; what are the implications of these patterns for our 
understanding of control in the information society? 
While each of the cases had the potential to form the basis of a much more in-depth 
study, the guiding rationale for the eclectic yet innovative research design was to 
unpack the variety of influences that shape the relationship between digital 
surveillance and resistance: 
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‘Empirical cases, studied in depth…lead us to important social processes and the 
details of social organization that produce them’ (Becker 2014: 5). 
Case studies commonly face the criticism of being unable to speak to social 
processes and practices beyond the case in question (see Hammersley 2004).  
However, Becker’s (2014) guidance on case studies is continually enlightening in that 
regard.   He advocates that case studies should raise more questions than they 
answer: 
‘…my work doesn’t produce timeless generalizations about relations between 
variables. It results instead in the identification of new elements of a situation, 
new things that can vary in ways that will affect the outcome I’m interested in…I 
can use these new elements of organisation to direct my next inquiry’ (2014: 3). 
It would have been possible here, for example, to conduct a highly detailed analysis 
of one instance of the ‘regulation of surveillance’ or of the social and technological 
impact of WikiLeaks64.  Yet this would have failed to account for the concurrent and 
shifting social processes unfolding alongside and playing an equal role in shaping the 
landscape of online control.  Crucially, Becker tells us that ‘everything present in or 
connected to a situation [we] want to understand should be taken account of and 
made use of’ (2014: 3). 
The overall approach to the fieldwork can be described, therefore, as both ‘multi-
strategy’ (Layder 1993; Bryman 2004) and ‘multi-method’ (Bryman 2004a).  Although 
some authors use these terms interchangeably (see Cresswell 2008) in this context 
the former indicates the combination of quantitative and qualitative strategies that 
were employed, while the latter describes the variety of (primarily) qualitative 
methods used throughout the research.  Naturally, this raises questions of the 
epistemological orientation of the study.  The principles of quantitative and 
qualitative strategies are not incompatible.  This research subscribed to a ‘technical 
version’ (Bryman 2004: 454) of the divide between the two strategies; that they are 
capable of being fused in pursuit of a research agenda and that this benefits the 
research process.  In Hammersley’s (1996) terms, the justification for this is one of 
‘complementarity’ as opposed to triangulation.  The use of different strategies was 
not intended to corroborate or validate other findings from the research.  Rather, it 
                                                          
64 Chapters Six and Seven respectively. 
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was designed to comprehensively reflect and illustrate the diverse, complex and 
overlapping nature of modern digital surveillance. 
At the same time, the quantitative aspects to the study (primarily those in Chapter 
Five) require some definition.  The methods used contribute to and contemporise 
the debate about the compatibility of quantitative and qualitative strategies.  The 
quantitative elements of the study fall under the category of computational social 
science research methods.  This nascent field of social research aims to respond to 
the burgeoning of data available online (‘Big Data’) as a result of social changes in 
communication and interaction.  It seeks to harness the potential of these changes 
to enhance social research (Ackland and Gibson 2013; Burnap et al. 2013, Dutton 
2013; Edwards et al. 2013; Procter et al. 2013; Sloan et al. 2013) and respond to 
what Savage and Burrows (2007) have called the ‘coming crisis of empirical 
sociology’.  Traditional research methods such as surveys and interviews have 
already successfully migrated to virtual environments.  Rogers (2009) however, is 
among those who suggest that we are currently witnessing the emergence of digital 
methods as opposed to virtual.  The former are grounded in the realm of the 
Internet; they are, like the next generation of Internet users, natively digital.  
Hyperlink or tag analysis, exploiting search engines, data mining from social media 
all represent a new approach to studying society as it is expressed on the Internet.  
New forms of social interaction have laid the foundations for new forms of social 
research.  Of course, this is not limited to social media as it is understood in terms of 
Facebook and Twitter (although these are at the heart of it); it is rather that social 
media use is indicative of a broader social change in the way in which we interact 
with each other and how the Internet is used.  Edwards et al. (2013), for instance, 
point us to the change from the informational web (Web 1.0) to the socially 
generated web (Web 2.0); interaction online generates new forms of data and is 
thus to be investigated in new ways. 
Computational methods that allow for the investigation of emergent forms of social 
organisation and interaction in online spaces are thus comparable with ‘traditional’ 
quantitative methods that aim to capture macro social processes, albeit in a static 
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fashion65.  Computational social science research tools allow for the collection of 
data that simultaneously describes large-scale social organisation as it occurs online 
but also micro processes of interpersonal interaction.  There is an inherent fusing, 
therefore, of qualitative and quantitative principles in this approach.  Moreover, 
although these tools were used in only one of the research ‘sites’ (see Chapter Five) 
they reinforce the overlap between social research and the surveillance that is the 
subject of this thesis.  As Lyon notes, we should seek to understand the ‘capacities of 
Big Data and their social-political consequences’ (2014: 2, emphasis in original). 
While each of the three research sites/cases were examined using different 
methods, these were supplemented with a short series of semi-structured 
qualitative interviews that spanned the three sites.  These interviews targeted a 
variety of individuals who were identified for their expertise in the area of digital 
communication, activism, privacy and policy.  They also represented the diversity of 
issues that interact to construct the modern environment of digital surveillance and 
resistance.  Bespoke interview guides were created for each participant (or pair of 
participants in two cases66) that were designed to tap into their areas of expertise – 
Internet activism, digital rights, policy or specific technologies for instance.  These 
‘conversations with a purpose’ (Burgess 1984: 102) were consequently flexible and 
fluid and permitted probing based on insights gained from other data collection 
being carried out simultaneously.  The interview guides also aimed to tap into 
general themes regarding perceptions of online surveillance and regulation.  Each 
interview was designed to last approximately 45 minutes, an intentional decision, as 
contacting and recruiting potential participants in some cases required attempts to 
make the research appeal to very busy individuals (politicians and lawyers being two 
examples).  The flexibility of the interview guides meant that on occasion the 
interviews lasted much longer than planned – to neither the concern of participant 
or researcher. 
The selection of participants was not designed to be representative; rather, they 
were identified as holding specific knowledge or experience that would be useful for 
                                                          
65 See Chapter Four (section 4.3) for a more detailed discussion of the benefits and contributions of 
computational social science research methods. 
66 Two academic researchers at the Oxford Internet Institute were interviewed together, as were two 
employees at the Government Digital Service. 
   77 
 
the research.  Nine interviews67 were conducted in total and the data generated 
informed initial analysis across each of the three fieldwork sites. 
 Eric King – Head of Research, Privacy International 
 Pete Bradwell – Policy Director, Open Rights Group 
 Dr Joss Wright – Oxford Internet Institute 
 Dr Anne-Marie Oostveen – Oxford Internet Institute 
 Trefor Davies – Chief Technology Officer, Timico 
 Smári McCarthy – information activist 
 Daniel Domscheit-Berg – OpenLeaks founder, former WikiLeaks spokesman 
 ‘Bert’ – Government Digital Service 
 ‘Ernie’ – Government Digital Service 
Contact with these participants was established via email.  In some cases this was a 
direct email to a potential participant identified as holding specific expertise.  In 
other cases participants were recommended after making contact with a gatekeeper 
at an organisation.  Initially, these interviews were designed as an adjunct to the 
other aspects of the fieldwork.  However, it quickly became apparent that the 
contributions of the interviewees offered valuable insight into the research and 
provided several entry-points that directed analysis of the other data.  Issues 
relating to these interviews are discussed later, particularly as regards access in the 
case of Daniel and WikiLeaks.  There were some refusals to participate and other 
cases where contact with potential participants dried up before interviews could be 
scheduled68.  As above, in both cases of failed recruitment, this was due to 
respondents’ time commitments.  Before the chapter moves on to examine the 
specificities of each research site, there are some necessary observations to make 
regarding the role of the Internet in this research. 
 
 
                                                          
67 Seven of the nine interviewees agreed to their names being used in the research.  In addition, all 
participants in the interviews consented either verbally (on record) or in writing to the conditions of the 
research set out in the ‘Information for Research Participants’ (see Appendix B) 
68 Three instances included the Director of a UK-based anti-surveillance campaign group, an MP from 
Iceland involved in the ‘Modern Media Initiative’ and a solicitor representing a coalition of advocacy 
groups at the European Court. 
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4.2.1 THE INTERNET: OBJECT AND MEDIUM 
Having always held an interest in online research methods, it was an easy decision to 
engage them in pursuit of this research agenda.  Previous research experience had 
demonstrated their use in facilitating traditional forms of research (such as 
conducting qualitative interviews by Skype or email) as well as allowing for 
innovative means of exploring social phenomena.  At the same time, with the 
Internet as the object of study, online research methods were considered at times a 
necessity.  In much the same way as ethnography developed as a method for 
studying social life in its natural context, an investigation of digital surveillance and 
resistance had to be situated – at least in part – online. 
It becomes clear at this stage that the Internet occupies a dual position in this thesis 
as both an object and medium for research, which connects to the relationship 
already identified between surveillance studies and social science research.  So too is 
this a product of the wider story of the thesis – technological development creating 
new relations and causing societal-level changes.  Naturally, this impacts on social 
research; as Fischer et al. have noted, ‘opportunities for social scientists will be 
driven both by changes in societies and advances in our research methods’ (2008: 
519).  This highlights the fundamental link between theory and method.  While the 
Internet opens up new possibilities for exploring social phenomena, it also 
necessitates theorisation of the new forms of social organisation and interaction 
that occur as a result. 
The question of the nature of virtual spaces compared to ‘real world’ spaces has 
informed methodological debates as well as theoretical ones.  This distinction is also 
keenly felt in the context of surveillance studies and other areas concerned with 
communication media (for example Meyrowitz 1985).  New technologies blur the 
boundary between digital and physical spaces.  Acknowledging this, the research 
followed in footsteps of social researchers who have framed digital and physical 
spaces as overlapping and inseparable (see Lyman and Wakeford 1999; Ruhleder 
2000).  Whereas some authors advocate a view of the two as separate environments 
for research (Hine 2000; Lysloff 2003) others, such as Garcia et al. (2009) argue that: 
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‘…there is one social world which contains both traditional and technologically 
advanced modes of communication and sites of social activity…”Virtual reality” 
is not a reality separate from other aspects of human action and experience, 
but rather a part of it. Therefore, ethnographers should define the field or 
setting of their research on the basis of their research topic, rather than 
arbitrarily or prematurely excluding one arena or the other.’ (Garcia et al. 2009: 
54) 
This research was not ethnographic but the argument remains applicable.  
Surveillance is a phenomenon that is increasingly framed in digital terms but it 
cannot be divorced from its real world implications or facets – such as protest events 
or regulatory processes that shape it.  The methods adopted in this study aimed to 
capture this character of surveillance by examining both online and offline processes 
so as to more rigorously theorise social control as it transverses the digital and the 
physical. 
Online research methods, much like traditional methods, fall into two categories.  
‘Internet-mediated research’ (Hewson et al. 2003) – also referred to as primary 
Internet research (Hewson and Laurent 2008) – involves the collection of novel or 
original data.  Secondary Internet research on the other hand is defined as 
‘techniques and procedures for locating and accessing bibliographic materials online’ 
(Hewson and Laurent 2008: 58), which thereby encompasses the collection of news 
reports, official documents and other forms of secondary data (see sections 4.4 and 
4.5).  The fieldwork for this research involved both primary and secondary methods.  
The former can be subdivided into two further categories, which can be called 
Internet-facilitated and Internet-targeted research. 
The Internet-facilitated component of the fieldwork involved the use of Skype to 
carry out the qualitative interviews.  As a research tool, Skype has the same 
methodological and practical benefits of telephone interviewing, such as allowing for 
synchronous communication69 and saving on time and cost of travel (see O’Connor 
et al. 2008; Holt 2010).  However, whereas telephone interviews lack the ability to 
pick up on contextual indicators present in face-to-face interviewing (see Evans et al. 
2008), Skype’s video functionality overcomes this.  Of course, this is only applicable 
when both parties have webcams; of the nine interviews conducted during the 
fieldwork, five were carried out via Skype and of these three were video-enabled.  
                                                          
69 As compared, for instance, to email interviews which are asynchronous. 
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The argument that Skype represents the best alternative to face-to-face interviews 
(Hanna 2012) is accurate, although only when accompanied by video.  In some cases 
(even without video) it is actually preferable as recruiting participants from overseas 
(such as Daniel and Smári in this research) is a more feasible possibility (see 
Sedgwick and Spiers 2009).  Skype is by no means flawless and some of the pitfalls 
identified by King and Horrocks (2010: 84-5) were experienced during the research; 
bandwidth limitations resulted in poor sound quality and one interview cut out part 
way through (a connection was later re-established).  An important lesson was also 
learned early on.  In a bid to preserve the face-to-face benefits of the interview, an 
attempt was made to record both audio and video with QuickTime.  It was only 
afterwards that the poor sound quality during the interview was attributed to the 
increased processing capacity this placed on the computer.  Consequently, 
transcription was difficult and at times impossible. 
Internet-targeted research refers to the computational methods that were 
employed.  These differ from Internet-facilitated methods as both the object and 
medium of research is based online.  In this case, the objects were communities and 
networks constituted online in both hyperlink and social media environments.  
These are outlined in more detail in the following section and the data they 
generated form the basis of Chapter Five.  However, for now, Fielding and Lee 
observe that: 
‘Emergent technologies enable new modes of research, new approaches to 
analysis, and new relationships between social research and society. Moreover, 
the emergence of a pervasive computational environment offers a new subject 
for social science inquiry, raising issues relating to the social shaping of 
technologies and the role that technology has in shaping society and social 
relations’ (2008: 491). 
The inference here is that understanding the mutual relationship between 
technology and society requires new forms of social research.  However, care needs 
to be taken in applying these methods as with any novel form of research.  ‘The 
newness of a method can lead to unthinking application and a distancing of users 
from the craft aspects of a particular methodological approach’ (Lee et al. 2008: 6).  
In the same vein, Hine (2005) has discussed how the hype surrounding novel, online 
methodological developments can lead to their indiscriminate use.  This returns to 
my earlier point; care was taken throughout to ensure that the methods employed 
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were appropriate for the subject/case in question.  Rather than novelty for novelty’s 
sake, using computational methods was an exploration of the potential of new 
forms of research to shed light on the relationship between technology and society 
as much as it was an investigation of that relationship. 
A final point regarding this research returns to the link with surveillance studies.  
Throughout the research, as a result of increased exposure and curiosity, I 
developed an interest in the ‘tools of the trade’ of both surveillance and resistance.  
Specifically, privacy-preserving software such as the Tor system that permits 
anonymous Web browsing and allows access to the ‘Dark Web’.  Such software is 
used by privacy advocacy organisations and activists around the world in order to 
maintain secure and confidential communications.  These tools raise fascinating and 
as yet largely unexplored possibilities for social research (for some early examples 
see Chen et al. 2008; Chen 2012 and Gehl 2014) and surveillance studies.  The Dark 
Web can provide access to very hard to reach populations but at the same time, it 
poses numerous ethical issues.  Chief amongst these is the fact that users of the 
Dark Web are unlikely to want to be found online, let alone talk with researchers.  
Safety would also be a concern, given that the Dark Web masks a lot of criminal 
activity including the drug trade and illegal pornography.  Nevertheless, given what 
has already been said about the Internet as an object and a medium and the need to 
continually adapt and expand our theoretical and methodological resources in line 
with technological development, the potential should not be overlooked.  This 
research agenda is reconsidered in the conclusion to this thesis. 
4.3 CHARTING THE TERRAIN: MAPS AND METRICS 
The remainder of this chapter deals in turn with the three research sites: online civil 
society, regulation and media respectively.  The first of these was concerned with 
the social organisation of resistance: identifying the key actors and their inter-
relationships online, describing the characteristics of their network and how these 
changed over time.  A theory of nodal governance was used to analyse these 
patterns from the data that were gathered, as will be seen here.  Some attention 
was also paid to the extent to which physical geography was reflected in these 
virtual spaces and the implications of this for understanding resistance to digital 
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surveillance.  The following discussion outlines and evaluates a toolkit for 
investigating online interactions between those who resist surveillance.  Social 
network analysis (SNA) concepts also help describe how these interactions were 
interpreted.  First of all, however, we can consider the benefits of visualisation of 
data that computational methods bring with them. 
For mapping out the online community of groups that resist surveillance, Dodge and 
Kitchin’s insights from the Atlas of Cyberspace provided a good deal of inspiration: 
‘Cartography provides a means by which to classify, represent and 
communicate information about areas that are too large and too complex to be 
seen directly. Well-designed maps are relatively easy to interpret, and they 
constitute concentrated databases of information about the location, shape and 
size of key features of a landscape and the connections between them…In 
essence, maps and spatializations exploit the mind’s ability to more readily see 
complex relationships in images, providing a clear understanding of a 
phenomenon, reducing search time, and revealing relationships that may 
otherwise not have been noticed’ (2008: 2). 
These comments also speak to the utility of computational methods as a whole; 
extracting value and meaning from quantities of new transactional data that would 
hitherto have been impossible to collect and store, let alone analyse.  Mapping 
techniques and visualisation of data, then, are vital aspects of computational 
methods.  So too do they emphasise the blend of quantitative and qualitative 
principles present in this approach.  Data visualisations are not only graphic outputs 
of research – like charts and plots – they are representations, in this case, of forms 
of organisation and interaction.  Consequently, they are amenable to interpretation; 
they are data in their own right as opposed to being merely a product of data. 
Recent commentaries on the growth of computational social science (for example 
Edwards et al. 2013; Housley et al. 2014) situate it within the ‘conventional’ pursuits 
of social science research.  They also help to illustrate the value of these methods for 
this stage of the research.  For Housley et al., ‘big and broad social data’ open the 
possibility of ‘studying social processes as they unfold at the level of populations’ 
(2014: 4).  The implication here concerns change (in social relations or structures) 
over time and the ability to capture this on a broad scale using emergent 
computational methods (what Edwards et al. (2013) refer to as locomotive and 
extensive research).  Given the rapidity of technological (and hence social) change, 
being able to capture ‘real-time’ data is crucial for social scientists. 
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The presentation of visualised online networks was also crucial for developing an 
empirical application of the theory of nodal governance.  In simple terms, the 
language of nodes and networks complement one another readily.  Demonstrating 
and explaining the existence of communities and sub-communities, whether they 
are transient or permanent, is a core component of theories of nodal governance.  
The methodological approach used in this case study was thus well suited to the task 
in hand.  The arguments in Chapter Five illuminate these points in more detail. 
4.3.1 ISSUE CRAWLER 
The starting point for this stage of the research was deciding how to examine the 
existence of an online community and subsequently identify appropriate tools for 
the mapping task.  Adapting earlier work by Introna and Gibbons (2009), the 
decision was taken in the first instance to use web crawling software – automated 
programs (‘bots’) that find, index and download web pages – to examine the 
network of organisations that oppose various forms of surveillance (whom Bennett 
(2008) refers to as ‘privacy advocates’).  The main aim was to retrieve data on how 
organisations’ websites linked to one another via hyperlinks.  The rationale being 
that mapping out the network according to their linking practices could illustrate the 
availability and potential flow of counter-surveillance information across this 
network.  Bennett’s (2008) concept of ‘information politics’ as a modality for 
resisting surveillance – speaking truth to power, getting information to the people 
and places where it can have the greatest impact – suggests that a cohesive 
hyperlink network could improve the ability of advocacy organisations to resist 
surveillance by more effective transmission of information about surveillance to web 
users (i.e. the public). 
For this research, web crawling software Issue Crawler70 was used.  Once supplied 
with an initial list of websites (‘starting points’) to crawl, Issue Crawler searches 
these websites for links to other pages.  If two or more links are found to the same 
site from different webpages, this then becomes a new node in the network and is 
subsequently crawled.  This process continues until the network is exhausted.  The 
                                                          
70 https://www.issuecrawler.net/ 
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top 100 most linked-to websites are then used to visualise the network, using Issue 
Crawler’s own software. 
Starting points were determined by drawing on and refining earlier findings (Introna 
and Gibbons 2009).  A list was first compiled of the ten most prominent actors in the 
network from 200871 and supplemented this with organisations known about from 
personal experience.  A crawl was launched using these websites and the most 
prominent actors were noted.  This process was repeated.  Given the breadth of 
organisations that were returned from these initial crawls – including 55 prominent 
advocacy and technical organisations – ten starting points were distilled from those 
initially identified72.  This process allowed a degree of confidence that the networks 
gathered were comprehensive. 
Practically, Issue Crawler offers several benefits.  It is automatic, so requires little 
attention and crawls can be scheduled to repeat for a pre-determined length of time 
and at regular intervals (e.g. hourly, daily, weekly).  There is also flexibility in how the 
crawls are carried out and instruction on calibration.  Crawl depth (the number of 
pages ‘down’ into a website the crawler will search) and iterations (the number of 
times a site is crawled in one search) are two such examples.  The settings chosen 
were the best suited to mapping the network for the purposes of illustrating the 
potential for information politics, such as crawling by page rather than site (the 
latter of which would only search homepages and thus would be likely to miss 
content containing links to other organisations).  Most importantly, crawls were 
scheduled weekly for a period of three months in line with principles discussed 
above of observing change over time.  Given that an aim was to observe any impact 
on the network of surveillance-related news or events, weekly intervals seemed the 
most appropriate length of time to capture this.  More regular crawls were avoided 
for ethical reasons (see Thelwall and Stuart 2006); although unlikely in a case of 
individual use such as this, there is a possibility of web crawlers placing burdens on 
target websites’ servers and thus increasing their costs. 
                                                          
71 A related rationale for this stage of the research was to update previous findings.  A gap of four years 
is a significant time for online networks to change in constitution and structure.  Also, as described in 
Chapter Five, new organisations had emerged in 2012 that did not exist in 2008. 
72 See Appendix C. 
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Another benefit of Issue Crawler is the built-in visualisation tool.  Once crawls were 
completed, networks could be viewed online and saved in a variety of formats.  Issue 
Crawler’s visualisations were easy to understand and clearly laid out and hence were 
used directly in the analysis73.  However, despite some flexibility in presentation, 
Issue Crawler offers little in the way of detailed explanation as to how networks 
were constructed.  On reflection, while a hindrance, this was part of the learning 
process of using such software for SNA and allowed me to develop sound 
interpretive skills.  As a result, the next step to refine the analysis of these networks 
was to export the data to an interactive visualisation platform – Gephi74  – that 
permitted a much greater degree of exploration of various network metrics. 
4.3.2 GEPHI AND NETWORK METRICS 
A key task for the analysis of the hyperlink networks was to identify the most 
prominent actors in the community.  Issue Crawler permitted only superficial insight 
into this.  Gephi by contrast allowed much greater freedom to manipulate the 
networks and subject the data to various layouts and calculations, including 
weighting the edges between nodes to show higher frequency of linking.  
Specifically, three measures of centrality (i.e. importance) of a node in the network 
were selected from the toolkit of SNA.  Each of these measured importance in a 
different way and thus allowed for different interpretations of the network. 
DEGREE CENTRALITY  
Degree refers to the number of unique edges connected to a node in a network.  In a 
‘directed’ network (such as a hyperlink network) where edges travel in a specific 
direction between nodes, in-degree refers to links received and out-degree refers to 
links sent.  These are the simplest ways of ranking importance.  Issue Crawler was 
capable of visualising the network according to either in-degree or degree but that 
was the extent of its capacities.  While it was interesting to note those actors in the 
networks with the highest in-degree, other measures of centrality provided more 
robust indicators of importance. 
EIGENVECTOR CENTRALITY 
                                                          
73 See Chapter Five for examples. 
74 https://gephi.github.io/ 
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Eigenvector centrality takes into account not only the degree of a node but also the 
degree of all those nodes directing to it.  It is thus a measure of centrality that takes 
into account all the ‘attention’ that is being given – directly or indirectly – to an actor 
in the network.  Measuring actors by Eigenvector centrality revealed those 
organisations that ‘are paid attention to by lots of others, who are themselves paid 
attention to by lots of others’ (Hansen et al. 2011: 150, emphasis in original).  
Moreover, it is of benefit to a network such as one of information politics to expand 
and draw in more actors.  Being connected to a node ranked highly for Eigenvector 
centrality is an effective way to increase the visibility of an otherwise peripheral 
network actor.  In SNA terminology this is referred to as ‘positive network 
externality’. 
BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY 
Betweenness centrality is linked to the idea of network ‘bridges’ or connections 
between clusters of nodes.  It is a measure of how an actor’s position in the network 
affects their access to non-redundant information.  Ranking highly for Betweenness 
centrality means that the node is important for the transmission of information 
across the network.  This was a helpful metric for the research as it conveyed a sense 
of which actors were important for ensuring dispersed nodes in the network could 
access information in other places. 
Figure 175 illustrates these points. The Eigenvector centrality values are listed above 
each node, in blue, and Betweenness centrality values below, in red.  The closer to 1, 
the higher the ranking.  Nodes D and F are most important according to Eigenvector 
centrality while Node E is in the most advantageous position as a crucial bridge76. 
 
                                                          
75 Adapted from Hansen et al. (2011: 150) 
76 It should be noted that this diagram is undirected; it assumes information is flowing in either 
direction between nodes.  As mentioned, the benefit of examining a hyperlink ecosystem is that it is 
directed; we can observe the flow of information from one actor to another. 
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FIGURE 1: EIGENVECTOR AND BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY 
 
The question was whether to be concerned with Internet users navigating the 
advocacy network online or the benefits for the advocates themselves (such as 
websites being visited more often, support generated for their organisation).  In the 
context of information politics, it is probably a case of the former.  Acting solely out 
of self-interest is unlikely to achieve the goals of the organisation.  At the heart of 
this is a concern with the meaning of a hyperlink, which I return to momentarily. 
4.3.3 NODEXL AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
The final piece of software used during the course of this stage of the research was 
NodeXL77.  The decision to engage this software came after analysis of the networks 
produced by Issue Crawler highlighted the prominence of micro-blogging, social 
media website Twitter (see Chapter Five).  NodeXL both retrieves data from the 
Internet (primarily social media) and visualises it via Microsoft Excel.  For instance, it 
was possible to quickly retrieve the entire friends/followers network of any given 
Twitter account or any tweets, replies and retweets containing a given ‘hashtag’ 
over a period of time.  Crawl depths could be set to retrieve only friends/followers of 
one user or extended to subsequently capture second and third degree networks 
(i.e. friends of friends and so on).  There was a greater degree of freedom to 
manipulate visualisations than with Issue Crawler, as centrality metrics could be 
implemented, however, the platform was not as powerful in this respect as Gephi.  
                                                          
77 https://nodexl.codeplex.com/ 
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Similar to the ethical considerations highlighted by Thelwall and Stuart (2006) there 
were also limitations placed on the amount of data that could be requested at one 
time owing to the restrictions put in place on such requests by Twitter. 
For that reason it was impossible, despite several attempts, to generate a social 
network for WikiLeaks (who were of particular interest to me) as their number of 
followers – at the time in excess of one million – was too large to be processed 
without waiting an impractical length of time.  This limited the examination to 
Twitter accounts with approximately 1,000 followers.  UK-based campaign group 
No2ID fell into this category and thus NodeXL was used to examine their social 
network and categorise their followers78.  Methodologically, there was also an 
element of triangulation to this process, allowing for reflection on whether 
characteristics of the social networks of advocacy organisations were similar to 
those of the hyperlink networks.  It also produced a more granular picture of the 
community; the hyperlink networks primarily captured organisations who had a 
website presence.  Using NodeXL allowed me to complement this with an 
understanding of how individuals constituted and interacted with the network. 
4.3.4 REFLECTIONS ON SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
Overall, the network analysis component of the fieldwork was instructive and a 
useful entry-point to the study.  As Dodge and Kitchin (2005) note, the appeal of this 
approach to data collection and analysis was its fit with theories of nodal 
governance that guided the research.  As Chapter Five goes on to show, there was 
much that could be taken from the network analysis in respect of understanding 
governance in the context of surveillance and resistance.  This stage of the fieldwork 
built helpfully on earlier work identified (see Introna and Gibbons 2009).  In 
particular, the use of different platforms for network manipulation and analysis 
allowed for a multi-layered perspective of communities organised around issues of 
surveillance.  The further development of computational social science research 
methods will assist greatly in shedding more light on these relations.  Towards the 
end of this stage of the research, a beta-version of the Collaborative Online Social 
                                                          
78 See Chapter Five. 
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Media Observatory (COSMOS) platform79 was trialled, which provided similar 
functions to NodeXL but with the added benefits of harvesting tweets in real-time 
and allowing for frequency and geo-spatial analysis.  While this could construct 
networks of Twitter conversations relating to Snowden and the National Security 
Agency, the analysis at that stage was not sufficiently robust to merit inclusion in the 
thesis.  Nevertheless, it is an avenue that can certainly develop our understanding of 
the response of publics to surveillance-related issues and the ways in which 
resistance is constructed amongst networks of advocacy organisations. 
One particular methodological point to consider concerns the feasibility of 
examining resistance by looking at hyperlink networks.  Underpinning the 
construction of these networks is the assumption that a hyperlink has a meaning.  
That by directing to another website, this signals an endorsement of some kind of 
the target organisation.  The fact that the majority of organisations appearing in the 
networks were ‘privacy advocates’ of one kind or another does support the 
assumption that linking practices support the building of a community that has a 
common interest or purpose – to facilitate the transmission of information about 
harmful surveillance practices and to mobilise support.  However, it should also be 
acknowledged that at times hyperlinks may, either, not be ‘intended’ to achieve a 
particular goal or may direct to information that is not ‘counter-surveillance’ in 
nature.  An example of the latter would be directing to the website of a government 
organisation responsible for a certain form of surveillance.  In this case, the 
hyperlink is not an endorsement.  We should understand the resulting network, 
therefore, not as one of mutual support and necessarily ‘anti-surveillance’ in nature 
but as one where information about surveillance is made accessible, awareness is 
raised and – it is to be hoped – acted upon. 
From a methodological standpoint the question concerns validity of measurement.  
Rogers’ (2009) dilemma is instructive in this respect: how can we study social media 
and learn something about society rather than about social media use?  The value of 
this insight is not limited to the study of social media.  We can extend this problem 
to ask how we can study interaction on the Internet and learn something about 
society rather than about Internet behaviour (i.e. hyperlinking practices).  Chapter 
                                                          
79 http://www.cs.cf.ac.uk/cosmos/ 
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Five is designed to remind the reader of this.  It emphasises that the divide between 
offline and online social relations is not concrete.  Bearing in mind what has already 
been said about computational methods, a key task of the chapter is to examine 
change in the networks over time and also how real-world events (such as media 
reports) impact on the network.  By studying interaction online, therefore, we are 
learning about society.  The triangulation of data described here helps flesh out the 
claims made about interaction and organisation.  At the same time computational 
social science allows us to engage with Rogers’ (2009) question by observing large-
scale social processes in near real-time. 
4.4 DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS: REGULATION AND RESISTANCE 
This section describes the next stage of research that was undertaken.  This 
concerned introducing digital surveillance into the narrative and also served the 
purpose of ‘seeing in action’ several of the actors identified during the mapping 
exercise outlined above.  As a result of a particular opportunity presented at the 
time, the fieldwork focused on the (attempted) enactment of regulation of digital 
surveillance practices.  ‘Attempted’ is the key word in this instance; the theoretical 
motivation behind this part of the fieldwork was to gain an appreciation of how legal 
frameworks have sought to regulate surveillance and how these have generated 
effects of resistance.  As the analysis progressed, it became clear that what was 
being uncovered in particular was the relationship between the state and private 
sector in constructing digital surveillance.  The regulatory instrument in question 
was the UK Draft Communications Data Bill (CDB) from 2012.  Over a period of 
approximately five months, a pre-legislative consultation process was undertaken by 
a Joint Committee to elicit attitudes and opinions from both experts and lay people 
towards the proposed regulation.  All written and oral evidence submitted as part of 
this process was made available for public consumption (including the text of the Bill 
and the final report of the Joint Committee) and it was this that constituted the data 
for the case. 
There have been many discussions concerning the utility of documentary analysis for 
empirical social science that are applicable to this research.  Documentary analysis, 
some have pointed out, has suffered from accusations of inferiority when compared 
   91 
 
to ‘rich’ observational or interview data or lack of neutrality (Coffey and Atkinson 
2004; May 2011).  Coffey and Atkinson say documents are not ‘transparent 
representations of organisational routines [or] decision making processes’ (2004: 
58).  However the CDB consultation as a ‘sedimentation of social practices’ (May 
2011: 191) challenged that in some respect as it was part of a wider process of 
deliberation, evidence-gathering, opinion-seeking and, ultimately, rejection of the 
decision to implement a new regulatory structure for digital surveillance.  Coffey and 
Atkinson’s position that documents are not ‘surrogates’ for other sorts of data 
(2004: 58) was acknowledged here and thus interviews conducted at the same time 
aimed to further explore opinions of the CDB to corroborate the findings from the 
documentary analysis. 
The consultation on the CDB fitted into the wider arena of crime prevention and 
counter-terrorist policy; the changes it proposed to the surveillance regime of 
communications data in the UK were primarily about managing the risk posed by 
organised criminals, cybercrime and terrorism.  Documentary analysis can provide a 
useful window into such shifts in policy (Noaks and Wincup 2004).  Particularly given 
its eventual rejection – and from 2014-2015 other significant changes in national and 
supra-national communications data retention legislation80 – documentary analysis 
of the consultation process on the CDB provided valuable insight into the dynamic 
and rapidly evolving area of surveillance regulation. 
Methodologically, the CDB presented several issues regarding documentary analysis.  
First is the nature of the design.  There were elements of the research that could be 
described as a unique case study (Yin 1984); consultation processes on legislation of 
the depth demonstrated by the CDB are infrequent and there had been no similar 
attempts to rigorously elicit the attitudes of the public, experts and governmental 
officials towards surveillance regulation81.  Previous research (for example Akdeniz 
et al. 2001) has examined the implications of surveillance-focused regulation but has 
not systematically analysed the process of its creation in the same way as the CDB 
allowed – and nor have the circumstances arisen to do so.  However, situated within 
the broader work of thesis, the approach to the CDB is perhaps best described as an 
                                                          
80 See Chapter Six. 
81 The Draft Investigatory Powers Bill (2015) underwent a similar consultation process. 
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exemplifying case  (Bryman 2004); the CDB was simply a suitable context to examine 
the rationale behind the regulation of surveillance and resistance to it, albeit a highly 
opportune one.  
Noaks and Wincup (2004: 117) emphasise the need for ‘reflexivity and 
methodological rigour’ in approaching documents as sources of data.  Given the use 
of the CDB as one specific instance of negotiation of surveillance, reflexivity was not 
a primary concern insofar as Noaks and Wincup mean to refer to the relevance of a 
variety of documents.  In a broader sense, however, the consultation documents 
were a satisfactory and appropriate reflection of the process of regulating and 
resisting surveillance.  Scott’s (1990) four criteria for assessing documents – 
authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning – were also instructive.  
The origin and nature of the documents (i.e. their use as formal evidence by the 
Joint Committee) validated and gave value to the documents as a source of 
evidence.  Only infrequently was the evidence incomplete, where some oral 
submissions were redacted during transcription for confidentiality reasons on the 
part of witnesses.  Scott (1990: 35) advocates constant reappraisal of the quality of 
documents and acknowledges the variety of problems researchers will encounter in 
dealing with them.  A number of methodological and analytical hurdles were 
encountered here, but overall the contribution of the documentary analysis was 
invaluable to the research. 
4.4.1 ANALYTICAL PROCESS 
Although the consultation process was distilled into two primary documents – the 
oral and written evidence – it is more accurate to consider these as a collection of a 
larger number of documents as each is attributable to a single author/organisation 
(in the case of the written evidence) or a panel of interviewees (in the case of the 
oral evidence).  Consequently, the written evidence consisted of 145 documents 
(separate submissions to the committee) and the oral evidence 23 documents 
(separate sessions with the committee at the House of Commons).  Implicit 
throughout the consultation process was also the intertextuality (Coffey and 
Atkinson 2004) between the evidence documents and the text of the Bill itself as 
many of the points of objection raised referred to specific aspects of the proposed 
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legislation.  Consequently, some attention was also given to the text of the Bill itself, 
its predecessor the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) and  the final 
report of the Joint Committee. 
The consultation documents were accessed online from the UK Parliament 
website82.  Scott (2004) provides a number of ways in which the documents can be 
classified.  All documents were textual and of four kinds: written evidence submitted 
by individuals or organisations collated in one document; oral evidence transcribed 
and compiled in a second document83; the final report of the Joint Committee and 
last; the text of the Bill itself.  Scott (2008) also categorises documents by access and 
authorship.  In respect of the former, the documents were ‘open-published’ 
(available for public consumption).  For the latter, while the documents represent 
official records of a parliamentary process and were published by the government, 
authorship of the documents can be described as each of Scott’s three categories, 
public, private and state, owing to the fact that the evidence contained within them 
was written by members of the public, private and charitable organisations and 
government departments and officials.  It is important to note these distinctions as 
the analysis was constructed around identification of the contributions of different 
groups of actors (i.e. authors). 
The analysis was first directed at the written evidence submitted to the Joint 
Committee.  In total 145 submissions were made, of varying lengths.  The entire 
collection of written evidence totalled more than 600 pages.  Altheide (1996) 
outlines an approach for analysing documentary sources, which guided the 
systematic appraisal carried out here.  Consequently a protocol – ‘a list of questions, 
items, categories, or variables that guide data collection from documents’ (Altheide 
1996: 26) – was designed to effectively deal with the large volume of data.  The first 
stage was to categorise respondents to the consultation.  This was a reflexive 
process, beginning with eleven categories and eventually refining this to seven: 
 Individual/Non-Expert 
 Advocacy/Non-Profit 
                                                          
82 http://www.parliament.uk/draft-communications-bill/ 
83 Visual evidence was available in the form of webcasts of oral evidence sessions.  For practical reasons 
it made more sense to use the textual transcripts. 
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 Telecoms Industry 
 Experts 
 Media 
 Official/Governmental 
 Independent Authorities 
For the purposes of analysis seven categories were both a sufficiently large number 
to allow for differences to be shown and small enough to allow for ease of analysis.  
The next stage was to apply the same process to the oral evidence, which consisted 
of 23 interview sessions with 55 respondents.  The categorisation of respondents 
was suitable for incorporating the oral evidence and as a final step sub-categories of 
respondents were devised where appropriate. 
The majority of the analysis of data was consistent with a qualitative approach.  
However as a precursor to this a brief quantitative content analysis was carried out 
on the written evidence.  As well as noting the number of respondents in each 
category, this took account of the weight of each category’s contributions to the 
evidence.  For analytical purposes, this was valuable as it indicated who was most 
‘visible’ and active in supporting or resisting the proposals of the Bill.  The protocol 
for qualitative analysis of the documents consisted of a series of questions: 
 What were the key arguments made for and against the Bill? 
 What arguments were made most frequently by each category of 
respondents? 
 To what extent did different categories of respondents make the same 
arguments? 
Thus, the analysis of the content of the documents was thematic and comparative.  
Time constraints made it impractical to develop a formal coding strategy and apply 
this to every written and oral submission (i.e. every document).  Instead, a sampling 
approach was used, producing a selection of each category’s responses: five written 
submissions from each category of respondent and six of the oral evidence sessions, 
across a variety of categories (approximately one quarter of each of the types of 
evidence).  In the case of the written evidence, this entailed the entirety of two 
category’s responses given the small number of respondents from each.  From this 
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developed an initial thematic framework, which was also informed by personal 
knowledge of the issues of concern to advocacy groups.  The thematic analysis was 
driven jointly, therefore, by deductive and inductive imperatives. 
This enabled identification of which categories of respondents discussed certain 
themes more prominently than others and this guided subsequent examinations of 
the texts.  Searching for key terms derived from these themes in both the written 
and oral evidence – an affordance of having electronic documents – allowed 
identification of where important themes reoccurred.  Moreover, it permitted 
insight into the last of the protocol questions above.  As a result, the analytical 
process came to focus primarily on three categories of respondents: ‘Telecoms 
Industry’, ‘Experts’ and ‘Advocacy/Non-Profit’.  In itself, this outcome of the process 
was an important finding and Chapter Six discusses the main contributors to the 
debate around the CDB.  Ultimately, identification of the most prominent themes 
justified focusing more attention on some categories of respondents than others. 
This was particularly the case with ‘Individual/Non-Experts’.  This category was by far 
the largest proportionally although the data presented in this category was of less 
(but by no means zero) analytical interest. 
The process of documentary analysis employed during the fieldwork was an exercise 
in effective management of a large body of data.  Methodological rigour was 
paramount to avoid becoming overwhelmed by what was a comprehensive and 
unparalleled account of how digital surveillance and online space is negotiated in 
practice.  It also allowed reflections on the methodological issues inherent in 
documentary analysis.  Specifically, part way through the analysis it became clear 
that the oral and written evidence documents had different characteristics.  The 
former were much more ‘engaging’ owing to the method by which the data were 
captured.  For all intents and purposes, the oral evidence was secondary interview 
data albeit gathered for purposes beyond social research.  Indeed, many of the 
practicalities of documentary analysis encountered while engaging with the CDB 
consultation were those identified by McGinn (2008) in respect of secondary data: 
easy access and savings in time and labour.  More than that though, the oral 
evidence was richer than the written evidence.  While both supplied valuable data, 
the oral evidence exhibited questioning, probing, explanation and elaboration.  Thus 
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the qualities of these data compared to the written data were the same as 
comparing primary qualitative interview data to written responses to open ended 
questions in a survey.  The written evidence was more formulaic and precise, 
particularly in the case of responses from advocacy organisations, having been 
planned thoroughly for maximum impact.  With this said, it was also interesting to 
note the occasions when respondents to the written evidence were later invited to 
give evidence to the panel (or in fewer cases, vice-versa). 
4.5 MORAL PANICS AND THE MEDIA: EXPLORING WIKILEAKS 
The final site for the data collection was the media.  The two primary focal points 
were whistleblowing organisation WikiLeaks (a ‘new media’ platform and a potent 
agent of resistance) and ‘traditional’ mainstream press.  As outlined in Chapter Two, 
there has been little systematic academic attention given to WikiLeaks, particularly 
with regards to (resisting) surveillance.  The data collection first aimed to describe 
the phenomenon of WikiLeaks to theorise its contribution to our understanding of 
digital surveillance and resistance.  Subsequently, echoing previous studies of social 
control – namely Stan Cohen’s (1972) Folk Devils and Moral Panics – the fieldwork 
sought to examine the recent history and presentation of WikiLeaks and surveillance 
issues in the mainstream media.  This discussion describes the choice to emulate 
aspects of Cohen’s approach as well as methodological issues concerning media 
analysis.  There is a final anecdotal reflection on the experience of investigating 
WikiLeaks through qualitative interviews with a former employee and a collaborator 
as well as attempts to make contact with Editor-in-Chief Julian Assange. 
4.5.1 TRACKING DISCOURSE 
The media are ‘consequential in social life’ (Altheide 1996: 69).  Reports in the news 
media control cognition (Cohen 2002); they affect public perceptions and the 
construction of social problems – a core aspect of the negotiation of modern 
surveillance.  Altheide (1996: 69) also emphasises the presence of ‘powerful cultural 
symbols’ in the news – a theme that is particularly relevant to the study of 
surveillance and resistance. 
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To a degree, a similar documentary approach was adopted during this stage of data 
collection as for the analysis of the CDB.  The emphasis was on charting the change 
over time in media presentations of surveillance and resistance.  This is called 
‘tracking discourse…following certain issues, words, themes and frames over a 
period of time’ (Altheide 1996: 70).  This does not equate to implementing a 
traditional ‘discourse analysis’.  While some aspects of language use in news reports 
were considered – tone and symbolism for instance – the primary agenda was to 
track the frequency and prevalence of news stories relating to the topics of interest, 
rather than the constructive or performative characteristics of language (Willig 
2014).  The Nexis database provided the mechanism for searching and retrieving 
relevant stories.  Nexis is an invaluable resource for social research (Altheide 1996; 
Hewson et al. 2003; Ó Dochartaigh 2007; Schulz 2008).  The depth of its historical 
coverage from the US and UK, availability of full-text news articles, powerful and 
flexible search capabilities and ease of downloading and saving search results all 
recommend Nexis as a resource for social research involving news media. 
Queries of the Nexis database limited the search to ‘UK publications’84 as the volume 
of data generated by a search of all publications (i.e. worldwide) would have been 
unmanageable.  Equally for the context of the thesis, this helped to ground the study 
in a UK context.  WikiLeaks was used as the primary organising search term.  Thus 
the time-frame of the search was dictated by the emergence of WikiLeaks in the 
press in January 2007.  The time of the initial search (August 2012) naturally acted as 
the end-point although the ease by which reports could be retrieved from Nexis 
meant this was constantly updated as the research progressed.  This was particularly 
crucial when, in June 2013, surveillance became a headline issue with the revelation 
of information concerning the NSA and GCHQ from Edward Snowden.  These 
important and highly relevant events were able to be incorporated with little effort 
into the analytical process.  Again, opportunity played an important role in the 
research process. 
A small set of search terms (with Boolean operators where required) were devised 
to chart the reporting of various topics in the press.  The search was directed at 
                                                          
84 The category ‘UK publications’, in contrast to ‘UK newspapers’ also includes a selection of magazines 
that were considered reliable sources of information. 
   98 
 
keywords within articles rather than headlines to ensure a broad coverage.  Initially, 
three search terms were used: 
 ‘WikiLeaks’ 
 ‘Assange’: initially ‘Julian Assange’, this was revised as it was clear the press 
quickly began referring to him primarily by surname. 
 ‘Surveillance AND Privacy’: using only ‘surveillance’ retrieved far too many 
reports to be of use.  Moreover, the term was imprecise and captured 
articles that were not related to the type of surveillance of interest to the 
research.  ‘Privacy’ was included as it was considered to be the most 
appropriate coupling to obtain articles that discussed surveillance 
technologies and their (potentially) harmful consequences.  Arguably, this 
could have skewed the results in favour of reports that presented 
surveillance in a negative light, e.g., ‘privacy concerns over new surveillance 
tools’.  However, it is not in the nature of the news media to be overtly 
supportive of government or corporate surveillance and thus it is fair to say 
that searching for articles containing ‘surveillance AND privacy’ would 
generate an accurate reflection of the volume and nature of news media 
reporting on the topic. 
Nexis enabled automatic filtering of results so repeated articles were removed, 
improving the accuracy of the number of articles returned.  The next step was to 
count the number of articles featuring the keywords each month and tabulate these 
in Microsoft Excel for converting to graphical format.  Nexis has an inbuilt limitation 
on the number of articles it will return (3,000).  Thus, when WikiLeaks was featuring 
minimally in the news, searches could cover a period of one year each month tallied 
accordingly.  As WikiLeaks appeared more frequently, this approach required 
refining to month-by-month searches.  In some months, the total number of articles 
exceeded 3,000 and so fortnightly or weekly searches were conducted until the 
volume of reports for that month could be calculated.  This had the benefit of 
highlighting early on key ‘moments’ (i.e. large fluctuations) in the reporting history. 
When Snowden’s leaks made the news in mid-2013 the search terms were expanded 
to include the following: 
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 ‘Edward Snowden’: unlike ‘Julian Assange’, Snowden’s full name was used as 
his surname was more common and returned a wealth of irrelevant articles. 
 ‘NSA OR GCHQ’: given that many news reports concerning Snowden’s leaked 
documents mentioned both the NSA and GCHQ, it was feasible to use ‘OR’ 
as opposed to ‘AND’. 
The search was backdated to 2010, thereby placing reporting trends concerning the 
NSA and GCHQ in their historical context85.  Owing to the infrequency of reports 
featuring WikiLeaks and Assange from 2007 to 2009, the analysis focused on the 
period from 2010 to 2013, when the impact of WikiLeaks in the press was most 
visible.  One final addition to the search criteria aimed to extract from within the 
search results a subset of articles specifically addressing surveillance and/on the 
Internet (i.e. ‘digital surveillance’).  Each set of results for ‘surveillance AND privacy’ 
were also searched for ‘online’ or ‘Internet’86.  This reduced the number of relevant 
articles (an important finding in itself) and also allowed for more thorough analysis. 
As with the previous case, volume of data was a hurdle.  This was particularly the 
case with WikiLeaks; at the height of their popularity in the news, there were more 
than 3,000 news articles in the UK in one month.   A similar approach as before was 
adopted to effectively parse the data from Nexis.  Nexis results were sorted by 
relevance (the number of times search terms are mentioned in an article) and the 25 
most relevant articles from each set of results were reviewed.  In the case of 
online/Internet-related surveillance articles, there was some repetition and so this 
process also involved filtering these and combining the two sets of search results to 
identify the most relevant.  Finally, scanning the headlines proved to be a reliable 
indicator of the topic and tone of each article.  This supplemented the frequency 
analysis of articles with an appreciation of their topic and tone. 
Regarding the theoretical framework, the process of ‘tracking discourse’ allowed an 
emulation of Cohen’s (1972) analytical approach to understanding the creation of 
‘folk devils’ and ‘moral panics’.  Cohen adapted a framework from research on 
natural disasters to explain the construction in the news media (as well other social 
                                                          
85 Edward Snowden, naturally, did not appear prior to June 2013. 
86 Boolean operators did not work for the ‘search within results’ function and so each term had to 
searched for separately. 
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arenas) of social problems – specifically those related to crime and disorder.  
Drawing on this approach allowed me to theorise the relationship between 
WikiLeaks (and later Snowden) and surveillance with respect to their construction as 
social problems and to what extent it was possible to characterise these phenomena 
as moral panics.  Locating this final case around the news media was therefore 
valuable and drew on a long-established tradition of examining the media as a forum 
for the creation of public anxieties and concern and the construction of deviance 
and control (for example Young 1971; Cohen and Young 1973, Ericson et al. 1989, 
1991; Ferrell and Websdale 1999; Loseke 2003).  It proved to be a useful mechanism 
for appreciating the social and political impact of WikiLeaks and Snowden and 
helped to condense what was a relatively rapid succession of high-intensity events 
into a comprehensible story.  As with the CDB, the quantity of material precluded in-
depth content analysis.  However, the approach captured the essence of the media 
trajectories in a meaningful way for the broader aim of the thesis. 
4.5.2 CHASING THE CYPHERPUNKS 
The second component of the fieldwork in this site was directed specifically at 
WikiLeaks, investigating its position as a new platform in the changing landscape of 
media and communication and technologies.  Primary and secondary interview data 
constituted the basis for this and so the final part of this recitation of method 
returns to the observations above concerning the interviews that helped to inform 
all three of the research sites.  This aspect of the research required significant 
persistence at times – also a fantastic learning curve – but ultimately produced 
primary data that added tremendous value to the thesis. 
Two of the interviews conducted as part of the research were with individuals who 
had worked in the past with WikiLeaks: Daniel Domscheit-Berg and Smári McCarthy.  
The experience of interviewing the latter in respect of Skype was described earlier; it 
was on this occasion the efforts to record audio and video caused more problems 
than they resolved.  As he lived in Germany, Daniel was also contacted via Skype.  
His account of the time he spent with WikiLeaks (Domscheit-Berg 2011) was 
motivation to include him in the research.  Until he quit in late 2010 following 
internal conflicts in the organisation Daniel was a core member of WikiLeaks, having 
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been one of three people responsible for much of their operations since it began in 
earnest.  This unique background situated Daniel as a valuable contact for the 
research and justifies having only two interviewees with a connection to WikiLeaks.  
There is a tradition in social science (and criminology specifically), characterised 
most prominently by Clifford Shaw’s The Jack Roller (1930), of case studies of 
individuals and narrative style interviews.  The interview with Daniel was not a 
narrative analysis, nor was the research a longitudinal case study of WikiLeaks.  
However, Daniel, as indicated above, was the only person realistically available to 
describe the operation and motivations of WikiLeaks in its early days.  Of the other 
two, one continues to reside in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London and the other 
remains anonymous.  While small interview samples are typically seen as limited in 
the insight they can provide, in the case of this research the opposite was true.  
Here, ‘n=1’ (see Maruna and Matravers 2007) was of enormous benefit to the 
research. 
After leaving WikiLeaks Daniel began his own platform for the receipt and 
transmission of leaked material, OpenLeaks.  This was the first point of contact87.  A 
response was received from ‘Max’ who, alongside saying he would pass the request 
to Daniel, queried several aspects of the research topic.  A few emails were 
exchanged in this manner but a response from Daniel was not forthcoming.  
Eventually, he was emailed directly; his address appeared in one response from Max 
in the ‘Cc’ section of the email header.  Daniel responded positively but shortly after 
email responses ceased, despite prompting.  In addition, emails returned 
undelivered and the OpenLeaks website was found to have been taken offline.  As a 
last resort, contact details were located for Daniel’s wife who was asked if she could 
help to get back in touch with Daniel.  Fortunately a positive response was 
forthcoming and Daniel re-established contact, explaining problems the organisation 
had been experiencing with their servers.  While it took two and a half months, 
obtaining this interview was a highlight of the entire research and a valuable lesson 
in persistence. 
                                                          
87 See Appendix D: OpenLeaks emails for the majority of this correspondence.  Owing to technical 
difficulties, some of these emails were irretrievable. 
   102 
 
The next logical step was to attempt to make contact with Julian Assange.  Having 
said that, this was initially borne out of opportunity rather than meticulous 
planning88.  What might be called ‘a series of unfortunate events’ characterised the 
efforts to recruit Assange.  A speculative visit to the Ecuadorian Embassy in London, 
a formal written invitation to take part in the research89, a series of requests to 
WikiLeaks’ publishers The Sunshine Press and an email conversation with Assange’s 
(accommodating) mother failed to secure his participation in the research process.  
Assange’s voice does feature in the research but via secondary data: a transcription 
of a Channel 4 documentary on WikiLeaks, several short clips discussing The Spy Files 
release in 2012, and transcripts of several interviews and lectures.  Given the failed 
attempts to recruit Assange, secondary data was the only viable means of placing his 
knowledge and opinions in this research.  These did not constitute a substantial 
portion of the data for analysis in this research site, but they were helpful for 
providing a degree of insight into the rationale behind WikiLeaks and their strategies 
for disclosing information90.  
4.6 ETHICAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS 
The final portion of this chapter deals with ethical and political dimensions of 
carrying out research around surveillance.  The start of this chapter alluded to the 
parallels between social research and surveillance.  Drawing from Lyon (2002: 3) and 
Haggerty and Ericson (2000), Kemple and Huey note how ‘modern social science and 
modern surveillance were each from their earliest days a means of “keeping tabs on 
the mobile” and yet today are both components in a much larger assemblage’ (2005: 
155).  By this, they mean to draw attention to the potential for reflexivity in social 
science that studying surveillance allows, and the simultaneous positioning of the 
researcher within ‘flows’ of observation and visibility that characterise surveillance 
relationships.  This research exposed and alerted me to a number of the ethical and 
political dimensions surrounding (online) surveillance research.  These overlap to a 
great extent with issues inherent to the nascent fields of computational social 
science and ‘big data’. 
                                                          
88 For a full but more anecdotal account of this process, see Appendix F. 
89 See Appendix E. 
90 See Chapter Seven. 
   103 
 
4.6.1 PRIVACY, ANONYMITY AND CONSENT 
Privacy is an emotive issue at the heart of discussions around surveillance and the 
consequences of the continual trend towards online interaction (including ‘big 
data’).  It is also an intrinsic consideration for any social research.  The combination 
of the two – online social research and particularly that which involves social media 
– is thus characterised by lively debate.  Solove (2007b) and Albrechtslund (2008) 
among others point to the shifting nature and expectations of privacy in online social 
spaces.  In part, this could be the result of changes in online relationships and 
surveillance.  Andrejevic’s (2005) three types of ‘lateral surveillance’ (romantic 
interests, family and friends) emphasise mutuality as opposed to the traditional 
disempowering, top-down conception of ‘watching over’ people.  Audiences online 
are many and it can be a challenge to keep tabs on the sorts of information we share 
and with whom we share it.  Underpinning and fuelling much of this are corporate 
‘consumers’ of our data – an ‘audience’ perhaps overlooked by many people.  Such 
changes highlight the contextual nature of privacy online (Nissenbaum 1998, 2004, 
2009; Zimmer 2006; boyd 2008); what we expect and understand by privacy and the 
related issues of anonymity and consent differs according to online setting and 
audience.  It is also apparent that what is ‘public’ and ‘private’ is relative in the 
context of social media; we may choose to share information on Facebook with 
audiences we would not usually engage with in normal social interaction or likewise, 
we may share more personal information on some sites as opposed to others. 
The increasingly public nature of our data online poses many difficulties, therefore, 
for understanding privacy.  It can be difficult in this context to classify or quantify 
what a breach of privacy is (boyd and Crawford 2012).  For instance, is there an 
immediate impact or will one be felt several years later?  The ethics of online social 
research are equally complex (Ess 2002; Markham and Buchanan 2012) and need 
careful consideration in this age of proliferating and accessible data (see also 
COSMOS 2014).  The typical response to the question of how to treat online/social 
media data is that ‘it is already public’ (Zimmer 2010) and so there should be few 
ethical concerns with the collection of these data for research purposes.  It is a 
question of informed consent.  Publicly available data of the sort found on social 
media compels us to reconsider what it means to give consent to the collection and 
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analysis personal information.  While social media users accept the terms of service 
when they register (most likely without reading them at all or at least to any large 
extent) this should not necessarily be taken as tacit agreement for the use of their 
data in settings beyond those of the service they signed up for.  It is a question of 
audience again and the case of Lewis et al. (2008)91 illustrates this.  As Zimmer’s 
(2010) critique of the ethical basis of that research argued, while users may have 
agreed to their personal information appearing on Facebook, it is unlikely many 
would expect their data to be removed from this setting (despite anonymity) and 
published in academic journals.  As Zwitter (2014: 6) has also observed, somewhat 
reminiscent of the issue of ‘social sorting’ (Gandy 1993; Lyon 2003b), ‘uncomfortable 
truths’ about social groups who are identified and studied on Twitter can return 
negative impacts upon those groups. 
This research was not based significantly around the collection and analysis of 
individual social media data but there are some aspects of the fieldwork that do 
merit consideration in light of these issues.  Sufficiently so that during a round of 
questions following a paper related to this thesis presented at the Surveillance 
Studies Network conference in 2012, one delegate asked how I reconciled being a 
surveillance researcher (usually taken to imply a degree of anti-surveillance) with the 
use of research techniques that were tantamount to surveillance practices in their 
own right.  There is not a straightforward answer to this kind of question.  Neither is 
it true that using such tools is ‘surveillance’.  The work of Kemple and Huey (2005) 
again helps us to understand that researching surveillance places the researcher 
within a series of flows between observers and observed and at any one time we can 
be situated in both of these positions.  We do not have to categorise ourselves as 
either ‘observer’ or ‘observed’.  The key point to take from this illustration is that 
using NodeXL and similar computational platforms does not have to equate with 
‘doing surveillance’ rather than ‘doing research’.  The distinction is a hazy one in 
truth but, taking lessons from the above discussion, evidently it is the obligation of 
online/social media/surveillance researchers to account for the contexts and people 
                                                          
91 The Tastes, Ties and Time project (Lewis et al. 2008 and see also Lewis 2008) involved the location 
and downloading of over 1,000 Facebook profiles of a US college student cohort.  Profiles were 
anonymised and fed into a codebook dataset that identified, among other demographics, gender, 
ethnicity, political views and college major.  Despite anonymisation, Zimmer (2010) describes the 
relative ease by which profiles were ‘re-identified’ – the college was identified as Harvard and many of 
the students were able to be identified. 
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they study and consequently how privacy, anonymity and consent are to be 
managed. 
The research methods used here did not seek to collect personal information or 
first-hand accounts from social media.  They mapped out connections.  This use of 
publicly available data does not pose any harm to service users; admittedly it is 
carried out in accordance with the ‘it is already public’ line of thought but this is one 
context where the argument can be supported.  One issue does arise, however, that 
researchers employing computational methods should be aware of: inadvertent 
collection of personal data and the revelation of information beyond that which was 
intended or anticipated.  In the context of this fieldwork, capturing social network 
connections using NodeXL meant simultaneously collecting a wealth of data beyond 
that of ‘who follows whom’: most recent tweets, geo-location data and profile 
pictures to name a few.  These data were not intended to be collected, nor were 
they used in the research, but they were collected nonetheless.  What obligation 
does this place on the researcher?  Likewise, with the increasing sophistication of 
computational research tools it is entirely plausible that information about people 
and their networks could be gleaned beyond that which is explicitly stated in any 
data.  This process of ‘triangulation’ or ‘homophily’92 is a trait of big data analysis.  
Some might argue that this is the purpose of research; interpreting meaning behind 
actions and statements and uncovering unseen social processes are traditional social 
science pursuits.  However, with the scale and depth of data available to social 
scientists (and any other consumers of big data) and capabilities of algorithmic 
analysis these interpretations become certainties.  Our data can reveal far more 
than they appear to.  As social researchers we should consider what privacy means 
and how it is experienced in different contexts.  As Zimmer (2010: 324) concludes, 
‘[c]oncerns over consent, privacy and anonymity do not disappear simply because 
subjects participate in online social networks; rather, they become even more 
important.’ 
 
 
                                                          
92 See Chapter Six. 
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4.6.2 SUBJECTIFICATION AND SUBJECTIVITY 
Kemple and Huey (2005) describe their experiences of researching patterns of 
surveillance and counter-surveillance in a deprived (‘Skid Row’) neighbourhood.  
They argue that researchers in such environments can become implicated in these 
relationships – identified as agents of surveillance and as appropriate targets for 
counter-surveillance (resistance).  The risk of being labelled as an agent of social 
control is one that must always be managed when researching surveillance of any 
kind – both in physical and virtual places.  I experienced this during Masters research 
prior to this thesis when attempting to recruit participants from a public, online 
forum of an anti-surveillance campaign group.  These efforts were met with 
scepticism and a degree of distrust; ultimately the best solution was to carry out the 
intended ‘focus group’ within the website forum rather than on an external website.  
For people who are naturally distrustful of surveillance meeting them on their ‘home 
turf’ was vital (although was by no means a panacea).  There is, however, a 
noticeable difference in attitude between administrators/staff of advocacy groups 
and their member base.  The former – recruited during this fieldwork – appear much 
more willing to engage in research.  Again, Kemple and Huey’s (2005: 155) 
observations shed some light on why this may be.  
‘Among the ironies of the supposed ‘democratization of surveillance’ is that 
many of the most marginalized and mobile subjects of observation are already 
hypervisible and hypervigilent by virtue of their lack of access to private and 
protected places, and yet at the same time they remain largely unseen and 
unaccounted for, forgotten and unheard from (Archand, 1979).’ 
In the context of digital surveillance ‘marginalised and mobile subjects’ are 
understood to be members of the public – everyday ‘Internet users’ subject to many 
forms of tracking and monitoring.  Distrust of researchers asking about surveillance, 
particularly in online places where identity cannot be verified, is understandable.  
Chapter Six addresses the issue of ‘unheard voices’ in surveillance relationships; the 
pre-legislative consultation provided a valuable arena in this respect where the ‘lay 
public’ could willingly and trustingly share their opinions.  To borrow Kemple and 
Huey’s phrase, we should acknowledge the ‘dialectic of visibility and invisibility 
which envelops the lives of each and every one of us’ (2005: 155).  This research has 
allowed me to develop my own appreciation of the complexity of the relationship 
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between surveiller and surveilled and how I occupy both sides of this as a researcher 
of/doing surveillance and as a citizen concerned about the risks of surveillance. 
The other side of this coin is the risk of researchers being subject to undesirable 
forms of surveillance.  I do not appear to have suffered any negative repercussions 
during the research.  However, it is prudent (if not a little paranoid perhaps) to 
acknowledge the fact that repeated attempts to contact Julian Assange and 
contacting his former associate Daniel Domscheit-Berg, among other aspects of the 
research, may have increased my ‘visibility’ as a subject of surveillance.  Had I been 
successful in gaining access to the Ecuadorian embassy, this would certainly have 
been the case. 
During the course of this research – undeniably a product of immersing myself in the 
area for a period of years – I have also become increasingly aware of the ubiquity 
and risks of online surveillance.  This has had the effect of changing my behaviours 
regarding various protective measures online.  The outcome of this research, 
therefore, is that acknowledgement of my position as both researcher and ‘citizen’ 
in respect of the surveillance relationships under study.  Becker’s (1967) classic 
question springs to mind.  Social research is never value-free; indeed, it appears to 
be the tendency of surveillance studies to raise awareness of the risks surveillance 
poses rather than endorsing the benefits that do exist.  I did not begin this research 
with strong ‘anti-surveillance’ values but as my awareness of the field has developed 
my opinions have crystallised around the profoundly negative implications of 
modern surveillance practices.  I am now a member of the Open Rights Group, who 
campaign for digital rights.  We should consider, therefore, that not only can 
researcher values impact on research participants or projects but so can the 
research problem impact on the researcher.  Neither of these outcomes invalidates 
research.  Studying surveillance has allowed me to question my own values 
regarding the protection of digital rights and privacy and this is an intrinsic part of 
the research process. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided a reflexive overview of the design and implementation of 
the research process of this thesis.  The multi-strategy/mixed-methods approach 
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employed was designed to capture the diversity of relationships and settings in 
which modern digital surveillance and resistance to surveillance occur.  Alongside 
eliciting contributions from expert participants in this arena using traditional 
qualitative methods, computational social science research added an innovative 
aspect to this methodology by allowing for the exploration of near real-time changes 
in some of the networks that constitute this contested environment.  Illustrated 
throughout this chapter is the overlap between the methodological and theoretical 
aspects of this research.  Specifically, how the study of digital surveillance and 
resistance, the socio-technical system of the Internet, the use of online research 
methods and the importance of the concept of privacy interact in a complex but 
continually fascinating way. 
- .... .  -. . .--  .... --- -- .  --- ..-.  -- .. -. -.. .-.-.- 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE ORGANISATION OF RESISTANCE: NETWORKS 
AND NODAL GOVERNANCE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins the empirical component of the thesis.  The aim of this first 
stage of the analysis is to examine the online social organisation of resistance to 
surveillance.  It is based on the idea that as digital surveillance is characterised by 
globally distributed networks and information flows, so too must resistance be 
understood in the same way.  To borrow a term from Bauman and Lyon (2013), 
because modern surveillance is ‘liquid’, characterised by mobility and flexibility, it 
follows that so too ought resistance to be a fluid, adaptable process.  For this reason, 
the chapter develops as its basis the theory of nodal governance that guides the 
research as a whole.  Previous research has sought to demonstrate the workings of 
nodal governance by focusing on public and private providers of security (Shearing 
and Stenning 2003; Burris et al. 2005; Wood and Shearing 2007).  The rationale 
behind this part of the fieldwork was to expand those traditional notions of nodal 
governance by looking to civil society and, specifically, those settings and nodes who 
resist the various forms of governance exercised elsewhere – namely, techniques of 
digital surveillance.  The subjects of this chapter, therefore, are the members of a 
global network of ‘privacy advocates’ (Bennett 2008) who campaign around a host 
of issues related to digital surveillance.  The chapter clarifies in what sense we can 
consider these organisations, and civil society more broadly, as governing nodes.  It 
also shows, through visualising online network data, that resistance to digital 
surveillance can be understood as both a macro-level social process and a micro-
level series of interactions and exchanges. 
The data that support the observations in this chapter are drawn from some of the 
sources outlined in Chapter Four.  The primary source is hyperlink network data, 
retrieved and visualised using Issue Crawler and Gephi.  These data are 
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supplemented, where appropriate, with qualitative interview data from members of 
advocacy organisations.  The analysis in this chapter employs concepts from nodal 
governance theory and social network analysis (SNA), outlined in Chapters Three and 
Four respectively93.  While SNA metrics quantitatively illustrate communication and 
organisation within the network, these can be contextualised with reference to 
nodal governance theory and the other qualitative data.  Together, these concepts 
allow us to gain an insight into the prominence of various groups within the 
community of privacy advocates, the structural features of the network, its potential 
to change over time and adapt to emergent issues and the ways in which its 
members go about resisting digital surveillance.  Previous studies of privacy 
advocacy (Bennett 2008) and networked organisation (Introna and Gibbons 2009) 
have sought to delineate these features.  The network analysis presented here is a 
necessary update to these efforts, as new sites of resistance have emerged.  Gaining 
an understanding of the mentalities, technologies, resources of the nodes within the 
network and the presence of ‘superstructural nodes’ (Burris et al. 2005) adds to the 
analysis by illustrating how those who resist surveillance interact with other nodes 
tradtionally illuminated in studies of governance of security. 
5.2 INFORMATION POLITICS AND HYPERLINK NETWORKS 
The purpose of the network of privacy advocates, broadly speaking, is to resist the 
expansion of unwarranted or invasive surveillance practices and to protect individual 
privacy.  While over-simplified, this represents a useful starting point.  A key strategy 
by which they aim to do this is what Bennett (2008) refers to as information politics, 
‘the politics of persuasion…speaking truth to power.’  More specifically in the 
context of surveillance and privacy, this strategy: 
‘often involves extrapolations from the experiences of similar surveillance 
systems in other times and places…It often requires a leap of faith, that many 
are unwilling or incapable of making, from a particular provision under 
discussion to larger arguments about the slow and incremental slide toward the 
“surveillance society”’ (Bennett 2008: 98). 
                                                          
93 Sections 3.2.3 and 4.3.2. 
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Online as well as offline, this entails the transmission of information to the public 
about particular surveillance-related issues.  Interview data from representatives of 
Privacy International and the Open Rights Group (ORG) support this: 
‘We’re a charitable organisation so our resistance is in the form of public 
discussion, raising awareness, public education and helping to assist 
policymakers in ensuring they have an informed understanding of policies 
they’re trying to introduce…We do a lot of public out reach to enable an 
understanding both in the human rights communities and other non-profits to 
ensure that they’re appropriately protected…’ (Eric King, Privacy International). 
‘..we do a lot of blogging and advocacy work ourselves…in-house policy work 
where we talk to policymakers and politicians…getting our 30,000-odd active 
supporters interested and informed enough so that they get worked up enough 
to do something about it…to try to foment the public disquiet…’ (Pete Bradwell, 
Open Rights Group). 
An important avenue for transmitting information and keeping such issues in the 
public eye is the Internet.  Both Privacy International and the ORG have an active 
web presence – as do many other organisations, as this chapter illustrates – and 
therefore the online environment is an important factor to understand in the 
organisation of resistance. 
The hyperlink structure of the Internet means that Internet users can follow links 
between websites to other related sources of information.  It is to be expected that 
advocacy groups with similar interests or working towards similar goals will show 
some degree of mutual support through linking to one another’s websites94 or to the 
same collaborative campaign website.  Additionally, should Internet users want to 
find out more about a particular surveillance practice the use of a search engine will 
present a list of results that are ranked according to those websites linked to most 
frequently by others.  Software such as Issue Crawler gathers these links and allows 
us to visualise networks according to these patterns of connectivity. 
Another key aspect of information politics, and more broadly of social control online, 
is the presence in the network of non-advocate groups.  As the theory of nodal 
governance dictates, governing nodes in civil society do not act in a vacuum but 
interact with other nodes in different sectors.  The role of governmental bodies, 
regulatory agencies, the traditional news media and social media should therefore 
                                                          
94 This of course is not to be taken as a given. Hyperlinks do not necessarily convey meaning and for 
that reason cannot be assumed to be an endorsement of the destination website (see Chapter Four). 
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not be neglected.  The data gathered suggest there are a number of prominent 
nodes in this regard. 
Previous research in this field suggests that the behaviour of the advocacy network 
may ‘transcend the intentions and possibilities of individual actors’ (i.e. pursuing 
their own political agendas) and to become an ‘expanding and cohesive online 
network for information politics and meta-surveillance’ (Introna and Gibbons 2009: 
234).  ‘Meta-surveillance’ in this context is what, in Chapter Three, was discussed as 
‘resistive surveillance’ – watching the watchers as it might be termed.  
Consequently, the potential to expand and incorporate a cohesive body of civil 
society nodes could be the key to effectively resisting surveillance.  Nodal 
governance theory would see this as incorporating in to the network institutions 
with a more diverse range of mentalities, technologies and resources (Burris et al. 
2005).  The consequence of which would be, arguably, to make the network more 
flexible and adaptable to resisting diverse surveillance practices in different 
geographic locales.  At the same time, network metrics allow us to assess whether 
this ‘transcendent’ ability of the network exists.  These are briefly recapped from 
Chapter Four, alongside the organisational characteristics of the network that are of 
interest for the analysis. 
5.2.1 METRICS, MEASURES AND NETWORK STRUCTURE 
There are three types of network centrality that can be identified: degree, 
Eigenvector and Betweenness95.  When constructing the advocacy community these 
measures are helpful because they allow us to see which members are paid 
attention to the most and which are useful for the relay of information.  This matters 
for the online advocacy community for two reasons.  First, it can indicate who may 
be influential in shaping the framing of a particular issue.  Second, if we consider an 
Internet user searching for information about a given surveillance issue it is likely 
they will end up being directed to those with higher Eigenvector centrality or being 
able to access related information by virtue of a bridge existing between two sub-
communities. 
                                                          
95 See Chapter Four (4.3.2) for a description of these metrics.  Figure 1 provides an illustration of 
Eigenvector and Betweenness centrality. 
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Where centrality helps to identify prominence and position in the network, the 
overall structure of the network is also an important consideration.  For instance, 
the effect of clustering together nodes in the network according to frequency of 
linking is to produce areas of varying density.  As Introna and Gibbons (2009: 236) 
observe: 
‘we are likely to encounter a relatively stable core of actors that are steadily 
affecting changes in the periphery96 through their on-going linking practices. 
These core actors tend to have a high level of visibility…and as such are 
disproportionately likely to be visited and linked to repeatedly, thus, affording 
them growing importance or centrality in the network’ (emphasis in original).   
These structural characteristics of the network are not fixed; they fluctuate as a 
result of hyperlinking practices.  If a node in the core links to one in the periphery , 
the effect is to draw them in closer to the centre of the network.  The result for the 
network, as a modality for resisting surveillance through information politics, is that 
more information is available to be brought to bear on the issue.  This phenomenon 
is referred to as positive network externality: benefits for the network as a whole as 
result of these linking practices.  The distinction between the core and the periphery 
is not clear-cut in the analysis below and an intermediate zone between the two is 
highlighted.  Furthermore, there are sub-communities within the core and 
elsewhere that are important features in their own right.  The shape and structure of 
the network is also dictated by real-time response to current surveillance issues97. 
Last are three structural characteristics that may affect the ability of the advocacy 
community to achieve its goals: density, stability and reciprocity.  Density, or fewer 
‘degrees of separation’98 will permit information to travel around the network more 
quickly because fewer links will be required to connect separate nodes.  The core is 
the densest area of the network.  Stability would prevent the network (and such 
density) dissipating over time.  The ability of the network to remain cohesive over 
time is potentially a crucial factor in resisting surveillance (Introna and Gibbons 
2009).  Similarly, nodal governance theory would suggest in this case, where there is 
                                                          
96 The changes in the periphery to which the authors refer are dealt with in section 5.3 and 5.6 of this 
chapter. 
97 Section 5.6 
98 The shortest distance between two nodes in a network.  Based on the ‘small world hypothesis’ that 
suggests any two people in the world are connected by no more than six links.  When calculating 
network metrics, Gephi, the average number of degrees of separation is referred to as the average 
geodesic distance; the lower the number, the denser the network. 
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a broadly shared mentality about the dangers of surveillance, cooperation and not 
competition is the key to effective governance from within civil society.  However 
this assumption is questioned later.  Reciprocity would also signal a cooperative 
approach to networking, as opposed to only receiving links and not directing 
Internet users elsewhere.  Reciprocity in this instance need not necessarily mean 
linking directly back to a website that a link is received from.  However, nodes 
should not act as ‘cul-de-sacs’. 
Exchange and transmission of information within the network is vital for the privacy 
advocates.  This was made clear in one interview: 
‘One of the main roles we’ve taken on has been…Co-ordinating civil society for 
want of a better word and helping set up the email lists and the meetings 
between people like ORG and Privacy International and Liberty and so on to 
help us understand what we’re doing respectively…sharing intelligence, 
understanding who sits where, whether anybody’s moved, put together a 
picture of where we’re being effective’ (Pete Bradwell, ORG). 
This emphasises again the importance placed on cooperation, both online and 
offline.  It also acknowledges that different organisations may have different 
mentalities, technologies and resources that can be co-ordinated for greater 
effectiveness.  In quantitative terms for the network analysis, density, stability and 
reciprocity, then, are all features that could contribute to such effectiveness of the 
community in resisting surveillance.  Of these, the first two have been highlighted in 
early research into the online advocacy community (Introna and Gibbons 2009).  The 
authors point to a small, stable and ‘geographically biased’99 core consisting of 
prominent advocate groups such as Privacy International, Statewatch and the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF).  As suggested above, non-advocate groups may 
also have a key role to play, but Introna and Gibbons (2009: 248) suggest that in 
2008 the ability of the network to draw in such nodes was limited. 
 
 
 
                                                          
99 The issue of geography is revisited below, with particular reference to the German socio-historical 
context for surveillance and resistance. 
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5.3 ONLINE CIVIL SOCIETY: KEY NODES 
5.3.1 THE CORE – DEGREE CENTRALITY 
The logical place to begin examining patterns of organisation and communication 
within the online advocacy community is the ‘core’.  It is here where the majority of 
advocate groups are to be found and, as described above, it is also the densest area 
of interaction in the network.  Figure 2 below is a snapshot of the network on the 4th 
January 2013.  The nodes in this diagram are scaled according to in-degree; the 
larger the node, the more links received100.  The lower left corner of the network is 
the core; there are a visibly higher number of linkages between nodes here. A brief 
examination of the core defines several key nodes by in-degree: the European Digital 
Rights Initiative101 (EDRi), the Electronic Frontier Foundation102 (EFF), Privacy 
International103 and the Electronic Privacy Information Center104 (EPIC).  These four 
organisations are prominent advocate groups.  The preponderance of other nodes 
situated in the core are also advocates concerned with some aspect of privacy and 
digital rights – the Global Internet Liberty Campaign105 (GILC), Article 19106, Electronic 
Frontier Finland107 (EFFI) and La Quadrature du Net108 are all good examples.  There 
are also nodes who are not advocates by nature, but whose work has an overlap 
with the interests of these groups; GNU109 is a free Unix-based operating system 
developed in accordance with the ethos of the Creative Commons (free access, 
development and distribution of software).  Other nodes of interest situated on the 
border of the core area such as the Chaos Computer Club110 (CCC) and the 
Informatics Centre for Peace and Social Responsibility111 will be discussed in due 
course. 
                                                          
100 Links received refer to those from discrete websites as opposed to pages within those websites. 
101 edri.org 
102 eff.org 
103 privacyinternational.org 
104 epic.org 
105 gilc.org 
106 article19.org 
107 effi.org 
108 laquadrature.net 
109 gnu.org 
110 ccc.de 
111 fiff.de 
   116 
 
FIGURE 2: NETWORK ON THE 4TH JANUARY 2013, NODES SCALED BY IN-DEGREE 
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Exploring the network online also shows where links to these key nodes come from 
and conversely whom the key nodes link to.  The key in Figure 2 identifies the 20 
nodes who linked to EDRi – the majority of whom are advocate groups, of which 
several are also located in the core.  The same is largely true of the EFF, EPIC and 
Privacy International.  Each of their situations within the core should also be noted, 
however, as this gives some indication of where links are received from and given to 
in the network.  For example, EDRi is more connected to the organisations in the 
lower left section of the network whereas Privacy International and EPIC are more 
connected to the actors in the top half of the network. 
There is, therefore, a high degree of interlinking within the core (high density).  
Additionally, the majority of nodes within the core are advocates of one sort or 
another.  There are a couple of implications for understanding this network in 
respect of nodal governance at this early stage.  The population of the core of the 
network solely by advocacy groups indicates a broadly shared mentality within the 
community.  As Burris et al. (2005) describe, mentalities are specific ways of thinking 
about the matters that nodes (in this case advocacy organisations) have emerged to 
govern.  Governance in this respect is engaged in by way of challenging the actions 
of those public and private entities that seek to implement digital surveillance 
practices.  The various nodes within the core (and the rest of the network) do all 
have their own specific interests, goals and expertise, as will shortly be illustrated.  
However, in general terms we can argue that there is a shared counter-
surveillance/digital rights mentality, particularly within the core of the network.  This 
acts as a distinct centre of gravity in the community around which more dispersed 
nodes can coalesce.  Another implication concerns the visible existence of 
networking.  Wood and Shearing (2007) suggest that whether nodes come together 
to form networks is an issue to be explored empirically.  The core of the network – 
as the data go on to show – remained largely stable.  Online, therefore, it seems that 
the nodes that comprise the privacy advocacy community do indeed come together 
to form networks.  To what extent this signifies more formal processes of 
cooperation is yet to be seen. 
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FIGURE 3: NETWORK ON THE 4TH JANUARY 2013, NODES SCALED BY IN-DEGREE AND OUT-DEGREE 
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There are also clues emerging as to where bridges are beginning to be made to the 
wider network.  The next step to furthering our understanding of the core of the 
network is to examine it in light of other measures of importance.  Figure 3 below is 
the same snapshot of the network – January 4th 2013 – but with the nodes scaled by 
both in-degree and out-degree.  The result is that rather than the attention paid to 
an actor being the decisive factor by which its importance is categorised, their 
linking to other nodes is also taken into account.  Larger nodes in Figure 3, therefore, 
indicate those nodes who both give and receive a high number of links.  This is 
important as we can begin to think about the flow of information around the 
network. 
Examining Figure 3, EDRi and EPIC both remain two of the most prominent nodes.  
This tells us that the frequency with which they link to others does not diminish the 
established importance of receiving a large number of links – which is the case for 
Privacy International and the EFF.  In their place, other key nodes now emerge.  GILC 
and EFFI are both visibly more prominent, a change that is the result of a higher 
frequency of linking to others as opposed to receiving links.  This indicates the 
relevance of reciprocity as a structural network characteristic.  Other networks 
produced during the time-scale of the research demonstrated similar patterns. 
Table 1 summarises the most prominent nodes in this network according to in-
degree, out-degree and degree (the sum of the previous two).  EPIC, for instance, 
receives links from 40 distinct websites and links out to 13.  The figures demonstrate 
the point made previously; EFFI and GILC receive only nine and eight links 
respectively yet link out to 43 and 35 websites.  This suggests that the importance of 
an actor in the network cannot be solely attributed to how many links it receives 
from others.  This runs parallel with the assumption of the purpose of a network of 
information politics; communication and transmission of information is the 
fundamental task at hand.  The important nodes in the network are those who 
contribute to this aim. 
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF DEGREE OF NODES 
Organisation In-Degree Out-Degree Sum 
(Degree) 
Total links 
received112 
EPIC 40 13 53 238 
EFFI 9 43 52 275 
EDRi 20 28 48 2,319 
GILC 8 35 43 312 
ORG 8 24 32 94 
IP Justice 5 27 32 18 
La Quadrature 5 24 29 151 
Privacy Int. 19 0 19 592 
EFF 18 0 18 418 
 
Until now, one advocacy group in particular has escaped attention.  The Open Rights 
Group113 (ORG) is not situated within the core of the network in Figures 2 and 3 and 
nor does it ever appear as such in other networks.  The same can be said of other 
advocates such as Statewatch114, No2ID115 and Liberty116.  The next step in 
identifying key nodes therefore is to examine measures of Eigenvector and 
Betweenness centrality. 
5.3.2 THE CORE – EIGENVECTOR AND BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY 
Using Gephi, it was possible to visualise the above networks using the metrics of 
Eigenvector and Betweenness centrality.  Figure 4 is drawn from the same data as 
Figures 2 and 3 (4th January 2013).  This time, the nodes are scaled and coloured 
according to Eigenvector and Betweenness centrality respectively; the larger the 
node the higher the ranking for Eigenvector centrality and the bluer the node (on a 
scale from red to blue) the higher the ranking for Betweenness centrality. 
 
 
 
                                                          
112 This refers to the total number of actual hyperlinks made to the website in question from the entire 
network. 
113 openrightsgroup.org 
114 statewatch.org 
115 no2id.net 
116 liberty-human-rights.org.uk 
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TABLE 2: NODE RANKS: EIGENVECTOR/BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY (4TH JAN 2013) 
Eigenvector Centrality Betweenness Centrality 
Actor Value Actor Value 
EDRi 1 EPIC 1037.094 
Privacy 
International 
0.977 EDRi 963.161 
EFF 0.859 ICO 664.276 
Chaos Computer 
Club 
0.685 ORG 614.504 
Twitter 0.613 EFFI 487.823 
 
It is immediately noticeable that EPIC and EDRi are the two most prominent nodes in 
terms of Betweenness centrality, while the Information Commissioner’s Office117 
(ICO), the ORG and EFFI also rank highly in this respect.  For Eigenvector centrality, 
EDRi is once again prominent, closely followed by Privacy International, the CCC, the 
EFF and Twitter.  Table 2 summarises the values for each of these. 
The patterns observed here remain relatively constant across all networks produced 
in the three-month period.  For reference, Figure 5 below is drawn from network 
data on the 28th February.  As can be seen, the key nodes remain the same – if only 
with a slight variation in relative importance118. 
In addition to the size and colour of nodes, the links between them (‘edges’) are also 
weighted in Figure 4.  The thicker the edge, the more links exist.  The colour of the 
edge indicates the predominant source of those links.  In this instance, there are a 
large number of links to Twitter from several sites.  However, this does not cause 
Twitter to rank highest for Eigenvector centrality as none of the nodes linking to it 
are themselves linked to by many important nodes.  The most important nodes in 
this regard, EDRi and Privacy International receive links from (amongst others) 
similarly frequently linked-to nodes such as EPIC and the EFF. 
 
                                                          
117 ico.gov.uk 
118 Changes in the network over time are addressed in more detail in section 5.6. 
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FIGURE 4: EIGENVECTOR AND BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY (4th JAN 2013) 
 
Although informative, it is easy to become too immersed in these figures obscuring 
the key findings from this network.  What we can confidently state is that the most 
important nodes in the network – those whom attention is paid to the most both 
directly and indirectly – are advocacy groups with the shared mentality of promoting 
privacy and the protection of rights in a digital context.  The core of this network is 
constituted primarily of these organisations.  An Internet user browsing for 
information pertaining to these topics is highly likely to end up at one of these 
websites by virtue of their linking practices. 
In terms of nodal governance, we can take the analysis one step further.  While the 
dense core signifies a degree of (online) cooperation between those advocacy 
groups, the presence of other counter-surveillance groups outside of the core also 
needs to be accounted for.  Being excluded from the core (whether intentionally or 
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not) is a form of competition as insofar as peripheral nodes will not be easily 
accessible to Internet users browsing the counter-surveillance community.  
Alternatively, this may signal a difference in mentalities or technologies of the 
groups.  Take Liberty, for instance, which is situated outside of the core.  While the 
organisation has been involved with campaigns to protect privacy, they are a more 
broad-based human rights organisation.  Counter-surveillance is one of several 
mentalities that characterise the organisation.  It may also be the case that Liberty 
places less emphasis on its online presence (one of several possible technologies 
that may be employed) than organisations in the core, which likewise may be 
oriented more specifically around issues related to digital surveillance.  Bennett’s 
(2008) distinction between ‘privacy-centric’ and ‘privacy-marginal’ organisations 
draws attention to the same issues. For Bennett it is their relation to the guiding 
concept of privacy that define their position.  The network diagrams, therefore, may 
be providing a similar insight into the way in which the various organisations 
prioritise online connectivity as a technology that allows them to mobilise resources 
for resisting surveillance. 
With this said, the core is not the sole area of importance of this network; there are 
sub-communities and other nodes to identify as the previous points make clear.  
Examining the ‘connective structures’ (Diani 1995, in Tarrow 1998: 124) linking the 
core and periphery assists with this.  We can therefore move out towards the 
periphery via bridging nodes that have already begun to be identified.  The measure 
for Betweenness centrality points us in the direction of these; beyond the core 
nodes, those important for relaying information are the Open Rights Group and the 
Information Commissioner’s Office. 
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FIGURE 5: EIGENVECTOR AND BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY (28TH FEB 2013) 
 
5.3.3 BRIDGING NODES 
Several recurrently appearing nodes in the network never occupy a position close to 
the core but neither are they of little enough importance to be relegated to the 
periphery.  Instead, they are located in an intermediate zone between the advocate 
community and other sub-groups of the network, an area overlooked in previous 
research.  This area of the network is much less dense than the core but contains 
several nodes whose role appears to be to act as a bridge between communities 
(specifically between the advocacy community and other sub-groups).  Bridging 
nodes might operate in two ways.  First, for joining together otherwise disconnected 
sub-groups with similar mentalities.  Second, as intermediaries between privacy 
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advocates and, for example, public sector organisations able to translate issues of 
concern into different policy or legislative contexts. 
The first of these bridges, the ORG, appears at a key juncture between the core and 
the UK (quasi)governmental websites such as the Home Office, the Ministry of 
Justice and Parliament.  As previously noted, the ORG is an important node in terms 
of Betweenness centrality and this is evident from its positioning.  It receives links 
from some of the key advocates in the core including EFFI and EDRi and in linking 
out, connects not only to advocates in and outside of the core but to social media, 
governmental nodes, policy advisory bodies and websites aiming to promote 
democratic accountability and participation.  In short, all of these are potentially 
useful nodes for engaging in information politics.  What makes the ORG stand out is 
this ability to establish lines of communication between different sub-groups and 
the advocacy-centric core. 
While the ORG ranks behind EDRi and EPIC for Betweenness centrality119, of these 
EDRi is located at a different intersection with a European sub-group120 and EPIC is 
not much more important in terms of Eigenvector centrality (suggesting it does not 
receive a disproportionate amount of attention to direct elsewhere).  Consequently, 
the ORG serves a useful role in the network as an intermediary.  Of note, this role, 
revealed by the network analysis, was reiterated by the representative from the 
ORG in interview.  In the earlier extract he talks of ORG’s current role as ‘co-
ordinating civil society’.  The context of this conversation was the campaign against 
the Communications Data Bill121.  This interesting parallel indicates that, at least 
temporarily, seemingly cooperative patterns of online organisation are reflected 
offline. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
119 See Table 2. 
120 See section 5.5. 
121 See Chapter Six. 
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FIGURE 6: SECTION OF FIGURE 4 (4TH JAN 2013) AS INTERMEDIATE ZONE 
 
 
In a similar fashion, the ICO is located one step further across this divide.  As Table 2 
indicates, it ranks highly for Betweenness centrality.  This is due to the links it makes 
possible for the network to and from several UK governmental bodies including HM 
Revenue and Customs, the Ministry of Justice and the Department for Education.  It 
also receives links from news media groups The Guardian and the BBC.  Although the 
ICO links to fewer nodes than the ORG (both receive the same number of links), it 
ranks higher for Betweenness centrality by virtue of the fact that its position enables 
transmission of some information to the core of the network that otherwise would 
be less immediately accessible.  In network terms, it decreases the degree of 
separation between some peripheral nodes and the core. 
The final node of interest in this intermediate area of the network is the Foundation 
for Information Policy Research122 (FIPR), situated in Figures 3 and 6 to the left of the 
ORG.  The FIPR ranks more highly than both the ORG and the ICO for Eigenvector 
                                                          
122 fipr.org 
127 
 
centrality and eighth for Betweenness centrality.  Examining its in- and out-links 
shows it is primarily a hub for several marginal advocacy groups (including Liberty, 
discussed earlier, and No2ID) and the core, fulfilling a similar function for these as 
the ICO does for the UK governmental nodes.  Interestingly, the ORG, the ICO and 
the FIPR form a reciprocal triangle, each linking to the other two.  This reciprocity 
appears to reinforce the importance of each of these three nodes in bridging the 
divide between the core and various peripheral sub-groups in the network.  Without 
these nodes, interaction between the core and areas of the periphery would either 
be limited or non-existent.  Before we turn to examine one sub-group in particular 
there is a final (and vital) node to discuss; a newcomer to the community since 
previous research – social media/micro-blogging website Twitter. 
5.4 #FOLLOWUS ON TWITTER 
The importance of Twitter in the networks is based primarily on its in-degree but 
also, as indicated by Figures 4, 5 and Table 2, its Eigenvector centrality.  Although 
Twitter only receives links from 18 nodes in the network (fewer than others) its rank 
for Eigenvector centrality is due to the fact that several of these come from 
important nodes: EPIC and La Quadrature du Net in the core and the ORG as 
identified above.  Connections also exist to news media groups, government bodies 
in the UK and US and academic nodes.  Where Twitter stands out from other nodes 
is in the volume of individual links (i.e. the total of all links found within each 
webpage) received from the network.  Over the course of the research, on average, 
Twitter received 2,405 in-links from separate pages and 25,968 individual links.  This 
is compared to an average of only 512 in-links from pages and 2,432 individual links 
for core advocate EDRi.  It is this which places Twitter at the top of every table for in-
degree across all networks produced.  In contrast to Twitter’s in-degree, its out-
degree is virtually non-existent according to Issue Crawler123. 
Twitter can be considered as akin to the public agora.  Characteristic of Web 2.0 
technology, production of its content is democratised (user-generated) and is 
                                                          
123 This is a methodological issue.  As a discrete website, Twitter does not link out to other websites.  
Individual tweets may contain URLs/hyperlinks but Issue Crawler cannot detect these.  Similarly, Issue 
Crawler misses some of the links sent to Twitter due to the layout of some websites but regardless of 
this, the fact it remains the highest ranking node for in-degree illustrates its prominence. 
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generated on an enormous scale; in March 2012 an estimated 340 million tweets 
were sent every day (Twitter 2012).  Moreover, the ‘friendship’ structure of Twitter 
is more open than its social media contemporaries Facebook and MySpace where 
both parties must enter into connections.  In the context of understanding how the 
network fosters communication about current surveillance issues, it is unsurprising 
that the world’s most prominent micro-blogging forum is the most frequently linked 
to node in the network.  Advocate groups know they have an audience on Twitter 
and that it is easier to interact informally with other organisations via this medium.  
Both of these are important aspects to consider.  In the context of nodal 
governance, Twitter adds a different dimension.  Its presence in the network is not 
as a governing node per se.  Twitter (as an organisation) is a governing node and will 
at times use its influence to direct policy or debate about online communication.  
However, in this instance, Twitter is a location for other nodes to come together and 
interact with one another (through discursive cooperation and competition) and 
with members of the public whom they seek to mobilise and recruit.  In this sense, 
Twitter may be understood as a ‘superstructural’ node (Burris et al. 2005) wherein 
resources and efforts are combined.  This idea is returned to later, as the presence 
of superstructural nodes is important for nodal governance and can be applied to 
this network in more than one way. 
These beneficial aspects of Web 2.0 environments for advocacy groups could be 
expected to skew the visualised network structure towards the participation and 
engagement-friendly space of Twitter.  On the one hand, this can be controlled for 
by viewing importance in the network based on other metrics already discussed 
above.  On the other hand, it does not necessarily need to be controlled for in the 
first place.  As the observations thus far have shown, the core is not resultantly re-
oriented around Twitter.  The advocate groups dominate this area, while Twitter is 
found in the intermediate zone (although not serving the same purpose as the 
bridging nodes already identified).  Reintroducing the theme of competition and 
cooperation, what the frequency of linking to Twitter may indicate is recognition of 
the utility of Twitter for promoting discussion of important issues and maintaining 
‘sustained relations’ (Tarrow 1998: 124) with opponents or collaborators.  Both 
interviewees from the advocacy groups acknowledged the value of Twitter for these 
purposes. 
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‘…it is just essential in quite quickly helping us reach people with details of what 
we’re doing…more broadly it’s important for us to be in a particular debate or 
be visible to our supporters and realise we are doing something…So I guess it 
has two uses, it sort of helps us exploit and utilise our network…to help our 
supporters take action…and secondly it helps us build our reputation and 
presence in the debate’ (Pete Bradwell, ORG). 
Eric King (Privacy International) noted the same, although he also suggested Twitter 
suited some purposes more than others: 
‘…for policy engagement social media is not the appropriate tool but for broad 
public outreach or communicating our goals, what we’ve been doing, it 
certainly is.’ 
Bruns et al. (2010) has examined the effect of social media – particularly Twitter – 
on participation in democratic political life.  He describes a theoretical move from a 
singular public sphere – ‘a universally accessible space where informed citizens 
engage in the political process’ – to multiple ‘publics’ (2010: 9).  These publics are 
‘constituted via communication’ and illustrate how the new dynamics of social 
media interact with existing forms of rational critical debate.  Within this new 
communication environment the coincidence of mundane interpersonal 
communication and moments of shared public anxiety allow advocacy groups to 
direct their efforts in a much more individualised way.  Bennett (2012) calls this the 
‘personalization of politics’: a broader trend of the mobilisation of individuals 
around lifestyle values to engage with a range of social causes.  Resistance against 
surveillance is only one of these observable causes on social media but it is one that 
privacy advocates, by their equally visible presence, are actively generating and 
sustaining. 
The lone point represented by Twitter in the network diagrams undermines its 
significance in the current context of collective action.  We have begun to 
understand the nodal characteristics of the broader advocacy network but we must 
also be aware that within this network – and connecting it to other similar 
communities of information – is another domain entirely; social media forums like 
Twitter that are increasingly vital resources for advocacy groups in their efforts to 
mobilise a diverse range of publics against surveillance in its many forms124.  A brief 
                                                          
124 The rapid and widespread mobilisation of publics can be seen in examples such as the ‘No Make-Up 
Selfie’ and the ‘ALS Ice Bucket Challenge’ in 2014.  These viral campaigns are often short-lived but are 
effective in engendering mass awareness and participation in a variety of social or charitable causes.  
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analysis of organisation on Twitter helps to clarify these points and elaborates how 
governing nodes can execute their functions. 
5.4.1 WHO FOLLOWS WHOM? 
Figure 7 was produced using NodeXL.  The entire group of followers for No2ID was 
collected and filtered125 to produce the network diagram above.  The size of the 
nodes indicates Betweenness centrality.  The larger the node, the more they drew 
others into NodeXL’s network126.  Although a little messy, the density of edges within 
the network indicates a high degree of connectivity between the nodes (following 
one another).  A clustering algorithm grouped the followers into three communities 
according to their connectivity to one another.  There is some overlap between 
these clusters but the general trends are as follows: the red nodes primarily consist 
of privacy advocates and activists; the yellow are mainly affiliated to a political party 
or are political bloggers; green can be described as left wing/anti-establishment 
figures127 and; media groups are dispersed across all three categories. 
While this is a microscopic perspective on the nature of the advocacy community on 
Twitter it does reveal several points of interest.  First, some of the most prominent 
nodes are advocates who also feature in the wider hyperlink community: Privacy 
International, the ORG and Big Brother Watch.  Organisational patterns are thus 
repeated to some extent.  However, there is a stronger UK-bias to this network that 
is not as evident from the hyperlink analysis. This could be explained by the fact that 
No2ID was positioned in the previous networks away from the core that was 
characterised by trans-national connections128.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Campaigns for digital issues have been less prominent but operate on the same basis; many supporters 
of net neutrality, for instance, changed profile pictures to a symbolic ‘loading’ graphic in mid-2014. 
125 15th March 2012. UK-based advocacy organisation No2ID was selected out of necessity as their total 
number of followers was relatively small (~1,500) which reduced the burden on NodeXL.  To reduce the 
network noise, No2ID’s followers were filtered so that only those with over 100 followers of their own 
were shown.   
126 See Appendix C for a tabulation of all 64 actors in the network with Betweenness centrality metrics. 
127 This is true in general of the nature of the whole network yet it is interesting that NodeXL identified 
patterns of connectivity among these actors in particular. 
128 See section 5.5 for more on this theme. 
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FIGURE 7: A SELECTION OF TWITTER FOLLOWERS FOR 'NO2ID' 
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Second, many new nodes are revealed.  Most commonly this is a result of their lack 
of a website presence to be captured by hyperlink analysis.  Their presence here, 
however, does indicate potential importance, particularly for those ranking higher 
for Betweenness centrality: ‘paullewis’, ‘guidofawkes’, ‘policestateuk’ and 
‘wikileaks’.  Third (resulting from this), we see WikiLeaks as the most important 
actor after No2ID.  With 2.37 million followers129 this is unsurprising yet it also 
foregrounds the necessity of including WikiLeaks in our conception of the online 
advocacy community.  Despite such prominence on Twitter, they rarely appear in 
any significant way in the hyperlink networks.  This could indicate a lack of 
recognition from the rest of the community – perhaps a desire to avoid association– 
or the desire of WikiLeaks to ‘go it alone’130.  Their organisational tactics, shown on 
Twitter, would support this claim; they do not follow anybody, opting instead only to 
receive attention rather than directing theirs elsewhere. 
Three findings can be derived from this analysis.  First, Twitter is an important digital 
domain for resistance activity in its own right for the advocacy community.  It allows 
for a form of ‘connective action’ based on communication and individual-level 
content sharing (see Bennett and Segerberg 2012).  Second, Twitter is an intrinsic 
part of the online network of privacy advocates.  It is the most frequently linked-to 
website in the community and, while its position in the network is not that 
revealing, the interaction that takes place within this node situates it as an 
indispensable sub-domain.  Third, the examination of Twitter raises a question of 
the organisational characteristics of the network.  The insights from Bruns et al. 
(2010) and Bennett (2012) suggest that the character of an advocacy network 
resisting surveillance would be less fixed and more fluid and responsive – aspects 
that are re-examined below in regard to change in the network over time.  While the 
hyperlink networks (at the level of organisations) remained stable over time, we can 
anticipate that social media networks (on an individual/interactional level) will, by 
their nature, only expand.  In addition, we can see how Twitter adds a social 
dimension to the network, which augments the established advocacy network 
(Tarrow 1998). 
                                                          
129 As of September 2014. 
130 See Chapter Seven. 
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5.5 PHYSICAL AND VIRTUAL GEOGRAPHY 
Three aspects of the online network of the advocacy community have been 
examined: the core, bridges and social media (predominated by Twitter).  The 
presence has also been identified of some minor sub-groups to which links are 
made: UK government nodes and broader civil society nodes.  However, the most 
prominent sub-group that appears consistently is one situated near to the core.  
Given the nature of the groups that populate it (predominantly privacy advocates) 
this sub-group may be more appropriately termed a sub-core. 
The four most prominent nodes in this group are: 
 The Chaos Computer Club, German computer science and advocacy 
organisation; 
 Informatics Centre for Peace and Social Responsibility, German advocacy 
organisation campaigning for data protection; 
 Digital Courage Association131, German civil rights and privacy advocacy 
organisation; and 
 Big Brother Awards132, German-based version of a joint initiative between 
various advocacy groups giving annual ‘awards’ to government and 
corporate organisations responsible for infringing privacy rights. 
These nodes are not only prominent in their sub-group but also rank alongside or 
above several other key advocates in terms of Eigenvector centrality.  There is also a 
high frequency of linking (high density) within this group.  Across all networks 
produced, the CCC consistently ranks closely behind EDRi and the EFF in the top ten 
nodes for in-degree. 
Clearly, these are important nodes in their own right, although their prominence 
raises an interesting point: all are German organisations.  As Figures 2 and 3 
demonstrate, these groups are situated close to the core of the network, hence the 
designation of ‘sub-core’.  Many of the German and other European organisations in 
the network are clustered together here, suggesting mutual support between the 
continental European groups.  This issue of considering physical as well as virtual 
                                                          
131 foebud.org 
132 bigbrotherawards.de 
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geography is significant.  Introna and Gibbons (2009: 247-8) suggested a western 
bias in the network and this is reflected in the data here; the core primarily consists 
of UK and US organisations.  However, the continental European bias in the network 
was not as apparent in their research. 
Introna and Gibbons (2009: 247) also suggest the dense structure of the sub-core 
could be a result of language – websites linking to one another more frequently as a 
result of a shared language other than English.  With that said, we should also note 
that some of the core nodes are non-English speaking as well.  Consequently, the 
prominence of this sub-network raises a different issue.  At play here is the influence 
of a shared history amongst some continental European countries of intensive state 
surveillance during the late 20th century.  Public consciousness of surveillance or the 
digital/privacy rights of citizens is arguably greater in these countries133.  The data 
are in keeping with this belief; when it comes to where attention is commonly 
directed in the network, the German organisations by and large are more prominent 
than other advocacy groups.  Related to this, we should be aware of potential 
differences between countries in Internet use (particularly regarding social media).  
Findings from a survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre (2012: 1) indicate 
that 54% of Britons use social media compared to 40% in Poland, 39% in France and 
34% in Germany134 (2012: 4).  However, of those using social media, similar 
proportions in Britain and Germany used social media for sharing views about 
‘politics’.  A wider lens shows that using social media to discuss political opinions is 
far more common in Arabic countries, such as Lebanon, Tunisia and Egypt (2012: 4).  
These findings reinforce the need to remain aware of the links between Internet 
use, the history of and attitudes to surveillance as well as different appetites for 
regulation (see Vogel 2012) in different national contexts135. 
Elsewhere, we can see evidence of national and trans-national connections being 
played out in the network.  The UK governmental nodes cluster together, as do the 
US governmental nodes when they appear in the network.  The core, on the other 
hand, is more transnational, drawing in nodes from the UK, France, the US and 
                                                          
133 In Germany a strong state-based foundation for individual privacy rights – the Grundrechte – has 
helped a strong network of privacy advocates to develop. 
134 Sample size approximately 1,000 per country. 
135 Also, see Chapter Six. 
135 
 
Germany.  This raises the question of resistance to surveillance requires 
transnational organisation to be effective?  It also signifies that to understand 
resistance to surveillance using nodal governance theory, we need to frame the 
issue globally at the same time as appreciating how the relationship between tht wo 
is played out at the national and local levels.  The nature of linking within the core 
would suggest that the most important nodes in the network do bridge national 
divides.  The reason the German organisations are both located close to the core 
and clustered tightly together could be that the geo-historical context for pro-
privacy/anti-surveillance in Germany is stronger than elsewhere.  We can infer, 
therefore, that advocates that find themselves outside of the core are likely to have 
stronger intra-national connections and this does seem to be the case with No2ID 
and Liberty in Figures 2 and 3. 
5.6 CHANGES OVER TIME 
The analysis has so far examined to what extent density, stability and reciprocity 
may contribute to an effective environment for ‘information politics’ as a form of 
resistance to surveillance.  Each has been evidenced to some extent, particularly in 
the core of the network.  Here, there is a high degree of reciprocal interlinking and 
there is very little change in the nodes present over time – those in the core and the 
sub-core are always present in those areas.  As also indicated, the linking practices 
of the core can affect changes in the periphery.  The bridging nodes identified earlier 
illustrate how this occurs in this specific network.  Drawing on lessons from nodal 
governance has also helped to suggest why this may be.  However, the peripheral 
nodes referred to so far rarely feature in any way in the network beyond that of 
marginality.  Nevertheless, there are other nodes whose presence in the network 
does fluctuate more significantly over time and who are resultantly drawn closer 
towards the core. 
Using Issue Crawler a tabulated series of outputs allows us to observe changes in in-
degree over time136.  Specific data were drawn out that showed noticeable changes 
                                                          
136 In-degree in this instance was based on the number of links received from separate pages as 
opposed to websites as in Table 1.  This method was chosen as it demonstrated fluctuations most 
clearly.  Using this alternative measure does not create fluctuations where none exist; it merely makes 
them more visible. 
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in in-degree for several nodes.  The results, in graphical form, are displayed below in 
Figure 8137.  The four nodes of interest are news media organisations The Guardian 
and BBC News, Spy Blog (a website providing commentary on current surveillance 
trends and privacy issues) and Parliament.uk (the official website of the House of 
Commons). 
Beginning with the most prominent changes, EDRi varies between receiving 880 and 
74 links.  As we know it is one of the most important nodes in the network.  This 
variation would suggest a dip in such centrality on the 10th January and 7th February.  
However, when we observe the data for GILC we can see it follows a similar pattern, 
albeit with a lower in-degree in general.  This pattern was similar for the majority of 
key nodes in the network.  On those dates, for whatever the reason may be, there 
fewer links in the network as a whole rather than fewer links being directed only to 
EDRi and GILC. 
In contrast to this, the UK Parliament website has only one sudden increase in in-
degree on the 4th January, while for the remainder of the research period it remains 
firmly in the periphery.  Inspecting the source file for the network on this date 
reveals that the large majority of these links directed to summaries of written and 
oral evidence given to a Select Committee in 2004 responsible for scrutinising the 
Identity Cards Bill and to a similar process of review for the Identity Documents Bill 
2010 which eventually repealed the previous Act.  The links directing to these 
originated from human rights organisation Liberty.  What is unclear, unfortunately, 
is why these links were only revealed in January 2013, more than two years after the 
Identity Documents Bill was passed into law.  Regardless of this, what this case does 
highlight is the importance that such linking can have for the network.  Evidently, as 
of the 4th January 2013, information was made more easily accessible concerning 
identity card legislation in the UK. 
 
                                                          
137 For comparative purposes – and because they too fluctuate – data for core actors EDRi and GILC 
were also included. 
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FIGURE 8: GRAPH SHOWING CHANGES OVER TIME IN IN-DEGREE OF SIX NODES 
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The two other most apparent spikes in prominence by in-degree are almost mirror 
images of one another.  The Guardian and Spy Blog both demonstrate large 
increases in in-degree on the 1st and 28th February 2013.  The only real difference 
between the two is that The Guardian is always present in the network whereas Spy 
Blog does not appear until 10th January.  This is a pertinent point in its own right, and 
is reflected in the anlaysis in Chapter Seven; the online presence of traditional media 
outlets helps them retain their power.  It is to be expected that the closely matching 
fluctuations in in-degree could be attributed to the same sources – for instance the 
same newsworthy events relating to surveillance or privacy.  Again browsing the 
source data revealed that on each of these dates there were a number of potentially 
relevant news stories published in The Guardian to which the increase in in-degree 
might allude.  On the 1st February, stories were published in The Guardian 
concerning Chinese hacking of US companies (Arthur 2013) and Internet copyright 
(Doctorow 2013).  On 28th February stories were found relating to the trial of alleged 
US military whistle-blower Bradley ing (Pilkington 2013a), the use of Twitter in North 
Korea (Lee 2013), a UK court order requiring several ISP’s to block access to three 
popular file-sharing websites (O’Carroll 2013) and US defence firm Raytheon’s 
release of R.I.O.T. – software that permits deep data mining of social media profiles 
(Ball et al. 2013).  At the same time, there are also visible peaks in the in-degree of 
BBC News.  Searches of the BBC News website revealed similar coverage of those 
stories covered by The Guardian and others including the dangers of wiretapping 
cloud computing systems on the 31st January (Wakefield 2013) and the value of 
virtual currency Bitcoin on the 28th February (BBC News 2013). 
Identifying such events for Spy Blog proved less successful, despite its apparent 
concurrence with The Guardian.  However, a large number of links to Spy Blog at this 
time originated from Bad Science, a blog interrogating government reports and 
scientific claims that was a new (but peripheral and infrequent) node in the network 
on the 1st February.  This blog was also the source of some of the links to The 
Guardian at the time which may help to explain the congruence in Figure 8.  The 
peak on the 28th February may be interpreted in similar terms given that both 
received links from Statewatch, an advocacy organisation monitoring civil liberties in 
Europe.  The link to Spy Blog on this occasion appeared to be concerning the Draft 
Anti-Social Behaviour Bill from December 2012; Spy Blog’s objection was that the 
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proposed legislation infringed civil rights through ‘over-broad catch-all language’ 
(Spy Blog 2013).  The Guardian ran a story on the legislation just prior to this (Plant 
2013). 
Identifying and explaining these changes in the network over time is a useful final 
step in the network analysis of the privacy advocates.  It further highlights the links 
between this online community and its real-world manifestation.  We have already 
noted one such relationship regarding the German/European sub-group.  Three of 
the nodes identified here – The Guardian, BBC News and Spy Blog – help to make 
another connection to real-world events and their potential to impact on the 
structure and stability of the network.  Their fluctuating presence in the network is 
to some degree a sign of instability but it is in no way detrimental to the network – 
in fact it is quite the opposite.  The presence of news media allows us to consider 
responsiveness of the network rather than stability.  Much as for new social media 
outlets such as Twitter, the increased prevalence of linking to these news media 
nodes on occasion suggests recognition of the importance of these channels of 
communication on the part of the advocacy community.  When it comes to 
information politics, these nodes could play a significant role in contributing to the 
goals of the community as a whole. 
We could make two further assertions as to how this might occur.  First, the 
positioning of The Guardian and BBC News is similar to that of the bridging nodes; 
they create connections between key advocate groups and (quasi)governmental 
bodies, including the ICO.  Furthermore, as Figures 4 and 5 show there is a larger 
number of links between both of these groups and Twitter, signifying that the 
potential exists for widespread communication of relevant news stories (indeed, we 
need only personal experience of news on Twitter to know this is the case).  Second, 
the readership of these groups (particularly The Guardian) is noteworthy.  No other 
newspapers appear in the network.  The Guardian’s left-wing tendencies are likely to 
attract those readers whose sensibilities are more in tune with those of the 
advocacy community and therefore those who may be more likely to support and 
engage in resistance to surveillance.  Questions regarding the role of news media 
and their potential to retain influence through an online presence are returned to in 
Chapter Seven. 
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5.7 SURVEILLANCE AND RESISTANCE PART 1: INFORMATION 
POLITICS AND NODAL GOVERNANCE 
The final part of this chapter looks in more detail at what the theory of nodal 
governance has contributed to our understanding of resistance to surveillance in 
light of the analysis presented, as well as what lessons can still be drawn out in 
terms of how nodal governance is performedthroug online communities.  Some 
themes have already been highlighted, in particular the idea of competition and 
cooperation within networks of governance.  Others, like the concept of 
‘superstructural nodes’ (Burris et al. 2005) warrant further attention. 
5.7.1 SUPERSTRUCTURAL NODES 
A superstructural node, according to Burris et al. (2005: 38) is one ‘which brings 
together representatives of different nodal organizations…to concentrate the 
members’ resources and technologies for a common purpose but without 
integrating the various networks.’  What this signifies once again is a process of 
cooperation between nodes.  To add to this, Wood and Shearing’s (2007) 
observation that such cooperation may be temporary or more permanent is also 
important.  The presence of superstructural nodes signals, in the case of resisting 
surveillance, joint efforts by advocacy groups that challenge certain surveillance 
practices.  These do not undermine or replace the individual organisations’ goals but 
instead indicates a ‘strength in numbers’ approach and the recognition that 
different mentalities and resources can be brought to bear on the issue in question.  
To understand what this means in practice, we can look at a two examples from the 
networks that have been explored in this chapter as well as one that emerged after 
the fieldwork. 
Some of the key nodes identified earlier can be considered superstructural nodes.  
The European Digital Rights Initiative (EDRi) and the Global Internet Liberty 
Campaign (GILC) were both situated in the core of the network and are both 
constituted by a collection of other advocacy groups, many of whom also appear in 
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the network138.  EDRi ‘defends rights and freedoms in the digital environment’ (EDRi 
2016) and comprises 31 European organisations while GILC advocates a broad range 
of digital rights (including freedom from censorship and access to encryption of 
communication) and comprises 68 organisations from around the world (GILC 2016).  
Both are long-term, formalised collaborations having been established in 2002 and 
1996 respectively.  While both exhibit the defining features of a superstructural 
node EDRi is more significant in the network according to measures of centrality and 
is a useful case in point.  Governance of surveillance and security in the UK is 
increasingly a European-level issue, the product of negotiations between EU 
member states.  For instance, as Chapter Two outlined, European law influences 
regulation of surveillance and Internet communication in the UK.  Groups such as 
EDRi are therefore potentially very helpful for amplifying the voice that otherwise 
relatively small and nationally based organisations can have in the supra-national 
arena.  In the language of nodal governance each member of EDRi will have their 
own resources and technologies to draw on for the benefit of the wider group.  
These may take the form of established connections to government agencies and 
policymakers, member bases and links to other civil society or activist networks.  It is 
illuminating (and validating for the method) that the network analysis here reveals 
the significance of superstructural nodes based on prevalence of hyperlinking. 
Another superstructural node emerged in 2013, after this stage of the fieldwork had 
concluded.  Don’t Spy On Us139 is a coalition of advocacy groups that came together 
in the wake of Edward Snowden’s revelations.  They have since campaigned against 
mass surveillance in the UK including challenging the Investigatory Powers Bill in 
2016, of which the Communication Data Bill in Chapter Six was a precursor.  Its 
founding members are six UK-based organisations140.  A further twelve affiliates141 
come from the UK and elsewhere.  While it does not feature in the networks, this 
coalition illustrates the continued desire within the community to cooperate 
through sharing resources and technologies.  The example of Don’t Spy On Us 
                                                          
138 See Appendix G for the list of featured advocacy groups.  The entries for EDRi and GILC detail their 
member organisations. 
139 https://www.dontspyonus.org.uk 
140 Article 19, Big Brother Watch, English PEN, Liberty, Open Rights Group and Privacy International. 
141 Access Now, Amnesty, Centre for Investigative Journalism, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Fight for 
the Future, ifex, Index on Censorship, Open Democracy, Open Media, Public Concern at Work, Sum of 
Us and the World Wide Web Foundation. 
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illustrates the existence of a superstructural node whose mentality is oriented solely 
towards mass surveillance and whose resistive efforts have to date been mainly 
located in the UK.  In comparison, EDRi addresses a wider variety of digital rights 
issues. 
Superstructural nodes, then, allow mobilisation against different problems by 
adopting a cooperative approach.  Whether such coalitions are the ‘command 
centers’ (Burris et al. 2005: 38) of resistance to digital surveillance is less certain.  It 
is reasonable to say, given the analysis here, that they do play a significant role in 
the online community at least.  Their centrality makes them effective at a particular 
brand of resistance, namely ‘information politics’.  Yet there are other forms of 
resistance.  Activism, hacking, whistleblowing and encryption are all other ways that 
surveillance can be resisted.  However narrowly or broadly we may want to 
conceptualise superstructural nodes, we might then also designate the entire 
privacy advocacy community as a superstructural node that is part of a wider civil 
society network, albeit one with looser organisation as geography and mentalities 
become more dispersed.  Fewer or more nodes can be revealed in our observations 
‘depending of the level of aggregation and disaggregation in the analysis’ (Burris et 
al. 2005: 38).  Likewise, it was also suggested earlier that Twitter may function in 
some respect as a superstructural node, given that it provides a space for 
communication and interaction between other nodes and another channel through 
which to practice information politics.  All of this indicates that the organisation of 
resistance to digital surveillance happens at a global, national, local and hyperlocal 
(in the sense of tweeting) level.  The fundamental factor is the network as a form of 
organisation that allows for flexibility and responsiveness as well as a degree of 
stability. 
5.7.2 THE LANGUAGE OF CONNECTIVITY 
The language of nodal governance is helpful for beginning to explore the 
relationship between surveillance and resistance.  It will be clear to the reader that 
there is a significant amount of overlap with other ideas introduced in Chapter 
Three.  Martin et al.’s (2009) ‘multi-actor framework’, Sharp et al.’s (2000) 
‘entanglements’ of dominating and resisting power and Haggerty and Ericsson’s 
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(2000) ‘surveillant assemblage’ all identify similar themes of plurality and 
connectivity that can be applied to understanding the interaction between 
surveillance and resistance.  The value of nodal governance in particular is that it 
goes beyond simple network analysis by identifying the real and active institutions 
that compete and cooperate with one another in shaping debates and practices of 
digital surveillance. 
The analysis in this chapter adds support to a number of claims made so far in the 
thesis.  There is competition and cooperation (Wood and Shearing 2007; Fuchs 
2008) within and between the various public, private and civil society entities that 
engage in surveillance and resistance.  One way this has been envisioned is through 
measures of centrality in the hyperlink networks.  Greater centrality can indicate 
both the desire to be ‘seen’ online (competition) and also the result of coalitions of 
organisations (cooperation).  We also see that the Internet facilitates connectivity 
for the advocacy community – both between organisations websites and on social 
media – which may signal an escalation of ‘resisting power’ (Sharp et al. 2000) to 
counteract the ‘dominating power’ of public and private surveillance.  There was 
also evidence that the global nature of digital surveillance and resistance in the 
information society was reflected in the network.  By necessity, if the network of 
advocates is to be effective – as individual or cooperating governing nodes – it must 
be able to span national boundaries.  The networks here indicate that this process is 
already in existence.  However, one important barrier may be language.  This may 
account for the apparent degree of introspection in the ‘sub-core’ but this may also 
be a product of a more hospitable civic setting for privacy advocacy in continental 
Europe. 
The question that remains is whether the network of privacy advocates are effective 
governing nodes.  In other words, are they successful in resisting surveillance?  The 
findings have demonstrated that density, stability and reciprocity of the network – 
and later responsiveness – are evident and, as such, the online advocacy network is 
perhaps both a suitably structured environment and modality for resistance in the 
form of information politics.  It is also apparent that this conglomeration is fluid and 
flexible.  Furthermore, nodes are involved whose primary business is not to resist 
forms of surveillance. 
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Burris et al. (2005) note that nodal governance is typified in equal part by flexibility 
and reconstitution of networks as much as stability and planning.  The network in 
this chapter needs to be adaptable and responsive to resist the various forms that 
digital surveillance can take.  For the privacy advocacy community, the main tool at 
their disposal is information politics, which is aided by the practices seen here of 
connectivity and cooperation.  Equally, each organisation has its own agenda and 
needs to compete for members, for funding and against other organisations that 
may try to advocate for greater surveillance powers.  Their relative prominence in 
the networks fluctuates over time as new connections are made and real-time 
events are responded to.  On occasion, significant ‘surveillance events’ can act as 
symbols142 that allow for a coalescing effect; instances of unity and greater 
collaboration, or ‘synthesis moments’ (Della Porta 2008: 3), that create the 
opportunity for ‘superstructural’ nodes to emerge – such as Don’t Spy On Us.  This 
empirical exploration of networks and nodal governance has shown some of the 
ways in which these relationships can be understood and how resistance to 
surveillance must be approached with respect to networked forms of organisation, 
flexibility and adaptability. 
5.7.3 CONCLUSION 
The network analysis of the data in this chapter in tandem with the theory of nodal 
governance contributes to the thesis by illuminating some structural and 
interactional dimensions of the social organisation of resistance.  Nodal governance 
alerts us to the multiplicity of institutions involved in guiding social affairs.  This 
chapter offers support for this argument.  Alongside the privacy advocates, the 
network incorporates key non-advocate nodes including the news media, regulatory 
agencies such as the ICO, policy advisory bodies such as the FIPR, organisations 
promoting libertarian ideologies such as Creative Commons and GNU and new social 
media forums like Twitter.  Revealing and making sense of these interactions helps 
to develop our understanding of how resistance to surveillance is organised and is 
what this chapter has begun to achieve. 
                                                          
142 See Chapter Seven. 
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The empirical data also aid in developing a critical understanding of the theory of 
nodal governance.  Specifically, they have illustrated how these relationships can 
take shape online.  In that respect, the identification of ‘bridging nodes’ adds a new 
dimension to nodal governance.  These nodes (not solely privacy advocates) appear 
to have distinct functions in the network that may not simply be about pursuing 
their own objectives.  Instead they facilitate connectivity between sectors with 
differing mentalities.  This insight might be applied to other contexts for theorising 
nodal governance, particularly as it signals the potential for capitalising on the 
resources of other institutions.  
Resistance, then, is dynamic, global and networked.  There are shifting relationships 
within resistant communities but this arguably increases its effectiveness in resisting 
surveillance.  The institutions within the community have varying mentalities, 
technologies and resources.  The overall goal for many of the organisations present 
in this community is to raise awareness of, and to work for, a balance between 
liberty and security.  This analysis contributes to knowledge on governance of 
security using the nodal governance framework by empirically and visually 
illustrating how networks of nodes who challenge the means of providing security 
are organised in online spaces.  It furthers the work of the thesis by illustrating the 
online organisation of resistance on a broad scale – which is reflected in the physical 
world the organisations occupy.  This first step is continued in Chapter Six where we 
see an attempt at digital surveillance reform and the mobilisation of resistant nodes 
(both from within the community examined here and beyond) that ensues. 
--- -.  -... . .... .- .-.. ..-.  --- ..-.  - .... .  ..-. ..- - ..- .-. . --..-- 
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CHAPTER SIX 
REGULATION OF SURVEILLANCE AS A SITE OF 
RESISTANCE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Surveillance is one mode of social control and it interacts with other modes of 
control.  Regulation – controlling and managing risk through the use of law (Innes 
2003) – is one such modality.  It attends to process (Innes 2014) rather than 
outcome, which is to say it dictates, by varying degrees of persuasion or coercion the 
way things should be carried out.  Naturally, then, key aspects of regulation are 
compliance-seeking, bargaining and persuasion (Hutter 1988, 1997), as the various 
public and private entities involved negotiate their respective obligations.  
Regulation in the information society, as Chapter Two described, encompasses a 
broad array of social entities (or governing nodes) who are capable of, and 
responsible for, facilitating digital communication and collecting the data it 
generates.  Consequently, digital surveillance and regulation are inseparable.  Faced 
with the constant need to protect citizens from a range of online harms and terror 
attacks facilitated by digital communication tehcnologies, governments have actively 
pursued greater regulation of digital surveillance. 
One such case, that exemplifies these broader patterns and trends, is the focus of 
this chapter – the Draft Communications Data Bill from 2012.  One aim of this 
chapter, therefore, is to examine how legal frameworks have sought to regulate 
surveillance.  The other, crucially, is how these have generated effects of resistance.  
The chapter therefore comprises two related themes.  The first addresses research 
question two – ‘why do individuals and groups who resist digital surveillance identify 
a need for doing so?’ – by examining some of the key arguments made from a 
variety of standpoints against reform of surveillance legislation in the UK.  
Resistance in this context is also noteworthy because it represents an opportunity 
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for individuals and groups to have their concerns codified in law, even should 
regulation ultimately be passed. 
The second theme contributes to the broader discussion around research question 
three, by illuminating the intersection between regulation and surveillance as modes 
of control.  Examining the regulatory context of digital surveillance is valuable 
because it draws out a number of important facets of the relationship between 
digital surveillance and resistance.  One of these is the role played by 
communications service providers (CSPs)143.  These entities are powerful surveillance 
agents whose business models rely in large part on the collection and processing of 
data from customers and Internet users.  Harvey Molotch has observed that ‘[a] 
bastion of modern security, domestic and foreign, is storing digital data on the lives, 
habits, and capacities of individuals and groups’ (2012: 201).  This chapter supports 
this claim, illustrating how current security measures aim to exploit CSPs through a 
process of mediated surveillance (Bright and Agustina 2013): recruiting and enlisting 
(typically through regulation) the surveillance capabilities of other actors.  However, 
regulating CSPs (for the purposes of increased security) is hotly contested; these 
nodes emerge as equally ‘resistive’ as they are ‘surveillant’. 
Another dynamic the focus on regulation therefore draws out is the interaction, at a 
specific point in time, between various nodes with a stake in the governance of the 
information society.  This chapter features some of the nodes from civil society that 
appeared previously, alongside government, law enforcement, private sector, 
technological expert and media nodes.  The analysis in this chapter therefore 
attunes us to the negotiated character of this kind of control work (Innes 2003: 136) 
and therefore, by extension, of contemporary digital surveillance.  The case study of 
regulation in this chapter illustrates these processes, emphasising the significant 
counter-arguments that were formulated against the necessity and proportionality 
of the proposed regulatory framework for digital surveillance. 
 
 
                                                          
143 The term being used here to capture all private organisations that provide Internet connectivity as 
well as online products and services. 
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6.2 THE COMMUNICATIONS DATA BILL 
The Communications Data Bill (CDB) in 2012 was, at the time, the latest attempt by 
the UK government to regulate in the area of investigation of communications data 
for the purposes of crime prevention.  It sought to address a perceived ‘capability 
gap’ of UK law enforcement and intelligence agencies in light of rapidly changing 
communications technologies and services.  Chiefly, it required CSPs to retain more 
data (i.e. data they did not routinely collect for business purposes) relating to their 
customers and their communications.  Chapter Two144 relays the recent history of 
such regulation in the UK and, where applicable, Europe.  This is a helpful rehearsal 
what follows and highlights the key points that: (1) the CDB aimed to update the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000; (2) the content of digital 
communications has typically been afforded greater protection under surveillance 
legislation, and; (3) that data protection is a contentious issue at both the national 
and supra-national levels. 
6.2.1 CONSULTATION ON THE COMMUNICATIONS DATA BILL 
The CDB was announced in the Queen’s Speech in May 2012, in order to ‘maintain 
the ability of the law enforcement and intelligence agencies to access vital 
communications data’ (HM The Queen).  The Home Office produced the Bill in draft 
form for pre-legislative scrutiny.  A Joint Committee of six members each from the 
House of Lords and the House of Commons was appointed to review the CDB in July 
2012.  A public consultation was issued and written evidence received from 145 
respondents.  Coupled with this, oral evidence sessions were held and testimonies 
received from 54 witnesses, both supporting and opposing the Bill.  Finally, the Joint 
Committee visited the Metropolitan Police Central Intelligence Unit and UK network 
operator Everything Everywhere to observe the procedures for requesting and 
granting access to data (Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Data Bill 
2012: 9-10).  A final report was issued by the Joint Committee in December 2012, 
the main points of which are summarised below. 
                                                          
144 Section 2.4.4 
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Drawing attention to the motivation underpinning the CDB, Charles Farr, Director 
General of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism stated in one evidence 
session to the Joint Committee, ‘[t]he central plank of this programme is a 
collaborative relationship with service providers in this country and overseas’ (CDB 
Oral Evidence, p.19).  Part One of the CDB was indicative of this145.  The majority of 
attention was paid to Part One given that it was, according to one interviewee from 
the fieldwork, 
‘far too broadly defined in that it doesn’t really specify at all the kind of 
information they want to get from who, about whom’ (Pete Bradwell – Open 
Rights Group). 
Importantly, as the analysis below also highlights, the CDB contained provisions to 
move beyond the scope of the EU Data Retention Directive and compel CSPs to 
retain data pertaining to third-party/overseas providers (such as Facebook or 
Google). 
The final report of the Joint Committee acknowledged that there was a case for 
updating the legislation currently represented by RIPA.  However, the verdict of the 
Joint Committee was that 
‘the draft Bill pays insufficient attention to the duty to respect the right to 
privacy, and goes much further than it need or should for the purpose of 
providing necessary and justifiable official access to communications data’ 
(Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Data Bill 2012: 3).   
They also noted, as suggested above, that Part One would grant ‘sweeping powers’ 
and that ‘potentially limitless categories of data’ could be retained (2012: 3).  In its 
current form the draft Bill was rejected on these and other grounds.  The analysis 
that follows picks out some of the prominent themes that emerged from the 
evidence given to the Joint Committee.  The story that develops throughout is one 
                                                          
145 Part One: creates a new power to order CSPs to collect specific datasets, creating them if necessary, 
and deploying any technical or policy changes needed to do so. It also requires this data to be retained 
in a secure and confidential manner for 12 months, and destroyed after this period elapses. This power 
can be used by any principal secretary of state but in practice this would be the Home Secretary. 
Part Two: creates a system for assorted public bodies to get access to this data, including ‘filtering’ 
arrangements, i.e. the process of querying databases owned/operated by CSPs that hold retained 
communications data. 
Part Three: makes some changes to RIPA, repeals all other existing powers that involve retaining and 
disclosing "communications data", and makes the Information Commissioner, the Interception of 
Communications Commissioner, and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal responsible for scrutiny and 
oversight of the implementation of these powers (adapted from the Open Rights Group 2012). 
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of managing an uncertain, ambiguous and contested environment, particularly with 
respect to the relationship between the state and private sector. 
6.2.2 WHO HAD A SAY? 
Evidence was gathered by the Joint Committee in written and oral form.  There was 
some degree of overlap between the two; some respondents who were interviewed 
by the Committee later submitted supplementary written evidence, whilst others 
who responded in writing were later invited to interview with a panel of others with 
similar expertise.  This section briefly outlines a categorisation of the responses 
received.  This categorisation is weaved into the subsequent analysis to illustrate the 
various contributions to the process of negotiation146.  Given its larger scale, a 
categorisation was first developed from the written evidence.  Initially respondents 
were placed in 11 categories, this being refined into a more coherent seven 
categories with appropriate sub-categories147.  The result was as follows148: 
TABLE 3: CATEGORISATION OF RESPONDENTS TO CONSULTATION 
Category Written 
Evidence 
Oral Evidence Total 
Official (Government and 
Law Enforcement) 
11 19 30 
Independent Authorities 5 4 9 
Telecoms Industry 11 13 24 
Expert (Technical, Academic 
and Legal) 
28 8 36 
Advocacy/Non-Profit 16 8 24 
Media 6 3 9 
Individual/Non-Expert 68 - 68 
 
                                                          
146 The category a respondent falls into is indicated in italics following any direct quotations used in the 
analysis. 
147 Naturally there is scope for interpretation here; some respondents could be placed in multiple 
categories.  For instance, respondents from the ‘Telecoms Industry’ are likely to be experts in their field 
but it was felt that this warranted a category of its own given the subject matter. 
148 Numbers in parentheses indicate total number of respondents in each category from written 
evidence. 
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Categorising respondents in this way is helpful as it indicates the diversity of actors 
involved in negotiating the regulation.  Surprisingly the number of ‘individual/non-
expert’ respondents149 was high.  These are voices not typically heard in their own 
right; the accounts of advocacy groups are usually taken to be representative of the 
concerns of these individuals. 
This initial breakdown indicates the sustained importance (from Chapter Five) of the 
advocacy community who, as might be expected, were vocal in their criticism of the 
Bill.  Although they did not represent the largest proportion of respondents, the 
quantity of their contribution to the written evidence was substantial; 25% of the 
evidence submitted150 compared to only 10% from official sources.  This adds weight 
to the observation of Lord Carlile of Berriew that ‘[t]he narrative over these 
proposals has in my view been inadequate. There has been a much stronger 
counter-narrative…Government, or successive Governments could have told a much 
stronger story’ (CDB Oral Evidence, p.298).  However, the majority of oral evidence 
taken in interview by the Committee was from governmental or law enforcement 
representatives, which did provide some balance. 
6.3 CENTRALISING AND DECENTRALISING IMPULSES 
Some of the points raised so far indicate a theme that reoccurs throughout the 
remainder of this chapter, and the thesis.  Centralising and decentralising tendencies 
are useful conceptual tools for thinking through not only trends in contemporary 
social control (revisited in Chapter Eight) but also patterns of governance, 
surveillance and resistance.  This theme emerged from several of the interviews 
conducted during this research.  These voices are introduced to the analysis at this 
stage.  Three broad conceptualisations were identified throughout the analysis: 
centralisation versus decentralisation of Internet architecture; centralisation of 
information, and; centralisation/decentralisation as organisational principles151.  
These three are all related to an extent but each represents a particular concern that 
different participants held. 
                                                          
149 These respondents had no professed expertise or loyalties but were nonetheless motivated to 
respond to the consultation. 
150 Figure is drawn from the total number of pages of evidence submitted and thus is only approximate. 
151 The latter is discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven. 
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The ‘problem’ of centralisation of Internet architecture is connected to the 
liberalism characteristic of many Internet activists, hackers, cypherpunks and 
advocacy groups.  As Chapter Two described, the Internet was designed as a resilient 
network.  Centralisation runs counter to this.  One interviewee, Daniel – a co-
founder of WikiLeaks – noted that decentralisation permitted the Internet to 
‘intelligently route around’ any problems in the network.  Speaking in more specific 
counter-surveillance terms, he also observed ‘it can bypass censorship by 
design…that’s what the Internet was built for.’  Such is the attachment to the ideal 
of a decentralised, ‘free’ Internet that one cannot help but notice a nostalgic and 
quasi-utopian impulse in further remarks by Daniel and another interviewee, Joss. 
‘… in the late 90s and early 2000s there was a real trend of…peer-to-peer 
networking, file sharing and there was this utopian vision at that point that we 
were going to do everything peer-to-peer and so it would remove centralised 
control and everything was going to be wonderful but there are…fundamental 
difficulties with the peer-to-peer approach and for convenience sake, 
centralisation is easier and it allows you to build things like Facebook.’ (Joss 
Wright, OII) 
 ‘…the great thing about the Internet is that there is no hierarchy in some 
sense…in the face of the Internet protocol men and women are created equal 
you know, it doesn’t matter where you are, what your status is, how much you 
earn, if you’re black, white or yellow or whatever, it doesn’t matter if you are a 
man or a woman as long as you have an Internet protocol address and you’re 
connected and you are the same as everybody else, you have the same 
potential for having a voice, you have the same say in the Internet you have the 
same possibilities to do something to consume to produce, whatever, and that 
is what this is about you know, this is a shift in paradigm for the future that if 
we don’t take it then we’re stuck with this old hierarchical stuff forever we have 
people ruling us and we’re not all equal.’ (Daniel Domscheit-Berg, OpenLeaks) 
Two observations can be made from these remarks.  First, based on Daniel’s 
comments, decentralisation of Internet architecture is perceived as a mechanism to 
achieve equality on the Internet.  Underlying this belief is the assumption that the 
Internet, as a communication medium, affords great potential for participation and 
democratisation (as Chapter Five has gone some way towards illustrating).  Second, 
Joss’ remarks direct us towards centralisation of information.  The shift away from 
peer-to-peer networking in the early 1990s is represented by the emergence (and 
dominance) of centralised provision of online services such as Facebook, Twitter and 
Google – actors who appear later in this chapter, largely as a result of their 
capacities in this respect. 
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Centralisation of information, then, is a symptom of the growth of online service 
providers primarily encompassing social media and search engines.  These ‘walled 
gardens’ (Berners-Lee 2010152) allow for collection and processing of enormous 
quantities of personal data provided by users.  In another interview, self-described 
software developer, hacker and freedom fighter Smári McCarthy observed, 
‘…overall, the ability to surveill has been increased because of the centralisation 
of services. The more people that use services such as Facebook…the fewer 
points you need to attack. I say attack in the adversarial sense, to gain 
information about a very large population.’ 
Additionally they provide, for many, an all-encompassing service; as Joss noted, 
‘there are a good chunk of people I’m sure that you could put in front of a 
computer that only accessed Facebook…that would be perfectly happy with 
that. This is a monoculture…centralisation of information, putting all our eggs in 
one basket. I wish we would start to move away from it but we can’t because 
it’s quite difficult to do that.’ 
The explanation for why this would be difficult appeared to centre on convenience, 
and Smári outlined its connection to privacy and centralisation.  
‘…people are very willing to trade their privacy for convenience so we willingly 
opt into putting our private data on to large centralised hub services or things 
like that because it’s simple, you don’t have to worry about your computer 
crashing, all these kind of convenient habits which actually from various 
levels…really damage your ability to exercise autonomy.’ 
A lack of personal privacy and freedoms seems to be the trade-off that the 
convenience of centralised information and services requires – and that is often 
taken.  Running in parallel to this were concerns over the lack of awareness of what 
happens to personal data and how centralisation of information impacts upon users.  
The following remarks are only a snapshot of what participants had to say but they 
nevertheless convey significant disquiet. 
‘…we are giving up and allowing to be gathered and providing to these 
centralised providers huge amounts of information…and what’s happening is 
we’re coming up against this fundamental thing that people don’t realise and 
don’t like to realise – that we’re very very very predictable and that amount of 
control, the control that it allows…means that the Internet is just turning into 
some big command and control centre for people…’ (Joss Wright, OII) 
‘So generally I think people need to understand that whatever is centralised is 
always bad for them because there is too much of them in this one place. They 
don’t know what’s happening with this data, you know so I think actually…it’s 
                                                          
152 See Chapter Two (section 2.5.2). 
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the same kind of logical step that we have in other aspects of society. 
Centralisation never helped anybody.’ (Daniel Domscheit-Berg, OpenLeaks) 
The surveillance capability of such commercial service providers is one issue of 
concern in its own right.  The Intercept Modernisation Programme in 2009153 was a 
prime example of an attempt at centralising information for surveillance purposes 
by the government.  Vocal concerns over such a data repository arguably informed 
the current approach in the CDB to federalise (i.e. decentralise) data storage to 
CSPs.  Equally, we can see how centralisation of information in the private sector 
informs this process.  CSPs already possess the data of interest to government and 
have the ability to store it (as well as collect more data relatively easily) and thus the 
decision to couch the CDB in decentralised terms was, arguably, more pragmatic and 
calculated than out of concern for such views as voiced by the interviewees above. 
At the same time, continuing with government motivations, centralisation of 
services but not necessarily information was evident in the public sector, signalling a 
centralising impulse in the nature of contemporary (online) governance.  Two 
participants from the Government Digital Service (GDS) were interviewed regarding 
the launch of GOV.uk – a platform that centralises many formerly separate 
government departments and online services154.  The motivation behind GOV.uk, in 
support of the ‘Digital by Default’ agenda155, was to improve efficiency and reliability 
in service delivery and, again, to make accessing government services online more 
convenient.  However, in contrast to the approach of centralised corporate services, 
GOV.uk did not represent a simultaneous move towards centralising citizen data and 
information. 
The interviewees’ role was to facilitate identity assurance, the mechanisms by which 
members of the public verify their identity to the government in order to 
access/apply for services.  The way in which this was achieved was, again, by a 
federated model, using private sector identity services to verify that applicants were 
who they said they were. 
                                                          
153 See Chapter Two (section 2.4.4) 
154 As of June 2014, all 24 ministerial departments, five out of nine non-ministerial departments and 84 
out of 157 agencies and other public bodies (including, for example, the Driver and Vehicle Licensing 
Agency) had been merged on GOV.uk 
155 For the 26 criteria of Digital by Default see: https://www.gov.uk/service-manual/digital-by-default 
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‘…this is about you choosing the private sector supplier, providing them with 
evidence of your identity, them verifying it and issuing you with a credential to 
a certain level of assurance…you’ll be asked to log in with your credential or 
your private sector identity or whatever, you’ll go off to their webpage, you’ll 
authenticate with them and they will then release a small amount of data not 
related to any levels of assurance but just enough information that will allow 
the government department to match who you are in their records.’ (Bert, GDS) 
This bears some resemblance to the outsourcing of responsibility for data collection 
to CSPs described in this chapter.  Similarly, what we see is an acknowledgement of 
the ‘agility’ of the private sector; 
‘it can take advantage of new technologies and respond to threats and 
opportunities obviously a lot quicker than government.’ (Bert) 
At the same time, citizens are offered a choice of how to assert their identity.  Thus, 
centralisation of services in this instance does not directly correlate with the 
concerns voiced by other participants.  The difference appeared to be a pragmatic 
emphasis on engaging users and reflecting their needs. 
‘I understand the philosophy you know why some people say the Internet’s a 
sort of organic entity that will just grow and to actually try and corral different 
elements into one place runs contrary to that, however, you want people to use 
those services, you know it’s a bit like if users didn’t want it they wouldn’t have 
Amazon then why would Amazon would be there as that one place to purchase 
a variety of goods and services so I understand the philosophy but the approach 
we’ve adopted is based in the insight we’ve received from users and the 
direction of travel that they’ve kind of laid down and ultimately you know it is a 
market and the users will determine if it’s wrong, if it’s not appropriate they’ll 
stop using it...’ (Ernie, GDS) 
Centralisation of Internet architecture and information/services are closely linked.  
While there were persuasive arguments for decentralisation in the context of 
corporate services, there was an equally coherent position adopted by proponents 
of centralisation by government. 
Thinking about tendencies towards centralising and decentralising patterns of 
organisation and regulation in this way is helpful for what follows.  It has already 
been indicated that centralisation of services is occurring on the Internet, primarily 
in the form of social media and other Web-based service providers such as Google 
(for whom social media is one part of a broader enterprise).  Centralisation of this 
kind is naturally pursued for economic motives: get the customers through the 
virtual door, then keep them there for as long as possible, extracting as much useful 
(i.e. monetised) data as possible.  The wealth of data possessed by such services 
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means, in essence, if government or law enforcement wants data on citizens’ 
activities online, they know where to go.  Accessing these data requires regulation 
both in terms of attempting to ensure companies comply with such demands but 
also – as a reaction of sorts – that such requests comply with other regulation that 
seeks to protect consumers and Internet users.  These processes are illustrated 
throughout the remainder of this chapter. 
At the same time, the private sector is implicated in the processes of identity 
assurance being introduced by the government.  There is a clear parallel here with 
Lessig’s (1999) ‘architectures of identification’, the trend towards regulating the 
architecture of the Internet so as to make identification easier and commonplace.  
Again, convenience seems to be a strong undercurrent.  It does not require a 
tremendous leap of imagination to see the connection between centralisation of 
information and services in this respect.  However, it is important to remain that the 
government and private sector relationship is at times cooperative and other times 
competitive (Fuchs 2008). 
6.4 CONTENT VERSUS COMMUNICATION DATA 
‘If you give me six lines written by the most honest man, I will find something in 
them to hang him’ (Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642)) 
A key feature of many written and oral responses to the consultation on the CDB 
was a dichotomy between communications data (CD) and the content of 
communications.  In their examinations of witnesses, the Joint Committee 
repeatedly ventured to uncover respondents’ thoughts regarding the distinction 
between these two forms of data.  Was any such distinction considered to exist, or 
was it a necessary distinction to attempt to make in light of the intentions of the 
Bill?  Did they consider the proposals of the Bill to allow for content of 
communications (e.g. emails and SMS messages) to be captured?  The rationale for 
this is clear; the ability of government or law enforcement to read the contents of 
private citizens’ communications would be incredibly intrusive.  This concern was 
apparent in one individual/non-expert respondent’s evidence: 
‘You seem to want to know what is going in on in every single persons mind in 
the UK from private conversations on the phone to emails and texts messages. 
You can build a picture of peoples political tendancies, which websites interest 
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them, what they look at and if you deem it to be a threat what would you do,... 
put them in prison because they looked at a website about the muslim religion 
so they might just turn out to be a terrorist [sic].’ (Lisa Kavanagh – 
Individual/Non-Expert, CDB Written Evidence, p.329) 
However, as Justice (2011: 71) note in their report Freedom from Suspicion this 
intention or capability is a misconception; a lack of public understanding of what 
constitutes communications data, fuelled by speculative media reports (see for 
example Kirkup 2008).  The issue this raises is an undercurrent in what follows; 
whether obtaining a granular picture of citizens’ daily lives was (1) intentional and 
(2) if not intentional, whether the government were alert to this possibility. 
CD are commonly referred to as the ‘who, where and when’ of a communication and 
are constituted of three parts: traffic, service use and subscriber data156.  Traffic data 
are those elements that are attached or contained within a postal or 
telecommunication message that allow it to be transmitted.  For an email, this will 
typically include the date and time it was sent and received, the login name of the 
sender and their IP address (from which can usually be obtained the physical 
location of the computer).  Traffic data from Internet browsing sessions will also 
include the URL of any website visited157 and the time spent on this page.  Service 
use data are those produced by CSPs that record users’ activity such as itemised bills 
and activity logs, while subscriber data are those details of customers such as name, 
date of birth, contact and payment details – everything one provides when signing 
up to a service.  From this brief description, it is clear that CD can reveal a large 
amount of information about individuals’ electronic communications and activities.  
Their relative value to law enforcement is also apparent; being able confirm that a 
suspect was at a particular location at a particular time or was in communication 
with someone else can be vital evidence for an investigation.  In his oral evidence 
session, the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police stated that the value of 
CD was in establishing associations between criminals and groups of criminals.  
However, as one interviewee argued, the government’s stated aims expected too 
much from CD: 
                                                          
156 These three parts are defined in Section 21(4) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 
2000 and were retained in the draft CDB. 
157 ‘Weblog’ data as described above. 
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‘…the idea that this huge amount of data would be available for detecting, 
sifting, whatever else, finding the terrorists in the crowd is very unlikely. I 
wouldn’t deny that it would be able to backup data that you would get from 
somewhere you know, you suspect somebody of being a terrorist, this would 
potentially allow you to investigate that individual probably very effectively, 
that’s certainly feasible but this idea that you would use this as a system to pull 
terrorists out of the general population by detection is just completely, 
mathematically, very unlikely.’ (Joss Wright, OII) 
The findings here illustrate two key aspects of the data dichotomy.  First, while 
government officials defended their claim that accessing content data was not their 
intention, the technical feasibility of separating CD from content in electronic 
communications was challenged by several respondents.  Second, the sensitivity of 
CD was highlighted; the insight into people’s personal lives that could be ascertained 
from CD was considered equal to, if not greater, than content. 
6.4.1 ISOLATING THE ‘WHO, WHERE AND WHEN’ 
Government officials were quick to reassure the Committee that content data would 
not be captured under the CDB. 
‘I am absolutely clear that the key data we want is the who, where, when and 
how. That is clear, and there is no intention of going beyond that into content 
or anything…We have been very clear about that at every stage, and the Bill is 
not intended to take us any further than that.’ (Theresa May (Home Secretary) 
– Official, CDB Oral Evidence, p.399) 
 ‘…we would only be able to store communications data…I must stress, through 
the Bill it is illegal for us to collect content.’ (Richard Alcock – Official, CDB Oral 
Evidence, p.17) 
These claims indicate a desire to allay fears and by doing so make some headway in 
justifying the collection of CD.  Despite the fact that CD constitute a breadth of 
valuable personal data, the message was clear: content data is more personal and as 
such the government draws the line at CD158. 
Some respondents to the consultation felt that it would only be a matter of time 
until content-focused powers were legislated for and that in itself was sufficient 
reason to prevent the passing of the CDB.  
                                                          
158 This is not to disregard the value of content data for crime prevention purposes.  Justice (2011) 
point out that the lack of public understanding about CD is due to confusion with intercept data.  
Intercept data is content data but access to this is only possible via a warrant obtained in accordance 
with s.71 of RIPA (2000).   
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 ‘…this is a stepping stone legislation. While content monitoring is not yet 
included in this bill, it makes it easier to be included in a later one.’ (Martin 
Ammann – Individual/Non-Expert, CDB Written Evidence, p.25) 
‘The Government is not presently arguing that we should all be routinely or 
randomly subject to bugging, covert tracking or interception ‘just in case’ but, if 
the present proposal is allowed to pass, proposals for other types of blanket or 
random surveillance irrespective of suspicion ‘just in case’ are a logical next 
step.’ (Liberty – Advocacy/Non-Profit, CDB Written Evidence, p.364) 
The challenge in maintaining the position that content data would not be captured 
came in the form of the technical feasibility of keeping the two forms of data 
separate during collection.  If technical limitations meant that some content could 
be ‘scooped up’ along with CD then the level of intrusion would be unjustified.  
According to the Director of the Communications Capability Directorate of the Home 
Office, this problem could be avoided by responsibilising CSPs: 
‘We will be working with them to retain, in some cases, aspects of 
communications data and, in that case, it is very easy to separate content from 
CD…We will not be applying any systems that cannot reliably extract CD from 
content through whatever data streams.’ (Richard Alcock – Official, CDB Oral 
Evidence, p.17)  
This optimism was not shared amongst other respondents:  
‘Until you have a very clear idea of what the law says in terms of what is 
communications data and what is content, you cannot try to translate that into 
a series of technical measures – filtering of the sort that is being suggested in 
the legislation. Many of us believe that the definitions are far from clear. 
(Professor Peter Sommer – Expert (Academic), CDB Oral Evidence, p.130) 
Placing the onus on CSPs brings to the surface the nature of the relationship 
between government and the private sector.  To that extent the CDB is 
representative of similar trends identified elsewhere in contemporary formations of 
control (Garland 2001).  Relatedly, a core aspect of social control is blaming (Innes 
2003: 139).  Arguably, if content data are accidentally captured and subsequently 
viewed, shared, or lost, culpability lies with the CSPs who collect them.  This has 
implications for understanding control.  Through regulation both corporate entities 
and individual citizens are embroiled in the social control apparatus, directly or 
indirectly.  Hypothetically we might envision a reformulation by government of the 
‘problem’ of capturing content data – what Innes refers to as a ‘stylised politics of 
blame’ (2003: 141).  To negate the problem, regulation could dictate collection of all 
content and CD and then empower an independent authority to separate the two 
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upon an authorised request.  The resultant expansion of the control ‘net’ (Cohen 
1985) – supplementary/intensified powers of dataveillance – would be justified on 
the grounds of improved oversight and security of data.  Resistance to the CDB from 
the private sector is therefore understandable and deepens our understanding of 
the negotiation of social control. 
Cooperation, on the other hand, between government and CSPs and security of data 
are separate issues returned to below.  However, it is helpful to draw briefly on 
private sector observations of the data dichotomy.  Many of the questions put to 
CSPs concerned encryption of data that travels across their networks – particularly 
third-party data (e.g. data from Facebook or Gmail):  
‘Once we can identify the packets of data, we would need to find a way 
technically to say, “Okay, we understand that we now need to retain these”, 
but they are encrypted, or not, on an application-by-application basis. If they 
are fully encrypted, we need to be able technically to unpick it and say, “Here is 
the traffic data but obviously we have not touched the content”, which is very 
difficult.’ (Mark Hughes – Telecoms Industry, CDB Oral Evidence, p.179) 
Mr Hughes pointed towards two problems here.  First, the presence and form of 
encryption of communications varies and thus the technical procedure to separate 
content from CD will vary accordingly; in other words there is no single way to do 
this.  Second, ‘unpicking’ the encryption without viewing the content is 
troublesome.  While Mr Hughes mentions later that some packets of data have the 
CD labelled in plain text, this is not typically the case.  Further to this, in the event 
that overseas service providers would/could not provide details regarding service 
users159, the Bill outlined provisions for placing ‘black boxes’160 between UK-based 
CSPs and their customers to rectify this problem.  Glyn Wintle (CDB Oral Evidence, 
p.132), noted that by using this technique ‘absolutely, categorically, you are going to 
get some blurring’ between content and CD. 
 
 
                                                          
159 See section 6.5 for a discussion of this point in respect of jurisdictionality. 
160 Colloquial – these pieces of equipment are used to carry out Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) and are 
typically used for the collection of intercept data. 
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6.4.2 THE ‘INTRUSION FALLACY’: COMMUNICATIONS DATA IN THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY 
A primary issue that the research data up until this point have pointed towards 
concerns the distinction between CD and content data in terms of their respective 
abilities to reveal sensitive and personal information.  The key assumption relied 
upon by advocates of the CDB was that content data was the more personal and 
sensitive of the two, hence its protection in previous legislation by the need for 
intercept warrants.  However, there was vocal criticism of this line of argument.  In 
the contemporary technological environment, it was frequently argued, CD were 
just as revealing (if not more so) than content data. 
‘Promoters of the scheme have made much of the idea that only 
communications data will be open to such routine inspection, not content – the 
implication being that somehow content is more intimate. This is not true. A 
timeline of all your contacts and interests, phone calls, reading and browsing, 
purchases, financial worries, patterns of movement, of waking and sleeping, 
build a far more complete picture of you than you ever explicitly write down for 
anyone, perhaps more complete than you have yourself…’ (No2ID – 
Advocacy/Non-Profit, CDB Written Evidence, pp.437-8, emphasis in original) 
‘…one of the huge aspects of the Communications Data Bill has been this 
disparity between content and communications data – this idea that they’re not 
going to be reading your emails, they’re just going to be looking at who you 
sent them to – and that being an utterly false dichotomy whereby the amount 
of information that is embedded in what you do, when you do it, who you do it 
with, what websites you access, when you access them, how you access them, 
the shape of your social network, the idea that this is not somehow privacy 
invasive, is just massively false.’ (Joss Wright, OII) 
An analogy could be drawn here with other forms of surveillance.  CCTV for instance, 
offers the same possibility for monitoring real-world interactions between people – 
the who, where and when – as CD to a large extent.  Equally, the content of people’s 
conversations does not need to be captured on CCTV for a reasonably robust 
estimation of what occurs in the daily life of any observed individual.  What is more, 
in the context of digital communications there is a wealth of data subsumed under 
the heading ‘communications data’ that, when brought together, can create a highly 
detailed picture of an individual.  This concern was central to the critiques of many 
respondents: 
‘They [communication data] can be far more intrusive and revealing and, of 
course, far more useful. This is especially so when data is combined to create a 
broader picture of an individual’s movements, personality and social circles…we 
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refute the suggestion that communications data does not somehow convey 
substantive content about a person’s life.’ (Open Rights Group – Advocacy/Non-
Profit, CDB Written Evidence, p.448) 
‘…social network analysis of communications data can generate sensitive (aka 
‘special category’) personal data, without any knowledge of the content of 
communications…experiments have successfully demonstrated prediction of 
users’ political affiliation, gender and hobbies.’ (Caspar Bowden – 
Advocacy/Non-Profit, CDB Written Evidence, p.94) 
The process Mr Bowden refers to is known as homophily; the inference of various 
personal traits based on those of close acquaintances161 (typically observed through 
social network analysis).  Identification of individual browsing habits and 
preferences is lucrative for online marketing and advertising companies and the 
subsequent explosion of academic, media and tech interest in ‘Big Data’ cannot be 
divorced from the types of concerns evidenced here.  Central to each are the 
questions of what can be done with our personal data, who can access it and what it 
can reveal about our personal lives.  The Tor Project, in their written submission, 
highlighted the computational aspect to the collection of CD: 
‘The reason that communications data can be more sensitive than content is 
that it is more amenable to automated analysis, particularly when collected in 
bulk (as proposed by the draft bill)…communications data is designed for 
computers to interpret and so is far easier for computers to analyse, allowing a 
more accurate and detailed profile of individuals to be built than is possible 
with current technology to interpret content.’ (Advocacy/Non-Profit, CDB 
Written Evidence, p.563) 
Automated analysis, to which the Tor Project refers, is indicative of these related 
concerns of ‘big’ data analytics.  The intrusion presented by the collection of CD can 
therefore be understood as a product of the combination of multiple data sources.  
In isolation, various CD may not reveal particularly sensitive information.  In 
combination however, the possibility for inferring sensitive information (with a high 
degree of accuracy) is greatly increased.  This process of triangulation has primarily 
been critiqued in the context of Big Data; the privacy rights of service users may be 
undermined if data are used to produce information beyond that covered in privacy 
agreements.  The same assumption provided the basis for the claim that CD was just 
as intrusive than content.  The observations of the Open Rights Group (above) and 
the following remarks from Privacy International demonstrate this: 
                                                          
161 Previous research has demonstrated that people interact more frequently with people who are 
similar to themselves (see McPherson et al. 2001). 
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‘Bringing together data from such a wide variety of sources…provides an 
intimate mapping, allowing law enforcement to identify a person’s associates, 
friends, family and daily habits, even when and where that person sleeps.’ 
(Advocacy/Non-Profit, CDB Written Evidence, p.479, emphasis added) 
6.4.3 EVOLVING DATA 
The data dichotomy was one of the most prominent themes to emerge from analysis 
of the consultation data and was echoed in conversations with fieldwork 
interviewees.  Given its technical nuances, the discussion of the feasibility of 
separating content from CD primarily occurred between respondents from official, 
expert (academic and technical) and telecoms categories.  The argument for what is 
denoted the ‘intrusion fallacy’ was vocalised largely by advocacy groups and activists 
– although some of these groups do acknowledge these arguments were 
constructed from consultation with experts in the field.  The basis of this issue is 
thus a computational/technical one, but it is translated effectively into meaningful 
terms for the public audience who are affected by it.  Consequently, we are 
presented with a simple theme; regulation failing to keep pace with and respond 
accordingly to changes in technology. 
A number of confounding factors meant the separation of content and CD – at least 
on a technological level – would be complex.  It appeared that the technical 
feasibility of separating content from CD was inherently connected to the concept of 
the dichotomy between the two forms of data themselves; what is content and 
what is communication data is not as clear as it was when previous regulation was 
enacted.  Thus even if a system could be successfully implemented to collect only 
CD, the dangers to users would still exist.  The intrusion fallacy helps to reinforce this 
point.  Whether the government were alert to this possibility is unclear.  However, 
what is apparent is regulation was being framed inappropriately for the 
technological environment. 
The crime and terrorism context of this regulation is important to bear in mind.  It 
dictates a balance that must be struck between freedom and security while at the 
same time ensuring any steps taken are necessary and proportionate.  For Brown, 
‘precautionary mass surveillance’ (2009: 132) is neither necessary nor proportionate 
and regulation that allows for this – such as the CDB – amounts to a failure to 
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protect both the freedom and security of citizens.  Freedom is eroded by the 
intensification of digital surveillance; gaining increasingly granular pictures of 
people’s private lives as they are constituted by their communications.  Although 
monitoring all Internet traffic is technically impossible (Brown 2010), recent events 
such as the Snowden revelations indicate that the capabilities of intelligence 
agencies are significantly greater than previously acknowledged.  Security 
meanwhile is undermined by the continued failure to enact satisfactory legislation 
that appropriately updates the capacities of intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies.  Approaches to conducting surveillance via developing regulation such as 
the CDB will always be met with resistance.  As an alternative, Brown (2010) 
advocates a targeted, proportionate and court-authorised model for 
communications data surveillance that would strike the necessary balance between 
freedom and security. 
6.5 JURISDICTIONALITY 
Dealing with multiple regulatory jurisdictions was an unavoidable aspect of the type 
of powers the CDB attempted to provide; while a good deal of communications data 
of interest to law enforcement would originate in the UK/relate to intra-UK digital 
interactions, a large amount would involve extra-UK interaction with overseas 
service providers.  While specified legal processes162 exist to access data held 
overseas about service users in the UK, the CDB made provisions for UK-based CSPs 
to retain data relating to 
‘ii) the services of overseas providers used by people in this country which 
transit systems but which the system provider currently has no business to 
retain.’ (House of Commons 2012: 12) 
This is the issue of third-party data.  As a contextual example, this would consist of 
BT (based in the UK) collecting and retaining data about their customers’ use of 
Gmail (based in the US) as it travels across their network within the boundaries of 
the UK.  While this may seem a reasonable and tempting step to take (MLATs are 
                                                          
162 RIPA is one such process. Another key method discussed in evidence sessions with the Joint 
Committee was the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT).  This is a formal request for information 
made between different sovereign jurisdictions and legal systems.  It acknowledges and is designed to 
overcome the barriers to information sharing between states.  In some cases, bilateral or multilateral 
treaties may obligate states to comply with MLAT requests issued from corresponding states, such as 
the 1994 UK-US MLAT. 
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not a swift process), there were a number of barriers to this, not least UK and 
overseas CSPs’ reticence to accept such measures.  The issue of jurisdictionality also 
brings into this discussion the valuable contributions of overseas actors in the 
‘Telecoms Industry’ category of respondents.  Their position is unique in that they 
possess first-hand experience of complying with RIPA and MLATs in an international 
context, and consequently offer clear indications as to the reception of the Bill 
amongst their community. 
6.5.1 IF IT AIN’T BROKE, DON’T FIX IT 
Representatives from Google, Hotmail/Microsoft and Yahoo! presented a 
straightforward argument: there are limits to what data the UK is allowed to obtain 
directly; there are existing routes to follow in order to obtain data it is not permitted 
to access and; while there may be room for improvement, these routes provide 
some clarity and legal protection in an already complex regulatory arena.  Expanding 
upon this, Emma Ascroft of Yahoo! was concerned on two related grounds. 
‘The UK would be the first country to extend its jurisdiction and take a reserve 
power to require UK providers to retain data that they could not obtain directly. 
We believe that other countries would follow, including countries that would 
use legislation of this kind to limit free expression and infringe privacy rights of 
internet users. From our perspective, that would create a bewildering 
patchwork of overlapping and potentially conflicting legislation.’ (Telecoms 
Industry, CDB Oral Evidence, p.214) 
First of all, then, the Bill could generate copycat legislation – muddying the 
regulatory waters more than they currently are.  Second, the countries that might 
do so could be those whose intentions are more restrictive of civil liberties.  Adding 
to this, Yahoo!’s Director of Public Policy made clear the reason why maintaining 
clarity in this arena was important. 
‘Companies like us would face impossible decisions about how to be consistent 
in how we protect our users and operate our businesses in the 57 markets 
around the world where we operate…we are a company that is built on 
consumers’ trust and confidence, and in order to honour that commitment we 
aim to be consistent in how we engage law enforcement around the world.’ 
(Telecoms Industry, CDB Oral Evidence, pp.214 and 223) 
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This outlook, shared by representatives from Microsoft and Google, positions 
overseas CSPs as accountable, first and foremost, to their consumers163.  This issue 
of trust between CSPs and service users is an important one and is played out visibly 
in respect of jurisdictionality. 
There was also the problem of encrypted third-party data.  Encryption of data for 
CSPs is typically proprietary; consequently, when retaining their own data, 
decryption would be straightforward for (UK) CSPs but would not be the case for 
third-party data.  Asserting their position on this issue, overseas CSPs stated that 
they are usually willing to decrypt these data when issued with a valid RIPA/MLAT 
request. 
Sarah Hunter (Google): ‘From a Google Inc. perspective, we are very confident 
about the security of our encryption. If a valid RIPA request comes in or UK law 
enforcement goes through the MLAT, receives a court order and in turn gets 
Gmail user data, we will obviously provide that data decrypted. If it was to use a 
third-party provider to gather the encrypted data, I think it very unlikely that 
Google Inc. would provide anyone outside Google Inc. with that key. That is 
simply because, as everyone said earlier, security is our most important asset. 
Our relationship with our users is predicated on trust. Without that, we have no 
business.’ 
Emma Ascroft (Yahoo!): ‘I would say the same thing…The encryption question 
is rather a red herring because the UK law enforcement agency can obtain the 
data direct from us using international legal channels such as the MLAT. If it 
came to us through those channels, we would disclose those data in the clear. If 
those channels work properly, this backstop power is unnecessary.’ (Telecoms 
Industry, CDB Oral Evidence, p.226) 
This stance reinforces the position that the current methods for requesting data are 
sufficient.  Encryption appears as a bargaining chip of sorts, with the justification 
that this is in the best interests of service users.  By attempting to circumvent the 
lengthy RIPA/MLAT process, UK law enforcement (via UK CSPs) would need to 
decrypt the data themselves, which is both time consuming and costly.  To do so 
would require some form of ‘man in the middle164’ attack but this too could have 
negative consequences on trust and security.  As the Chief Technology Officer for 
Timico noted during a fieldwork interview, 
                                                          
163 While increased faith in personal data protection is favourable for service users, it is not cynical to 
suggest CSPs’ motivation is retaining a valuable customer base. 
164 A man in the middle attack is a means of intercepting digital communications by creating 
independent connections to both sender and receiver and relaying the messages between them.  As far 
as the parties are concerned, they are talking to one another but in actual fact they are talking via the 
‘man in the middle’ server. 
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 ‘…notwithstanding the fact that to be able to do so at any scale would need 
massive computing power, when you start messing about with things like that 
[HTTPS165] you start undermining the trust in the banking system for example, 
you know, how do you know that your HTTPS link between you and your 
banking is not being monitored by somebody?’ (Trefor Davies – CTO, Timico) 
The broader ramifications of this part of the discussion begin to appear.  Trust 
between service user and provider is crucial to the operation of the Internet.  
However, the reason that this is crucial is because the Internet has evolved as a 
space where trust is required – specifically, a commercial space.  As Lessig (1999: 64) 
says, ‘Spaces have values. They express these values through the practices or lives 
that they enable or disable.’  Cyberspace is primarily a space for consumption.  Of 
course, it is also a space for communication but in large part communication relies 
upon forms of consumption.  The dominant form of practice enabled on the Internet 
is consumption and for this to be sustained and to grow, trust and security are 
required.  More recent events illuminate this juxtaposition of space/territory and 
trust, security and digital rights.  The on-going debate about the General Data 
Protection Regulation in the EU for instance signifies the interests that both states 
and corporations have in restrictions on the transfer of personal data between 
jurisdictions, with each pursuing a specific agenda (whether that is increased profit 
or prevention of crime) while trying to negotiate the terms of their relationship and 
balance the privacy rights of citizens.  Online spaces are consequently multiple, 
overlapping and contested and it is clear why attempts at regulation of these spaces 
produce such struggle. 
6.5.2 NOT IN OUR CYBERSPACE! 
One final observation serves to ground jurisdictionality in more popular debates.  
Jurisdictionality as representative of place and territory is a useful conceptual tool 
for anyone wishing to make comparisons between the UK and other states in 
respect of the extent of surveillance.  For that reason, it was a tool employed often 
by advocacy groups in pursuit of a persuasive counter-surveillance narrative.  These 
groups tended to identify the proposed use of a specific technology – DPI – as 
comparable to other states, while individuals/non-experts (and again advocacy 
                                                          
165 Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure: Rather than a different protocol, HTTPS is a layering of standard 
HTTP communications with SSL (Secure Sockets Layer), thus ensuring more secure data transfer over a 
network. 
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groups to some extent) gravitated towards notions of democracy and popular 
representations of pervasive state surveillance.  The following extracts are indicative 
of these respectively:  
‘The collection of data through black boxes at ISPs in order to monitor activities 
within a country and beyond a country has only been implemented at a national 
scale in China, Iran and Kazakhstan. DPI—deep packet inspection—and black 
boxes have been used on a local scale, and we have cases in Egypt, Pakistan and 
Tunisia. The idea of a black box run at a national scale, at an organised 
centralised level, as to what will actually be monitored, has not yet been done 
in a democratic country.’ (Dr Gus Hosein – Advocacy/Non-Profit, CDB Oral 
Evidence, p.49) 
‘The Home Office has failed to make any case about why Britain should be the 
first democratic state to implement this kind of policy. Nor has the Home Office 
responded to the legitimate concern that this policy adds legitimacy of the 
surveillance pursued in China or Iran, which British foreign policy has sought to 
prevent in other countries.’ (Big Brother Watch – Advocacy/Non-Profit, CDB 
Written Evidence, p.63) 
In these remarks we see advocacy groups’ awareness of the instrumental value of 
appealing to notions of Western democracy and liberalism, particularly when placed 
in contrast to authoritarian regimes of the likes of China and Iran.  The same theme 
was taken up by other categories of respondents: 
‘…this is the kind of oppressive policy that one might find in a much less 
libertarian nation, such as China or Libya, where electronic communications 
were monitored until the government was overthrown.’ (Peter Cromie – 
Individual/Non-Expert, CDB Written Evidence, p.140) 
What is also clear from these extracts is that cyberspace is perceived in territorial 
terms – there are models of cyberspace to aspire to and there are those to avoid.  
Comparisons with China and Iran are therefore designed to send the message that 
‘we don’t want our cyberspace to be like their cyberspace.’ 
Nevertheless, not everyone who discussed the analogy perceived it in these terms.  
The Director of the Centre for Social Media Analysis at think tank Demos noted: 
‘I do not think that analogies with China, Iran and Kazakhstan are very helpful. 
We regulate the ways in which privacy is breached in a way that those countries 
do not, even if they use some of the same technologies, which they do already, 
for all types of snooping. Also, there needs to be that way in which the police 
know what they are doing, so that we do not have the risk of inadvertently 
breaching various regulations, which is probably easier now than ever.’ (Jamie 
Bartlett – Advocacy/Non-Profit, CDB Oral Evidence, p.290) 
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Here, the difference between the proposed measures in the Bill and the regimes 
existing in other countries was that the Bill was an attempt to put state intrusion 
into privacy on a legal footing and to clarify – for public reassurance and for law 
enforcement guidance – precisely ‘what can be done, why, under what conditions 
and by whom’ (p.290). 
Beyond the case in question, using different jurisdictions as emblematic of a type of 
surveillance has broader significance for understanding the process of negotiating 
social control and social order.  They provide insight into culturally embedded ideas 
about surveillance and citizens’ rights; they show the social construction of what is 
deemed necessary and proportionate and illustrate the values that people attach to 
freedom of communication.  Moreover, official sources also these categories as a 
form of defence: 
‘…it is absurd to compare any aspect of this Bill to the practice in non-
democratic countries’ (Home Secretary Theresa May, CDB Written Evidence, 
p.255).   
Social order is produced by such practices of consensus-building and constructing 
meaning.  It follows that forms of social control designed to maintain social order 
(surveillance and regulation) should adhere to these conceptions of the type of 
social order we wish to preserve.  Respondents’ comparisons between the CDB and 
authoritarian regimes elsewhere alert us therefore to a paradox at the heart of the 
state response to the risks of crime and terrorism; the removal of the freedoms and 
liberties that they profess to protect.  This ‘state of exception’ (Agamben 2005) – 
normalising exceptional powers and enactment of ‘emergency’ legislation – is 
characteristic of the UK and US rhetoric on national security post-9/11.  As Lyon 
(2007) observes, this situation extends to routine surveillance (such as monitoring of 
communications data) as well as specific counter-terrorism powers (such as 
extended detention)166.  Resistance to regulation and increased surveillance in this 
context is thus a process of competing for the right to define how social order 
should be protected. 
 
                                                          
166 Indeed, since this analysis was conducted Parliament has passed – despite much criticism (see 
Powles 2014) – broadly similar powers to those in the CDB as emergency legislation in the form of the 
Data Retention and Investigatory Powers (DRIP) Act. 
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6.5.3 MEDIATED SPACE 
Surveillance is rarely a relationship between two parties – the ideal type of ‘watcher 
and watched’.  The literature in this area has long acknowledged this, most notably 
with the concept of the surveillant assemblage (Haggerty and Ericson 2000) that 
alerts us to the plurality of modern surveillance.  Among others, Haggerty (2006) has 
suggested that surveillance practices should no longer be conceived of in panoptic 
terms167  as they have dispersed beyond a state-centric, control-based model into 
inter-personal interactions via new technologies (webcams, IRC, social media) and 
into transactions between individuals and a variety of organisations.  While state-
centricity remains a powerful influence in the context of this chapter, also evident 
are the multiplicity of actors with a stake in current debates around regulation of 
digital surveillance.  Specifically, there is a tenuous relationship between states and 
CSPs.  Citizens, meanwhile, are caught in the middle. 
Online spaces are not only constituted of state regulatory jurisdictions.  Just as 
significantly, online spaces are the territory of private organisations; for example 
CSP networks, social media websites and search engine facilities.  These domains are 
strictly regulated in their own way and subject to extensive (but typically 
consensual168) monitoring and for that reason have been referred to as ‘walled 
gardens’ (Berners-Lee 2010).  In the context of the CDB, mediation of surveillance is 
particularly visible as there is a tacit acknowledgement on the part of governments 
that private corporations and their services are a valuable source of information. 
‘…I had a chat with the guy at the Home Office who I think drafted the draft Bill 
and he was saying “well you know, in effect all we’re asking for is the same kind 
of level of information that already exists in private companies like Google and 
places like that” so my answer then is actually, maybe, there is a debate to be 
had about how much information the likes of Google are allowed to keep.’ 
(Trefor Davies – CTO, Timico) 
From these remarks, the tension between states and CSPs is evidently connected to 
other concerns regarding data practices of the latter.  Recent media and academic 
outpourings on ‘big data’ are indicative of these and have found resonance with pre-
                                                          
167 See the discussion in Chapter Three. 
168 In the form of Terms of Service and Privacy Agreements. However, these are frequently the source 
of contention as service providers often introduce new features that impact upon privacy expectations 
of their users. 
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existing concerns regarding the socially regressive possibilities and sorting effects of 
‘dataveillance’ technology (Clarke 1988; Gandy 1993; Lyon 2003b).  What emerges is 
that artificially-imposed jurisdictions in ‘borderless’ cyberspace present a barrier to 
the state’s efforts at trans-national mediated surveillance.  Two related lessons 
follow from this.  First, regulating cyberspace within national jurisdictions (intra-
regulation) is less problematic – although by no means straightforward – than 
attempting to cross virtual jurisdictions (extra-regulation).  This is due to other legal 
obligations placed on corporations.  Second, there is increased blurring between 
regulation offline and online, which again plays out in form of tension between the 
state and the private sector. 
Lessig’s (1999) work is instructional at this point.  Contrasting ‘East Coast Code’ (law 
and regulation) with ‘West Coast Code’ (computer coding of programmers and 
engineers), Lessig shows how the former (i.e. the government) has increasingly 
attempted to control the latter (cyberspace).  Importantly, this has become easier as 
West Coast Code has increasingly become the domain of corporations (think Google, 
Facebook or BT) who can be regulated much easier than earlier programmers and 
software writers.  Corporations do have a (commercial) interest in regulation – 
indeed they regulate themselves to a degree.  However, the trend Lessig identifies 
remains true today and has been demonstrated by the data here: ‘the West, 
partially, resists’ (1999: 53). 
Lessig’s story of ‘East meets West’ (1999: 53) resembles the theme of this chapter.  
When East meets West in the context of digital surveillance, tensions become 
particularly apparent.  In part this is due to the increasingly politicised nature of 
private data and cyberspace.  CSPs have obligations to customers and other 
commercial actors that must be balanced with the need to comply with law 
enforcement and state regulation.  Regardless, CSPs have slowly been transformed 
into surveillance instruments for the state.  While a large amount of what they do 
for their own gain is worrying in the context of civil liberties and privacy, CSPs and 
other corporations do – as the data show – resist to some extent. Yet, the 
incremental control of West Coast Code by the East is clear.  Again, we need only to 
look at the Snowden revelations to see that the true nature of mediated surveillance 
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– sculpting the private sector into a system of mass surveillance – is far deeper, 
longer and more intensive than previously thought. 
6.6 FUTURE-PROOFING AND FUNCTION CREEP 
A general concern with the draft Bill, evidenced in both the written and oral 
evidence and vocalised in fieldwork interviews, was that Part One of the Bill was too 
broad, the powers it granted and subsequently the types of data that might be 
collected too wide ranging.  As the breadth of extracts below illustrate, this 
pervasive issue was taken up by all categories of respondents.  The dilemma at the 
heart of this speaks to this chapter as a whole; how to adequately respond and 
adapt to continual technological development.  There were, then, two pathways 
that might be followed.  Home Office officials and law enforcement bodies favoured 
the path of keeping the scope of CDB wide so as to anticipate further advances in 
communications technology – ‘future-proofing’ the Bill: 
‘The fundamental reason why we are nervous about limiting Clause 1 is future-
proofing…I genuinely believe that no sooner will you get this legislation through 
than something else will come up, given the pace of change in the 
communications industry, which will create another gap…’ (Charles Farr 
(Director General of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism) – Official, 
CDB Oral Evidence, p.346) 
‘…we need…to make sure the legislation is framed so that it maintains that 
capability for the months and years ahead.’ (Sir Peter Fahy (Chief Constable 
Greater Manchester Police) - Official, CDB Oral Evidence, p.376) 
Opponents on the other hand advocated a narrower, limited scope to tackle only 
the current capability gap and to require some form of Parliamentary approval for 
any future addition to the powers that would be enacted: 
‘I think this Bill is future-proof, but in the worst possible way…the Home 
Secretary seeks to have the power to her and her successors, in the words of 
the Bill, to do anything they like once the universal surveillance engine is 
connected up to the entire national internet. So, for that reason, it is 
additionally terrifying…I do not think you can put in place a good future-proof 
Bill, but you could put in a transparent, thoughtful, representative system of 
reviewing how you adapt access to intercept and communications data as the 
technology changes.’ (Duncan Campbell – Media, CDB Oral Evidence, p.315) 
Reflecting the earlier discussion of the data dichotomy, it is plausible that as 
technologies continue to develop, it will become even harder to separate the two 
forms of data.  Evidence has already been presented that this is a technical hurdle at 
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present, let alone in 10 years’ time.  There is a danger that wide ranging Order-
making powers could result in content (or likewise revealing data) being captured at 
a later stage.  This is yet another example of the tendency of a failure of control to 
produce successively more intensive forms of control (Innes 2003).  In response to 
this concern, the Home Secretary felt ‘that would be a different discussion that 
would need to be had’ (CDB Oral Evidence, p.402).  Evidently not persuaded, the 
Joint Committee recommended in their final report that concerns over the breadth 
of Clause One were hardly surprising and that it be narrowed, rather than enacted 
with a promise of being used, at present, to a limited extent. 
This brings us to the issue of ‘function creep’, which can be conceived of in three 
ways.  The first has already been noted; over time the parameters of what is classed 
as content data may be altered.  Dr Paul Bernal, in his written submission (p.59), 
describes two more: the purposes to which the data is put and access to data.  The 
former describes the temptation to use the data for additional and perhaps less 
serious criminal investigations than the primary categories outlined in the Bill: 
terrorism, organised crime and child pornography.  The consequence would be an 
expanded net of social control (Cohen 1985).  The latter describes a concern that has 
also been directed at RIPA, that a wide array of additional agencies and 
organisations may access the data for their own purposes; in Cohen’s terms, wider 
and different nets of control (1985: 44). 
In the case of RIPA, many local councils have come under fire for using investigatory 
powers for minor incidents – fly tipping for instance – which were not felt justified 
(see Norton-Taylor and Roberts 2009).  Pete Bradwell of the ORG and the CTO of 
Timico address this concern: 
‘…they’ve done nothing to address the problems they have, existing problems 
with RIPA…that access in our opinion is far too easy and that’s a problem 
already we think especially when you consider the oversight regime in our 
opinion is too, isn’t strong enough…’ (Pete Bradwell, ORG) 
‘…you’ll note that already local government bodies are wanting the scope of 
this Act or Bill to extend to them and again the concern is that they will use it 
for all sorts of things that the Bill wasn’t originally intended to be used for. Who 
knows what happens when a new political environment comes in and they say 
“hey, we’ve got all these tools at our disposal, let’s use it to good purpose.”’ 
(Trefor Davies – CTO, Timico) 
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Four public bodies were designated access to communications data: the police, 
SOCA, HMRC and the intelligence services.  Additional organisations requiring access 
were obliged to submit their justification in writing to the Home Office.  The Home 
Secretary remarked that she anticipated the Financial Services Authority and the UK 
Border Agency being granted access and ‘others that we are still looking at’ (p.409), 
suggesting therefore that function creep in respect of access to data was already in 
evidence. 
Data, in this context and others, have intrinsic value; they are a resource to be 
exploited.  This is patently true for the private sector, particularly in the recent 
context of the advent of ‘big data’.  Moreover, ‘Google envy’ is characteristic of 
public bodies and government as a whole – and the approach of the CDB – as the 
previous section argued.  There are a wide variety of uses to which data can be put – 
the bill outlines ten ambiguously broad169 purposes for which data may be obtained 
– and thus it can be expected that a federated database of communications data 
would be a compelling resource for many organisations and institutions.  As one 
individual/non-expert respondent to the consultation observed, 
‘Any assurance that “we won’t allow that in the rules” is not worth the paper it 
would be published on. Once the data is on file, the uses of it will creep 
outwards step by step, and each step looks small to the government that allows 
it. Within ten years use of that data would be widespread, and vested interests 
would be too big to let it be given up.’ (J. R. S. Kistruck – Individual/Non-Expert, 
CDB Written Evidence, p.336) 
This has echoes of earlier remarks170 and shows both a more general concern with 
function creep and a specific issue with what happens to data once it is collected.  
Added to this, while the description of the data to be collected was typically that 
which CSPs ‘had no business interest’ to retain, it is similarly plausible that at some 
stage in the future, they would develop a business interest in these data.  It is 
unclear what the effect of this would be, given that the data would be held in 
privately-owned databases.  This, along with all of the factors outlined in respect of 
                                                          
169 For national security, for preventing or detecting crime or preventing disorder, in relation financial 
misconduct under section 123 or 129 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (civil penalties for 
market abuse), in the interests of the economic well-being of the UK, in the interests of public safety, 
for protecting public health, for tax reasons, for emergency health reasons, to assist investigations into 
alleged miscarriages of justice and to identify people who are incapacitated or dead, in order to identify 
them, their relatives, people connected with them, or to understand what has happened to them. 
170 See data from Martin Ammann and Liberty in section 6.4.1. 
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future proofing and function creep, all raise the question of data security and the 
oversight regime. 
6.7 OVERSIGHT AND SECURITY 
The proposed safeguards at all stages of the data collection, authorisation and 
retention regime and the formal oversight mechanisms received intense scrutiny 
throughout the consultation.  Like many other aspects of the CDB these systems 
were drawn in large part from those already in place under RIPA but – as was the 
case with the definition of communications data – this approach was not perceived 
as wholly adequate for the new technological environment.  Focusing lastly on 
safeguards and oversight permits an examination of the concepts of necessity and 
proportionality, which have since become a unifying banner for advocacy groups 
and concerned organisations and individuals.  It is here that the contributions of the 
‘Independent Authorities’ category are mostly heard.  
6.7.1 NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE 
Two independent commissioners – the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) and 
the Interception of Communications Commissioner (IoCC) – have responsibilities 
with regards to protection of and access to data in the UK.  The IoCC does not play a 
role in authorising requests for data; responsibility for assessing and authorising 
access to data resides with the Single Point of Contact (SPoC) and the Designated 
Senior Officer171 within an organisation.  It is for the SPoC to assess, in the first 
instance, whether an application satisfies the tests for necessity and proportionality. 
For one privacy advocate, Caspar Bowden, the opacity of the tests for necessity and 
proportionality was concerning.  In his written evidence, he observed that ‘under 
the UK regime, almost all jurisprudence about interception and communications 
data takes place within the cranium of the IoCC, and almost nowhere else’ (p.100).  
                                                          
171 SPoCs are responsible for assessing the application for communications data and, if satisfactory, 
passing this to the DSO for authorisation. If the application is granted, the SPoC submits the request, 
obtains the data from the CSP and passes them to the investigatory team. Within the police force, 
SPoCs must be of a certain rank or higher; Inspector for subscriber data and Superintendent for service 
user and traffic data.  In other public authorities the equivalent rank must be held, which can 
sometimes be the reason for procedural errors, i.e., the proper rank for authorisation can be 
misunderstood. Serious instances of wilful and fraudulent attempts to obtain communications data are 
criminalised under various Acts. 
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Citing the IoCC, Mr Bowden highlighted that necessity entails making the link 
‘between the crime/offence…the suspect, victim or witness; and the 
phone/communications address’172.  Proportionality meanwhile rests upon ‘the 
benefit the data will give the investigation’, the relevance of the time period 
requested, whether less intrusive methods are possible and why any collateral 
intrusion into individuals’ privacy is justified.  The problem is that this does not 
provide contextual examples of what is and is not necessary and proportionate: 
‘How many people's data can be accessed to investigate what types of crime, 
what happens to that data subsequently, especially if something unexpected is 
found? Can a request be widened if nothing is found initially? Is anything done 
systematically to detect attempts at fishing expeditions? What is the policy on 
disclosure of communications data access to defense counsel? There is no 
published policy on any of these matters.’ (Caspar Bowden – Advocacy/Non-
Profit, CDB Written Evidence, p.101) 
Elsewhere in the evidence, this issue was returned to: 
‘…it is still not clear to me what criteria SPOCs use to determine what is 
necessary and proportionate. Indeed, it is not clear what criteria the 
Interception Commissioner uses, despite his evidence…in his evidence, said he 
does not have any difficulty deciding which is which, and I suggest this means 
that all SPOCs are somehow operating with some sort of magical sense of pre-
established harmony, which I find rather hard to believe. I would like to know 
concretely what is considered necessary and proportionate.’ (Caspar Bowden – 
Advocacy/Non-Profit, CDB Oral Evidence, p.372) 
For the Executive Director of Privacy International, SPoCs – while valued for their 
training and skills – were not sufficiently independent arbiters of necessity and 
proportionality.  Instead a warrant system was favoured, his reason for this echoing 
the discussion in section 6.4. 
‘One opportunity for this Committee is to start having a debate about why is it 
we protect communications content to such a degree but not highly invasive 
data-minable communications data and why are they any different? I believe 
once we start having that debate, we will start asking why is it we require a 
warrant for content but not for communications? (Dr Hosein – Advocacy/Non-
Profit, CDB Oral Evidence, p.372) 
For both Dr Hosein and Mr Bowden, the independence required to satisfactorily 
oversee the authorisation process resided with magistrates – echoing the earlier 
                                                          
172 Necessity also relies upon demonstrating the use of the data fits with one of the purposes listed in 
footnote 150. 
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remarks of Brown (2010)173 – although there was concern that they lacked the 
specific training needed. 
6.7.2 VULNERABILITY 
Aside from formal oversight mechanisms, the other pertinent issue here is the 
vulnerability of data.  Vulnerability covers a broad spectrum of risks from technical 
weaknesses to human error including database security, hacking, commercial 
pressures to monetise data (alluded to above), and theft and data loss.  Due to the 
high profile and newsworthiness of hacker groups such as Anonymous and the loss 
of confidential public records by public authorities, it is unsurprising that these 
vulnerabilities were picked out by a large number of respondents – particularly 
individuals/non-experts.  The CTO of Timico, too, voiced his concern about these 
potential pitfalls. 
‘OK, so you put this big system in place…and you’re gathering information, lots 
of diverse information about everything, about a person’s online activity and 
keeping it somewhere which you are saying is very secure and which will be 
very carefully managed and access to it will be very carefully monitored etc., 
but since we’ve started talking about the Draft Comms Data Bill, I’ve started 
asking taxi drivers how often they find laptops left in the back of their cabs and 
out of the last taxi drivers I’ve asked, two have said “never, although I find a lot 
of phones” and three of them said they’d had eight laptops left, one had five 
laptops over a period of four to five years…so you have all this evidence about 
laptops stolen from GCHQ, laptops lost by civil servants, you know you hear 
about them in the news periodically about someone’s left their entire national 
health records on a train or something like that and, you know, that will happen 
and on top of that once this system is in place it will become a target for 
hackers wanting to show that they can actually access this information and just 
like we had 6.5 million LinkedIn passwords published on a website in Russia, it 
will happen.’ 
The logical counterbalance to the problems highlighted in this extract is not to 
collect and retain communications data on this scale.  Certainly this was the 
foundation of many of the critiques of the Bill.  It was the same criticism levelled at 
the proposals for the IMP in 2009 in respect of a centralised government database, 
which can perhaps help explain the shift to a distributed/federated database model 
in 2012.  This could be read as an attempt to give ownership of the vulnerability 
‘problem’ to CSPs, thus both deflecting concern about privileged access to 
communications data and trying to ensure that data were held by those with the 
                                                          
173 See section 6.4.3 
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technical capacities to do securely (and cheaply).  However, as Dr Paul Bernal rightly 
pointed out (CDB Written Evidence, p.58), even sophisticated computing systems 
are vulnerable to attack; in 2011, Sony’s online gaming platform the PlayStation 
Network was hacked, resulting in the disclosure of millions of users’ passwords and 
credit card numbers174. 
While a distributed, federated database circumvents the problem of having all data 
accessible in one place, security as a result does not logically follow.  This approach 
simply means there are multiple access points that are vulnerable to attack and 
more opportunities for human error in data handling across differently operated 
systems.  Moreover, it does nothing to counter fears of data loss once they are 
passed to public authorities. 
To an extent, these are problems that will have to be tolerated.  Data exist and no 
security system is infallible.  The variable factor, however, is the extent to which data 
exist and this was the crux of the debate surrounding the CDB.  The Bill was 
described as a step-change in surveillance practice; not only one in which the 
mediation of surveillance was formalised to a greater extent but one that moved 
away from a ‘traditional’ model of targeted surveillance towards one of blanket 
surveillance – retention of data ‘just in case’.  Caspar Bowden described this as the 
dichotomy between data preservation and data retention and while this is an apt 
description of trends in communications surveillance, it has wider resonance for 
society. 
‘…because of exponentially falling data storage costs, in the long run two 
contrasting states of society can be envisaged. Subject to exceptions, the 
default must be either that individuals determine whether and when their 
history is recorded, or data will exist about everyone all the time. At some point 
in the future, most people will understand the reality of “dataveillance” and the 
loss of associated freedoms.’ (Caspar Bowden – Advocacy/Non-Profit, CDB 
Written Evidence, p.86, emphasis in original) 
 
 
                                                          
174 See Halliday (2013). 
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6.8 SURVEILLANCE AND RESISTANCE PART 2: LESSONS FROM 
REGULATION 
6.8.1 UNCERTAINTY AND AMBIGUITY 
The question of how to ‘do security’ online is a troubling one for government.  
Evidently there is a pressing need.  The Internet presents a bewildering array of 
opportunities for criminals to communicate and carry out their activities.  However, 
we have seen that need is only one side of the coin.  It is counterbalanced by 
proportionality and by most accounts the CDB represented a disproportionate 
extension of digital surveillance capabilities.  Government perceived the necessity of 
keeping pace with technological change, to bridge a capability gap that emerged as 
the development of communication technology outstripped that of surveillance 
capacities.  However, the findings here show that uncertainty plagues this field.  
What are the risks presented by technological developments in communication?  
What data are needed?  Who has – or should have – the power and responsibility to 
conduct this surveillance?  What are the impacts of surveillance on subjects?  How 
will data be kept safe and by whom?  The ethos behind the CDB was very much 
‘more data is better’ but there appeared a corresponding lack of acknowledgment of 
what this drive towards blanket surveillance and data retention would entail and 
what impact it would have on individual citizens. 
The Internet domain is an ambiguous one in this context; the threat posed can be 
misunderstood (or even unknown in the case of ‘future-proofing’ the Bill against as 
yet non-existent dangers) and attempts to implement security measures such as 
expansive capacities for data retention can produce unintended effects.  These 
effects can include the sort of resistance to surveillance legislation demonstrated in 
this chapter or the circumvention of measures put in place, which produces a 
repetitive cycle of action and reaction (Marx 2009; Innes and Levi 2012).  This 
argument is picked up by Harvey Molotch (2012).  Analysing several ‘sites of 
ambiguous danger’ Molotch contends that top-down security should be avoided and 
in its place flexibility and responsibility given to those ‘on the ground’ who are better 
suited to understanding and responding to the reality of risk environments.  Turning 
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to the case of the government’s attempted Bill, however, there is a case for both 
sides of this argument. 
First, the government did not plan to solely wield the powers of the Bill.  The 
discussion comes back to this momentarily but the mediation of surveillance – 
empowering CSPs to collect and retain communications data – is a step towards 
allowing those who are best placed to do the job of security.  Zittrain (2003) calls 
CSPs natural ‘points of control’ on the Internet.  Mediation of this sort is, therefore, 
instrumental and more than a little shrewd, but it can help avoid the criticisms of 
top-down, heavy-handed, centralised methods of control that Molotch (2012) 
outlines.  Moreover, the desire to future-proof the Bill is reminiscent of Molotch’s 
suggestion that security measures should ‘leverage redesign’ (2012: 218-19).  That 
is, they should serve multiple purposes and focus on wider, long-term goals. 
The second side to the argument countermands this.  The reality is that CSPs would 
not have been given any flexibility, being compelled to collect and retain whatever 
data the government instructed.  As Molotch predicts – and as the findings are 
testament to – the implementation of the powers in the CDB would ignore many 
side-effects; the revelation of personal information from communication data, the 
obfuscation of existing regulation, the vulnerability of data and the infringement of 
civil liberties.  Doing this runs contrary to what Molotch describes as the ‘default to 
decency’; when presented with a risky situation or environment to regulate, the 
approach should be that which preserves the rights of individuals and groups.  
Contrary to this, Clark (2014) notes how states are resorting to deception to 
persuade the public of the need for mass surveillance.  This is the paradox alluded to 
previously.  Security is about protecting freedoms and liberties.  If these goals can be 
better met by not implementing a surveillance regime like the CDB, surely that is the 
right solution.  It is a question of necessity and proportionality. 
6.8.2 MEDIATED SURVEILLANCE 
The ‘central plank’ of the CDB was a collaborative relationship between government 
and CSPs, both in the UK and overseas.  Elements of this have surfaced throughout 
the discussion.  ‘Mediation’ emerges as the mechanism by which the government 
attempted to implement a digital surveillance regime in pursuit of a wider crime 
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prevention and security agenda.  There is already excellent work done on the topic 
of mediated surveillance by Bright and Agustina (2013).  Their three hypotheses of 
mediated surveillance state that 1) it occurs in situations where institutions have 
incomplete power or information, 2) a significant degree of coercion is required to 
mediate surveillance, and 3) mediation has significant consequences for the 
effectiveness with which surveillance is carried out, including the opportunity for 
circumvention by the surveilled (2013: 123).  The findings presented here are 
consistent with at least the first two of these hypotheses.  The first is shown by the 
identified ‘capability gap’ and the tacit acknowledgement that CSPs are in the best 
position as ‘points of control’ to remedy this.  The second is evidenced by the fact 
that the Bill mandated CSPs to retain CD – there would have been little scope for 
negotiation175. 
‘I think we really do have to recognise the step change here, from a position 
where companies keep information for their own commercial purposes to a 
situation where we are effectively contracting out responsibility for keeping 
records on the entire population for future law enforcement purposes.’ (Rachel 
Robinson – Advocacy/Non-Profit, CDB Oral Evidence, p.91)  
It is likely the third hypothesis would play out, although that is of course only 
conjecture.  However, given the frequent argument that criminals would find a way 
to bypass the measures, we can presume this would be the case.  We can also look 
at mediation more broadly.  While CSPs are the locus of mediation, other individuals 
and authorities are implicated in the process; SPoCs, DSOs and the IoCC. 
Mediation can be understood as a problem-solving exercise in surveillance.  It 
provides some of the answers to the uncertainty faced by government and is 
simultaneously a means of allaying fears.  The abandonment of the centralised 
database, for example, is suggestive of this.  However, mediation presents its own 
challenges when we factor in jurisdictionality.  It does not seem to be the case that 
devolving responsibility or co-opting the riches of the private sector is a panacea.  
Third-party data remains elusive – at least in the way the UK government envisaged. 
As suggested above, mediation is also closely tied to theoretical work on 
assemblages.  In the context of this case study we have on the one hand a 
multiplicity of organisations, institutions and individuals engaged in the activity of 
                                                          
175 By passing DRIP in 2014, this is essentially what Parliament achieved. 
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surveilling one another (usually in unequal measure).  On the other hand we have a 
multi-actor network that is engaged in resisting surveillance (see Martin et al. 2009 
and Chapter Five), the possibilities for which are enlarged by the very process of 
mediation (Bright and Agustina 2013: 132).  All of these actors help to constitute a 
surveillance assemblage.  As well as permitting the rhizomatic operation of 
surveillance systems across society, this assemblage is continually engaged in the 
process of negotiating surveillance in new environments.  Recent contributions to 
the wider literature on risk regulation are instructive here.  Hutter and Lloyd-Bostock 
(2013) for example discuss how an array of interest groups becomes involved in 
defining risk expectations and shaping regulatory responses.  Two extracts from this 
discussion resonate with this case study.  They note that ‘the central justification of 
regulation is that it controls undesirable risk and it is embedded in socio-cultural and 
political risk environments which are in the business of managing feelings of 
vulnerability and demands for security’ (2013: 398, emphasis added).  Risk, growing 
from an inadequate surveillance capability in the midst of technological change, was 
the justification of the CDB.  However the proposals in the Bill had the unintended 
effect that ‘regulation came to be framed as itself a source of risk’ (Hutter and Lloyd-
Bostock 2013: 400).  A final lesson from the authors is picked up in the next chapter; 
that such a flurry of regulatory activity emerges at times of crisis. 
6.8.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown a specific instance of the interaction between digital 
surveillance and resistance.  The setting for this has been the regulatory arena.  
Consequently, the nature of the resistance seen is not of the ‘technological fix’ 
variety (Dupont 2008; see also Marx 2003) – the deliberate evasion or neutralisation 
of a specific digital surveillance technology.  Rather it is a collective process of 
constructing counter-arguments to the proposed regulation of surveillance and 
attempts to have resistance codified in law176.  Sometimes this is through 
cooperation between individuals and groups and other times as a result of individual 
                                                          
176 This is a process (and an opportunity) that has continued since the fieldwork was conducted.  The 
Investigatory Powers Bill (2015) underwent a similar process of consultation and, given it appears to be 
progressing towards enactment, represents a milestone for codification of some the principles being 
advocated by privacy campaigners – however small the government’s concession on these may 
ultimately be. 
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efforts.  Particularly in the case of individual/non-expert respondents and advocacy 
groups, this was an instance of putting ‘information politics’ (Bennett 2008) into 
practice.  The chapter has also shown a key feature of digital surveillance in the 
information society; that it is framed by complex regulatory practice, a necessity 
given the favoured approach of ‘mediating’ surveillance.  Regulation and digital 
surveillance are increasingly intertwined and consequently regulation generates 
specific effects of resistance that impact the nature of surveillance. 
The case study of the CDB contributes to guiding narrative of the thesis.  In 
particular, it provides a great amount of detail as to why individuals and groups 
choose to resist digital surveillance (research question two).  These include: the 
‘intrusion fallacy’ (that communications data can be just as revealing as content); 
problems relating to the jurisdiction in which data are collected and transmitted (in 
particular with overseas/third-party data); the potential for function creep inherent 
in surveillance legislation, and; inadequate oversight and security mechanisms.  The 
chapter has also fleshed out the relationship between digital surveillance and 
resistance (research question one) by illustrating a specific instance of this 
relationship.  Last, there are implications for understanding contemporary social 
control (research question three) that are informed by the focus on both regulation 
and surveillance.  Centralising and decentralising impulses discussed earlier are one 
important theme here and this is returned to in Chapter Eight. 
Regulation and surveillance are modes of social control that are intrinsically 
connected.  In combination they dictate much of the national surveillance 
experience, whether this surveillance is political or economic.  Despite this, there is 
typically little opportunity for nodes beyond the public and private sector to 
participate formally in the process of shaping the regulation that governs how they 
are surveilled.  The consultation on the CDB accommodated this and, from a 
research perspective, offered valuable insights into the types of issues that were 
negotiated and contested between the various groups involved. 
Acknowledging the wealth of data held by private CSPs, the ‘central plank’ of the 
CDB was collaboration between government and these organisations.  From the 
data, this relationship appeared to be a tense one.  Although some CSPs supported 
the rationale behind the CDB and some of its proposals, the issue of allowing the law 
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enforcement to request third-party data was rejected unanimously on both 
technical and jurisdictional grounds. 
Being alert to the changing nature of the public-private relationship is also necessary 
for developing an understanding of contemporary social control.  Cohen (1985) 
discusses various characteristics associated with privatisation of control.  He 
observes that ‘huge areas of public life previously under state control are now in the 
hands of private corporations’ (1985: 67).  This remains applicable in the information 
society.  A broader debate the CDB thus speaks to in the context of this thesis is one 
of ownership and control of the virtual spaces of the Internet.  The CDB is only one 
example yet it continues a trend177 of increasing regulatory activity by the state that 
attempts to responsibilise (see Stenning 2000), private corporations to create, 
maintain and enforce social order online. 
All of this helps to clarify the nature of resistance at the level of regulation.  In the 
previous chapter, the constitution of the advocacy community online revealed the 
potential for the geographically dispersed community to quickly respond to real 
world ‘surveillance events’.  The CDB was one such event and the consultation 
revealed the participation of several prominent nodes from the network of privacy 
advocates.  Alongside these, many others emerged who partook in negotiating 
what, in the context of digital surveillance, is necessary and proportionate.  This 
shows the broader constitution of the network of governing nodes that contribute 
to the framing of surveillance issues.  The categorisation of respondents outlined at 
the start of the chapter helps to indicate how each of these groups constructed their 
responses around certain themes.  Some categories primarily addressed specific 
issues, while others spoke more broadly to an array of concerns.  Drawing out these 
patterns reinforces the multi-actor character of resistance (Martin et al. 2009) and 
counter-resistance at the level of regulation178. 
Much of this chapter has demonstrated the truth in the assertion that ‘the law has 
failed to keep pace with the ever more sophisticated surveillance techniques 
available…’ (Akdeniz et al. 2001: 19).  The government would argue slightly 
                                                          
177 For instance, see Chapter Three and also the earlier discussion in this chapter of Lessig’s (1999) 
contributions on ‘East Coast’ versus ‘West Coast’ code. 
178 See Appendix H for a summary of these positions. 
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differently; that the law has failed to keep pace with risks posed by new technology.  
The underlying assumption is the same: effective regulation is the favoured way to 
manage the various risks posed by technology.  The trend, as Vogel (2012) has 
argued, is that regulation in Europe has become increasingly precautionary.  In the 
context of regulating digital surveillance, measures are justified on the basis of 
protection from known and unknown threats arising from a new communication 
environment.  Blanket surveillance, as opposed to court-sanctioned, targeted 
surveillance (Brown 2010) indicates this preference for precaution.  However, the 
context of digital surveillance challenges Vogel’s (2012) claim that while precaution 
characterises European regulation the US has shifted towards evidence-based 
approaches.  Pursuing an agenda against terrorism on each side of the Atlantic, both 
the UK and US governments have sought to pre-emptively harvest and retain 
enormous quantities of Internet traffic data for subsequent analysis by intelligence 
agencies.  Yet, these developments problematise the study of regulation because 
the activities of the intelligence agencies have been, for the most part, unregulated 
or at the very least, subject to little oversight and accountability. 
Regulation (of digital surveillance) is highly relevant facet of social control. This case 
study showed an attempt at regulating digital surveillance that was reflective of 
neither the contemporary technological environment, nor people’s concerns about 
communications data.  The rapidly changing and diverse nature of digital 
communications means that such attempts to regulate the environment for the 
purposes of crime prevention are lacking in precision and are resultantly resisted for 
the dangers such ill-conceived attempts represent.  Running counter to the ‘default 
to decency’ (Molotch 2012) like this will likely engender more resistance in future. 
This produces a new regulatory dilemma.  Surveillance infrastructures must be 
regulated according to the same principle that regulation like the CDB attempted to 
fulfil in the first place; protection of the public against threats to civil liberties.  The 
current ‘state of exception’ (Agamben 2005) has resulted in the need to regulate 
against the types of protective measures that were designed in the first place.  Trust 
and public consent are vital; the social order we are trying to preserve should not be 
undermined by the very surveillance and regulation that aims to protect it. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
NEWS AND NEW MEDIA: THE LEGACY OF THE 
CYPHERPUNKS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This is the final substantive empirical chapter of the thesis.  It examines the symbolic 
and communicative aspects of the relationship between digital surveillance and 
resistance.  To do this, the chapter focuses on two instances of ‘resistive 
surveillance’: new media platform WikiLeaks and the later revelations about mass 
surveillance from Edward Snowden.  The WikiLeaks case illuminates one element of 
the surveillance/resistance relationship – how resistance to digital surveillance (i.e. 
resistive surveillance) capitalises on the potential inherent in the socio-technical 
medium of the Internet.  This constitutes the first half of the chapter and is informed 
by qualitative data from the interview with Daniel (a co-founder of WikiLeaks) 
supplemented by secondary data from interviews and documentaries about Julian 
Assange and WikiLeaks. 
The WikiLeaks case, in combination with the case of Snowden, also shows how 
resistive surveillance is met with counter-resistance efforts.  These efforts are 
represented in the second half of the chapter by analysis of reporting in the news 
media.  To make sense of the series of claims and counter-claims made about 
surveillance and resistive surveillance the concept of moral panic is used as an 
analytical framework.  Doing so allows for a discussion concerning the construction 
of social problems and moral panics in the context of surveillance and resistive 
surveillance.  In closing, the chapter takes a broader look at the implications of this 
recent history of public discourse around digital surveillance for understanding the 
role of the media in the relationship between digital surveillance and resistance. 
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7.1.1 ON SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND MORAL PANIC 
The closely related issues of social problems and moral panics share a foundation in 
social constructionism.  This approach focuses on the ways different groups attempt 
to define certain acts, practices or issues as problematic for society and in need of a 
response.  However, defining a problem is far from straightforward.  It brings social 
actors into conflict with one another, as each try to impose their version of events as 
the ‘true’ account, whether that it is ‘the problem has been caused by the failings of 
this group’, ‘there is no problem’, ‘there is a problem, but it is not the way it has 
been portrayed’ or ‘ the problem is not as bad as it seems and can be justified’ 
(Cohen 2002: xli).  Moral panics, characterised by the exaggeration of a threat to the 
social order, are an example a very specific form of societal reaction to the 
construction of a problem.  This occurs most often with the assistance of mass 
media reporting:   
‘The student of moral enterprise cannot but pay particular attention to the role 
of the mass media in defining and shaping social problems.’ (Cohen 1972: 16) 
Constructing a problem does not require the existence of a moral panic.  Moral 
panic, on the other hand, is an example of the construction of a social problem but 
to label it a ‘panic’ is to draw attention to the disproportionate reaction it receives.  
Related to this are questions of why this issue has been reported in the way it has, 
whose purposes the panic appears to favour and why some (trivial) issues generate 
such a response while other (catastrophic) issues do not.  Moral panics are 
‘condensed political struggles’ and exploring them ‘allows us to identify and 
conceptualise the lines of power in any society’ (Cohen 2002: xliv).  Key to swaying 
people’s perception of a problem, then, is control over information and this chapter 
illustrates two aspects of this: news media reporting, and the ability to access and 
make public confidential information. 
These issues resonate with a study of surveillance and resistance.  In fact, much of 
what this thesis has shown so far could be incorporated into a study of, if not moral 
panic, then certainly the construction of social problems.  The Communications Data 
Bill is a good example of this.  The oral and written evidence quite obviously 
illustrate claims and counter-claims regarding the necessity and proportionality of 
digital surveillance.  But resistance to surveillance in its widest terms also 
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exemplifies the efforts to which individuals and groups go to construct surveillance 
practices as dangerous, or as a risk to personal privacy and civil liberties. 
‘Information politics’, the favoured strategy employed by the privacy advocates from 
Chapter Five, is further evidence of on-going claims-making about such risks. 
Risk and moral panic share some of the same conceptual ground.  Risk 
(incorporating both information about objective threats and the ways to respond to 
them) has colonised some of the sociological space once occupied by moral panic 
(Cohen 2002).  It has produced a reflexive and more technical way of identifying 
problems and how to deal with them; however, statements about risk can still 
devolve into moral judgements, for instance regarding the integrity of ‘experts’ or 
the proportionality of the proposed solutions (Cohen 2002: xxx-xxxi).  Surveillance, 
for instance, is promoted as a technological solution to the insecurities arising from 
increased crime rates or the risk of terror attacks (Ceyhan 2008).  However, when 
surveillance extends to the indiscriminate bulk collection of digitised personal data, 
moral judgements arise regarding invasion of privacy, trust in those who collect and 
retain the data and the transparency of regulation that permits such practices.  
Some of this will sound familiar.  These themes continue in this chapter, where we 
see repeated instances of surveillance practices being forcibly opened to scrutiny to 
construct them as problematic and risky.  The counter-claims are evidenced too: 
that revealing confidential information about the state and about surveillance 
systems increases the risks they are intended to protect.  WikiLeaks, Julian Assange 
and Edward Snowden were vilified and celebrated in equal measure.  The events 
described in this chapter from 2007 are thus an effective backdrop to explore the 
shifting relationship between digital surveillance and resistance. 
The framework of moral panic and social problems, then, guides the analysis of the 
empirical data.  However, the chapter is not so much concerned with proclaiming 
the existence (or not) of a moral panic about digital or resistive surveillance.  
Instead, it uses some of the lessons of this framework to illuminate the presentation 
of troubling individuals and groups in the news media, the patterns of reporting on 
these over time, and the consequences of these for public consciousness and 
concern about digital surveillance.  In that respect, this chapter picks up an 
important point from Chapter Five regarding the presence of news media in online 
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networks of privacy advocates and their ability to retain their power by occupying 
online spaces as well as ‘offline’. 
Cohen (1972) emphasised how he paid correspondingly less attention to the ‘folk 
devils’ than to the social reaction that followed.  This chapter aims for more balance.  
Using the qualitative data it first describes and characterises WikiLeaks to ‘set the 
scene’ for what follows.  Not only does this highlight why WikiLeaks were 
susceptible to negative constructions in the news media, it also shows how they 
were capable of their actions – and consequently, why they were the target of 
counter-resistance.  The second half of the chapter charts the changes in patterns 
and tone of reporting on WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden in news media reporting 
to illustrate the competing claims-making about digital surveillance and resistive 
surveillance. 
7.2 WIKILEAKS 
Whistleblowing is a long-standing form of resistance; the circumventing of control 
measures to bring confidential information of perceived interest into the public 
domain (Conway 1977; Vandekerckhove 2006).  In 2010, however, it found new 
currency with the emergence of a novel, online media platform: WikiLeaks 
(Greenberg 2012; Brevini et al. 2013).  Built on a foundation of sophisticated 
encryption, WikiLeaks was able to encourage whistleblowers to reveal sensitive 
information.  Exploiting the architecture of the Internet, they could consequently 
publish it without fear of reprisal.  WikiLeaks actively sought evidence of censorship 
for ‘while it is something to condemn, it is always an optimistic signal, it is always an 
opportunity, because censorship reveals the fear of reform by knowledge’ (Julian 
Assange, WikiLeaks: Secrets and Lies). 
WikiLeaks is associated most prominently with a series of leaked military and 
diplomatic communications.  A brief history of WikiLeaks is presented below.  
However, before this a caveat is added to put the organisation into context.  A large 
amount of WikiLeaks’ publications were not the result of leaked information.  
WikiLeaks identifies itself as an investigative, journalistic, not-for-profit media 
organisation.  To that end it publishes information that it believes is in the public 
interest but this is not, therefore, solely reliant upon whistleblowers.  While the 
190 
 
whistleblowing aspect of WikiLeaks is important, the story presented here 
necessarily focuses on publications that were also the result of investigative efforts 
on the part of WikiLeaks and its ad hoc collaborators. 
WikiLeaks (and more recent instances of whistleblowing) is helpful for developing 
our understanding of the relationship between surveillance and resistance.  On the 
face of it there are obvious reasons why this could be: some of WikiLeaks’ 
publications and all of those released by Edward Snowden pertain to various aspects 
of the surveillance complex.  But this analysis aims to provide a more comprehensive 
account, drawing on the work of Cohen (1972) and also the concepts outlined in 
Chapter Three – sousveillance and the synopticon, broadly captured under the term 
resistive surveillance.  Resistive surveillance, then, points to the ways that digital 
technologies are used to surveill those in authority and make their actions, and by 
extension surveillance practices, more visible to the surveilled. 
7.2.1 A WHISTLE-STOP TOUR OF WIKILEAKS AND WHISTLE-BLOWING 
WikiLeaks emerged in the public sphere slowly.  The data below show that 
throughout the three-year period from 2007 to 2009, reports of WikiLeaks in UK 
publications were low-level and sporadic.  Published leaks varied in style: political 
corruption in Kenya (‘The Kroll Report’), financial malpractice by Swiss bank Julius 
Baer, the contents of US state governor Sarah Palin’s emails and operational 
handbooks and documents from the Church of Scientology.  In 2010, WikiLeaks 
arrived fully on the media stage.  Collateral Murder179 – video footage shot from an 
Apache helicopter in Iraq that showed the death of a number of civilians and two 
Reuters journalists – was released in April, followed by the publication of the Afghan 
War Diary180 in July; 91,000 classified US military reports.  Media impact increased 
further in October with the subsequent publication of the Iraq War Logs181, at the 
time the largest release of classified military information (391,832 reports), followed 
by the Cablegate182 incident in December; 251,287183 US diplomatic cables, detailing 
correspondence between 274 US embassies and the State Department from 1966 to 
                                                          
179 http://www.collateralmurder.com/ 
180 https://wikileaks.org/wiki/Afghan_War_Diary,_2004-2010 
181 https://www.wikileaks.org/irq/ 
182 https://wikileaks.org/cablegate.html 
183 According to WikiLeaks (2013), 15,652 of these cables were classified as ‘secret’. 
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2010.  The ‘Arab Spring’ events of 2011 were partly attributed to the corruption 
revealed by the release of the diplomatic cables (see Walker 2011). 
Subsequent leaks did not generate the same level of media impact in the UK.  April 
2011 saw the publication of files relating to detainees at Guantanamo Bay and in 
September of that year attention returned to the diplomatic cables; WikiLeaks 
released the full archive of the cables without redactions that had been used to 
protect sources when the cables were initially released via media partners in 2010.  
At the end of 2011 and in early 2012 WikiLeaks released a series of related 
documents entitled The Spy Files184 and the Global Intelligence Files185.  The former 
detailed the international trade in surveillance technologies and saw WikiLeaks 
partner with several organisations including Privacy International.  The latter 
consisted of over five million emails from US intelligence contractor Stratfor.  These 
emails had been hacked by Anonymous and were used by WikiLeaks to demonstrate 
the ‘inner workings…web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering 
techniques and psychological methods’ (WikiLeaks 2014) of an intelligence firm that 
WikiLeaks alleged were employed by the US government to discredit their 
organisation (see Ball 2012) – just one instance of counter-resistance. 
As the analysis below outlines, throughout 2012 the attention directed at WikiLeaks 
was a product of Editor-in-Chief Julian Assange’s legal battle against extradition to 
Sweden from the UK.  The failure of this culminated in his taking residency inside the 
Ecuadorian Embassy in London in June 2012 (where he was subsequently granted 
asylum) and where he remains to date, nearly four years later.  In the interim, 
WikiLeaks have retained an offline and online (including social media) presence but 
any published leaks have failed to generate the type of impact seen in 2010.  With 
the publication of Edward Snowden’s revelations in June 2013, WikiLeaks enjoyed 
some renewed media attention (despite not being involved in publication).  
However this remained at a lower level than that seen in 2010.  Likewise, Edward 
Snowden, the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ) have all fuelled more media speculation in the intervening 18 
months than WikiLeaks. 
                                                          
184 https://www.wikileaks.org/the-spyfiles.html 
185 https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/ 
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In sum it is worth noting a few key points.  WikiLeaks use sophisticated encryption 
methods to protect the anonymity of their sources and they have never publicly 
revealed the identity of any whistleblowers.  They have presented themselves 
throughout as an investigative journalistic platform committed to motives of press 
freedom and democracy, transparency and accountability in government.  Over 
time, there has been a noticeable shift from a very ‘broad brush’ approach to a 
much more anti-US agenda in published information.  Lastly, WikiLeaks have never 
been successfully subjected to censorship or termination of service. 
7.2.2 TECHNOLOGY, JURISDICTION AND RESILIENCE 
There are both social and technological aspects of the WikiLeaks phenomenon.  
These help to describe the operability of WikiLeaks and also reintroduce the 
centralisation/decentralisation concept from the previous chapter.  The 
technological foundations of WikiLeaks are a logical starting point for analysis.  
Cryptography and code have always been the heart of the subversive culture of 
hackers, activists and cypherpunks.  Greenberg (2012) tells the story of this culture 
as it grew throughout the last few decades and, importantly, the role of advances in 
encryption as a driving force behind online anti-authoritarian activism – resulting 
most recently in WikiLeaks.  The keystone of WikiLeaks’ capabilities was encryption 
designed to protect the anonymity of whistleblowers and thereby encourage them 
to leak information that might otherwise remain private.  It is this that is largely 
responsible for the impact WikiLeaks had.  For Daniel, this was part of his motivation 
for the project, as he said in interview: 
‘…you have whistleblowers that are speaking out but there are not enough of 
these people so the idea was how do you, how do you, maximise this potential, 
how do you get the most out of it? And as such WikiLeaks was set out to 
provide an avenue on the Internet that is, that has a much lower barrier than 
anything else…classical ways that whistleblowers can use have quite a high 
barrier that one has to overcome and WikiLeaks’ idea was to provide a barrier 
that was very low, that with three clicks you’re done you know and the 
anonymity is part of the concept you don’t have to worry about that and the 
question was if that was provided can we maximise the potential we have for 
whistleblowers, can we encourage more people? And that was at least for me, 
what this was always about – finding out if there was a potential and if so, tap 
into this potential.’ (Daniel Domscheit-Berg) 
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By facilitating the ease with which whistleblowers could submit information and 
allaying fears of identification, WikiLeaks harnessed the potential of the distributed 
architecture of the Internet (see Galloway 2004186).  Thus enabled, WikiLeaks acted 
as both sword and shield in respect of privacy; by leveraging confidential 
information they could undermine institutional secrecy while at the same time 
protecting the privacy of its sources.  On another level there is a broader message 
here: online technology can be actively used to not surveill people (i.e. 
whistleblowers).  It was not the case that WikiLeaks protected the identity of known 
sources.  Rather, the cryptographic mechanisms ensured they could not know who 
the sources were.  There is an interesting parallel in that respect with a Foucauldian 
reading of surveillance, namely that the initial (resistive) surveillance agent (the 
whistleblower) remains hidden from sight.  This adds a different quality to resistive 
surveillance than ‘information politics’ seen earlier where resistance comes from 
known sources. 
Coupled with this, there were techno-legal mechanisms employed by WikiLeaks that 
help to explain its resilience.  As Julian Assange described in a TED interview in 2010: 
‘we use this state-of-the-art encryption to bounce stuff around the Internet, to 
hide trails, pass it through legal jurisdictions like Sweden and Belgium to enact 
those legal protections.’ 
WikiLeaks located servers around the world to facilitate this global transfer of 
information.  This took advantage of the legal protections that passing virtual 
information through a jurisdiction invokes.  Jurisdictionality, as the previous chapter 
indicated, is an important component in understanding contemporary digital 
surveillance and resistance.  This also permitted WikiLeaks to host ‘mirror’ 
(duplicate) websites.  Should one website be targeted by an injunction (as it was in 
February 2008 following the Julius Baer incident), the service can still be accessed 
via the Internet as traffic is routed to another of the duplicates hosted elsewhere.  
Combined, these technological and techno-legal aspects were the operational 
foundation of WikiLeaks.  They illustrate why WikiLeaks is an exemplar of resistance 
in the digital environment and the potential of digital technology to generate new 
                                                          
186 That is to say, they exploited the way in which is the Internet is regulated or coded (Lessig 1999) in 
order for it to operate effectively for subversive purposes. 
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and resilient forms of resistance.  The point was made in Chapter Three that 
counter-resistance can only for a short time debilitate such efforts. 
On an organisational level, WikiLeaks made use of a decentralised network form to 
great effect; centralising the organisation would have made counter-resistance a 
much easier prospect.  With WikiLeaks, we are presented with a form of resistance 
that has arisen out of a specific set of technical (as well as social and cultural) 
circumstances.  Decentralisation is not necessarily the way online resistance has to 
happen; but it is the way that is most effective within the architecture of the 
Internet as it currently stands187.  As Lessig (1999: 30) says, ‘the possible 
architectures of cyberspace are many.’  It stands to reason that the possible 
architectures of resistance are equally numerous. 
Despite the preference for – and the necessity of – a decentralised model in 
technical terms, centralisation was still required by WikiLeaks to some extent.  
Setting WikiLeaks up as the ‘gold standard’ of whistleblowing and source protection 
was a logical precursor to centralisation of information.  WikiLeaks had to remain in 
control of all information received or their guarantee of protection for 
whistleblowers would be undermined.  However, this is where a tension emerged.  
WikiLeaks’ mission statement – ‘we open governments’ – was constructed in the 
pursuit of transparency and accountability and as this brief history of WikiLeaks 
depicts, this expanded to many corporate institutions and organisations.  WikiLeaks’ 
strict control of leaked information, while somewhat necessary, ran counter to this.  
By attempting to restrict mainstream media access to this information, and using 
their own privileged access to release un-redacted material, tensions grew between 
WikiLeaks and their media partners.  The technical aspect of control over 
information thereby begins to overlap with social and organisational aspects of 
WikiLeaks. 
Much of what has been said here overlaps with the centralising/decentralising dyad 
introduced in Chapter Six.  The two themes discussed there (Internet architecture 
and information/services) are also evidenced here.  A third theme emerged from 
what Daniel had to say about centralisation and decentralisation as organisational 
                                                          
187 Recall the discussion in Chapter Five regarding the mobilising potential of a flexible, distributed 
network of advocacy groups. 
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principles; specifically that decentralising information flows is a preferable strategy. 
Daniel saw decentralisation as the preferred means of communicating leaked 
information, i.e., in opposition to the way in which WikiLeaks operated.  Daniel’s 
vision for an organisation of this kind was that it should strive for neutrality, acting 
as an intermediary between whistleblowers and a variety of actors – such as news 
media, advocacy groups and NGOs – who could use the information for different 
purposes and reach a broader audience. 
‘I think it’s a question of how centralised this whole network is. In this chain of 
how information flows you know, somewhere there is information and then on 
the other end very far away there are these people that actually should care 
about the information. Now let’s say the information, I don’t know, is a 180-
page military document, then all these people cannot have access to that 
because even if they would read it they probably wouldn’t understand it, they’d 
be bored as hell after five pages and they wouldn’t look it into it any further, 
they wouldn’t understand the language the acronyms and all of that. So you 
need somebody mediating in between.’ 
The mediator (WikiLeaks) would be an interpreter.  However, despite Daniel’s claim, 
it would likely be difficult to absolve the organisation of a central role in this regard 
as interpretation, translation and subsequently highlighting important features of 
the information are crucial functions.  Clarifying his position, he noted: 
‘The more decentralised you do that and the more layers you are adding I think 
the better it is, because first of all you’re spreading it better…second it is not 
only particular organisations that is in control of the whole interpretation flow. 
You know if it’s just one organisation that has access to it and that can publish it 
and interpret it and all of that then they can make a lot of politics of this but in a 
more decentralised model it keeps everybody honest because everybody is just 
this smaller player in the whole picture.’ (Daniel) 
Daniel’s argument188 is the same as that proposed in Chapter Five where resistance 
was portrayed as a networked, mainly collaborative project.  Information flows 
within this network were dynamic, changing over time and in response to real-world 
events.  While certain actors were shown to be prominent, there was no central hub 
through which information had to be relayed in order to reach an audience.  This 
model is different from that enacted by WikiLeaks.  WikiLeaks did collaborate with 
other organisations but these relationships were tenuous and fraught, and the 
                                                          
188 As an aside, while Daniel’s critique of centralisation of this type is entirely valid, his personal position 
in this debate should be acknowledged.  His departure from WikiLeaks was an acrimonious one and 
therefore a degree of discontent with its operation is to be expected. 
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tendency towards centralisation was evident in a number of ways.  Whether this 
proved to be an obstacle will be discussed later. 
7.2.3 RATIONALE 
The rationale behind WikiLeaks is complex and debated, particularly as the goals of 
the organisation became entwined with the status and profile of Assange.  The 
original motivation behind WikiLeaks still perseveres in some form: forcing 
transparency on closed institutions and demanding accountability from government.  
Daniel’s remarks above showed his motivation for joining WikiLeaks: lowering the 
barrier to whistleblowing, making it simple and reassuring.  During another 
interview, Eric King of Privacy International echoed this sentiment; he felt that 
‘nurturing that community is really important.’  However, this original USP – 
providing a safe and secure avenue for whistleblowers – was somewhat undermined 
in the aftermath of the prosecution and sentencing of Chelsea ing189 in the US in 
2013.  In hindsight, Daniel had reservations.  He explained that he felt some of what 
WikiLeaks engaged in was not working towards the broader agenda of transparency 
and accountability: 
‘I don’t believe in abolishing secrecy completely, this is not what, this is too easy 
and the world is more complicated than this and this is a bit what the agenda 
has become today so it’s more like a campaign platform against secrecy rather 
than a support platform for whistleblowers. Today I’m wondering a little bit 
about whether this has been the case right from the beginning and whether the 
whole whistleblower thing was just very easy to sell and this was why it had 
been promoted.’ 
Daniel distinguished between three types of activities WikiLeaks has carried out, 
each of which appear to show different rationales for publishing information: 
whistleblowing, anti-secrecy and what he later referred to as ‘lobbying for 
awareness’.  Anti-secrecy, as his remarks indicate, was on the whole not considered 
a worthwhile pursuit and did not serve the public interest.  Lobbying for awareness, 
as a subset of anti-secrecy (and tied more to WikiLeaks’ role as an investigative 
journalistic platform), was more valuable and it is at this point we can turn to the 
matter of digital surveillance. 
                                                          
189 A US soldier, PFC Bradley Manning was prosecuted for leaking confidential military and diplomatic 
communications to WikiLeaks, accessed while stationed in Iraq.  In 2013, Manning announced she had 
experienced gender dysphoria for several years and that her new identity was Chelsea Manning.   
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It is possible to debate, ad infinitum, what WikiLeaks hoped to achieve with each of 
their publications.  What we are interested in here is the ability of the case of 
WikiLeaks to shed light on our understanding of new media and resistance to 
surveillance.  The Spy Files open the door to this discussion.  Speaking to the Bureau 
of Investigative Journalism (with whom WikiLeaks and Privacy International 
collaborated), Assange described the motivation behind the release of information 
pertaining to the global surveillance-industrial complex.  Over 90 companies are 
subject to scrutiny in the publications, which consist of prospectuses, presentations 
and pricelists for mass surveillance products, among other documents.   
‘There is little left of democratic life that is not surveilled. But it is not being 
surveilled equally, it is not the public that is surveilling big corporations, 
secretive government agencies and the rest of the public, rather there is a 
disproportionate flow of information from us, from the public, into 
organisations that are already very powerful. And that permits the elite, the 
surveillance elite, the national security elite of a country to lift off from its 
people, to disconnect from its people, to predict its people. Now that’s a 
dangerous situation and what we’re dealing with here is not merely the 
surveillance elite of one country operating alone but rather an international 
surveillance elite, transnational companies selling these [mass surveillance] 
products all over the world and intelligence agencies swapping data that they 
collect with each other, that’s a worrying situation for Western 
democracy.’(Julian Assange [video transcript] in Chatterjee 2011). 
These remarks indicate why WikiLeaks targeted the international surveillance 
industry, with the familiar political-economic surveillance dyad emerging once again.  
There are notions of equality and democracy that are in line with WikiLeaks’ original 
motivations.  Assange also suggested that The Spy Files release may place pressure 
on governments to create better export regulation ‘so that Western companies can’t 
sell mass surveillance equipment to regimes that abuse human rights’ (in Chatterjee 
2011).  Rather than exposing corruption this appears to be a more measured 
attempt at opening a discussion about the extent of political and economic 
surveillance and the need to regulate the surveillance industry. 
Assange’s claim that life is ‘not being surveilled equally’ implies the need to level the 
playing field.  WikiLeaks’ strategy of ‘opening up’ was designed to redress the 
imbalance in the flow of information from the public to powerful public and private 
entities.  This exemplifies ‘resistive surveillance’ in that it captures elements of both 
sousveillance (Mann et al. 2003) – using technological means to invert the panoptic 
gaze and observe those in authority – and the synopticon (Mathiesen 1997) – 
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illustrating the role of (news) media in making the actions of the elite more visible.  
In the case of the latter it is more apt to consider Doyle’s (2011) reconfiguration of 
the synopticon to account for its resistive potential rather than its ability to maintain 
the surveillance status quo. 
7.2.4 ORGANISATION AND ‘DICTATORSHIP OF ACTION’ 
Finally, there are useful observations regarding the social organisational aspects of 
WikiLeaks.  The organisational forms of technological activist groups have been 
explored by Milan (2013).  She notes that within such groups there is a characteristic 
horizontality and decentralisation in organisational structure.  This may include 
multiple or alternating leaders or a collective ‘all in’ approach.  Others ‘give the right 
to centrality and uniqueness of the individual’ (2013: 93).  There can be consensus-
building but frequently individuals decide on a course for action by themselves and 
are allowed to pursue this on a basis of ‘inferred consensus’ resulting from a shared 
set of values amongst activists.  Milan refers to this as ‘dictatorship of action’ (2013: 
93-4). 
The organisational culture of WikiLeaks appears to depart from this model.  Many 
critical accounts from former staff and media partners paint a picture of Julian 
Assange as controlling and willing to privilege his own interests above those of the 
principles of WikiLeaks (see Domscheit-Berg 2011; Leigh and Harding 2011; Beckett 
and Ball 2012; Ball 2013).  Assange himself is a former hacker, however, those 
beliefs in decentralised organisation characteristic of activist/hacker culture (Milan 
2013) did not appear, entirely, to be carried into WikiLeaks.  On the contrary, as 
WikiLeaks achieved recognition, Assange became the figurehead of the organisation.  
The management of WikiLeaks was, perhaps, less ‘dictatorship of action’ and more 
‘dictatorship’.  At other times, he is described as the ‘charismatic leader’ (Brooke 
2011: 41).  Although a trait that undoubtedly helped WikiLeaks to forge its path, this 
adds further support to the argument that the organisation ran according to 
Assange’s rules and not the principles of participation, democracy and horizontality 
– particularly during its most prominent phase.   
‘Julian brought with him a rather strange quality; he carried himself as though 
he were a cult leader. We started making jokes very early on about people 
around Julian drinking the Kool-Aid…all this made you feel as though you were 
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dealing with someone who wasn’t quite from the same planet as the rest of us.’ 
(David Leigh, WikiLeaks: Secrets and Lies) 
None of this is designed to pass judgement on these issues.  They are important in 
sociological terms to the extent that they inform our understanding of why a group 
such as WikiLeaks faltered in the long term.  Resistance of this kind depends not only 
on powerful technological foundations but also organisational characteristics that do 
not destabilise the potential for resistance that exists.  Daniel described how he felt 
WikiLeaks should have adapted in this situation: 
‘…when this whole thing in 2010 started to go in a really strange direction I said 
the only thing that needs to happen is that it burns. It needs to burn down to 
the ground and cease to exist. And then the phoenix can rise from the ashes as 
something new. WikiLeaks is not in a position to really make a difference. There 
have been so many mistakes that have happened; so many people have been 
scared away, so many people that have been made angry by how things have 
been published, by mistakes that have been made, all of that. I don’t think this 
is sustainable anymore.’ 
Daniel believed the concept of WikiLeaks was sound but organisational factors 
undermined its potential.  This theme, along with the relations between WikiLeaks 
and its collaborators indicate two points to take forward.  First, despite their 
technological sophistication, news media partners were still vital to the impact 
WikiLeaks could generate.  This is reinforced by the patterns of reporting seen with 
the Snowden revelations.  Consequently, it is important to appreciate the position of 
both traditional and new media platforms in contemporary surveillance 
relationships.  This is a point that echoes from Chapter Five, where we saw the 
‘egocentric’ tendencies of WikiLeaks on social media and the online presence of 
traditional news media.  Second, we can relate perceptions of WikiLeaks and 
Assange to the broader issues of social problems and moral panics.  For claims-
makers, trust and credibility is vital if arguments are to be maintained.  Loss of 
credibility also helps the agenda of creating folk devils out of whistleblowers. 
7.3 TIMELINE OF THE NEW DIGITAL ANARCHISTS 
Media analysis covering a period of four years shows the pattern of reporting on a 
variety of issues related to WikiLeaks and surveillance.  Initially, this analysis was 
focused only on the prominence of WikiLeaks in UK publications (primarily the news 
media) and the relative discussion of surveillance and privacy.  In the aftermath of 
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the revelations from Edward Snowden in 2013, the focus was extended to show the 
impact of these events in comparison to the reporting of WikiLeaks190.  Figure 9 
shows clear points over the four-year period where the volume of media reports of 
these themes increased significantly.  The major fluctuations of interest concerned 
WikiLeaks and Assange in 2010 through to 2011 and Snowden in 2013.  Also of 
importance are the patterns in late 2011 and early 2012 for surveillance and privacy; 
while they are less pronounced than those of WikiLeaks, Assange and Snowden, they 
still indicate the impact of particular moments in the recent history of surveillance. 
From an analytical perspective the following discussion highlights the importance of 
considering ‘crisis moments’ in the on-going process of the construction of 
surveillance as a problem.  Privacy advocates, as Bennett (2008: 225) notes, are 
often perceived as waiting for a ‘privacy apocalypse’, a major violation that will be 
the final straw that motivates the wider public to mobilise and confront unjustifiable 
intrusion into our private lives.  Opinions from three interview participants were 
mixed on this issue: 
‘Yes, a lot of these sparks you can see. You see with ACTA191 for example, the 
only spark it required was a really well-made YouTube video and that is what 
made the people understand what is happening that made my parents able to 
understand it and to suddenly have an opinion on a topic they’ve before that 
thought was completely irrelevant. And the same for SOPA192 and PIPA193 and 
the same for the German censorship law that they wanted to introduce…if you 
give people a tangible introduction to this topic, something they can relate to, 
then they can become politicised.’ (Daniel) 
‘There are triggers all the time…It’s in the media and it’s there for a couple of 
weeks and everybody’s shocked and like ‘oh my god’ the consequences that 
such a tiny mistake can have and you know the novelty wears off and people do 
it again…’ (Anne-Marie Oostveen) 
‘…whilst I think privacy is a genuine concern for society very few people 
instantly die because of a privacy violation, you know it does happen, but I think 
it’s not something, there’s sort of a deep-seated psychological where we’re not, 
we’re obviously not built to deal with this kind of issue, we’re not programmed 
to deal with this kind of issue it’s far away and abstract…’ (Joss Wright) 
                                                          
190 See Chapter Four. 
191 The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, a multilateral policy that generated uproar amongst the 
Internet community for its potential to undermine net freedoms and the transfer of vital intellectual 
property (including medicine) across borders. 
192 Stop Online Piracy Act (US).  Shelved: opponents argued this would open the door to unjustified and 
blanket online censorship. 
193 Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property (PROTECT 
IP) Act (US).  Shelved due to concerns over Internet freedom of speech, innovation and integrity. 
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These excerpts raise two issues: the transience of surveillance/privacy stories in the 
news and the relevance and translatability of these for the public.  The questions 
about digital surveillance are plain.  Is it a social problem?  Has it, or will it ever, 
generate a public outcry?  As sociologists we should also bear in mind these 
questions carry their own moral judgement that (excessive) digital surveillance is a 
bad thing.  The counter-argument is a familiar one: if you have nothing to hide, you 
have nothing to fear.  This rhetoric exists to nullify any claims about the dangers of 
surveillance and can be combined with attempts to de-legitimise those claiming 
otherwise. 
7.3.1 IMPACTS, INVENTORIES AND REACTION 
The findings begin to point to an answer to the questions above.  To begin with, the 
main period of interest in the WikiLeaks case is from mid-2010 through to the end of 
2011.  This period covers the bulk of significant publications/leaks as well as the time 
when WikiLeaks was most often in the news, as seen in Figure 9.  The publications 
relating to digital surveillance practices appeared in late 2011 and actually garnered 
very little coverage, both in comparison to earlier leaks and to the later revelations 
by Snowden.  Only seven articles in December 2011 mention ‘Spy Files’ and thirteen 
mention both ‘WikiLeaks’ and ‘surveillance’.  Of these, seven were the Spy Files 
reports and three were irrelevant.  The tone was also entirely neutral; in the case of 
the Spy Files, the short articles194 quoted Assange at the launch event with little 
elaboration on the rationale or consequences of the leaks.  Only one of the thirteen 
articles – ‘www.friend or foe?’ (Kelly 2011) – engaged in debate about the liberating 
or repressive possibilities of the Web.  WikiLeaks and surveillance are mentioned 
only once here and even then, not in relation to one another.   
                                                          
194 Typically under 200 words. 
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While this evidences little specific connection between WikiLeaks and resistance to 
digital surveillance, the relevance of WikiLeaks for this analysis lies elsewhere.  To 
put these findings into context, then, we need to look at the earlier trajectory of 
WikiLeaks in the news media. 
Cohen’s (1972) exposition of the patterns of moral panics was based on 
observations from natural disaster research.  He outlined a process of warning, 
impact, inventory and reaction to describe a typical sequence of events that make 
up a deviant incident: its antecedents, the occurrence of the incident, the reporting 
of these behaviours in the news media and the social reaction to them.  The reaction 
phase was most critical, for it was here where attitudes towards the subject of the 
panic were shaped and crystallised into a broader perception of the ‘problem’.  
Through cycles of amplification in the new media, subsequent reactions to 
otherwise minor transgressions were disproportionate and served to further 
demonise those engaged in the initial deviant behaviour.  We do not need to apply 
this model to the letter.  Indeed, later authors have critiqued the specifics of what 
Cohen proposed (see Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994; McRobbie and Thornton 1995; 
Jewkes 2004; Altheide 2009) and Cohen himself revised his elaboration of the 
concept of moral panic in subsequent editions of Folk Devils (1980, 1987, 2002).  
Aspects of these revisions will be revisited later.  Nevertheless, the model helps to 
draw out some of the key elements of the WikiLeaks case. 
There are clear ‘spikes’ in the pattern of reporting on WikiLeaks and Julian Assange 
in Figure 9.  Where they begin to converge indicates that, over time, reports of 
WikiLeaks became conflated with those of Assange; conversely articles in 2010 and 
early 2011 mentioned WikiLeaks more without reference to Assange, indicating 
more focus being paid to the organisation and the publications they had released.  
There was arguably a ‘novelty’ factor at play as well, which is one explanation for the 
gradually decreasing volume of news coverage over the period.  The leaking of 
enormous quantities of confidential information in the War Diaries and Cablegate 
was hitherto unseen.  In interview, Daniel alluded to the fact that WikiLeaks’ earlier 
publications were reported not so much for their content but for the fact that 
something had leaked. In his opinion, this was ‘wasting a lot of the information that 
could actually make a difference.’  In the UK context this is understandable, as the 
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War Diaries and Cablegate had direct relevance to the UK and US government.  Pre-
2010, the publications were not so pertinent.  Naturally the content of these leaks 
was of interest to the news media, but the perceived public appetite for these would 
have to be great to sustain such reporting over a longer period of time.  Relatedly, 
another argument for the much less significant impact of The Spy Files in December 
2011 and January 2012 is the issue of ‘translatability’ discussed below. 
Figures 10 and 11 below validate the findings of the frequency analysis in Figure 9.  
They indicate worldwide and UK ‘interest’ (signified by volume of Google searches) 
in Assange (and Snowden195) across the same four-year period196.  The patterns are 
almost identical to those in Figure 9.  In addition, they provide a little nuance; 
interest in Assange was more pronounced in the UK in mid-2012 (when Assange 
took refuge in the Ecuadorian Embassy), while conversely, Snowden generated 
greater interest worldwide than in relative terms in the UK. 
 
FIGURE 10: GOOGLE TRENDS RESULTS: WORLDWIDE INTEREST IN ASSANGE AND 
SNOWDEN 2010-2013 (WEB SEARCHES) 
 
 
                                                          
195 Discussed in more detail later (section 7.3.2). 
196 The red and blue lines represent Assange and Snowden respectively. 
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FIGURE 11: GOOGLE TRENDS RESULTS: UK INTEREST IN ASSANGE AND SNOWDEN 
2010-2013 (WEB SEARCHES) 
 
 
The news media evidenced mixed responses during late 2010 (the inventory in 
Cohen’s model).  Some reports framed WikiLeaks or Assange as dangerous, some 
cast them in a more positive light and others appeared to leave it to the reader to 
decide, as these headlines illustrate: 
 ‘Who put WikiLeaks on the moral high ground? Secrecy causes damage but so can 
disclosure. Julian Assange has no right to decide which makes the greater evil’ (The 
Times, 29th July 2010) 
 ‘WikiLeaks may already have blood on its hands over Afghan revelations’ (The 
Times, 30th July 2010) 
 ‘Why WikiLeaks must be protected’ (New Statesman, 23rd August 2010) 
 ‘Hail to the whistleblowers’ (The Guardian, 23rd June 2010) 
 ‘Paranoid. Anarchic. Is WikiLeaker boss a force for good or chaos?’ (Daily Mail, 27th 
July 2010) 
 ‘WikiLeaker crusade or ego trip?’ (Daily Telegraph, 31st July 2010) 
This division of opinion, which characterised the majority of news reports collected, 
signals the competing claims being made about what the social problem actually 
was.  On the one hand the ‘inventory’ in response to the ‘impact’ of each batch of 
leaks was to praise the efforts of WikiLeaks and problematise the lack of 
transparency and accountability within government.  On the other, it was to 
question the justification of WikiLeaks’ actions, illustrate the damage they could 
cause and vilify the character of Assange. 
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Other reports indicate the broader reaction that began to take place as the two 
sides to this process of social construction exchanged blows: 
 ‘WikiLeaks booted off Amazon servers’ (V3.com, 1st December 2010) 
 ‘Amazon faces boycott for dropping WikiLeaks’ (New Media Age Online, 1st 
December 2010) 
 ‘How the net hit back at attempts to shut website’ (The Guardian, 8th December 
2010) 
  ‘WikiLeaks fans crash credit card websites’ (The Sun, 9th December 2010) 
 ‘More attacks in WikiLeaks cyber war’ (South Wales Argus, 10th December 2010) 
 ‘Hackers in web wars to protect leaks site’ (The Express, 9th December 2010) 
Reports such as these indicate the broader ramifications of WikiLeaks.  Beyond the 
conflict between WikiLeaks and governments around the world, a range of other 
entities and actors were directly or indirectly involved in the process of claims-
making, through supporting, or not, the actions of WikiLeaks.  This enriches our 
understanding of what ‘resistive surveillance’ entails in the context of new media.  
Although WikiLeaks developed their own technological strategies and resources, 
they were also reliant upon others, for instance to host servers, or process 
donations.  This is a consequence of networked forms of organisation and thus is a 
vital dynamic to add to the analysis as these other actors can facilitate or debilitate 
attempts at resistance.  Furthermore, as some of the reports cited indicate, one 
element of the social reaction following the media inventories at the time was to 
generate more support for WikiLeaks.  This adds little support to the idea of there 
being a panic about WikiLeaks and its detrimental implications for security and 
control. 
Following this the pattern of reporting changed.  No period generated the same 
volume of reports as those in December 2010.  A series of Guardian articles in early 
2011 entitled ‘After WikiLeaks…’ signalled the perception that WikiLeaks had already 
had its day.  Arguably the most significant event in the WikiLeaks timeline was 
Assange’s arrest (also in December 2010) over allegations of sexual assault.  The 
lengthy process of bail, house arrest, hearings and appeals that followed consumed 
the majority of news reports concerning WikiLeaks and Assange throughout 2011 
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and into 2012.  The spikes in 2012 correlate with Assange’s final appeal hearing and 
subsequent refuge in the Ecuadorian Embassy. 
To return to the start of this discussion, the question of why The Spy Files did not 
generate the impact previously seen can therefore be explained primarily by their 
position in the broader, turbulent history of WikiLeaks and Assange.  Two other 
factors are worth briefly considering.  First, these documents were not leaked.  They 
were the product of an investigative journalistic effort by WikiLeaks and its 
collaborators (including Privacy International).  Consequently, the novel character of 
leaked information was missing.  Second is the issue of translatability of the 
material.  This fundamental issue is one that concerns all forms of resistance against 
surveillance: how to make people care when there are myriad other social problems 
competing for their attention?  When this question arose with Daniel, he suggested 
that the lack of reaction in the UK to releases like The Spy Files is a product of the 
extent to which surveillance is accepted: 
‘I think you [the UK] are much further down the lane than everybody else, you 
see you just look around for all these cameras you know, that would be 
completely impossible over here you’d have people rioting in the streets if that 
would happen…That just shows to what extent people have kind of accepted 
that, you know, they’re, I don’t know, I think the UK is the leading example of 
that in the world so your threshold for outrage is much higher that you have to 
reach in order actually for people to care. You’ve already accepted it.’ 
This synopsis of the key elements of the reporting of WikiLeaks bears out some of 
the characteristics of moral panic.  Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) suggest a moral 
panic is typified by concern, hostility, consensus, disproportionality and volatility.  
Assessing WikiLeaks against these criteria involves a little subjectivity197.  However, 
we can see clear evidence of concern, hostility and volatility (the latter in the rapidly 
fluctuating volume of reports).  Consensus was not achieved; the news media 
appeared split along traditional ideological lines.  Disproportionality, a key element 
of moral panic, is also trickier to claim given the unique nature of WikiLeaks and the 
information they brought to the public domain.  On balance, the existence of a panic 
regarding WikiLeaks may be an overstatement, a key reason being that the events 
did not seem to be perceived as indicative of wider moral decline.  However, we 
should not discount the broader implications for constructing social problems, in 
                                                          
197 Indeed, a critique of the concept of moral panic is that defining which issues are ‘moral’ is subjective 
and arbitrary (Critcher 2016). 
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particular, the insights into how resistive surveillance and counter-resistance can be 
understood as claims-making activities that assert particular values. 
WikiLeaks alerted the public to a new state of affairs wherein the activities of 
governments and private companies could be made visible.  We might suggest this 
shifted the contours of morality in such a way that the rhetoric of secrecy in the 
name of providing security was challenged.  Spector and Kitsuse (1987) note that 
claims-making has an implicitly moral dimension.  Claims are normative in that they 
assert ‘conditions ought not to exist; something ought to be done to improve 
conditions’ (1987: 86, emphasis in original).  In this case, governments ought not to 
have privacy from citizens and confidential information in the public interest ought 
to be revealed; surveillance practices ought to respect the right to privacy and there 
ought to be greater regulation of this industry.  On the other hand, activists ought 
not to endanger security by publishing confidential information and these acts ought 
to be criminalised and punished by the law. 
So far, the analysis has been based on the relatively short time frame that WikiLeaks 
were in the public eye.  A final suggestion is that it may be of greater help for 
understanding digital surveillance and resistance to place these events in a broader 
historical context.  This would recognise contemporary resistive surveillance as a 
product of the development of the information society alongside the evolution of 
moral concerns about (perceived) subversive use of technology.  It would also allow 
us to explain the greater significance for debates about digital surveillance in the 
context of Snowden. 
This history would date back to the early days of the Internet and incorporate the 
hacker culture of the 1980s and the steady growth of cryptography as alluded to 
above (Greenberg 2012).  It would also accommodate significant moments of public 
anxiety regarding digital issues: the Stop Online Piracy Act, PROTECT Intellectual 
Property Act, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, turn-of-the-millennium P2P 
services such as Napster and WinMX, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 
the Communications Data Bill; the list is a long one.  Cohen’s (1972) modelling would 
be difficult to adapt to this perspective.  It would be hard to connect these disparate 
‘moments’ into a single story of warning, impact, inventory and reaction, and again 
the question of which side of the conflict a panic may exist about is unclear.  There is 
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concern about subversive use of technology in society and about political and 
economic control through surveillance and regulation of surveillance.   Where moral 
panic is not applicable, then, the process of social construction of digital surveillance 
and resistive surveillance can still provide useful insights. 
7.3.2 SNOWDEN AND SURVEILLANCE 
We have seen that for several reasons there was little evidence of a connection 
between WikiLeaks and reporting on surveillance, even where leaked material 
pertained to the surveillance industry.  In 2010, only 14 articles mentioned 
WikiLeaks, surveillance and privacy together and of these, only a handful did so 
relevantly.  The most relevant article was by Heather Brooke, who later authored 
The Revolution Will be Digitised, an exploration of, among other things, the 
phenomenon of WikiLeaks.  In her article she notes that ‘The powerful have long 
spied on citizens (surveillance) as a means of control, now citizens are turning their 
collected eyes back upon the powerful (sousveillance)’ (Brooke 2010).  From Figure 9 
we also see that there was little variation in volume of reporting on surveillance and 
privacy from 2010 to mid-2013.  The one spike in April 2012, the analysis revealed, 
coincides with the announcement of the Draft Communications Data Bill.  As briefly 
mentioned in Chapter Six, the media dubbed the CDB ‘the Snooper’s Charter’, 
conveying a sense of the nature of reporting on the Bill.  Capturing the negative 
aspects of the Bill with such symbolism may also have helped overcome the issue of 
translatability.  This instance notwithstanding, for a more sustained media inventory 
on surveillance we need to examine the impact of Snowden. 
In June 2013, The Guardian published the first in a prolonged series detailing the 
surveillance practices of the NSA and GCHQ.  Perhaps the most significant of 
Snowden’s early revelations was the existence of two intercept programs – PRISM 
and Tempora198.  PRISM targeted foreign nationals outside of the US allowing 
content and communications data to be collected ‘direct from the servers’ of nine 
US service providers199 (see Gellman and Poitras 2013).  Tempora, meanwhile, 
tapped submarine fibre-optic cables making landfall in the UK and stored large 
                                                          
198 Operated by the NSA and GCHQ respectively. 
199 Microsoft, Yahoo!, Google, Apple, Facebook, AOL, Skype, YouTube and PalTalk. 
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quantities of content and communications data, including ‘600 million “telephone 
events” each day’ (MacAskill et al. 2013).  The details of the two programs share a 
common thread: the relationship – willing or not – between state intelligence 
agencies and corporate telecommunications service providers.  Moreover, many of 
the data gathered and analysed under these two programs are shared between the 
NSA and GCHQ and – as later publications would reveal – with other intelligence 
agencies. 
The impact of these leaks had clear consequences on the reporting of surveillance 
and privacy in the UK.  The average monthly frequency of reports on surveillance 
and privacy in 2013 approximately tripled to 276 articles.  As Figure 9 illustrates, this 
increase was not the distorted product of a one or two month impact; the frequency 
was consistently higher than previously seen.  Reports mentioning the NSA or GCHQ 
followed a similar pattern.  The Guardian unsurprisingly dominated headlines from 
June and thus the tone of reports was critical of the political and economic entities 
involved, and aimed to stimulate debate about privacy and proportionality: 
 ‘Our privacy is not a luxury: Don’t fall for the narrative if you’ve nothing to hide, you 
needn’t worry. Democracy is at risk’ (7th June) 
 ‘Did we really all check ‘agree’ to this government snooping?’ (12th June) 
 ‘How can this level of state surveillance be legal?’ (19th June) 
Other news outlets followed similar lines of thought: 
 ‘Facebook and Google deny knowledge of top secret government spying initiative 
PRISM’ (Mail Online, 8th June) 
 ‘Spies strip us all bare’ (Daily Mail, 30th June) 
 ‘A case of the thief crying, Stop! Thief!’ (China Daily European Edition, 19th June) 
The last of these most clearly speaks to a moral dilemma regarding the ethics of data 
collection.  The language of theft relates to ownership, which naturally begs the 
question of who the rightful owners of digital data are?  In contrast to the largely 
critical reports at the time, some (conservative) newspapers opposed the 
‘presumption of guilt’ placed on the intelligence agencies: 
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 ‘We’ve made it so easy for the data snoopers; the PRISM furore is not just about 
civil liberties. Think how willingly we trade personal information for convenience’ 
(The Times, 10th June) 
 ‘Snooping Big Bruv helps keep us safe’ (The Sun, 16th June) 
The Sun article expanded this argument, while at the same time implying the 
justification for digital surveillance: 
‘We're crazy about telling everyone what we're up to, so why the mass 
indignation about the fact there might be someone listening? If you're not 
doing anything wrong, why worry? Unless you're discussing the latest bomb-
making techniques…searching for illegal images on Google, does it matter who 
sees your search history (embarrassing as it might be)? Not really. Not if it 
keeps you a little bit safer from prospective paedophiles, terrorists or 
murderers. As Obama said, "we can't have 100 per cent security and 100 per 
cent privacy". He's right.’ 
Aside from reporting details of political and economic surveillance, other agendas 
were pursued in the news media.  One was raising awareness of the means by which 
the public could protect themselves.  These individualised mechanisms of resistance 
that previously experienced little uptake in the public domain were vitalised in the 
news media.  One Independent article introduced: 
 ‘The Tor system: Welcome to the dark Internet where you can search in secret’ (9th 
June 2013) 
Figure 12200 supports the claim that such reports helped raise awareness of these 
techniques of resistance; the number of users of Tor in the UK rose dramatically in 
August and September 2013 from around 25,000 to 175,000. 
                                                          
200 Statistics drawn from Tor Metrics: https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=userstats-relay-
country&start=2013-06-01&end=2013-12-31&country=gb&events=off#userstats-relay-country 
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FIGURE 12: TOR USERS IN THE UK POST-SNOWDEN 
 
However, there were also indications of the counter-resistance strategies employed 
by the intelligence agencies: 
 ‘NSA and GCHQ target Tor network that protects anonymity of web users’ (The 
Guardian, 4th October 2013) 
As well as drawing the public’s attention to these efforts, the practices illuminated in 
this article evidence digital counter-resistance.  Such attempts to nullify the benefits 
of Tor impacts not only on those engaged in illicit activity on the ‘Dark Web’ but also 
privacy advocates, journalists and members of the public who use the technology 
out of a desire to preserve the value of privacy.  
The most important narrative, however, alongside the leaked material itself was that 
concerned with Snowden.  There were two key aspects to this for the purposes of 
this discussion: the involvement of WikiLeaks and debate of the legality and value of 
his actions.  Regarding the former, Assange voiced support for Snowden: 
 ‘Support NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, says Julian Assange’ (The Guardian, 
22nd June) 
 ‘Whistleblower Edward Snowden ‘has left Hong Kong for Russia’ with help from 
WikiLeaks one day after US charges him with spying’ (Mail Online, 23rd June) 
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While WikiLeaks undoubtedly supported Snowden, some critics equated WikiLeaks’ 
efforts with an attempt to regain the spotlight (see Leetaru 2013).  While for some 
this will have elevated his credibility – WikiLeaks have not emerged from their time 
in the spotlight completely discredited – for competing claims-makers this would 
have provided an opportunity to equate Snowden with the wider problem of 
undermining national security. 
The attention directed at Snowden himself was, therefore, predictable.  Calls for his 
return to the US to stand trial were reported alongside praise for his actions.  The 
phrases ‘on the run’, ‘traitor’ and ‘America’s most wanted man’ are frequently seen 
in early reports, reinforcing the official statements of the US government that 
Snowden’s actions were illegal and threatened national security.  These were 
strongly counter-balanced by more positive accounts: 
 ‘Edward Snowden is a modern American hero; this was a precious public service’ 
(The Independent, 11th June) 
 ‘Snowden deserves our thanks for revealing world of surveillance’ (Irish Examiner, 
18th June) 
 ‘Edward Snowden: History will be kind to him’ (The Guardian, 26th June) 
There was, therefore, some similarity to the ambivalent way WikiLeaks and Assange 
(in earlier reports) were presented.  However, to date at least, Snowden appears to 
have avoided much of the negative attention that accompanied Assange.  The fact 
that he appears to remain a credible source is doubtless a contributing factor to the 
continued dialogue surrounding political and economic digital surveillance201. 
The extent to which the UK public are accepting of surveillance, as Daniel claimed, 
was challenged in 2013.  Where WikiLeaks’ publications (and other ‘surveillance 
events’) failed to generate an increased public consciousness of surveillance and 
privacy through media exposure, the Snowden revelations succeeded.  In one 
(obvious) respect this is to be expected; the Snowden revelations were primarily 
concerned with digital surveillance practices.  Compared to WikiLeaks, whose 
publications focused only sporadically on the surveillance complex, Snowden was 
bound to generate a greater social reaction.  Moreover, the timeline of reporting on 
                                                          
201 For instance in the on-going discussions and campaign surrounding the Investigatory Powers Bill 
(2015). 
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Snowden indicates the value of a sustained process of claims-making about one 
subject.  Whereas WikiLeaks published documents relating to a broad array of 
institutions and practices, Snowden’s revelations all contributed to the same issue of 
digital surveillance.  In this case, resistive surveillance is at its most effective.  To 
persuade people that something ‘ought to be done’, the problem needs to be 
sustained, which means the claims need to be sustained.  In turn this means the 
issues have to be able to be translated to the public effectively.  This is a hurdle for 
much resistance to surveillance, particularly in the face of counter-claims in the 
news that we should not be concerned if we have nothing to hide (as above).  The 
symbolic nature of resistive surveillance is thus an important consideration. 
7.4 SURVEILLANCE AND RESISTANCE PART THREE: THE SOCIAL 
PROBLEM OF DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE AND RESISTANCE 
7.4.1 THE SYMBOLIC POLITICS OF SURVEILLANCE: CONDENSATION SYMBOLS 
AND CRISES 
This chapter began with a question about the extent to which WikiLeaks and the 
more recent Snowden revelations can inform our understanding of digital 
surveillance and resistance.  The analysis has aimed to provide a foundation to move 
beyond a simplistic response based on ‘what we now know about digital surveillance 
practices’ thanks to the efforts of WikiLeaks and Snowden.  The recent history of the 
contest over control of information and digital surveillance in the news media is 
marked by events (impacts) and their aftermath (inventories).  The reaction phase of 
interest to Cohen has been addressed so far in respect of the creation of a public 
consciousness about surveillance and privacy, which was evidenced most 
prominently in the wake of the Snowden revelations.  Another element of this 
reaction is the effect of WikiLeaks and Snowden on the symbolic nature of the 
politics of surveillance.  Rather than isolated instances, then, the reaction phase can 
be considered as an on-going and cumulative process, supplemented by each new 
encounter between digital surveillance, resistance and counter-resistance. 
Surveillance is never neutral.  It implies a power dynamic: the power to ‘watch over’ 
someone or something.  Resistive surveillance re-appropriates this power, using 
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technological mechanisms and distribution of information through media channels 
to subject political and economic entities to surveillance.  Surveillance is, therefore, 
also increasingly political.  As surveillance becomes increasingly contested, so do the 
ways in which the ‘problem’ is constructed.  An important aspect to this is 
symbolism. 
Edelman (1964) notes how ‘condensation symbols…evoke the emotions associated 
with the situation.  They condense into one symbolic event, sign, or act, patriotic 
pride, anxieties, remembrances of past glories or humiliations, promises of future 
greatness: some of these or all of them’ (1964: 6).  Graber, meanwhile, defines such 
a symbol as ‘a name, word, phrase, or maxim which stirs vivid impressions involving 
the listener's most basic values’ (1976: 289).  A condensation symbol is useful, 
therefore, for achieving political ends; it can engender support by offering 
reassurance or by constructing a threat to be protected against.  If we are so inclined 
we can see symbols everywhere.  ‘Practically every political act that is controversial 
or regarded as really important is bound to serve in part as a condensation symbol’, 
Edelman suggests (1964: 7).  Thus ‘surveillance’ is a condensation symbol – but we 
can look in finer detail at the issue of digital surveillance and resistance to gain a 
better understanding of the relevance of this. 
Symbols appear frequently in the news.  Indeed, Edelman argues that the public 
‘wants symbols and not news’ (1964: 8).  He also notes we can attach emotion and 
become involved in a reported political act more readily when it is remote to our 
everyday experience – particularly when it is presented as some form of crisis or 
controversy.  The findings of this thesis provide support for this idea.  The insights 
into diplomatic communications, military practices and the activities of the 
intelligence services certainly fulfilled the ‘remoteness’ aspect of condensation 
symbols Edelman highlights; their presentation in the news media, the ‘crisis’ 
aspect.  From 2010-2013, WikiLeaks, Assange and Snowden all acted as 
condensation symbols in both Edelman (1964) and Graber’s (1976) terms.  They 
became symbolic of the power of an individual to overturn political and economic 
control over information, and of the ability of the Internet to put a degree of control 
back into the hands of citizens.  They have also become symbols of governments’ 
desires to punish those who challenge their legitimacy or ‘right’ to secrecy.  Resistive 
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surveillance has helped to reshape the political landscape of digital surveillance by 
making visible what was previously invisible. 
WikiLeaks and Snowden helped condense a set of attitudes, experiences and fears 
into a highly visible contest between activists, states and corporations.  Symbols of 
this conflict abound, for instance ‘civil liberties’, ‘privacy’, ‘security’, ‘freedom’ and, 
naturally, ‘surveillance’ or ‘surveillance society’.  WikiLeaks and Snowden fed into 
this existing and growing concern with personal digitised data.  However, all these 
symbols exhibit duality; they themselves are contested as each participant to the 
conflict attempts to construct them in order to achieve and justify their own political 
ends.  In the case of ‘surveillance’, government rhetoric frames the term as vital for 
safeguarding civil liberties and freedom.  As a condensation symbol, it is designed to 
reassure.  Advocacy groups, on the other hand, talk about surveillance as invasive 
and eroding civil liberties.  WikiLeaks, Assange and Snowden underwent a similar 
process of social construction.  Snowden’s single sustained narrative, despite its 
illegal foundations, and his adherence to his values arguably helped cement his 
position as a folk hero.  In contrast, the personification (as a mode of symbolisation) 
of what WikiLeaks stood for in the personage of Assange undermined the aims and 
reputation of the organisation.  In this respect, symbolisation needs to be treated 
carefully.  As Shirky (2011) observed ‘The press has covered him as dutifully as any 
movie star, while paying too little attention to what his invention means about the 
wider world.’ 
Condensation symbols, therefore, illustrate the importance of significant ‘moments’ 
in the trajectory of the digital surveillance/resistance relationship.  Key events and 
crises can be appropriated and re-appropriated.  They can convey a sense of the 
problem to be resolved and to engender support or attachment.  Surveillance is thus 
a contested symbol, employed as both a rhetorical and practical tool for reassurance 
and – particularly over the last few years – as a symbolic device, illustrating the 
threat posed to the private lives of citizens.  In tandem with resistive surveillance, 
which brings with an element of the ‘underdog’, these have shifted the landscape of 
digital surveillance. 
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7.4.2 MORAL PANICS AS CULTURAL POLITICS 
To talk of a ‘moral panic about surveillance’ is arguably a misnomer if taken in its 
original sense.  Panics have typically been understood as directed at marginalised 
sections of the population, and generated by a conservative, traditionalist elite.  
Surveillance does not fit that bill; it is enacted by those in power.  To label concern 
about it as a panic would invert the concept.  However, Cohen’s (2002) later 
comments do address ‘good’ and ‘bad’ moral panics and their respective use by 
different ends of the political ideological spectrum.  The evidence in this chapter 
shows claims were made for both of these ends. 
Panics are also characterised by disproportionate reaction and, while it is a 
subjective judgement to make, surveillance is potentially detrimental to social 
groups so any public anxiety about surveillance is, arguably, justified.  The converse 
– a panic about whistleblowing and the damage it could do – is more typical of a 
panic generated by conservative forces.  However, technologically-augmented 
strategies of resistance have proven too mobile, too resilient, to be targeted and 
subjected to a sustained attack.  In conflicts such as those seen in this chapter, both 
sides defend their actions by ‘implicatory denial’ (Cohen 2002: xli): ‘what happened 
was not really bad and can be justified.’  Particularly post-Snowden, the on-going 
public debate about digital surveillance suggests that such denial has been less 
effective on the part of the elite (political and economic entities). 
The analysis has been couched in a broader language of social problems, rather than 
attempting to declare with certainty if a panic exists, and about what.  However, 
conceptually, the question of morality is still important in the context of 
contemporary surveillance.  One reason for this is the connection between panic 
and risk.  Moral panics are associated with periods of rapid social change.  The pace 
of change of information and communication technologies, as Chapter Two 
described, has been rapid indeed.  It is for this reason that reforms to legislation of 
the kind in Chapter Six are proposed, because ICTs develop faster than law can keep 
pace.  This is equally true of digital surveillance and the appropriate degree of 
protection for privacy the law can offer.  The pace of change is therefore associated 
with risk and the need to implement controls that minimise such risks.  This raises 
218 
 
difficult questions: what level of risk and what sorts of risks are we prepared to 
tolerate?  How much surveillance will we accept for the benefit of our security?  
Does whistleblowing pose a greater threat than mass surveillance?  Privacy and 
security are abstract concepts.  They cannot be measured objectively and thus the 
question is one of political morality.  A related issue, however, is whether because 
something can be done, it should be done.  Just because information can be 
distributed without restriction, does that mean it should?  That is a moral dilemma, 
not only restricted to the realm of political morality.  Bear in mind as well the point 
from Chapter Two – the characteristics of the information society cannot be distilled 
only to technology.  There are social and cultural forces at work as well and we can 
see the intersection of all of these in the case of WikiLeaks and Snowden. 
Recall Cohen’s earlier point about conceptualising lines of power.  Here is the value 
in Cohen’s model for understanding the effect of WikiLeaks.  To theorise moral 
panics, Cohen (1972: 198) says we need to acknowledge that power differentials at a 
societal level mean some groups are vulnerable to attacks (that is, constituted as 
deviant or worthy of panic).  WikiLeaks redrew these lines of power and helped 
recast the boundaries of what can fall within moral concerns.  Indeed, this is what 
resistive surveillance more broadly achieves.  Altheide (2009) for instance suggests 
that terrorism is ‘off-limits’ as a panic in the news media.  It is an issue that cannot 
be subjected to point and counter-point.  Likewise, until WikiLeaks, the various 
mechanisms of the state and, after Snowden, of political and economic surveillance, 
were uncontested as ‘problems’ for two reasons: because they were there to 
protect security and, more simply, because the information was not there to inform 
any debate.  That the actions of governments are now more visible is a result of a 
shift in the lines of power in society brought about by (digital) resistive surveillance. 
‘The manipulation of appropriate symbols – the process which sustains moral 
campaigns, panics and crusades – is made much easier when the object of 
attack is both highly visible and structurally weak’ (Cohen 1972: 198, emphasis 
added). 
Perhaps there are panics still to come, either about the extent of political and 
economic surveillance or about the inability of the Internet to be controlled for the 
purposes of safety and security.  Meanwhile, the ‘cultural politics’ as Cohen (2002) 
described it of the information society – panic, risk, social problems, and more 
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specifically of digital surveillance and resistance – will continue to play out online 
and offline. 
7.4.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter completes the exploration of different sites of nodal governance.  
Broadly speaking, it has been concerned with ‘the media’, both the news media and 
‘new media’ platforms like WikiLeaks.  The importance of the news media was 
signalled in Chapter Five and this chapter has shown why this is.  Digital surveillance 
and resistance involve the public above all else.  Therefore, how these issues are 
communicated and constructed in the public domain is vital for understanding the 
broader nature of control in the information society.  Cohen (2002) tells us that 
people’s perceptions are difficult to shift.  Posing the question of why digital 
surveillance may or may not be taken ‘seriously’ is therefore of central importance.  
The chapter has also reiterated the socio-technical nature of resistance/resistive 
surveillance and returned to the idea of ‘visibility’ introduced in Chapter Three. 
The broader message to take from this chapter is not actually about the content of 
leaked material concerning surveillance practices.  The message is about the 
potential of resistive surveillance.  WikiLeaks, we have seen, did arguably little to 
foster a dialogue about digital surveillance and several reasons have been proposed 
as to why that is.  Snowden has achieved much more in that respect.  The impact is 
still being felt today.  The Investigatory Powers Bill working its way through the 
Houses of Parliament has been influenced greatly by the increased awareness that 
now exists regarding the extent of surveillance capabilities of intelligence agencies 
and the lack of regulation of their activities that exists.  Regardless of this, we should 
not discard the activities of WikiLeaks as they set the tone for the way in which 
political and economic entities can be subject to surveillance by citizens as a result 
of the dissemination of information across online and traditional news media 
channels. 
WikiLeaks perhaps exemplifies more clearly the technological potential of the 
Internet that underpins this.  They were empowered by sophisticated encryption 
and manipulation of global information flows through various jurisdictions.  These 
allowed an older form of resistance – whistleblowing – to find new currency via a 
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novel media platform.  The same technology allows individual Internet users (and 
organisations) to protect their anonymity and security online.  That WikiLeaks have 
resisted all attempts to remove their online presence adds to this.  Whilst Snowden 
was a much more ‘traditional’ whistleblower in that sense, he still made use of 
encrypted communication technology to communicate his intent at the outset and 
the documents that were later revealed.  Both cases, then, illustrate and support the 
argument of this chapter; that resistance to digital surveillance (in this case resistive 
surveillance) is resilient and socio-technical.  It also signifies – and as Doyle (2011) 
suggested, complicates – the relationship between media and surveillance.  The 
recent history this chapter has covered challenges Mathiesen’s (1997) original view 
of the synopticon as one that reinforces panoptic surveillance.  Our concept of 
media in this context needs to be much broader.  To be certain, there are patterns 
of reaction in the news media that aim to counteract resistive surveillance, as we 
have seen in the attempts to make folk devils out of WikiLeaks, Assange and 
Snowden, but these are opposed, if not outweighed, by the potential that exists for 
media platforms to challenge digital surveillance. 
Drawing on Cohen’s (1972) model of moral panic has allowed for a systematic 
appraisal of the construction of surveillance issues on an individual, organisational 
and symbolic level.  Charting the reaction alerts us to the construction of the 
subversive potential of the Internet, digital surveillance and resistance to this as 
simultaneously positive and negative.  The news media is the place in which these 
contests are played out.  Moments such as those explored in this chapter allow us a 
glimpse of what Becker has called a ‘moral enterprise…the creation of a new 
fragment of the moral constitution of society’ (1963: 145) or Gusfield (1963) refers 
to as a ‘symbolic crusade’.  Despite continued obstructions and counter-resistance 
along the way, three years on from Edward Snowden this crusade continues. 
-.-- --- ..-  .- .-. .  -. --- -  .-- . .-.. -.-. --- -- .  .- -- --- -. --.  ..- ... .-.-.- 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
EMERGING THEMES FROM THE SITES OF 
SURVEILLANCE AND RESISTANCE 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
New technologies and the uses to which they are put always bring with them 
uncertainty and risk, but also potential (Beck 1992).  This thesis has presented a 
picture of the communicative, interactional environment of the Internet as a 
constantly evolving technology that has given rise to an active, vociferous and 
complex set of inter-relationships between varieties of actors.  The history of the 
Internet is one of both competition and cooperation (Fuchs 2008), as the 
uncertainties, risks and possibilities it has persistently introduced have been argued 
for and against, co-opted and capitalised upon.  This trend has continued in recent 
times; specifically, the virtual environment is increasingly manipulated to maximise 
the visibility of Internet users.  The dynamics of digital surveillance and resistance, 
explored in three key sites, have provided the context in which the contemporary 
form of social control is produced.  Commonalities and patterns have begun to 
emerge and it is the purpose of this chapter to draw these out. 
The narrative guiding the analysis up to this point has two chief characteristics.  
Firstly, it has been framed by a theory of nodal governance that has helped to draw 
different entities with a stake in the relationship between digital surveillance and 
resistance into the analysis at different stages.  Secondly it has progressively become 
more focused.  IIt began in Chapter Five with an exploration of a online community 
of resistance and the patterns of organisation within this.  It then examined, in 
Chapter Six, a specific instance of resistance where this community and other nodes 
negotiated the regulation of digital surveillance.  Finally, in Chapter Seven, it 
scrutinised one organisation and one individual that have been at the heart of much 
recent debate around surveillance and the potential afforded by the Internet to 
invert surveillance relationships.  Organising the analysis in this way has helped to 
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draw out different features of the relationship between digital surveillance and 
resistance.  While these are distinct from one another – to a degree – they combine 
to produce an overarching picture of some of the contemporary characteristics of 
social control.  Consequently, this chapter develops three main themes: nodal 
governance, regulation and visibility.  These each fit broadly with the concepts 
deployed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven but they do not simply restate the issues.  
There are additional insights that allow us to consider the various and related 
features of control in the information society.  The groundwork is laid for the 
discussion in Chapter Nine of the specificities of what is termed socio-technical 
control.  
8.2 NODAL GOVERNANCE: COMPETITION AND COOPERATION 
The thesis began with the contention that networked communication technologies 
such as the Internet – and the broader networked organisation of global society 
(Castells 2007, 2008, 2009) – force us to reconsider the operation of social control.  
Specifically, surveillance and resistance need re-investigating and reconceptualising 
in a digital society that has changed significantly the way in which they operate.  
Top-down, one-directional, state-centric conceptions of surveillance based on the 
historical analysis of the ‘panopticon’ (Foucault 1977) are untenable in 
contemporary society.  So too are modernist concepts of resistance that pit a 
powerless subject against a powerful agent of control.  The relationship between the 
two is instead much more fluid and intricate, which mirrors the networked character 
of the information society.  With this in mind the theory of nodal governance was 
employed to reflected this approach to understanding surveillance, resistance and 
control and to structure the thesis accordingly.  Namely, cases were selected that 
highlighted the broad range of social actors and entities where surveillance and 
resistance takes place and, thus, where control is negotiated and shaped. 
In criminological discourse nodal governance has been used to describe the ways in 
which a diverse set of actors interact as providers of security (Wood and Shearing 
2007: 34).  Security in this context includes digital surveillance, and maps on to 
Haggerty and Ericson’s (2000) concept of the ‘surveillant assemblage’: a society-
wide horizontal network of public and private entities that within and between them 
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function to create the surveillance apparatus of society.  The aim of Chapter Five 
was to demonstrate how these complementary ideas could be expanded to take 
account of resistance as well as surveillance.  Nodal governance refers not only to 
those practices that seek to enact surveillance or other forms of security and control 
but to all manner of positive action that aims to guide a social system.   Thus, in the 
same way as governance of security amongst public and private entities has been 
described (see Johnston and Shearing 2003; Shearing and Wood 2003; Burris et al. 
2005; Wood and Shearing 2007), resistance is networked and fluid.  Online, within 
the advocacy community united by broadly-framed libertarian goals, there is jostling 
for position at the same time as there is cooperation in the form of coalitions, or 
‘superstructural’ nodes.  To add to this, resistance is also undertaken by some of 
those entities that seek to provide security (political surveillance) or carry out other 
economic surveillance (illustrated in Chapter Six).   
The analysis of the data in Chapter Five using the theory of nodal governance 
contributed to the narrative of the thesis, therefore, by illuminating the social 
organisation of resistance.  Drawing on insights from previous research on nodal 
governance and networked communities, several characteristics of the online 
network of ‘privacy advocates’ were highlighted.  These included: mentalities, 
resources, technologies and institutions (Burris et al. 2005); stability and density 
(Introna and Gibbons 2009) and responsiveness to the real time events.  Chapter 
Five demonstrated these digital workings of nodal governance empirically through 
visualisation of online networks of resistance. 
At its core, then, nodal governance implies a constant shifting of relationships 
between various entities, characterised by both competition and cooperation 
between networks of actors (Fuchs 2008).  These can define the relationship 
between any two actors.  Wood and Shearing (2007) also refer to these ideas in 
their discussion of nodal governance.  Nodes are not necessarily joined to one 
another in permanent, stable networks, even when they are pursuing the same 
goals.  For instance, the networks revealed in Chapter Five, while containing a 
breadth of advocacy groups with similar mentalities, were flexible and changed over 
time.  Relationships change depending on circumstance.  Martin et al. (2009) 
identified these themes in similar circumstances.  They suggest that a ‘multi-actor 
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framework’ is necessary to understand the relationships and processes that occur in 
response to specific surveillance developments.  Importantly, these frameworks are 
context-dependent.  Thus, for Martin et al. (2009) the set of competitive and 
cooperative interactions that emerged in response to the Identity Cards Act 2006 
was unique, just as were the interactions that were seen in this research in response 
to the Communications Data Bill.  The information society has allowed for these 
patterns of organisation to flourish (Castells 2000 in Burris et al. 2005: 37).  This is an 
important point, as it restates why it is crucial to focus research efforts in this area 
on the information society and why networks in particular are of analytical interest. 
Civil society, in its broad sense, is a node for governance as are the state and private 
sector.  These nodes, however, also encapsulate a large number of other nodes.  
Nodal governance thus operates at different organisational levels.  The relationships 
between the constituent nodes of the ‘privacy advocate’ sub-sector of civil society 
were visualised in Chapter Five.  There was evidence that some of these nodes were 
more connected in the hyperlink environment of the Web than others – and were 
thus possibly more ‘important’ for the network – which further develops the sense 
of constant competition and cooperation in governance processes.  A new insight 
theorised from the data was the existence of ‘bridging nodes’.  This important role 
was made visible through the visualisation of hyperlink networks and deepens our 
understanding of the operation of nodal governance.  
With respect to cooperation, aside from the connectivity via hyperlinks, there was 
further evidence of this in the existence of groups such as the European Digital 
Rights Initiative (EDRi) and Don’t Spy On Us.  Such groups could be considered 
‘superstructural nodes’ (Burris et al. 2005) insofar as they demonstrate a willingness 
to coordinate resources and technologies within the community to increase the 
impact the various groups can have in resisting surveillance.  Similarly, the privacy 
advocate community could also be considered a superstructural node but in perhaps 
a looser organisational sense as issues of geography and mission of groups becomes 
more dispersed and diverse.  Just as the relationship between digital surveillance 
and resistance is dynamic, so too is resistance a fluid process.  There are elements of 
the online social organisation of resistance that are stable over time, but there are 
also shifts in the contours of this community and different organisational levels 
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where resistance happens.  These online patterns were evidenced and expanded 
upon in Chapter Six, where a broader array of governing nodes were seen 
interacting; some advocating greater surveillance (the government), some resisting 
this (civil society and individual citizens) and others fulfilling both functions (CSPs 
and some experts).   
Wood and Shearing (2007: 34) also suggest that the nodal governance perspective 
does not presume a decline in state authority or power (resulting from the diffusion 
of governing roles to various other locales).  On the contrary, they argue, it 
represents a pervasive expansion of such power as diverse entities begin to function 
as auspices of security (Shearing and Stenning 1981, 1983, 1985; Cohen 1985, 
Garland 2001).  This research supports this claim, to an extent.  The government is 
prominent in the networks and interactions that have been explored, and through 
practices of surveillance and regulation they have sought to consolidate that 
position.  However, their authority has been challenged on a number of fronts.  
Rather than a decline in state power, then, what we are witnessing is a concurrent 
escalation of the resisting power (Sharp et al. 2000) of other nodes.  These patterns 
are the result of the empowering capacity of Internet communication and 
organisation. 
Wood and Shearing acknowledge this process when they say that other actors ‘may 
work with states but they can also coordinate nodes to resist and contest state 
governance’ (2003: 28).  This is a theme that was apparent within and between the 
three research sites and can be thought of as a competitive process of accumulating, 
deploying and mobilising various forms of ‘capital’ (Bourdieu 1986, in Dupont 2003, 
2006) – economic, social, cultural, political, and technological.  Private sector online 
service providers are particularly important in this respect.  While their motivations 
are primarily profit-driven (economic surveillance), government and law 
enforcement increasingly define them as important providers of security – what 
Wood and Shearing (2007: 29) call a blurring of ‘governing mentalities’.  These 
findings are similar to those of Dupont (2003, 2006) who claims that public policing 
bodies mobilise capital in order to maintain a degree of hegemony in the provision 
of security.  They are similar in that the government, by mandating CSPs to retain 
more data, sought to rectify a ‘capability gap’ in the ability of law enforcement to 
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provide security for citizens.  The way in which government attempts to mobilise 
this capital in the corporate domain is through regulation like the Communications 
Data Bill202 (CDB).  They differ, however, insofar as, by outsourcing or ‘mediating’ 
(Bright and Agustina 2013) control functions such as surveillance to the private 
sector, they acknowledge their shortfalls.  The public sector cannot reclaim this 
means of providing security – it must be carried out by other nodes.  In the other 
research sites, too, competition for capital occurred in different forms.  Social capital 
is important for the advocacy community (and indeed is a cornerstone of social 
movement theory that was touched upon in Chapter Five).  Cultural capital could be 
identified in similar terms and also in the efforts of WikiLeaks, Edward Snowden and 
the news media to create a symbolic sense both of the Internet as an empowering 
tool, and surveillance of this space as fundamentally repressive.  Technological 
capital is a new addition to the list outlined by Dupont (2003) but is vital to 
understanding online governance; WikiLeaks is a good example of how technological 
capital can be mobilised in the pursuit of specific goals.  Likewise, returning to CSPs, 
the reason that government identifies these nodes as valuable is for their 
technological capital – their ownership of the means to capture citizens’ 
transactional data. 
In respect of the theoretical positions outlined in Chapter Three, nodal governance 
here does not replace or supersede social control.  We need to be aware of both; 
control is a product of relationships and motivations within a broader socio-technical 
system of governance.  While the argument presented in Chapter Three, that there 
has been a shift in patterns of control – namely towards co-opting and 
responsibilising private auspices of security (i.e. towards a governing mentality) – is 
accurate, social control is not a defunct concept.  Rather, the socio-technical system 
of governance that has been described here is particularly productive of a new 
character of social control.  The Internet has amplified the potential for control but 
also the potential for resistance.  In Chapter Three, nodal governance was described 
as a ‘post-social’ outlook on control (Johnston and Shearing 2003; Shearing and 
Wood 2003; Wood and Shearing 2007).  That is, the 'social’, as both a target and 
location for control, has been replaced by various locales and sites of governance 
                                                          
202 And, more recently, the Investigatory Powers Bill (2015). 
227 
 
(nodes).  This research challenges that perspective.  The degree of interaction 
between nodes (changeable though it is) does suggest that the social is still a 
valuable theoretical construct.  Taken together, the sites identified in this thesis, for 
instance, encapsulate much of what could be fairly described as ‘the social’.  They do 
exist as distinct locales with differing motivations, priorities and targets for 
governing.  Yet they are connected to, and influence, one another (through 
competition or cooperation) to the extent that governance, and subsequently 
control, occurs at a societal level.  These trends are facilitated by the networked, 
communicative technology of the Internet.  The Internet also creates new spaces for 
governance and control, within which these nodes compete and cooperate with one 
another.  The concept of space and place is highly relevant for studying surveillance 
and control.  Indeed, it connects to Foucault’s (1977) initial elaboration of 
surveillance within certain institutions.  However, although the data here have 
pointed towards these issues, this is a theoretical debate that would require 
diiferently focused research to fully explore203.  While this might seem to suggest a 
deconstruction of the social once again – a division of society into distinct, virtual 
locales – the globally networked nature of these spaces instead re-emphasises the 
societal level of governance and control.  It is for all these reasons that the 
contemporary character of governance and control can be described as ‘socio-
technical’.  This concept is explored in greater detail in the concluding chapter in 
response to the third research question of the thesis. 
The concept of nodal governance has enriched the theoretical arguments of the 
thesis.  In equal measure, the thesis has added to contemporary debates about 
nodal governance by illustrating empirically the specificities of how it plays out in 
the information society.  Traditionally, discussions of governance and social control 
have placed the state at the centre of these processes, particularly in terms of 
security and crime prevention.  Both the nodal perspective on governance and the 
context of the information society problematise this perspective.  The primacy of the 
state is challenged by the private sector that owns the channels of communication 
and has its own interest in the data that are generated within them.  The socio-
technical system of governance encapsulates all the interactions and relations that 
                                                          
203 See Chapter Nine (section 9.4.1). 
228 
 
construct the Internet as an economic domain as well as a social, cultural and spatial 
one.  While governance, in these terms, is descriptive of the operation of power 
across society and illustrates the various rationalities for managing and influencing 
populations, social control, by comparison, occurs within this system and between 
the actors who constitute it. 
8.3 REGULATION: CONTROLLING BEHAVIOUR AND SHAPING THE 
WEB 
The focus in Chapter Six on regulation of surveillance both narrowed the focus of the 
research (by examining a particular context where surveillance and resistance 
intersected) and expanded upon some of the insights from Chapter Five (by 
illustrating the broader network of social entities involved in advocating surveillance 
and enacting resistance).  The aim of Chapter Six was to demonstrate how legal 
frameworks have sought to regulate surveillance in the information society and how 
these have subsequently generated effects of resistance.  Underpinning the analysis 
was the contention that regulation and surveillance intersect as modes of social 
control.  The relevance of focusing on regulation alongside surveillance (to inform a 
discussion of social control) stems from two sources: theoretical and empirical 
research204 that has examined the ‘regulation of cyberspace’ in various ways (from 
which this thesis takes a great deal of inspiration), and the precedent for 
incorporating this concept into studies of surveillance.  In Chapter Three, for 
instance, it was shown that Foucault’s (1977) elaboration of discipline was 
essentially concerned with regulating behaviour through constant surveillance.  In 
Chapter Two, Lessig’s (1999) ‘architectures of identification’ illustrated how 
regulating the digital environment can allow for specific forms of surveillance to 
exist.  Less has been said in the literature about the specificities of regulation of the 
surveillance industry or techniques of surveillance, although the extensive body 
work around this subject (e.g. Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Gunningham and 
Grabosky 1998) does indicate the value of considering how regulation functions 
alongside surveillance in the contemporary information society. 
                                                          
204 See Chapter Two. 
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Regulation is ‘concerned with technical modifications of procedure’ (Innes 2014: 
149) – how things should or can be done – rather than a concern with outcome.  
Rehearsing a theme for Chapter Nine, regulation in this context can be considered 
either as ‘social’ (i.e. legislation that compels certain behaviour) or ‘technological’ 
(i.e. the ability of technology to dictate the kinds of behaviour that are possible 
online).  This is behaviour that, to use Cohen’s (1985) approach, may be perceived as 
deviant or problematic, but it may also be behaviour of online consumers, for 
instance, whose preferences are targeted on the basis of algorithmic surveillance 
techniques.  Online, this is particularly applicable.  Galloway (2004) describes 
‘protocol’ as a technological system of control that defines the limits of possibility 
for online action; nothing can be done outside of the limits of the protocological 
system.  Even resistance has to operate within the boundaries of action that 
protocol makes possible.  Given that all interaction and organisation on the Internet 
can only occur because it is made possible by technological processes, regulation is a 
pertinent form of control that requires attention in the context of a study of digital 
surveillance, resistance and social control. 
These aspects of how regulation intersects with surveillance began to emerge from 
the data in Chapter Six (in the context of regulating those who carry out 
surveillance) and also in Chapter Seven (where the regulation of cyberspace or 
‘code’ was what allowed for WikiLeaks’ unique brand of resistance).  Regulating the 
way in which the digital environment can be accessed for the purposes of security is 
an enormously challenging process, as the CDB was testament to and as subsequent 
legislation has also shown205.  The CDB aimed to codify the tenuous relationship 
between the state and CSPs in the private sector.  This ‘mediation’ (Bright and 
Agustina 2013) of surveillance is not a new phenomenon, but the characteristics of 
surveillance in the information society complicate the process.  Specifically, 
regulation in this area must fit within a global surveillant assemblage (Haggerty and 
Ericson 2000) and not only within the boundaries of the nation state in which it is 
enacted.  Resistance to these newly regulated forms of surveillance, as a 
consequence, is amplified as this opens it up to a much broader set of actors who 
simultaneously work to codify their interests in law. 
                                                          
205 For example, the Investigatory Powers Bill (2015): 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/investigatory-powers-bill 
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The lessons learned in Chapter Six about regulation, therefore, were not confined to 
highlighting the position of private sector CSPs in the dynamic of surveillance and 
resistance.  While an important finding in itself, researching the regulatory domain 
in the context of digital surveillance also illuminated the role of other categories of 
actors in shaping a debate about necessary and proportionate surveillance.  These 
findings highlighted that the state no longer enjoys a monopoly on defining what is 
risky or problematic when it comes to crime and security and the necessary 
mechanisms to regulate these risks.  Drawing on the theme of Chapter Five, a large 
number of nodes aligned against the state during the consultation on the CDB, in 
both formal and informal collaboration.  Agamben’s (2005) ‘state of exception’ – the 
paradoxical tendency to undermine civil liberties in an effort to protect them – was a 
useful tool for understanding this situation.  Regulating the digital surveillance 
apparatus of the UK is not only a question of how to provide security for citizens, 
because in the information society the methods for doing this impact on the daily 
lives and interactions of people online at an increasingly granular level.  As before, 
then, regulation of digital surveillance speaks to the character of the information 
society in that everyone has a stake in this debate, not only the regulator and 
regulated.  
8.3.1 CENTRALISATION AND DECENTRALISATION 
A sub-theme connected to the concept of regulation that has emerged at various 
junctures is that of centralisation and decentralisation.  Chapter Two described how 
architecture of the Internet is decentralised/distributed and that it is this which 
allows it to operate as it does.  This characteristic is at the basis of many libertarian 
claims that the Internet democratises communication and is a powerful tool for free 
speech.  However, in contrast to this, there have been concerns voiced in the 
findings that there are increasing tendencies towards centralisation – of architecture 
and subsequently of information and services – that undermine and challenge the 
potential of Internet communication to be free from control.  The possible 
alternative architectures of cyberspace are many (Lessig 1999).  Some would allow 
for greater control (perhaps through commonplace surveillance) while others would 
allow for more freedom – to exchange ideas and property, or to interact free from 
surveillance perhaps.  Both of these are the product of a regulated Internet – or 
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regulated ‘code’.  This point is important.  Regulation of cyberspace is not inherently 
damaging but there are forms of regulation that could allow for greater surveillance, 
greater control and less freedom online.  This is what Lessig (1999) terms 
‘architectures of identification’.  By changing the nature of the Internet (centralising 
information and services for example) and thus the types of behaviour that can 
occur (regulation), it is made more susceptible to ubiquitous surveillance. 
It is a limitation of this thesis that it has not found specific instances where the 
technological architecture of the Internet has been regulated in such a way as to 
make surveillance more commonplace.  Some indication of this was observed in the 
work of the Government Digital Service (GDS) who were changing the way in which 
online public services functioned.  GDS were working closely with private sector 
businesses that held identifiable data on individuals, which could be used as a proxy 
for verifying the identity of prospective applicants for services.  To an extent, this is 
representative of a trend towards an Internet that is regulated on the basis of 
identifiability.  However, the arguments in Chapter Seven demonstrate how the 
antithesis is possible.  That is, virtual networks can be regulated so as to ensure 
identities cannot be ascertained; WikiLeaks ensured that those who submitted 
leaked material could not be identified.  This, of course, is not ‘formal’ regulation 
(i.e. ‘social’) but it is regulation of code (i.e. ‘technological). 
If we look to the case in Chapter Six, we see something similar in the regulation of 
surveillance.  The CDB was less concerned with affecting change in the virtual 
environment, in order to make it more susceptible to surveillance, than it was with 
regulating how digital surveillance should be carried out in practice.  This is a fine 
distinction but an important one.  The CDB, and other legislation preceding it, 
exemplify where the conduct of surveillance is regulated206.  Those subject to control 
in these cases include a wide variety of public and private bodies that collect data 
from citizens in one form or another.  What we see in these cases is regulation 
ensuring compliance from public and private bodies, which in turn legitimises other 
forms of control (surveillance) and attempts to allay any public fears that may exist 
over the use of such powers – fears that were seen in the data in Chapter Six.  Both 
                                                          
206 The CDB and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act being two examples where the goal is 
control of deviant behaviour (crime prevention). 
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‘social’ and ‘technological’ forms of regulation then, are instances where its 
implementation affects the nature, purpose and extent of surveillance. 
The regulation of surveillance can also be approached in terms of centralisation and 
decentralisation.  Take the example of the failed Intercept Modernisation 
Programme (IMP) in 2009207.  In this case, the conduct of communications data 
surveillance revolved around the establishment of a centralised database accessible 
to government and law enforcement.  For critics of the IMP, this proposal was an 
insurmountable barrier.  Furthermore, it illustrates that centralisation of data 
(specifically, data that can be very revealing208) is a major concern particularly, it 
would seem, when it is the government that holds such a repository.  By contrast, 
and likely as a response to this, the CDB proposed a decentralised/federated model 
for storing data.  This approach, of course, had the added benefit that responsibility 
for collecting and storing data securely would rest with the private sector.  
Regardless, the CDB was rejected on grounds more related to the fundamental 
opposition to the necessity and proportionality of extensive digital surveillance. 
In the legislative context, neither centralised nor decentralised processes, it would 
appear, are a panacea for implementing acceptable regulation of surveillance.  By 
contrast, participants in this research did advocate decentralisation of Internet 
architecture and information.  We need to couple these observations with the fact 
that decentralisation is a defining trait of the organisation and operation of 
contemporary surveillance.  Foucault’s (1991) work on governmentality laid the 
groundwork in shifting away from the dominant conceptualisation of a single point 
of power towards one of dispersed and diffuse networks of power.  Likewise, 
Haggerty and Ericson’s (2000) surveillant assemblage, and Cohen’s (1985) earlier 
work, are cases in point – as indeed is the preceding discussion of nodal governance.  
Theories of social control, then, suggest that decentralising tendencies characterise 
contemporary society.  Those networks exist and find new energy online.  At the 
same time, in technological terms, this tendency appears to be reversing – towards 
centralisation of services, as a result of the strong economic motives behind the 
                                                          
207 See Chapter Two (section 2.4.4). 
208 See Chapter Six (section 6.4.2). 
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regulation of cyberspace.  That is a particular product of control in the information 
society. 
8.4 VISIBILITY: DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE, SOUSVEILLANCE AND THE 
SYNOPTICON 
The final sub-narrative guiding the findings of the thesis was that of moral panic and 
the social construction of surveillance and resistance.  This is a vital part of 
understanding social control, as it is through such processes that the desire for, or 
alleged necessity of, more or less control is created.  The thesis began by introducing 
the concept of visibility as it applies to modern digital technology.  This was followed 
by a description of current surveillance issues and trends in contemporary 
surveillance practices.  Correspondingly, Chapter Seven returned to some of these 
themes, and continued the trend of the previous chapters of focusing in greater 
detail on specific scenes and actors in the surveillance/resistance relationship.  The 
analysis centred in closely on one actor in particular – WikiLeaks.  It elaborated, first, 
the mechanisms by which WikiLeaks operated, thus demonstrating the potential of 
digital communication to foster highly effective resistance.  Second, it drew out the 
cyclical process of resistance and counter-resistance that characterised WikiLeaks’ 
and Snowden’s interactions with surveillance agents (i.e. various governments).  The 
theory of moral panic (and, more broadly, social problems) helped to guide the 
exploration of how both surveillance and resistance (in this case ‘resistive 
surveillance’) were constructed as potentially problematic.  Throughout this 
discussion it also became clear that the division between surveillance and resistance 
is conceptually blurred.  ‘Resistive surveillance’ – incorporating sousveillance (Mann 
et al. 2003) and the synopticon (Mathiesen 1997) – shed light on the nature of this 
relationship.  These insights are drawn out here under the umbrella of ‘visibility’, 
introduced in Chapter Three.  This idea is speaks to the simultaneous ways in which 
people are made visible online (by surveillance) as well as how surveillance agents 
are made visible (by resistive surveillance). 
In many ways, the world around us is more visible in its literal sense; through video 
footage made available through the medium of television and the Web, we can see 
more places and people than we are ever likely to ‘in the flesh’.  Visibility in the 
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context of surveillance, however, need not always be about vision (Marx 2002).  
Indeed, online, we are often not ‘seen’ by those who surveill us but, rather, our 
actions, interactions and transactions for all intents and purposes render us more 
‘visible’ than ever before.  Even relatively innocuous data, when combined and 
aggregated, have the potential to reveal (or at least infer) very sensitive information 
about us, as the data in Chapter Six demonstrated.  All these kinds of information, 
many of which we volunteer ourselves for reward or convenience (Andrejevic 2007), 
generate knowledge about us as individuals, as members of various groups and 
communities and as a citizenry.  This knowledge, the product of algorithmic 
calculations, is frequently used to predict and subsequently persuade, instruct and 
regulate us. 
Of course, we are not only subject to ‘economic’ surveillance.  The revelations from 
Edward Snowden uncovered the mass ‘political’ surveillance practices of intelligence 
agencies in the UK and US, where in one case, millions of Internet users were made 
literally more visible as a result of GCHQ intercepting webcam images of Yahoo users 
(see Ackerman and Ball 2014).  It is difficult to theorise to what extent the mass 
surveillance apparatus of these agencies is linked to online control, given the 
obscurity that still surrounds the volume of data collected, how they are analysed, 
who sees them, how long they are kept and where.  Despite it being ‘invisible’ in a 
similar way to economic surveillance, the data are (we have to assume, or at least 
we are reassured) not used to alter our behaviour or the virtual environment.  It is 
used only to identify deviancy in the form of the most serious criminal activity and 
terrorism. 
However, what is clear is that both political and economic surveillance are 
increasingly invisible and unintelligible; carried out largely automatically by 
computers employing sophisticated algorithms.  Schneier (2014) notes that the NSA 
and GCHQ have used algorithmic surveillance as a defence of sorts for mass online 
surveillance, the defence being that the large majority of Internet users’ data are 
never viewed by a human operator and, hence, are never actually ‘collected’.  In 
another example of regulation of surveillance a US Department of Defense 
procedural manual says: 
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‘Information shall be considered as “collected” only when it has been received 
for use by an employee of a DoD intelligence component in the course of his 
official duties…Data acquired by electronic means is “collected” only when it 
has been processed into intelligible form.’ (Department of Defense 1982: 15) 
The adequacy of this is questionable; in 1982 it was unlikely they foresaw 
contemporary technological capabilities.  Nevertheless, we are told to trust that our 
data go no further than the computer receiving them.  However, as the Snowden 
revelations have demonstrated, trust in the intelligence agencies has been 
somewhat undermined.  While their activities have, over the last three years, 
become more visible than ever before, there remains a high degree of invisibility 
concerning digital surveillance processes and practices. 
Meyrowitz (1985) and Mathiesen (1997) offer useful tools for interpreting the 
impacts of evolving electronic media on control.  Meyrowitz (1985) suggests that 
electronic media have made different social situations more visible and thus have a 
liberating effect, breaking down barriers between different social groups.  One 
example of this would be between authorities and citizens (surveillers and 
surveilled).  Meyrowitz argues that the expansion of broadcast media renders public 
figures more visible, as a result of which their authority can be diminished.  The 
trends Meyrowitz identified in the 1980s in large part remain true today – and have 
escalated – in the context of social media where many public figures, organisations 
and institutions have an active presence.  The events revolving around WikiLeaks 
and Snowden have reinforced this trend – albeit a kind of ‘forced’ visibility placed on 
political and economic institutions through resistive surveillance.  These actions 
comprise, in part, the inversion of surveillance – ‘sousveillance’ (Mann et al. 2003) – 
through digital means.  What is common to both patterns is that powerful groups in 
society have less control over what is known about them as a consequence of the 
changing role of media in society (for which the Internet is the vehicle).  Mathiesen 
(1997) comments on similar trends.  For him the ‘synopticon’ inverted traditional 
panoptic relationships where instead the ‘many watch the few’.  Again, this is 
attributed to new media platforms.  However, Mathiesen is pessimistic; the 
synopticon is not liberating but controlling and ‘taken as a whole, things are much 
worse than Michel Foucault imagined’ (1997: 231, emphasis in original).  As Coleman 
(2013: 142) echoes, ‘the many in society are increasingly encouraged to watch and 
admire the ways of the powerful few’ as a means to keeping us in thrall to control.  
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Certainly, digital media possess synoptic tendencies insofar as they assist in 
promulgating the cult of celebrity and providing a means of enchantment and 
satisfaction; ‘it is by satisfying the need for escape that people are made to 
acquiesce’ (Mathiesen 1997: 230). 
However, new ‘synoptic’ media (such as WikiLeaks) do not necessarily reinforce 
panoptic surveillance.  In fact, the practices of ‘resistive surveillance’ in Chapter 
Seven show how the concept of the synopticon and sousveillance are somewhat 
blurred.  Moreover, platforms such as social media have also ushered in a situation 
where the ‘many watch the many’.  This is a view shared by Doyle (2011) who 
critiques Mathiesen’s argument on the basis that contemporary (online) media have 
expanded rapidly and further than Mathiesen’s analysis is able to adequately 
account for.  Furthermore, Doyle identifies a lack of space within Mathiesen’s work 
for the potential for resistance inherent in new media.  The work of this thesis is 
testament to that potential.  Mathiesen’s argument suggests that news media, by 
and large, support the status quo.  However, we have seen in Chapter Seven that the 
new media ecosystem is significantly less stable than this would suggest and has a 
more complex relationship with surveillance.  As Doyle notes, ‘in various contexts, 
mass media conduct surveillance, engender public support for it, help resist 
surveillance or help the marginalised use surveillance itself as a tool of resistance’ 
(2011: 290).  WikiLeaks has, in part, contributed to our understanding of how media 
and surveillance are entwined.  The WikiLeaks case exemplifies all the facets that 
Doyle lists, while also demonstrating how the ‘many watching the few’ is as much a 
form of resistance as it is control. 
It is still the case that powerful private and public influences shape what we are 
presented with in the media, but there is a strong counter-current resulting from the 
democratising potential of digital technology (Meyrowitz 1985; Brin 1998).  In 
addition, it is not only individuals who can take advantage of these opportunities for 
resistance through new media.  In Chapter Five, the advocacy community connected 
in different ways through various media platforms.  Traditional news media featured 
in the network, their presence online allowing them to retain some of their power.  
Twitter, meanwhile, appeared to be a central ‘hub’ where communication between 
these groups and with individuals took place at a frenetic rate.  Of course, this is not 
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to discount the fact that such platforms, while instrumental for resistance, are 
central components in the digital surveillance complex.  Doyle (2006: 206) reminds 
us to be aware that although such tools are democratising and can ‘reshape social 
situations’ they are the product of power relations, the likes of which we saw at play 
in Chapter Six. 
Visibility is a valuable concept for understanding digital surveillance and resistance.  
This thesis has helped to illuminate the continuing transformations in how different 
social groups (including surveillers and surveilled) and technologies are visible and 
invisible in the online environment.  In light of the findings of this thesis, Doyle 
(2011) is correct that Mathiesen’s (1997) argument for the ‘many watching the few’ 
as the central pillar of social control needs re-evaluating.  The Internet is a two-way 
medium capable of offering enormous potential for both surveillance and 
resistance.  Furthermore, the contemporary digital environment should not 
generate a sense of pessimism regarding digital surveillance and control.  Visibility is 
a precursor to control but it also encourages resistance. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION 
9.1 THE SURVEILLANCE AND RESISTANCE DYNAMIC 
This final chapter summarises the main findings of the thesis and relates these to the 
broader issues of digital surveillance and social control in the information society.  
The impact of a specific technological medium – the Internet – on social relations 
has been at the heart of this thesis.  Consequently, the research is situated amidst a 
broad and varied literature concerned, at its widest, with the contours of the 
contemporary information or network society and the role of the Internet in society 
(Castells 1997, 1998, 1999; Fuchs 2008; Graham and Dutton 2014) and, at its most 
specific, with digital surveillance, resistance, privacy and activism (Marx 2002, 2003, 
2009; Lyon 2001, 2003b; Bennett 2008; Dupont 2008; Milan 2013).  The evolution of 
the Internet has rapidly enhanced the volume and speed with which information is 
transmitted around the world.  At the same time, this has had clear consequences 
for the nature of surveillance in society as more information is generated, 
volunteered, captured and analysed.  Mundane communications, such as telephone 
calls, all contain metadata that tells our service providers where we were, whom we 
talked to and when.  Our Internet browsing histories are also able to be captured 
and can reveal a detailed picture of our habits and preferences.  Opinions, 
arguments and all manner of other sentiments are shared in public, online domains 
such as Facebook and Twitter.  Digital data about our personal histories are stored in 
multiple databases and, as well as containing individual-level information, these 
data can be aggregated and used to analyse and predict group and population-level 
behaviour. 
Surveillance is carried out for a large number of reasons in both the public and 
private sectors and increasingly, the motivations of actors from these two realms 
overlap.  Surveillance by the state (‘political surveillance’) is equated with security 
for citizens, while much of the ability of the state to fulfil this function rests on 
accessing data held by custodians in the private sector (‘economic surveillance’) who 
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control the digital spaces and channels through which social interactions and 
transactions take place.  At the centre of this network of competition and 
cooperation are individuals and groups of citizens.  Awareness of the myriad 
mechanisms of surveillance is by no means uniform and even when people are 
aware of surveillance, it is often accepted as routine or conferring some benefit.  
However, resistance to surveillance is a constant factor in this dynamic, its 
technologies and techniques evolving and adapting as new measures to counter 
risks from crime and terrorism are introduced.  The story of this thesis, therefore, is 
that as much as the Internet has allowed for the growth of surveillance in society, so 
too has it presented opportunities for resisting surveillance.  The relationship 
between surveillance and resistance is crucial for defining the relationship of 
technology to society (and vice-versa).  Examining this relationship in detail, as this 
thesis has done, has provided new insights, mapping social order in the information 
society and how social control constitutes and is constituted by it. 
9.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In engaging with these issues, the following questions have guided this thesis: 
1. How are digital surveillance and resistance related? 
2. Why do individuals and groups who resist surveillance identify a need for 
doing so? 
3. What are the implications of these patterns for our understanding of control 
in the information society? 
The conceptual framework for answering these questions developed out of a theory 
of nodal governance.  Much of what this thesis has contributed with respect to that 
framework was discussed in the preceding chapter; the significant changes in social 
organisation brought about by the constant evolution of the Internet (reiterated 
above) require us to view surveillance through a lens that attunes us to the 
networked nature of contemporary society, rather than one that emphasises top-
down forms of organisation and control.  The sites that provided the empirical data 
for the thesis were selected in line with this framework.  They illuminated the 
multiplicity of social actors involved in the digital surveillance/resistance dynamic 
and the consequently negotiated, fluid and networked character of social control.  It 
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is with this in mind that we can look at the responses to the overarching research 
questions. 
9.2.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SURVEILLANCE AND RESISTANCE 
The introductory discussion serves in part to answer the first research question 
concerning the relationship between digital surveillance and resistance.  This 
relationship is in constant flux.  This is a characteristic identified in earlier work in 
this area by Marx (2009), who proposed a cyclical model of ‘neutralisation’ 
(resistance), ‘counter-neutralisation’ and ‘counter-counter-neutralisation’ (and so 
on).  In this respect the patterns that have been identified in this research suggest 
that the core of the relationship between digital surveillance and resistance is the 
same as that for surveillance and resistance in broader terms as discussed by Marx.  
However, the nature of the relationship between digital surveillance and resistance 
can be understood in a more nuanced way.  Namely, the relationship enlists a much 
broader array of inter-connected social actors (identified as governing ‘nodes’ 
throughout).  Localised instances of ‘real world’ surveillance may generate effects of 
resistance at the individual level, and if these render the surveillance technology 
redundant, measures can be taken to neutralise the resistance by adapting the 
surveillance technology or practice (and so the cycle begins).  However, the context 
of digital surveillance and resistance is global.  Surveillance online has a much 
greater reach and subsequent resistance is generated at the level of networks of 
individuals and organisations.  Technological ‘fixes’ (Dupont 2008) such as 
encryption tools do still operate at the individual level but even these are the 
product of collaborative efforts between actors concerned with erosion of privacy in 
the digital world.  These networks were evidenced in Chapter Five, their overlapping 
mentalities constituting the basis for the formation of online communities at 
different levels.  They were also seen in operation in Chapter Six, where civil society 
organisations, individuals and private corporations joined in ad hoc collaborations 
(even if not intentionally) to resist regulation that would extend the UK surveillance 
apparatus. 
There are three key (related) points to take from this, which have been signalled 
throughout this thesis.  First, the Internet has greatly enhanced the potential for 
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both digital surveillance and resistance.  Regarding the latter, the case of WikiLeaks 
is particularly enlightening.  Second, digital surveillance and resistance are 
increasingly entwined in the information society.  As well as being a product of 
overlapping roles and motivations, this is also due to the ‘fabric’ of cyberspace that 
contains, within it, the building blocks for both surveillance and resistance (Galloway 
2004).  Third, the relationship between digital surveillance and resistance is to be 
considered in global and networked terms, however locally the manifestation of this 
may be played out. 
The relationship between digital surveillance and resistance is, therefore, a complex 
one.  It is not the case that there are two opposing sides of the divide – one 
advocating surveillance that the other resists – who are locked in a perpetual cycle 
of action and reaction.  Different actors at different times are both complicit in 
surveillance and resistance.  CSPs, several of whom featured in Chapter Six, seem 
particularly key in that respect.  At various points in the thesis it has been noted that 
these entities occupy a prominent place in the surveillance apparatus of the 
information society.  However, this position also confers on them the ability to 
effectively resist surveillance developments such as new forms of regulation.  
Individual citizens or users of Internet/digital technologies are also crucially 
positioned.  Collectively, as well as individually, we are the source of much of the 
data that are collected and analysed by surveillance technologies (Clarke 1998; Lyon 
2003).  However, there is little evidence of widespread objection to these practices.  
In part this may be due to a lack of awareness both of the systems and of their 
implications (see Albrechtslund 2008).  It may also be affected by a conscious desire 
to supply information that confers some sort of reward or benefit.  Nevertheless, 
the findings in Chapter Seven do begin to point towards a growing public 
consciousness of the role of governments as surveillance agents – if not private 
sector actors – that has been influenced by the efforts of organisations like 
WikiLeaks and whistleblowers like Edward Snowden.  It is questionable that this 
amounts to a moral panic about surveillance but equally the chapter argued that an 
identifiable ‘panic’ is not the be all and end all of the public’s ability to challenge 
digital surveillance practices. 
242 
 
In addition, another factor in this dynamic is that resistance and digital surveillance 
are not engaged in a wholesale conflict.  What this means is that not all surveillance 
is resisted – only ‘excessive’ or ‘disproportionate’ surveillance.  However, this raises 
the question of who gets to define surveillance in these terms.  Undoubtedly, there 
is an element of moral entrepreneurship at play here.  Again, the gratification that 
digital, economic surveillance can provide (Andrejevic 2007) needs to be 
acknowledged, as this may go some way towards explaining apathy towards 
increased surveillance.  As the data in Chapter Six illustrated, civil society 
organisations, private sector enterprises and individuals do recognise there is a need 
for surveillance that protects citizens and provides security in a range of contexts.  
However, there is also a feeling that this must be in proportion to the threats and 
risks faced.  The relationship between digital surveillance and resistance should be 
geared, therefore, towards finding stability, not dominance.  Subsequent attempts 
by the UK government to implement surveillance legislation irrespective of the 
concerns of civil society, parliamentary committees and a host of other actors 
suggests, however, that this approach is not currently being taken.  We can 
hypothesise how this situation may continue to develop.  As engagement with 
online services continues to develop, and as surveillance practices evolve as a result, 
it would be expected that normative values regarding what is ‘appropriate’ would 
also shift; necessity and proportionality are not objective.  Bringing the discussion of 
this research question back to where it began, aiming for equilibrium requires 
networked collaboration between varieties of social actors, while also dictating that 
there will inevitably be competition in different ways. 
9.2.2 WHY RESIST DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE? 
This discussion leads us on appropriately to the second research question 
concerning the motivations for resisting surveillance.  The findings of this thesis have 
shown, in different contexts, why individuals and groups resist digital surveillance. 
Chapter Five showed that the community of privacy advocates is characterised by a 
diverse and overlapping set of mentalities.  Privacy has been used in previous work 
as a unifying concept.  Bennett (2008) suggested that the organisations constituting 
this community can be categorised based on their relation to privacy; for some it is a 
core issue (‘privacy-centric’), while for others it is marginal.  In the literature, privacy 
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has typically been inseparable from the practice of surveillance because it is the 
natural antithesis to the process of extracting, collecting and analysing personal 
information.  However, it is also an amorphous concept (Huey 2010).  It is subject to 
changing interpretations over time and place.  What privacy means in one national 
context may not be the same in another.  Indeed, this argument was made to 
explain the density in the online organisation of German and other European 
organisations who may share a very different social history of surveillance to their 
counterparts from other countries.  This issue of history and collective memory is an 
important one as the implications may be broader than simply asking why 
surveillance is resisted.  It may, for instance, impact the nature of policymaking on 
surveillance, potentially enabling surveillance practices more in line with the ‘default 
to decency’209 (Molotch 2012).  Privacy, then, is an important and underlying 
rationale for resisting surveillance but we can delve in a little more detail into 
motivations for resistance.  Chapters Six and Seven enabled this by examining 
specific instances where resistance occurred and the reasons why the digital 
surveillance in question was challenged. 
The UK Communications Data Bill contained reforms that generated a great deal of 
resistance.  Some challenges to the Bill were indeed based on the broad idea of an 
invasion of privacy.  Others, however, were directed at more specific issues and 
these were grouped into themes in Chapter Six that illuminated the particularly 
troubling aspects of digital surveillance.  Foremost among these was the (allegedly) 
incorrect claim that communications data were less sensitive than content data.  
The nature of digital interactions and transactions is such that even seemingly 
mundane information about browsing habits, or the when and where of a telephone 
call, when collated, can build up a detailed picture of a person’s social and personal 
life.  Again, this is a concern related to privacy but demonstrated in a concrete way.  
Concerns relating to jurisdiction were another key reason for resisting digital 
surveillance.  The global nature of digital communications means that it was not 
considered appropriate (or indeed possible in some respects) to empower UK-based 
CSPs to collect and process data shared via overseas social networking websites or 
other service providers.  Other reasons for resisting digital surveillance evident from 
                                                          
209 See Chapter Six. 
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the consultation on the CDB included perceptions of function creep – the gradual 
expansion of digital surveillance capabilities – and a lack of effective oversight, 
which translates to a problem with the regulation of surveillance practices.  Both of 
these two issues, while enhancing our understanding of why digital surveillance is 
resisted also speak to broader concerns with surveillance in society. 
Chapter Seven’s exploration of WikiLeaks, Edward Snowden and the public 
consciousness/media presentation of surveillance also shed light on reasons for 
resisting digital surveillance.  Rather than focusing on a specific modality of digital 
surveillance (like the CDB), here the focus shifted to the nature of digital surveillance 
across society.  Underpinning the actions of WikiLeaks210 and Snowden were two 
related points.  First,the claim that a global network of surveillance is overly 
intrusive and threatening to civil liberties.  Second, the belief that there exists a lack 
of transparency and accountability as to how such surveillance is carried out.  In this 
sense, the motivations for resisting digital surveillance are to inform public opinion 
and generate further resistance, for instance through moral panic or by influencing 
policy debates.  While WikiLeaks and Snowden laid out in detail specific surveillance 
programmes, this form of resistance can be considered as a more broad-based 
strategy of catalysing public sentiment against unwarranted surveillance. 
Particularly in the case of WikiLeaks, the mechanisms for ‘resistive surveillance’ were 
an inherent part of the operation of the organisation.  WikiLeaks exploited the 
architecture of the Internet by encrypting and transmitting confidential information 
anonymously and evading attempts at counter-resistance such as court orders to 
prohibit access to the WikiLeaks website.  In this sense, therefore, the analysis 
suggested that resistance to digital surveillance was carried out because it could be – 
because the social order of the information society allowed for it.  The motivation 
for doing so was because it was a necessary part of the politics of surveillance in the 
information society.  Consequently resistive surveillance was both the mechanism 
and motivation for resistance. 
The reasons why individuals and groups who resist digital surveillance identify a 
need for doing so overlap in some ways with ‘traditional’ forms of surveillance – that 
                                                          
210 In those contexts where they published information pertaining to surveillance. 
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is, with previous expositions of the motivations for resistance.  Privacy is naturally a 
common feature that underpins much of the discussion here.  Ultimately, 
surveillance (digital or otherwise) involves extracting or collecting personal 
information and therefore privacy is the logical counterpoint to this.  However, we 
have seen specific ways in which this concern is played out in the information 
society.  Changes to how we interact and conduct our daily lives through digital 
forms of communication have altered the ways in which privacy is experienced or 
considered.  This is a process still in constant flux.  Again, public awareness of 
surveillance is important to consider, as is the continued evolution of digital, 
networked technologies that impact how privacy operates on an individual and 
societal level.  All of this adds further weight to the rationale for this thesis; that the 
information society has and will continue to generate new manifestations of the 
relationship between digital surveillance and resistance. 
9.2.3 UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: A 
SOCIO-TECHNICAL APPROACH 
The aim of this thesis has been to examine social control through the lens of 
surveillance and resistance, and to explore the extent to which it requires re-
thinking in a contemporary society that is characterised by global connectivity, 
networks and information flows.  This is no small task and the research has 
consequently sought to lay out for the reader the breadth of social domains where 
control is shaped (through practices of surveillance and resistance) but with a 
degree of focus dictated by a overall narrative.  It has achieved this in two ways: 
through a design informed by a theory of nodal governance and through employing 
theoretical frameworks that appropriately describe the social processes we see 
being played out.  The final stage of this discussion is to draw all of the previous 
insights together in response to the question of what the changes in and patterns of 
digital surveillance and resistance tells us about the nature of control in the 
information society. 
Theoretically, social control is a complex subject, constituted of various influences 
and subject to much change over time.  We saw this in Chapter Three, along with a 
description of the particular function of surveillance as a modality of control.  
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Chapter Eight demonstrated where surveillance and resistance intersect with other 
modalities of control (such as regulation) and also expanded on nodal governance 
and visibility, concepts that are difficult to separate from a study of surveillance and 
control in the information society.  While each of these themes adds a different 
dimension to our understanding of the dynamic between surveillance and resistance 
and how this shapes the character of contemporary control, it should also be 
apparent that there are continuities tying these themes together.  Specifically, that 
there are sociological and technological facets of the patterns that have been 
revealed.  These are two sides of the same coin and it is the existence and character 
of the interplay/relationship between these elements that is the core finding of this 
thesis. 
Control, then, is increasingly experienced as a socio-technical process, due to the 
permeation of networked technologies in our daily lives.  This assertion is based on 
some of the prominent themes discussed in the previous chapter including 
centralisation/decentralisation, competition and cooperation and visibility.  Our 
understanding of control needs to accommodate the conflicting tendencies for data 
to be corralled into numerous loci at the same time as the structure of the Internet 
allows for distributed organisation and communication.  Regulation of the ways in 
which digital data are collected, retained and processed is, likewise, a vital influence 
on the nature of control.  In addition to these factors, the increasingly granular ways 
in which we are made (and make ourselves) visible online, coupled with efforts to 
invert this visibility and expose surveillance agents using the Internet, add another 
dimension to how we understand control in the information society. 
This implies two key ideas.  First, it points towards control of people and populations 
within digital spaces, using digital technologies, and through surveillance of digital 
data.  Second, it concerns control of the technologies that constitute the fabric of 
digital space and that are used in the practice of surveillance.  These two denote 
distinct processes but they are nevertheless inseparable in the context of the 
information society.  A final dimension to consider, of course, is resistance to both 
these social and technological aspects of control.  Combined, these factors 
constitute what may be called socio-technical control. 
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To fully elaborate this concept, let us briefly take a step back.  At the outset of the 
thesis, and in Chapter Three, the influence of Foucault’s (1977) analysis of discipline 
on studies of surveillance was noted.  So too was the incompatibility of the panoptic 
metaphor for the information society (see Deleuze 1992; Poster 1996; Bogard 2006; 
Latour 1998; Haggerty 2006).  Specifically, Foucault’s analysis suggested a state-
centric, top-down model and it is this point which is particularly outmoded in 
contemporary society.  Deleuze (1992) said as much in his critique of Foucault.  
Simply, it comes down to the emergence of the computer as the dominant machine 
on which society bases its mode of production.  This is not to imply a Marxist reading 
of the situation.  It is only highlighted to make clear the pervasiveness on a 
previously unseen scale of one form of technology and the obvious ramifications this 
will have (indeed, has had) on society.  These arguments have been well rehearsed 
in this thesis; as networked computing power develops, it re-organises the 
relationships between people, organisations and states around the world.  It is 
within these networks that control is negotiated and enacted.  This is not to diminish 
the importance of the state in these relationships but it is to suggest they occupy a 
position within a horizontal, rhizomatic system (Haggerty and Ericsson 2000), not a 
hierarchical one.  Additionally, this needs to be considered more broadly than a 
system of socio-technical control.  This is one result of new forms of social 
organisation but it is situated within a wider system of socio-technical governance.  
The defining characteristics of this were laid out in Chapter Two and the logic of this 
argument was what drove the design of this research.  This system of governance is, 
as Chapter Two described, mainly centred on economic imperatives and the 
‘information economy’, although its other features should not be overlooked. 
This broader system complicates our understanding of control because all of the 
interconnected ways in which economic, social, cultural and technological spheres 
are governed have some relation to the ability to control in both social and 
technological ways.  Surveillance is necessarily central to how we need to look at 
control in the information society, simply because it is concerned with the multitude 
of ways in which information is harnessed and used to monitor and direct the 
actions of others.  Such surveillance need not necessarily be guided by any ulterior 
motive.  The fact is simply that these capabilities and patterns of surveillance have 
been made possible by technological evolution and they proliferate because they 
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confer benefits in many ways.  How we understand ‘benefits’ of course does depend 
on the motivation of whoever is carrying out the surveillance.  Increasingly granular 
knowledge of consumers is a benefit for commercial organisations.  Instantaneous 
access to friends and family via social networking is a benefit for individual Internet 
users.  Capturing  communications data is a benefit for law enforcement and the 
state.  The point is that in the entire multitude of arenas defined by the socio-
technical system of governance, surveillance is enacted in one form or another, for 
one purpose or another and – from time to time – it is resisted in one way or 
another. 
This is a qualitatively different situation to what has gone before in how we 
subsequently need to approach control in society.  While the state remains an 
important auspice of control its position is just one within a much wider network of 
actors whose activities, whether they are oriented towards the control of crime and 
deviance or not, and as a response and counter-response to the actions of others, 
produce a complex and shifting web of control.  Surveillance in one context can be 
‘repurposed’ in another and thus it is not accurate to think of surveillance solely as a 
coercive means of controlling deviance.  ‘Socio-technical control’ describes these 
contemporary patterns wherein control is a product of the multiple, overlapping 
motivations of a global set of actors connected through digital networks. 
The architecture of the Internet itself appears as a useful metaphor for socio-
technical control.  It is ‘distributed’ in the sense that there are a large number of 
globally connected components (nodes) interacting through constantly shifting 
relationships, some more permanent than others.  It is this that allows for resistance 
to forms of surveillance and control because digital technologies have the potential 
to ‘level the playing field’ in many respects.  ‘Distributed control’, then, means to 
gain a sense of its rhizomatic character.  On the other hand, socio-technical control 
can also be seen as ‘decentred’.  In this sense, different actors each have ownership 
over certain control functions and mechanisms of surveillance.  Each has capabilities 
they can leverage and motivations and interests they pursue in competition or 
cooperation with others.  From this perspective there is a degree of horizontality 
(cooperation) but also hierarchy (competition).  Both distributed and decentred 
models are applicable in the information society.  Both describe and are described 
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by the interaction between surveillance and resistance that this thesis has 
illustrated.  Having said all this, what we have is actually equal parts metaphor and 
reality, for socio-technical control is enacted within the very digital networks that 
constitute the Internet. 
9.3 CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
There are several key contributions this thesis makes to theory and method.  There 
are also implications for  policy and the continuing development of practices of 
digital surveillance.  At several points, the thesis has noted that the pace of change 
of digital communication, the Internet user environment and techniques for 
monitoring and surveilling is incredibly rapid.  Far too quick, in truth, for research to 
effectively keep pace.  The close of this section, therefore, updates the social and 
technological context of the findings of the thesis.  
9.3.1 CONCEPTS AND THE LITERATURE ON SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL 
The primary conceptual contribution of this research has largely been outlined in the 
preceding discussion.  Developing an understanding of control that is attuned to 
both its social and technological features (‘socio-technical control’) as well as the 
implicit connection between thetwo is vital in the context of the information society.  
It was made clear at the start of the thesis that the characterisation of society as 
networked, and as productive of a social order that is based around information 
flows, requires us to re-think core concepts such as control.  This thesis has begun to 
contribute to such a reorientation.  In sum there are a few core themes to develop. 
Centralised, state-centric and top-down notions of control are outmoded for an 
analysis of the information society.  Even former developments in the literature on 
social control that indicated the growing prominence of private auspices of control 
(Cohen 1985; Shearing and Stenning 1981, 1983, 1985; Garland 2001) require 
updating for a society characterised by global, digital connectivity.  States remain 
influential in the apparatus of socio-technical control but they are reliant upon 
cooperation from other actors.  Control through regulation of digital surveillance is 
an increasingly difficult means of achieving this cooperation.  There is some 
continuity with the literature that highlights the centrality of risk-based approaches 
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to control as surveillance technologies are key in this regard, however, we must also 
recognise that the continued expansion of digital communication technologies has, 
and will, bring with it new risks to be regulated.  An interesting dimension that this 
thesis has highlighted is the paradoxical situation whereby the surveillance 
mechanisms developed and deployed in response to risks are themselves 
constructed as dangerous for citizens and for society. 
Surveillance is increasingly sophisticated – that was known at the outset of this 
thesis.  However, this research adds weight to the argument that control in the 
information society is characterised above all by technologies of surveillance.  These 
are utilised by a breadth of social actors with differing motivations, but which are all 
connected to the emergence of information as a global commodity.  The thesis 
contributes, then, to the body of work that advocates a ‘post-panoptic’ view of 
surveillance.  Coercion, compliance and the control of deviancy are effects that are 
still pursued through surveillance by the state, but these go hand in hand with other 
rationales for surveillance in other sectors of society. 
The other main conceptual contribution made by this thesis to the area of 
surveillance studies and social control is that resistance is an inherent and 
fundamental part of how control is shaped.  This is especially true in the context of 
digital surveillance, owing to the potential for resistance that the Internet creates, 
through networked communication, organisation and technical ‘fixes’ (Dupont 
2008).  Digital surveillance cannot be explored without regard to those counter-
measures designed to limit its spread and mitigate its effects.  Increasingly, as 
surveillance practices pervade every social domain, we also need to give due regard 
to the changing nature of resistance.  Resistance to surveillance in general is most 
commonly framed as ‘privacy advocacy’, while to digital surveillance in particular it 
is typically described by encryption or anonymisation tools.  However, what this 
thesis has shown is that resistance takes many forms and there are many reasons 
why individuals and groups choose to resist.  Surveillance and resistance are 
inseparable.  As one develops, the other adapts, and this is a feature of that 
relationship that is only amplified by continued evolution of the information society. 
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9.3.2 METHODOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
It is also worth revisiting the approach the thesis has taken to studying surveillance 
and resistance empirically and how this might inform future research in related 
areas.  The thesis advocates a broader move that is required towards new 
methodological approaches in the social sciences.  The development of new 
methods at the intersection of computer science and social science is naturally one 
part of this.  Such innovation allows researchers to capitalise on the wealth of data 
that are produced in digital spaces.  It also drives interdisciplinarity, enabling new 
insights into social data.  This is a positive and necessary step forward for the social 
sciences.  However, we might also look to a more general paradigm shift in the way 
in which research is structured in the context of our mobile, connected and digitally 
augmented society. 
A defining characteristic of this research, then, has been its use of a diverse 
methodological toolkit.  The decisions relating to the use of certain methods and 
their application to three distinct cases have been outlined for the reader.  Early in 
the research process, it became clear that studying digital surveillance and 
resistance could not be confined to one instance where this relationship played out.  
Although the intention, at the very earliest stages, was to carry out an exploration of 
WikiLeaks as the basis for the thesis, it was evident that there was much more ‘going 
on’ that not only could be studied, but should be studied to develop a sound 
understanding of how surveillance and resistance interacted in the digital world.  
One example of this is a key contribution of the thesis to both theory and method.  
No previous research has sought to use legislation as a window onto resistance.  
However, as has been emphasised throughout, the opportunity the CDB presented 
and the novel insights it generated were invaluable for the research and for the 
broader impact of the thesis. 
Collectively, the cases selected captured a set of inter-related processes that 
characterised much of the current nature of digital surveillance and resistance to 
surveillance.  There is of course a good deal more that might have been observed.  
Social phenomena are not static.  This is especially true for the context of this 
research; the landscape is rapidly changing and there are already shifts that have 
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occurred which necessitate further research beyond that presented211.  Above all, 
however, the methodology employed avoids the kind of grand theorisation and 
abstracted empiricism that Mills (1959) felt inappropriate for contemporary 
sociology.  
While the thesis has focused on social change in the context of the information 
society and the Internet, the fieldwork was not designed to examine empirically only 
online behaviour.  The purpose of the research was to examine a range of social 
activity within that specific context.  The methodology – both the multi-case design 
and the use of a varied methodological toolkit – reflected this aim; indeed it was 
required to meet it.  The data that emerged from each of the three sites were 
diverse and unique to each particular case.  In instances such as this, integration of 
data is a key issue.  Data were integrated as part of a broader strategy to 
understand, as comprehensively as possible (within the restrictions of the research), 
how digital surveillance and resistance interacted as part of a system of social 
control.  Fielding (2012) observes three key reasons for conducting mixed-method 
research and it is the final one of these – ‘analytic density’ – that applies particularly 
to the research design here.  This rationale is not about gaining more reliable or 
valid findings (another reason for triangulation strategies) but is instead about 
‘getting a wider and deeper picture from all angles’ (Shih 1998: 633).  This approach, 
Fielding argues, must be animated by a guiding theory and for this thesis that theory 
was nodal governance.  This was put in place at the start of the thesis.  As the 
research progressed, the theoretical frame was validated by the interactions seen 
occurring between the various nodes involved.  Equally, it allowed for fresh 
theoretical insight to be generated when the data were taken as a whole.  The 
integration of data in these terms took place in the form of a narrative running 
through the thesis, which culminated in Chapter Eight where themes relating to the 
features of social control and surveillance were elaborated.  Overall, the 
methodology was both a necessary and valuable way of studying these particular 
social phenomena.  It is an approach that will be increasingly important for social 
science research that is situated in, and seeks to study, digital society in all its guises.  
The context of digital surveillance is wide ranging and complex, and thus to study 
                                                          
211 See below – section 9.3.3. 
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one aspect in isolation would have been to the detriment of the research.  
Consequently,  the thesis contributes to knowledge about the many ways in which 
digital surveillance and resistance interact to produce what we might identify as the 
state of surveillance in contemporary society. 
9.3.3 THE SHAPE OF THE DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 
This thesis is positioned in proximity to a rapidly shifting policy landscape.  A great 
deal has changed since the inception of the research.  Indeed, the world had not 
heard of Edward Snowden when the research commenced.  The state of surveillance 
had continued to change up until that point but from mid-2013 this landscape 
shifted immensely.  The legislative arena has also seen a lot of changes and these 
have all been framed in light of the new knowledge that Snowden helped to bring to 
the public domain.  As a consequence, there has been a persistent critical narrative 
within the policy realm regarding digital surveillance.  Now more than ever, 
surveillance is a highly politicised subject and it is to be hoped that research in this 
area contributes to the growing consensus that surveillance matters in the everyday 
lives of ordinary people. 
The patterns that this research identified in Chapter Six with regards to the 
regulation of surveillance technologies have been largely repeated during the time 
of writing this thesis.  In November 2015, the government published the Draft 
Investigatory Powers Bill.  In many ways, this Bill mirrored the Communications Data 
Bill, not least because it replicated the consultation process undertaken three years 
previously.  Likewise a similar response was seen from civil society organisations, 
CSPs, and technical and legal experts.  Regardless of this negative reaction, the Bill is 
currently in the House of Lords, following only minor amendments that do not 
address the multitude of privacy and oversight-related concerns voiced during the 
consultation.  These concerns were also foreshadowed in the form of three 
independent reports in 2015 into surveillance capabilities in the UK (Anderson 2015; 
ISC 2015; RUSI 2015).  This climate of public and policy concern surrounding digital 
surveillance illustrates the contemporaneity of this research.  Surveillance studies as 
a field of inquiry has already established a good presence in this area.  Incorporating 
wider issues by drawing on ideas from other disciplines, like this research has done, 
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there is an opportunity to develop a robust social scientific contribution to these 
debates as they rumble onwards.   
In broader terms, there is also scope for this research to feed into an exploration of 
the role of ‘digital civil society’.  This has emerged as a prominent undercurrent in 
the research.  There is good potential for some of the tools used in this research to 
be used to map other sub-sectors of civil society.  Specifically, it would be valuable 
to examine their involvement in and shaping of public and policy discourses in online 
spaces.  The story of this thesis has been how the evolution of the information 
society has impacted on one particular social process and those lessons could be 
easily translated to other issues as they arise.  The potential for digital spaces and 
communication technologies to foster collective or ‘connective’ action (Bennet and 
Segerberg 2012) is enormous and social research should take care to keep pace with 
these developments. 
9.4 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
This thesis has provided an empirical study of digital surveillance and resistance to 
surveillance.  Its contributions are both theoretical and empirical.  They relate to 
developing a critical sociological and criminological understanding of social control 
in the information society and illustrating, through a multi-case approach, how 
relationships between surveillance and resistance play out in this context.  It is a 
timely piece of research.  As outlined above it touches on issues including the 
necessity and proportionality of Internet surveillance for crime prevention and 
national security, the right to privacy and the role of civil society in advocating this, 
the ‘problem’ of encrypted communication (insofar as it hinders government 
attempts to provide security) and protection for whistleblowers are just some of 
those at the centre of debates that continue to run back and forth.  This closing 
section highlights some of the limitations of the research but also the promising 
directions in which it takes us. 
9.4.1 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
It is always the case with any project that compromises will need to be made for the 
sake of progress.  On reflection, there are always things we would have done 
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differently or spent more time on.  This is part of the research journey and looking 
back on what has been achieved allows us to take our research forward to 
investigate new problems and capitalise on new opportunities.  The first point worth 
highlighting is perhaps not so much a limitation but rather a challenge of researching 
surveillance and the Internet.  Things move and change quickly.  As a case in point, 
Snowden’s revelations appeared at a point in the research when fieldwork had 
concluded.  However, given the immense significance of these developments for the 
research, it was necessary to represent them in some way in the research.  The final 
shape of Chapter Seven is the result of this.  Following that, it was hard enough to 
keep up to date with the breaking stories on a personal level, let alone incorporate 
them into the thesis.  A doctoral research project begun in 2013 would have enough 
material in the space of a few months to inform a thorough analysis of the changing 
nature of digital surveillance and control. 
Similarly, while editing the findings chapter based on analysis of the CDB, new 
European legislation was introduced that changed the landscape of data retention.  
This was shortly followed by emergency legislation in the UK212 contravening these 
measures and enacting – to an extent – some of the proposals from the rejected 
CDB.  The pace of change is an on-going challenge that social researchers 
investigating digital society will have to tackle.  Fortunately, it appears that new 
computational research tools are enhancing our capabilities in this respect. 
A particular methodological limitation of the research is connected to the 
experience of using such tools, particularly Issue Crawler.  While yielding helpful 
data and allowing some flexibility in their presentation, the tool itself required some 
leaps of faith.  The software offers little explanation of how network metrics are 
calculated.  As a novice in the field of social network analysis this required a lot of 
experimentation to ensure that results were interpreted correctly.  Furthermore, in 
Chapter Four, the issue of hyperlink analysis using Issue Crawler was raised.  
Specifically, the question of whether we can attribute meaning to the practice of 
hyperlinking.  This had to be inferred, to an extent, although the arguments made 
were satisfactory.  On reflection, it would have added a valuable dimension to the 
                                                          
212 Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act (2015): 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/data-retention-and-investigatory-powers-act-2014. 
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analysis if the resulting network diagrams were used as interview aids with members 
of the privacy advocacy groups.  Seeking interpretations of these, based on their 
knowledge and experience of being involved in the community, would have 
provided more depth and rigour to the findings in that chapter. 
A second related limitation concerns the interview component of the methodology.  
The intention was to conduct more interviews than was the end product.  In part, 
this was due to several of the individuals contacted not being able to take part or 
contact with them drying up despite initial interest in the research.  Among such 
potential participants were members of more advocacy groups based in the UK, a 
senior policy advisor at the Information Commissioner’s Office and a member of the 
Icelandic parliament engaged in a programme aiming to establish a new foundation 
for free speech in the media213.  The views of these individuals, and more, would 
have added a depth to the findings that, on occasion, would have helped to develop 
the insights presented.  However, the opportunity afforded by the publication of the 
consultation on the CDB went a small way to remedying this shortfall.  The 
consultation illuminated the voices of many people who would otherwise have been 
overlooked or (in the case of individual ‘non-experts’) or I would never had the 
fortune to encounter.  It also goes without saying that, despite a great deal of 
determination and employing numerous tricks of the trade, it was disappointing not 
to meet with Julian Assange.  It is to be hoped that future research might cause our 
paths to cross.  Either that, or an application for asylum in Ecuador. 
Finally, each of the case studies that constituted this thesis could have been the sole 
basis for a much more substantial piece of research, given the time to do so.  In 
simple terms, network analyses could have continued for longer, all responses to the 
CDB, as well as subsequent legislation, could have been examined in finer detail, and 
leaked documents from WikiLeaks and Snowden could have been subjected to 
similar analysis.  In addition, the issues the analysis highlighted in each case were 
valuable enough to warrant further inquiry.  Aside from the time constraints, 
however, the approach taken was the most suitable for gaining a thorough  
appreciation of the complex dynamics of digital surveillance and resistance as they 
are played out in different contexts. 
                                                          
213 The Icelandic Modern Media Institute: https://en.immi.is/. 
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Some of these limitations point naturally towards directions that future research 
might take.  The affordances offered by the consultation process for the CDB were 
tremendous for social research.  The fact that equal amounts of data are now 
available following the consultation on the Investigatory Powers Bill should allow for 
more rigorous analysis of the process of regulating surveillance.  Relatedly, a 
promising avenue of inquiry not able to be followed in depth in this research was 
regulation of cyberspace or, in other words, regulation of the technology – ‘code’ 
(Lessig 1999) or ‘protocol’ (Galloway 2004) – that constitutes the architecture of the 
Internet.  This is a crucial area to investigate as it is as much a part of ‘socio-technical 
control’ as forms of digital surveillance.  Future research should seek to illuminate 
both regulation of behaviour (i.e. regulation of companies who provide online 
services) and also regulation of the infrastructure of the Internet.  This thesis has 
been unable to examine the latter in detail but it is a crucial component in shaping 
how we experience the Internet and how it can be used for repressive and liberating 
purposes.  Theoretically, this approach would also enable a fuller exposition of a 
theme that began to emerge in the course of the thesis but that did not make it 
through the final stage of editing.  This concerns theories of space and place.  The 
intersection between theories of social control and space is interesting and apposite, 
particularly as we begin to adapt the former to the digital world as this thesis has 
done.  Cyberspace is a unique environment in which to study surveillance and 
control because, unlike in the physical world, the entire architecture and laws of the 
spaces people inhabit can be re-designed.  As was stated in Chapter One, the digital 
world is increasingly designed to surveill. 
Related to this proposal for a ‘topology of control’ in relation to the Internet, there is 
a pressing question that should guide future research: how does social control occur 
on the ‘Dark Web’?  There is a lack of social research into the Dark Web, those areas 
of the Internet only accessible using certain software such as Tor.  Next to the World 
Wide Web, the ‘Dark Web’ is a space we know comparatively little about.  We know 
it is a space where illicit activities are carried out: a burgeoning drugs trade, child 
pornography, and sales of illegal firearms.  It is a place where alternative currencies 
such as ‘BitCoin’ are built.  Subversive networks of hackers and activists gather on 
the Dark Web.  Anonymous and LulzSec are two prominent examples of such groups 
but also included here are WikiLeaks who made use of the Dark Web to allow 
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whistleblowers to leak information without fear of surveillance.  If we aim to fully 
understand the ways in which social control occurs in online environments, then we 
must explore those spaces where people actively and successfully seek to avoid it.  
Using ethnographic methods to immerse oneself in these spaces, while challenging 
in terms of researcher safety and ethics, suggest themselves as the most promising 
toolkit to explore these issues.  Some questions that might begin to frame an 
exploration of this subversive cyberspace are as follows: 
1. Why do people use the Dark Web?  What are the ‘perceived futures’ of 
encrypted and ‘hidden’ social interaction? 
2. How do government and law enforcement frame the ‘problem’ of Dark Web 
communication/interaction? 
3. To what extent is formal and informal social control evident on the Dark 
Web and how do these differ from patterns of control on the World Wide 
Web? 
A final direction for future research is concerned with methodology, for two 
reasons.  There is enormous potential in the use of computational research methods 
for exploring social processes as they occur at the level of populations and in real-
time.  Chapter Five drew the reader’s attention to the importance of social media as 
a forum for negotiating surveillance.  Having experimented with the tools to explore 
interactions here in more detail but not developed this line of research in the thesis, 
it is easy to advocate a more detailed investigation of the communities and 
conversations that occur in these spaces; much like the hyperlink analysis, but on a 
more granular level.  In this way, ‘surveillance events’ could be tracked as they 
unfold and their social impact analysed.  The second reason for pursuing research 
using computational methods is to stimulate a debate across all disciplines of the 
social sciences regarding their associated ethical issues.  The question of to what 
extent these tools constitute ‘surveillance’ is a pertinent one. 
9.4.2 FINAL THOUGHTS 
This thesis has examined the interplay of digital surveillance and resistance and 
developed our understanding of the contemporary character of social control.  It has 
developed an innovative methodology to encompass a variety of social relations 
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related to digital surveillance and resistance.  This has both added to existing 
knowledge – for instance of advocacy networks and the cultural politics of 
surveillance – as well as contributed new knowledge regarding how legislation can 
be a window onto resistance.  Consequently, the thesis shows how organisation in, 
and governance of, online spaces occurs, both producing and resisting forms of 
control.  The Internet represents, for some, the foundation of a progressive social 
order which is, consequently, to be protected from intrusive surveillance.  Others 
say that it is necessary to enhance control online in order to preserve national 
security and protect the broader (economic) social order.  The outcome is a complex 
web of relationships and entanglements of power wherein resistance, counter-
resistance, negotiation and bargaining shape the nature of the Internet and social 
control. 
In light of the findings of the thesis, what we now know is that control, in a society 
characterised by ubiquitous computing and digital interaction, must be understood 
as a socio-technical process.  The Internet is a socio-technical system and as such 
there are social and technological forms of control.  Surveillance proliferates in this 
domain, capturing immense amounts of data on an increasingly digital citizenry.  
Importantly, however, the dynamics and politics of surveillance play out in the ‘real 
world’ as well as online.  While ‘the digital’ contains enormous potential for control 
in its own right, these patterns impact significantly on ‘the physical’.  This message is 
not a pessimistic one.  Digital spaces are highly susceptible to surveillance and 
control; but the logic of this means that they are equally, if not more, capable of 
opening up new forms of organisation, order and resistance. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE INTERNET 
TCP/IP 
Prior to the emergence of the World Wide Web, new standards in inter-network 
operability had been created, permitting more reliable and efficient communication 
across the Internet.  In 1983, Vint Cerf and Robert E. Kahn’s Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol (IP), commonly known as TCP/IP, were formally 
adopted by ARPANet.  This protocol suite remains central to Internet 
communication.  Its relevance to this discussion and to this research is that it 
establishes non-hierarchical relationships between any two Internet hosts 
(computers).  As Hall (2000: 407) observes, ‘IP uses an anarchic and highly 
distributed model, with every device being an equal peer to every other device on 
the global Internet.’  This radical approach to connectivity is a key part of the 
foundation for many Internet activists’ beliefs in freedom of communication and the 
ethos behind much of the development of the Internet and World Wide Web.  
However, TCP/IP is only one of two systems that govern access to the Internet and 
the Web.  Galloway’s (2004) exploration of protocol rests on the observation that 
while TCP/IP ‘radically distributes control into autonomous locales’ a second system, 
the Domain Name System (DNS) ‘focuses control into rigidly defined hierarchies’ 
(2004: 142). 
DNS 
Invented by Paul Mockapetris in 1983, DNS was a response to the problems of 
demand presented by a centralised system of recording all Internet addresses.  It 
also overcame the problem of having to remember the numerical address (IP 
address) of a computer on the network, replacing these with more memorable 
names such as ‘cardiff.ac.uk’.  DNS is decentralised and it delegates authority for 
domain names on the Internet to separate servers based in different locations 
around the world.  DNS is hierarchical; control over access to webpages is delegated.  
At the top are a handful of ‘root’ servers, mostly located in the United States.  At the 
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next level are servers for the various domains such as ‘com’, ‘org’ and ‘uk’.  These 
are followed by servers with authority at each level over each respective part of a 
domain name.  Removing a website from the Internet, for instance for censorship 
purposes, is therefore as simple as removing it from the indexing system of DNS; if 
the authoritative server cannot provide the IP address, the site cannot be accessed.  
For this reason, Berners-Lee has called DNS ‘the one centralized Achilles’ heel’ by 
which the Web can be brought down or controlled’ (1999: 126). 
TCP/IP and DNS are at the heart of Internet operability.  These dual systems and the 
philosophies they support connect with key ideas in the thesis regarding the 
negotiation of control, centralisation and decentralisation and the promotion of 
different values and forms of social order.  Just as it allows for both surveillance and 
resistance, the regulation of the Internet allows for restrictive and liberating forms 
of communication. 
The protocols that govern the Web originate from documents known as Requests 
for Comments (RFCs) produced by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).  All 
RFCs strive to achieve standardisation and organisation, regardless of whether the 
proposed protocol enables a radical open sharing of information, like with TCP/IP, or 
a hierarchical structuration like the DNS.  However, the organisations responsible for 
governing the creation of protocols – for instance the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which manages DNS – are highly 
bureaucratic and centralised.  Exemplifying this, several of the RFCs are concerned 
with laying out what RFCs constitute or how the IETF operates, and so on. 
  
291 
 
APPENDIX B: INFORMATION FOR RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
 
Wil Chivers 
1-3 Museum Place 
Cardiff University 
Cardiff CF10 3BT 
Email: ChiversWG1@cardiff.ac.uk 
 
INFORMATION FOR RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
 
I would like to invite you take part in a research study on surveillance, resistance and 
the Internet. Before you decide it is important you understand why the research is 
being done and what is involved in your participation. The following will hopefully 
address any queries you may have, so please read the information provided 
carefully. 
 
Who am I? 
My name is Wil Chivers and I am a third year PhD student in the School of Social 
Sciences (SOCSI) at Cardiff University.  My research is funded by the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC). My postgraduate researcher profile for Cardiff 
University can be accessed at the following web address: 
http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/socsi/contactsandpeople/postgraduateresearchers/chivers-
overview.html 
I am supervised by Professor Martin Innes and Dr Matthew Williams, also from 
SOCSI. You can find links to their profiles via the web address above. 
 
What is my research about? 
My research is primarily concerned with the following areas: 
 Individual and collective forms of resistance. 
 New forms of surveillance enabled/facilitated by the Internet. 
 How resistance occurs in online environments – what is it about the Internet 
that offers specific opportunities for resistance? How is surveillance shaped 
as a problem? 
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 The interaction between resistance and surveillance in online environments. 
 The role of social media in this relationship. 
 
The research study has received the approval of the School Research Ethics 
Committee (SREC). 
 
What will the interview involve? 
I would like to conduct interviews with people who have particular expertise or 
knowledge of the issues I am investigating. I anticipate that the interviews should 
last between 30 minutes and one hour. If you consent, interviews will be recorded 
so I have a record of what was said. Similarly, if you consent, I may contact you again 
by a method of your choosing to ask for clarification of some points. 
 
What happens to the interview data? 
The interviews will be confidential. I may, however, ask your permission to identify 
you in my research although this is entirely up to you and if you decline to be 
identified your responses will be anonymised. Interview transcripts will only be 
viewed by my supervisors and me. They will be kept in accordance with university 
data protection regulations. An analysis of the interviews will form part of my PhD 
thesis and may also be published in academic journals or books. 
 
What if you decide to withdraw from the research? 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary; you are therefore free to 
withdraw at any point without giving reason. Any data will be erased and you will 
not be identified in the research. 
 
What if you have further questions or concerns? 
Please feel free to contact me with any questions or concerns you have about my 
research, either before the interview or after. Should you decide at a later date that 
you do not want your responses to be included in my research, please do not 
hesitate to contact me at the email address above. If you would like to contact my 
supervisors, you will find their contact details as described above. 
 
Thank you. 
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CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
 
 I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the 
above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information. 
 
 I am willing to take part in an interview for this research and I am happy for 
this interview to be recorded. 
 
 I am happy to be contacted by the researcher following the interview, 
should it be necessary. 
 
 I understand that the interviews are confidential and that no one will have 
access to the recording or transcription with the exception of the researcher 
and his two supervisors. 
 
 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free at any 
point to withdraw if I should wish, without giving a reason. 
 
Anonymity (please tick one): 
 
 I am happy to be identified in the research. 
 I am happy to be identified in the research, provided I am contacted prior to 
inclusion of any direct quotations. 
 I would like to remain anonymous. 
 
Name of respondent:………………………………………………………………… 
Signature of respondent:…………………………………………………………… 
Contact email:…………………………………………………………………………… 
Date:………………………………………………………………………………………….
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APPENDIX C: NETWORK ANALYSIS DATA 
ISSUE CRAWLER 
Results of initial crawl: 55 organisations 
www.cdt.org 
www.creativecommons.org 
www.publicknowledge.org 
www.icann.org 
www.democraticmedia.org 
www.eff.org 
www.fas.org 
www.hrw.org 
www.aclu.org 
www.eff.org 
www.effi.org 
www.cpsr.org 
www.gnu.org 
www.gilc.org 
www.epic.org 
www.privacyrights.org 
www.privacy.org 
www.privacyinternational.org 
www.edri.org 
www.iris.sgdg.org 
www.fipr.org 
www.statewatch.org 
www.efa.org.au 
www.againstinternetsurveillance.org 
www.no-cctv.org.uk 
www.no2id.net 
www.openrightsgroup.org 
www.liberty-human-rights.org 
www.indexoncensorship.org 
www.justice.org.uk 
www.cyber.law.harvard.edu 
www.digitalrights.dk 
www.mediasmarts.ca 
www.digitalrights.ie 
www.article19.org 
www.accessreports.com 
www.bigbrotherawards.org 
www.bof.nl 
www.cfoi.org.uk 
www.cryptome.org 
www.wikileaks.org 
www.cyber-rights.org 
www.freedominfo.org 
www.gnupg.org 
www.ifea.net 
www.indymedia.org 
www.internetsociety.org 
www.jamesmadisonproject.org 
www.nocards.org 
www.privacyactivism.org 
www.pogo.org 
www.privacyjournal.net 
www.realnightmare.org 
www.spychips.com 
www.tor.eff.org 
www.wiki.vorratsdatenspeicherung.d
e
 
Ten starting points distilled from these: 
http://www.aclu.org 
http://www.bigbrotherwatch.org 
http://www.edri.org 
http://www.eff.org 
http://www.epic.org 
http://www.liberty-human-
rights.org.uk 
http://www.no2id.net 
http://www.openrightsgroup.org 
http://www.privacyinternational 
http://www.statewatch.org 
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Example of network results from crawl on 4th January 2013 
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NODEXL 
Top 64 network actors by in-degree (followers) – those with 100+ followers 
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Top 30 Actors ranked by Betweenness centrality: (red/green indicates change 
up/down inrankings) 
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APPENDIX D: EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH OPENLEAKS 
 
Hi Daniel, 
 
Here is the information sheet for my research if you would like to have a look over it 
- there are some points at the bottom by way of a consent form which can verbally 
agreed when we chat. 
 
Thanks, 
 
Wil 
 
********** 
Wil Chivers 
PhD Student (SOCSI) 
Cardiff University 
1-3 Museum Place 
Cardiff 
CF10 3BD 
ChiversWG1@cardiff.ac.uk 
 
On 16 Oct 2012, at 12:58, daniel domscheit-berg wrote: 
 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- 
> Hash: SHA1 
>  
>  
> Hi Wil, 
>  
> Friday 1100 sounds great. I assume that's UK time, so I should be one  
> hour ahead of that? 
>  
> Skype is fine also, can install it. My handle is domscheitberg 
>  
> All the best 
>  
> daniel 
>  
> On 10/16/12 1:49 PM, William Chivers wrote: 
>> Hi Daniel, 
>>  
>> Not to worry about the delay - thanks very much for responding again,  
>> I appreciate it. I hope the technical issues get resolved soon for  
>> you! 
>>  
>> Friday would be good for me to talk if that suits you. Shall we say  
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>> about 11:00? How is best for you - do you use Skype? Or would you  
>> prefer another means? 
>>  
>> Best, 
>>  
>> Wil 
>>  
>> ********** Wil Chivers PhD Student (SOCSI) Cardiff University 1-3  
>> Museum Place Cardiff CF10 3BD 
>>  
>>  
>>  
>> -----daniel domscheit-berg <daniel@domscheit-berg.de> wrote: ----- 
>> To: ChiversWG1@cardiff.ac.uk From: daniel domscheit-berg  
>> <daniel@domscheit-berg.de> Date: 10/16/2012 12:38PM Subject: 
>> touching base 
>>  
>> Hi Wil, 
>>  
>> so sorry for not getting back any earlier. We are having some DNS  
>> issues right now, meaning I have no access to my mail, and it will  
>> take a few more days until fixed. In that sense thanks for contacting  
>> Anke and providing her with your contact. 
>>  
>> If you want, to make this story short, we can speak this week, either  
>> Thursday or Friday. I would be available all day, whenever it suits  
>> you. 
>>  
>> All the best 
>>  
>> daniel 
>  
> - -- 
> daniel domscheit-berg 
> daniel@domscheit-berg.de 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- 
> Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.18 (Darwin) 
> Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org 
>  
> iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJQfUvNAAoJEB1wUXUsz/8XxTcP/025vuifKArvWch6pJfRs5BH 
> upfFSAy8K5+gFhvUIkzvg9rDSSKQ7/5eQjaO+Eyi+JE7Ic/dFtS0OSkgbDswPKn/ 
> Lx18NEQ6eHvvESG8RoCyCxtYYwjGTwwpqcBwPmjuVjTbc0GT8u4hl/exbZzJFMVP 
> puwIQqNqHRRfm2ykhTlirP3uADpVW2XDP3MXiC+nN3wfvak2FG8JwFMqpiLX7234 
> viFtWTJqP4tbbHMZpslwyJgZQHJZODeYmqOcsLOIrsIuV2EdAEfjX+RHrvZF2WRV 
> mgQKfFxfqAqbbfySegGA5XlH2mdgPhCGWwkSr+f2BwFo1/MITyAM5sncmIqyiCvZ 
> q8M1Ze+rSE2/tldSux4fe96H1XCkNWpgohzuDZQi8MnZt+FcI7dKZA9cPtkwjygc 
> ac5il3HviX5/jV63LOi5Gh2HaJNhuZ60+r5bHjR73S4bgSFkzM3Fz+eu0QfDIoLT 
> 
LAzn6O60ZphVWnRRvdpdmbVv9Vjr5uLVV6pMYe5NEUppOwGvegMubf8K43eXfysY 
> sEjxW1QYupa6781vA026eGGgCITjo8Tj8T6LivCCtXcS9CjAKzrTUca/5ruCtcoD 
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> AVYUstm0zDtnz4MuYZhusSk7E2VeAdUrPVgFL5AomS3WtV9kYWpUvIAhJJrn7SXP 
> YrJhx7JIJp3aYmg318jv 
> =lq1A 
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 
 
--- 
Hi Daniel, 
Thanks for getting back to me. The 5th is fine for me - shall we say midday? I am free 
all day however if there is another time more suitable for you. 
My Skype name is wilchivs if you would like to chat via Skype, or alternatively I will 
add you if you want to pass on your contact details. 
All the best for your trip. 
Wil 
********** 
Wil Chivers 
PhD Student (SOCSI) 
Cardiff University 
1-3 Museum Place 
Cardiff 
CF10 3BD 
ChiversWG1@cardiff.ac.uk 
 
On 24 Sep 2012, at 11:13, daniel domscheit-berg wrote: 
Hi Wil, 
sorry for missing out on you last time. I will leave or Norway and Sweden on 
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Wednesday, and will be back on the 5th. Does the 5th work for you? 
 
Best 
daniel 
 
On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 01:04:02PM +0100, William Chivers wrote: 
Hello Daniel 
Sorry to keep bombarding your inbox but I thought I would follow up our discussion 
about my PhD research as it would be really useful to hear your thoughts on the 
issues I am investigating and to learn more about OpenLeaks. 
If you are still interested, is there a time over the next two weeks that you would be 
free to chat? The only day I am unavailable is this Thursday as I am attending a 
conference but any other time would be great. Do you use Skype? If not is there a 
chat room you use where we could talk? 
Hope to hear from you soon, best wishes, 
Wil 
********** 
Wil Chivers 
PhD Student (SOCSI) 
Cardiff University 
1-3 Museum Place 
Cardiff 
CF10 3BD 
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-----daniel domscheit-berg <ddb@openleaks.org> wrote: ----- 
To: Wil Chivers <chiverswg1@cf.ac.uk> 
From: daniel domscheit-berg <ddb@openleaks.org> 
Date: 08/22/2012 12:57PM 
Subject: Re: Cardiff University PhD Research 
 
Hi Wil, 
thanks for getting in touch, and sorry for not replying any earlier. that must have 
slipped my attention. 
i am more than happy to help out -- either by chat or mail. as you think is best. what 
timeframe are you looking at? 
best 
daniel 
 
On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 10:54:58AM +0100, Wil Chivers wrote: 
Dear Mr Domscheit-Berg, 
I recently contacted OpenLeaks regarding PhD research I am carrying out at the 
School of Social Sciences at Cardiff University. I received a couple of helpful 
responses from Max, who offered some of his thoughts on the brief outline of my 
research that I provided. He also said that he forwarded my original email to you; my 
intention was to find out if there was a possibility that I could interview you as part 
of my research. 
I realise you must be very busy and I hope you will excuse my following up the 
original email. I am however very interested in speaking to you about some of the 
topics that I am investigating, namely online forms of resistance, the relationship 
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between collective action and state power in this environment and the role of social 
media in both of these. 
If you are able to spare any time for an interview I would be very grateful. I think 
electronic communication would likely be the most sensible option if so given our 
respective locations - either via email or chat perhaps? As I discussed with Max, I am 
not (yet) au fait with encrypted communication via email and the like but if there is a 
method of communication you would prefer to maximise privacy I am certain we 
would be able to do that. 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
Kind regards, 
Wil Chivers 
********** 
Wil Chivers 
PhD Student (SOCSI) 
Cardiff University 
1-3 Museum Place 
Cardiff 
CF10 3BD 
ChiversWG1@cardiff.ac.uk 
[attachment "atty8hch.dat" removed by William Chivers/ssowgc/CardiffUniversity] 
 
22nd August 
Hi Daniel, 
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Thanks for the response, great to hear you are available to help out - thank you very 
much. 
I am currently formulating interview schedules and need to run them by my 
supervisors next week. Would it be OK to get back in contact with you once I have 
done this? I would anticipate doing interviews in a few weeks time - mid-September 
perhaps, is this suitable for you? I will also be able to send you an information sheet 
via email letting you know some more details of my research. 
Do you have a preference for chat software/facility? That might work best in terms 
of timescale. If there is anything to follow up afterwards, or ask a bit more detail 
about that could be done via email. 
Best, 
Wil 
 
********** 
Wil Chivers 
PhD Student (SOCSI) 
Cardiff University 
1-3 Museum Place 
Cardiff 
CF10 3BD 
ChiversWG1@cardiff.ac.uk 
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Dear Max, 
Thank you for your previous response - apologies I did not respond until now.  The 
blurring of the boundary between public and private data is a working theory at the 
moment, although I do expect it to be of some use in framing my arguments. I see it 
as useful when thinking about the role that the Internet has come to play in 
resistance and also for considering the ways in which governments and state 
agencies interact with the public. For instance, the open data movement and how 
this could be said to represent a move towards making public what was previously 
private data. You are right to mention the idea of modern surveillance societies too 
which are in essence about collecting private data.  The role of the Internet cannot 
be ignored here - much of the private data of interest to corporations and state 
departments is now volunteered by the public via social media and can be harvested 
relatively easily. On the reverse side, groups such as OpenLeaks and WikiLeaks 
demonstrate the ability to use the Internet to make private data public. As you can 
see, there is a lot here I am working through! 
I haven't heard from Daniel yet - would it be possible for me to contact him directly? 
I notice on your original response his address was cc'd - is it possible to contact him 
on this address and if so should I do this via GPG? 
Many thanks once again, all the best, 
Wil 
********** 
Wil Chivers 
PhD Student (SOCSI) 
Cardiff University 
1-3 Museum Place 
Cardiff 
CF10 3BD 
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ChiversWG1@cardiff.ac.uk 
 
On 2 Aug 2012, at 05:05, contact@openleaks.org wrote: 
 
On Wed, Aug 01, 2012 at 11:52:53AM +0100, William Chivers wrote: 
Dear Max, 
Thanks for your response and comments and I look forward to hearing from Daniel. 
I realise I may have been rather brief with the outline of my research and you are 
correct - it is a broad area - and I have begun to identify the substantive topics that 
will be the basis of my analyses. One such topic I am interested in bringing to bear 
on my research is the blurred boundary between public/private data in the modern 
era. 
There may be some social phenomenon at work here, but in what way is 
the boundary between public and private now blurred?  (Of course, this 
is the era of the modern surveillance state, which has already been on 
the rise for many decades and should be compared to what was going on 
pre-20th century.) 
In respect of your last comment, I have come across GPG/OpenPGP before but as 
yet have not begun to use it (part of the problem with being a social science student 
as opposed to a computer science student is that it takes me rather longer to puzzle 
out the intricacies of certain pieces of software etc!) It is quite a steep learning 
curve. I do have an interest in this however and am starting to see where I can use 
measures to protect myself online - such as Tor for example. 
So you see for yourself--- if you are confused, put yourself in the 
place of a potential whistle-blower, or social activist/revolutionary, 
or average bloke for that matter.  At the same time digital and 
communications technology is becoming ubiquitously cheap and useful, 
it is not necessarily obvious how to use it properly and not put 
oneself at danger. 
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By the way, GPG is available at <http://www.gnupg.org> 
 
Many thanks once again! 
You are welcome 
 
Regards, 
Wil 
********** 
Wil Chivers 
PhD Student (SOCSI) 
Cardiff University 
1-3 Museum Place 
Cardiff 
CF10 3BD
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APPENDIX E: LETTER TO JULIAN ASSANGE 
 
Julian Assange 
c/o The Embassy of Ecuador 
Flat 3b, 3 Hans Crescent 
London 
SW1X 0LS 
 
9th November 2012 
 
Dear Mr. Assange, 
I write to you to request the opportunity to meet with you at the Ecuadorian 
Embassy in London. I am a final year doctoral research student studying at the 
School of Social Sciences at Cardiff University. My PhD thesis is concerned with the 
interaction facilitated by the Internet between surveillance and resistance in 
contemporary society. 
One aspect of my research is a case study of WikiLeaks. Your publications and efforts 
to reveal undemocratic and censored practices within powerful organisations from 
2007 to the present day represent a form of resistance that has had an 
unprecedented impact. I have explored WikiLeaks in this context and naturally, 
given my substantive interest in surveillance studies, have been keen to investigate 
the impact of the publication of The Spy Files in 2011. 
I have located several secondary sources of data that have allowed me to gain an 
insight into your motivations behind WikiLeaks in general and also for publishing 
specific documents (such as The Spy Files). I have already interviewed your former 
colleague Mr. Domscheit-Berg in relation to my research interests and have spoken 
with others who have worked with WikiLeaks over the years. However, it would add 
tremendous value to my research and would permit me to present a balanced 
argument if I could talk to you in person. My position is purely one of academic 
objectivity.  
This letter represents my fourth attempt to make contact with you – two emails sent 
to the Embassy have not yet been met with a response and I yesterday visited Hans 
Crescent to no avail (I met someone from inside the Embassy who took my ID but 
informed me I could not come in to meet you). I am visiting London again on the 
weekend of the 16th-18th November and I will call at the Embassy again to request a 
meeting if I have not received a response in the meantime. Failing that I will 
formulate another approach – I am nothing if not determined. I have learned during 
the course of my research that you do not get anywhere without asking. In this case, 
I know I will not get anywhere if I do not continue asking. 
I understand that your present situation may place demands on your time that are 
not compatible with granting requests from everyone who wishes to visit you. If you 
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think a visit in person is not possible, perhaps we could talk over the telephone 
instead? My contact details are listed below. 
If we do not get the opportunity to talk, I hope for a speedy resolution to your 
predicament. 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Wil Chivers 
1-3 Museum Place, Cardiff, CF10 3BT 
Email: ChiversWG1@cardiff.ac.uk 
Tel: (07920) 408064 
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APPENDIX F: CHASING JULIAN 
At that time Assange had been in the Ecuadorian Embassy for approximately four 
months, having taken refuge there following an unsuccessful appeal against his 
extradition to Sweden.  I was in London carrying out another two interviews (‘Bert’ 
and ‘Ernie’) and as I headed back towards Paddington it occurred to me that the 
Embassy, near Knightsbridge, was en route.  I was curious to see the place and the 
extent of police presence and consequently made a beeline for Hans Crescent 
through the crowds of visitors to Harrods.  Police were in evidence – although not to 
a huge extent – and it was this that made me decide to be proactive rather than 
wandering aimlessly up and down outside the embassy; I was unsure whether I was 
paranoid to suspect I could attract attention by my mere presence.  Approaching the 
front door I spoke to the police officer on duty and asked if it would be possible for 
me to go inside to talk to Assange.  Rather than denying the request, he seemed to 
find it amusing and went into the building reception to ask.  At this point I was 
caught somewhat off guard, having not factored this in to my plans let alone 
considered it a possibility.  The police officer beckoned me inside and I explained the 
situation to the receptionist.  He asked whether I had an appointment or had 
contacted them prior to this – I said no, feeling a little less hopeful – but he 
nevertheless said ‘well you never know’ and went over to a large vault-like door.  He 
knocked and told me they would be out in a moment.  A second police officer was 
stationed at this entrance to the embassy and I struck up a conversation with him.  
He too found it amusing I was trying my luck but acknowledged the sense in my 
action: ‘well you know he’s not going anywhere!’  Eventually the embassy door 
opened a crack.  An Ecuadorian man peered around and asked what I wanted.  I 
explained perhaps a little lamely that I wanted to come inside to talk to Assange 
about my research.  He asked for my ‘documents’ and again feeling like I was 
unprepared handed him my university ID and driving license, instantly regretting 
handing these over as the door clicked shut.  Several minutes later, the man 
reappeared and handed me my ID. 
‘No’, he said bluntly. 
‘Could I make an appointment to come back?’ I enquired. 
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‘No.’ The door shut. 
Unproductive though it may have been, this was another enjoyable and formative 
experience.  Moreover, it did not dissuade me from pursuing an interview with 
Assange.  On returning to Cardiff, I wrote a formal letter to Assange outlining my 
desire to speak with him.  I received no response to this and after a month of waiting 
I emailed The Sunshine Press (WikiLeaks’ official publishing name) instead.  On 
Christmas Day, I received a response informing me Julian Assange was not giving any 
interviews at that time.  Over the following months, I noticed Assange appearing 
infrequently in online news articles and videos and taking this as evidence he was 
actually willing to be contacted I set about a different route, drawing on my 
experience of contacting Daniel.  I located an email address for Assange’s mother, 
Christine.  Based in Assange’s native Australia, Christine Assange campaigns on 
Julian’s behalf for the appeal against his extradition.  Christine kindly responded to 
my request, forwarding an email to Julian but informing me he received thousands 
of emails and not to be disappointed by any lack of reply.  Once again The Sunshine 
Press responded in the same manner as before.  I counted it as a battle well fought 
but ultimately doomed to failure. 
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APPENDIX G: THE PRIVACY ADVOCATES 
The table below details some of the prominent organisations that featured in the 
network visualisations in Chapter Five.  The information regarding the purpose and 
strategies of each organisation was drawn from their respective websites. 
Organisation Location/URL Description/Philosophy/Strategies 
American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) 
USA 
aclu.org 
A nonpartisan, non-profit organization 
whose stated mission is "to defend and 
preserve the individual rights and 
liberties guaranteed to every person in 
this country by the Constitution and 
laws of the United States." It works 
through litigation, lobbying, and 
community empowerment. 
The ACLU has over 500,000 members 
and has annual budget of over $100 
million. 
Big Brother Watch UK 
bigbrotherwatch.org.uk 
Founded in 2009 with the intention of 
exposing the true scale of the 
surveillance state by challenging the 
policies which threaten privacy, 
freedoms and civil liberties. 
Big Brother Watch campaigns on behalf 
of the individual, to educate and 
encourage more control over personal 
data. We work to ensure that those who 
fail to respect our privacy, whether 
private companies, government 
departments or local authorities are 
held to account. 
We produce unique research that shines 
a light on the dramatic expansion of 
surveillance powers in the UK, the 
growth of the database state and the 
misuse of personal information. 
Chaos Computer Club Germany 
ccc.de 
The Chaos Computer Club (CCC) is 
Europe's largest association of hackers. 
For more than thirty years we have 
provided information about technical 
and societal issues, such as 
surveillance, privacy, freedom of 
information, hacktivism, data security, 
technology and hacking issues. 
As the most influential hacker collective 
in Europe we organize 
campaigns, events, lobbying and 
publications as well as anonymizing 
services and communication 
infrastructure. Many hackerspaces in 
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and around Germany which belong to or 
share a common bond to the CCC. 
Don’t Spy On Us214 UK 
dontspyonus.org.uk 
Don't Spy On Us is a coalition of the 
most influential organisations who 
defend privacy, free expression and 
digital rights in the UK and in Europe. 
Don't Spy On Us is calling for an end to 
mass surveillance in line with our six 
principles. We want new legislation that 
will mean: surveillance is only targeted 
at those suspected of crimes; the 
security agencies are accountable to our 
elected representatives; and judges not 
politicians will decide when surveillance 
is justified. 
Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF) 
USA 
eff.org 
The Electronic Frontier Foundation is the 
leading non-profit organization 
defending civil liberties in the digital 
world. Founded in 1990, EFF champions 
user privacy, free expression, and 
innovation through impact litigation, 
policy analysis, grassroots activism, and 
technology development. We work to 
ensure that rights and freedoms are 
enhanced and protected as our use of 
technology grows. 
EFF uses the unique expertise of leading 
technologists, activists, and attorneys in 
our efforts to defend free speech online, 
fight illegal surveillance, advocate for 
users and innovators, and support 
freedom-enhancing technologies. 
Together, we forged a vast network of 
concerned members and partner 
organizations spanning the globe. EFF 
advises policymakers and educates the 
press and the public through 
comprehensive analysis, educational 
guides, activist workshops, and more. 
EFF empowers hundreds of thousands of 
individuals through our Action Center 
and has become a leading voice in 
online rights debates. 
Electronic Privacy 
Information Center 
(EPIC) 
USA 
epic.org 
EPIC is a public interest research center 
in Washington, DC. EPIC was established 
in 1994 to focus public attention on 
emerging privacy and civil liberties 
issues and to protect privacy, freedom 
                                                          
214 Executive members: Article 19, Big Brother Watch, English PEN, Liberty, ORG, Privacy International. 
Affiliate members: Open Democracy, Public Concern at Work, Access Now, EFF, ifex, Index on 
Censorship, Fight for the Future, WWW Foundation, Open Media, Sum of Us, Centre for Investigative 
Journalism 
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of expression, and democratic values in 
the information age. EPIC pursues a 
wide range of program activities 
including policy research, public 
education, conferences, litigation, 
publications, and advocacy. 
EPIC maintains one of the most popular 
privacy web sites in the world. 
European Digital 
Rights Initiative215 
(EDRi) 
Belgium 
edri.org 
We are an association of civil and 
human rights organisations from across 
Europe. We defend rights and freedoms 
in the digital environment. 
We ensure that citizens’ rights and 
freedoms in the online environment are 
respected whenever they are 
endangered by the actions of political 
bodies or private organisations. 
EDRi’s key priorities for the next years 
are privacy, surveillance, net neutrality 
and copyright reform. 
EDRi distribute a fortnightly email 
newsletter to subscribers with news 
regarding privacy-related developments 
across Europe. 
Forum 
InformatikerInnen für 
Frieden und 
gesellschaftliche 
Verantwortung (FIFF) 
Germany 
fiff.de 
We warn the public of developments in 
our field, which we believe are harmful; 
we fight against the use of information 
technology for control and surveillance; 
we are committed to a disarmament of 
computer science in military 
applications; we encourage the 
development of environmentally 
sustainable economic circuits using 
information technology; we are 
committed in design and use of 
information technology for the equality 
of persons with disabilities; we are 
working against the discrimination of 
women in science. 
                                                          
215 Members: Access Now (International), Association for Technology and Internet (Romania), Article 
19 (UK), ALCEI (Italy), Alternatif Bilişim Derneği (Alternatif Bilişim) (Turkey), Bits of Freedom 
(Netherlands), Chaos Computer Club (Germany), Digital Rights (Ireland), Digital Courage (formerly 
Foebud) (Germany), Digital Gesellschaft (Germany), DFRI (Sweden), Electronic Frontier Finland 
(Finland), Electronic Frontier Foundation (USA), Forum InformatikerInnen für Frieden und 
gesellschaftliche Verantwortung (Germany), Foundation for Information Policy Research (UK), 
Förderverein Informationstechnik und Gesellschaft (FITUG e.V.) (Germany), Internet Society (Bulgaria), 
IT-Political Association of Denmark (Denmark), Iuridicum Remedium (Czech Republic), Initiative für 
Netzfreiheit (Austria), Liga voor Mensenrechten (Belgium), Metamorphosis (Macedonia), Modern 
Poland Foundation (Poland), Nodo50.org (Spain), Open Rights Group (UK), Panoptykon Foundation 
(Poland), Privacy International (UK), Quintessenz (Austria), Statewatch (UK), VIBE!AT (Austria), 
Vrijschrift (Netherlands). 
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Global Internet 
Liberties Campaign216 
(GILC) 
International 
gilc.org 
The member organizations of GILC have 
joined together to protect and promote 
fundamental human rights such as 
freedom of speech and the right of 
privacy on the net for users everywhere. 
GILC advocates: insisting that on-line 
free expression not be restricted by 
indirect means such as excessively 
restrictive governmental or private 
controls over computer hardware or 
software, telecommunications 
infrastructure, or other essential 
components of the Internet; ensuring 
that personal information generated on 
the global information infrastructure for 
one purpose is not used for an unrelated 
purpose or disclosed without the 
person's informed consent and enabling 
individuals to review personal 
information on the Internet and to 
correct inaccurate information; allowing 
on line users to encrypt their 
communications and information 
without restriction; and prohibiting prior 
censorship of on-line communication. 
Liberty UK 
liberty-human-
rights.org.uk 
Founded in 1934, we are a cross party, 
non-party membership organisation at 
the heart of the movement for 
fundamental rights and freedoms in the 
                                                          
216 Members: ALCEI - Associazione per la Libertà nella Comunicazione Elettronica Interattiva; 
American Civil Liberties Union; Applied Research and Communications Fund; Arge Daten; Association 
des Utilisateurs d'Internet; Association Electronique Libre (AEL) ASBL; Association for Progressive 
Communications; Association pour la Promotion d'Internet en Polynésie Française; Bevcom Internet 
Technologies; Bits of Freedom; Bulgarian Institute for Legal Development; Buro Jansen & Janssen; 
Canadian Journalists for Free Expression; Campaign Against Censorship of the Internet in Britain; Center 
for Democracy and Technology; Chaos Computer Club; CITADEL-EF France; Committee to Protect 
Journalists; CommUnity - The Computer Communicators Association; Computer Professionals for Social 
Responsibility; CryptoRights Foundation; Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties; CypherNet; Derechos Human 
Rights; Digital Freedom Network; Digital Rights; Equipo Nizkor; Electronic Frontiers Australia; Electronic 
Frontier Canada; Electronic Frontier Finland; Electronic Frontier Foundation; EFF-Austin; Electronic 
Privacy Information Center; Federation Nationale des Associations de Consommateurs du Quebec; 
Feminists Against Censorship; Forum InformatikerInnen fuer Frieden und gesellschaftliche 
Verantwortung (FIfF) e.V.; Förderverein Informationstechnik und Gesellschaft (FITUG); Foundation for 
Information Policy Research (FIPR); Human Rights Education Associates (HREA); Human Rights 
Network; Human Rights Watch; Hungarian Civil Liberties Union; Imaginons un Réseau Internet Solidaire 
(IRIS); Index on Censorship; Internet Freedom; Internet Society; Kriptopolis; Liberty (National Council of 
Civil Liberties); The Link Centre, Wits University; Netwokers against Surveillance Taskforce (NaST); 
NetAction; Online Policy Group; OpenNet; Open Society Institute; Peacefire; PEN American Center; 
Privacy International; Privacy Ukraine; Public Interest Advocacy Center, Ottawa; quintessenz; Reporters 
without borders (RSF); Singapore Internet Community (SInterCom); Statewatch; stop1984; Swiss 
Internet User Group (SIUG); Technika az Emberert Alapitvány (TEA); Verein für Internet Benutzer 
(VIBE!AT); XS4ALL Foundation. 
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UK. 
We promote the values of individual 
human dignity, equal treatment and 
fairness as the foundations of a 
democratic society. 
Liberty campaigns to protect basic rights 
and freedoms through the courts, in 
Parliament and in the wider community. 
We do this through a combination of 
public campaigning, test case litigation, 
parliamentary work, policy analysis and 
the provision of free advice and 
information. 
Open Rights Group 
(ORG) 
UK 
openrightsgroup.org 
Open Rights Group is the UK's only 
digital campaigning organisation 
working to protect the rights to privacy 
and free speech online. With almost 
3,000 active supporters, we are a 
grassroots organisation with local 
groups across the UK. 
Digital technology has transformed the 
way we live and opened up limitless new 
ways to communicate, connect, share 
and learn across the world. But for all 
the benefits, technological 
developments have created new threats 
to our human rights. 
We raise awareness of these threats and 
challenge them through public 
campaigns, legal actions, policy 
interventions and tech projects. 
We campaign, lobby, go to court — 
whatever it takes to build and support a 
movement for freedom in the digital 
age. We believe in coalition, and work 
with partners across the political 
spectrum to support an informed 
population of Internet users who 
understand and fight for their rights in 
the digital age. 
Privacy International UK 
privacyinternational.org 
Privacy International is committed to 
fighting for the right to privacy across 
the world. 
We investigate the secret world of 
government surveillance and expose the 
companies enabling it. We litigate to 
ensure that surveillance is consistent 
with the rule of law. We advocate for 
strong national, regional, and 
international laws that protect privacy. 
We conduct research to catalyse policy 
change. We raise awareness about 
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technologies and laws that place privacy 
at risk, to ensure that the public is 
informed and engaged. 
Privacy International envisions a world 
in which the right to privacy is 
protected, respected, and fulfilled. 
Privacy is essential to the protection of 
autonomy and human dignity, serving as 
the foundation upon which other human 
rights are built. In order for individuals 
to fully participate in the modern world, 
developments in law and technologies 
must strengthen and not undermine the 
ability to freely enjoy this right. 
Statewatch UK Statewatch is a non-profit-making 
voluntary group founded in 1991. It is 
comprised of lawyers, academics, 
journalists, researchers and community 
activists. Its European network of 
contributors is drawn from 18 countries. 
Statewatch encourages the publication 
of investigative journalism and critical 
research in Europe the fields of the 
state, justice and home affairs, civil 
liberties, accountability and openness. 
One of Statewatch's primary purposes is 
to provide a service for civil society to 
encourage informed discussion and 
debate - through the provision of news, 
features and analyses backed up by full-
text documentation so that people can 
access for themselves primary sources 
and come to their own conclusions. 
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APPENDIX H: CATEGORISATION OF RESPONDENTS TO 
COMMUNICATIONS DATA BILL 
 
Draft Communications Data Bill – Content Analysis Framework of Respondents 
Total respondents: 145 (multiple responses combined) 
Groups 
 Advocates/Non-Profits/Charities 
o AVAAZ, Big Brother Watch, Caspar Bowden, Civil Liberties 
Organisations Letter, Demos, Foundation for Information Policy 
Research,  Index on Censorship, Just West Yorkshire, JUSTICE, 
Liberty, No2ID, Open Rights Group, Public Concern at Work, Privacy 
International, The Tor Project, Wikimedia UK 
 Computer Science/IT Professionals 
o Simon Adlem, Richard Ash, Steve Ball, Alex Burr, Alec Muffet, Zoe 
O’Connell, Marisha Ray, Robbie Simpson, Richard Smith, David 
Walker, Andrew Watson 
 Academics 
o Prof. Ross Anderson FRS FREng, Dr Paul Bernal, Peter Buneman FRS 
FRSE & Michael Fourman FRSE FBCS, Clement Guitton, JANET, Prof. 
Robin Mansell, Dr Ashley Savage, Prof. Peter Sommer, Dr Eric 
Stoddart, Dr John Welford 
 Legal 
o The Bar Council of England and Wales, Lord Carlile of Berriew, 
Crown Prosecution Service, The Law Society 
 IT Organisations 
o BCS The Chartered Institute for IT, The Coalition for a Digital 
Economy, The Global Network Initiative 
 Governmental 
o European Commission, Charles Farr, Home Office, Home Secretary 
Rt. Hon. Theresa May, Local Government Authority, Oliver Colville 
MP, Rt Hon David Willetts MP 
 Independent /Statutory/Public Authorities 
o The Information Commissioner, Sir Paul Kennedy (Interception of 
Communications Commissioner), The Financial Services Authority, 
Equality and Human Rights Commission, National Anti-Fraud 
Network 
 Telecoms and Industry 
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o The Direct Marketing Association, ISPA, ITSPA, LINX, Telefonica UK 
Ltd, Three, Timico Ltd, Twitter Inc., Virgin Media, Vodafone, ADM 
Shine Technologies (Defence Research and Tech) 
 Policing and Law Enforcement 
o National Crime Agency, SOCA, UK Border Agency, HM Revenue and 
Customs 
 News Media/Journalists/Authors 
o Paul Bradshaw, Greg Callus, Glyn Moody, The Newspaper Society, 
Society of Editors, Robin Tudge 
 Individuals/Non-Professional 
o Rodney Aistrop, Nathan Allonby, Martin Ammann, Daniel Beckett, 
Mark Benson, Jonathan Birkitt, Robert M K Brereton, Graeme 
Carter, Sean Cheshire, Wendy Cockroft, Paul Connolly, Roger H 
Cook, Joe Corrall, Ray Corrigan, Simon Cramp, Mr P Cromie, Patrick 
Cunningham, Chris Davey, N Dove, Mark Drury, Keith Edkins, Bruce 
Elliot, Cliff Fowkes, Thomas Frampton, Mike Gerbrais, Y Guinan, 
William Heath, Roger Heathcote, George Hoggarth, Lucian Holland, 
Dr Dominic Jackson, Andrew James, Peter John, Lisa Kavanagh, J R S 
Kistruck, George Lawrence, Stacey Leigh Ross, Sorcha Lenagh, 
George Logan, Alastair Macmillan, P Main, Awad Mackie, Peter 
Marcham, Lorna Mitchell, Barbara Moody, Giles Murchiston, Jim 
Nash, M Neal, Richard Owens, Anne Palmer, Charlie Pearce, George 
Pender, J Richardson, Duncan Roy, Dr Peter Saul, Robert Smith, 
Robert Stirrups, Steven Taylor, Ernest F Thornton, Montgomery 
Vaughan, Phil Vellender, David Walter, J Wheeler, S Wheeler, Nic 
Wisttreich, Ben Woodling, Andy Wrigley, T Wright 
 
FINAL 7 CATEGORIES 
 OFFICIAL (11) 
o Government (7): European Commission, Charles Farr, Home Office, 
Home Secretary Rt. Hon. Theresa May, Local Government Authority, 
Oliver Colville MP, Rt Hon David Willetts MP 
o Policing/Law Enforcement (4): National Crime Agency, SOCA, UK 
Border Agency, HM Revenue and Customs 
 INDEPENDENT AUTHORITIES (5): The Information Commissioner, Sir Paul 
Kennedy (Interception of Communications Commissioner), The Financial 
Services Authority, Equality and Human Rights Commission, National Anti-
Fraud Network 
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 TELECOMS INDUSTRY (11): The Direct Marketing Association, ISPA, ITSPA, 
LINX, Telefonica UK Ltd, Three, Timico Ltd, Twitter Inc., Virgin Media, 
Vodafone, ADM Shine Technologies 
 EXPERT (28): 
o Technical (Individual and Organisational) (14): Simon Adlem, Richard 
Ash, Steve Ball, Alex Burr, Alec Muffet, Zoe O’Connell, Marisha Ray, 
Robbie Simpson, Richard Smith, David Walker, Andrew Watson, BCS 
The Chartered Institute for IT, The Coalition for a Digital Economy, 
The Global Network Initiative 
o Academic (10): Prof. Ross Anderson FRS FREng, Dr Paul Bernal, Peter 
Buneman FRS FRSE & Michael Fourman FRSE FBCS, Clement Guitton, 
JANET, Prof. Robin Mansell, Dr Ashley Savage, Prof. Peter Sommer, 
Dr Eric Stoddart, Dr John Welford 
o Legal (4): The Bar Council of England and Wales, Lord Carlile of 
Berriew, Crown Prosecution Service, The Law Society 
 ADVOCACY/NON-PROFIT (16): AVAAZ, Big Brother Watch, Caspar Bowden, 
Civil Liberties Organisations Letter, Demos, Foundation for Information 
Policy Research,  Index on Censorship, Just West Yorkshire, JUSTICE, Liberty, 
No2ID, Open Rights Group, Public Concern at Work, Privacy International, 
The Tor Project, Wikimedia UK 
 MEDIA (6): Paul Bradshaw, Greg Callus, Glyn Moody, The Newspaper 
Society, Society of Editors, Robin Tudge 
 INDIVIDUAL/NON-EXPERT (68): Rodney Aistrop, Nathan Allonby, Martin 
Ammann, Daniel Beckett, Mark Benson, Jonathan Birkitt, Robert M K 
Brereton, Graeme Carter, Sean Cheshire, Wendy Cockroft, Paul Connolly, 
Roger H Cook, Joe Corrall, Ray Corrigan, Simon Cramp, Mr P Cromie, Patrick 
Cunningham, Chris Davey, N Dove, Mark Drury, Keith Edkins, Bruce Elliot, 
Cliff Fowkes, Thomas Frampton, Mike Gerbrais, Y Guinan, William Heath, 
Roger Heathcote, George Hoggarth, Lucian Holland, Dr Dominic Jackson, 
Andrew James, Peter John, Lisa Kavanagh, J R S Kistruck, George Lawrence, 
Stacey Leigh Ross, Sorcha Lenagh, George Logan, Alastair Macmillan, P Main, 
Awad Mackie, Peter Marcham, Lorna Mitchell, Barbara Moore, Giles 
Murchiston, Jim Nash, M Neal, Richard Owens, Anne Palmer, Charlie Pearce, 
George Pender, J Richardson, Duncan Roy, Dr Peter Saul, Robert Smith, 
Robert Stirrups, Steven Taylor, Ernest F Thornton, Montgomery Vaughan, 
Phil Vellender, David Walter, J Wheeler, S Wheeler, Nic Wisttreich, Ben 
Woodling, Andy Wrigley, T Wright 
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OFFICIAL 
Government and law enforcement emphasised a ‘capabilities gap’ in their ability to 
effectively obtain and utilise communications data.  Their framing of the problem 
was therefore that technological advances had made previous regulation defunct.  
The accuracy of government estimates of inaccessible data was contested by 
opponents of the CDB in a number of sessions but in general the data required were 
of three kinds: IP resolution, weblog data and third-party communication data. 
Evidence provided by law enforcement was largely uniform in three respects: 
current oversight is satisfactory and comprehensive; communications data has been 
crucial in a large number of investigations and; requests for data are always assessed 
in terms of necessity, proportionality and ‘collateral intrusion’.  The theme of 
keeping pace with technological developments was echoed from law enforcement 
respondents; both HMRC and SOCA (CDB Written Evidence, pp.260 and 518) did not 
see the Bill as granting ‘new powers’, rather updating current capabilities217.  SOCA 
added that a resultant rebalancing of civil liberties was unnecessary as effective 
investigation of crime itself safeguards civil liberties – Agamben’s (2005) state of 
exception in practice.  Obtaining communications data was framed as the least 
intrusive of a range of investigatory powers; other methods were equated with 
greater intrusion and more time and expense218. 
TELECOMS INDUSTRY 
While acknowledging the need to adapt to a new technological environment, 
telecoms representatives (i.e. the vital private sector collaborators) were critical 
insofar as the Bill lacked precision.  It presented several problems in need of 
addressing: security and feasibility of the data processing arrangements; the 
potential for overlap/disjoint with existing UK and European data protection and 
retention regulation and; problems related to the retention of third-party data (both 
the jurisdictional aspect to this and the possibility of damaging commercial 
                                                          
217 SOCA outlined a ‘Day in the Life’ scenario to illustrate the reasons why current capabilities are 
insufficient because of the variety of communications an individual engages in on a daily basis (CDB 
Written Evidence, pp.521-22).  While enlightening, it was arguably the case that just such an example 
was indicative of the concerns other individuals may have had about the personal detail access to 
communications data can reveal (see Section 6.4). 
218 See UK Border Agency (CDB Written Evidence, p.572) 
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relationships).  Thus while current regulation was framed as having shortcomings in 
the technological environment, the proposals in the CDB over-played the 
government’s hand.  Communications enterprises will be fully aware of the value of 
the data they can retain but also of their obligations to service users.  These 
organisations inhabit a messy, trans-jurisdictional regulatory domain and so their 
resistance to the CDB is understandable; any developments affecting their role as 
data intermediaries must be carefully negotiated.  Private corporations’ resistance 
to mediation is an important outcome from these findings.  In future, advocates 
might benefit from nurturing relationships with private corporations given their 
capability to counteract government surveillance developments. Of course this will 
be difficult to manage given the simultaneous positioning of CSPs and their ilk as 
powerful surveillance agents in their own right. 
ADVOCACY/NON-PROFIT 
As expected, there was a high degree of collaboration between these organisations 
as well as consultation with expert advisors.  On a formal level, a joint letter was 
submitted to the Committee whilst behind the scenes, a strategic approach was 
adopted to ensure maximum impact.  Consequently, the written evidence provided 
by the advocacy community was comprehensive and spoke to all of the themes 
drawn out above.  Supplementary to this, the Open Rights Group and 38 Degrees 
actively encouraged their member base to sign online petitions and send emails to 
their local MPs and the Joint Committee expressing dissatisfaction with the Bill.  The 
result was a petition219 signed by just under 200,000 people and 19,000 pre-written 
emails220 to the Joint Committee.  This category of respondents thus demonstrated a 
strong presence in the debate, directly and indirectly. 
INDIVIDUAL/NON-EXPERT 
Individuals/non-experts accounted for the majority (26%) of written evidence 
submitted to the consultation.  Moreover, combined with the overwhelming 
number of emails sent at the behest of the ORG and 38 Degrees, the scale of public 
                                                          
219 https://secure.38degrees.org.uk/page/s/stop-government-snooping#petition  
220 http://blog.38degrees.org.uk/2012/09/12/snooping-our-voices-have-been-heard/ 
325 
 
disquiet about the CDB cannot have failed to draw the attention of the Joint 
Committee.  Although the emails were unpublished, the Committee issued a 
summary221 which stated that ‘we have not seen a single email supporting the draft 
Communications Data Bill, or even agreeing that there may be a case for the security 
services and law enforcement agencies having greater access to communications 
data than they do at present.’  While some of those who sent emails added their 
own arguments, others copied extracts verbatim from Liberty’s website.  There was 
to some extent, therefore, a blurring between the opinions of individual 
respondents and those of advocacy groups.  Nevertheless, we should overlook 
neither the role that individuals played in shaping the general nature of the 
response to the CDB, nor the level of engagement they displayed.  As the findings 
showed, it is at the individual level where popular constructions of surveillance take 
root.  Consequently, it is perhaps by examining individual attitudes towards 
regulation of surveillance that we can best appreciate how persuasive official 
justifications for extended surveillance are. 
 
                                                          
221 http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/communications-
data/Written%20evidence%20-%20summary%20of%20chain%20emails.pdf 
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APPENDIX I: JOHN PERRY BARLOW’S DECLARATION ON THE 
INDEPENDENCE OF CYBERSPACE 
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come 
from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the 
past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty 
where we gather. 
We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address you 
with no greater authority than that with which liberty itself always speaks. I declare 
the global social space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies 
you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any 
methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear. 
Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. You have 
neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite you. You do not know us, nor 
do you know our world. Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. Do not think 
that you can build it, as though it were a public construction project. You cannot. It 
is an act of nature and it grows itself through our collective actions. 
You have not engaged in our great and gathering conversation, nor did you create 
the wealth of our marketplaces. You do not know our culture, our ethics, or the 
unwritten codes that already provide our society more order than could be obtained 
by any of your impositions. 
You claim there are problems among us that you need to solve. You use this claim as 
an excuse to invade our precincts. Many of these problems don't exist. Where there 
are real conflicts, where there are wrongs, we will identify them and address them 
by our means. We are forming our own Social Contract . This governance will arise 
according to the conditions of our world, not yours. Our world is different. 
Cyberspace consists of transactions, relationships, and thought itself, arrayed like a 
standing wave in the web of our communications. Ours is a world that is both 
everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live. 
We are creating a world that all may enter without privilege or prejudice accorded 
by race, economic power, military force, or station of birth. 
We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no 
matter how singular, without fear of being coerced into silence or conformity. 
Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and context do not 
apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is no matter here. 
Our identities have no bodies, so, unlike you, we cannot obtain order by physical 
coercion. We believe that from ethics, enlightened self-interest, and the 
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commonweal, our governance will emerge . Our identities may be distributed across 
many of your jurisdictions. The only law that all our constituent cultures would 
generally recognize is the Golden Rule. We hope we will be able to build our 
particular solutions on that basis. But we cannot accept the solutions you are 
attempting to impose. 
In the United States, you have today created a law, the Telecommunications Reform 
Act, which repudiates your own Constitution and insults the dreams of Jefferson, 
Washington, Mill, Madison, DeToqueville, and Brandeis. These dreams must now be 
born anew in us. 
You are terrified of your own children, since they are natives in a world where you 
will always be immigrants. Because you fear them, you entrust your bureaucracies 
with the parental responsibilities you are too cowardly to confront yourselves. In our 
world, all the sentiments and expressions of humanity, from the debasing to the 
angelic, are parts of a seamless whole, the global conversation of bits. We cannot 
separate the air that chokes from the air upon which wings beat. 
In China, Germany, France, Russia, Singapore, Italy and the United States, you are 
trying to ward off the virus of liberty by erecting guard posts at the frontiers of 
Cyberspace. These may keep out the contagion for a small time, but they will not 
work in a world that will soon be blanketed in bit-bearing media. 
Your increasingly obsolete information industries would perpetuate themselves by 
proposing laws, in America and elsewhere, that claim to own speech itself 
throughout the world. These laws would declare ideas to be another industrial 
product, no more noble than pig iron. In our world, whatever the human mind may 
create can be reproduced and distributed infinitely at no cost. The global 
conveyance of thought no longer requires your factories to accomplish. 
These increasingly hostile and colonial measures place us in the same position as 
those previous lovers of freedom and self-determination who had to reject the 
authorities of distant, uninformed powers. We must declare our virtual selves 
immune to your sovereignty, even as we continue to consent to your rule over our 
bodies. We will spread ourselves across the Planet so that no one can arrest our 
thoughts.  
We will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace. May it be more humane and 
fair than the world your governments have made before. 
Davos, Switzerland  
February 8, 1996 
